

Influences
on
Peripatetic
Rhetoric

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH

EDITED BY
DAVID C. MIRHADY

Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric

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A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy

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Bill Fortenbaugh

Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric

Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh

Edited by

David C. Mirhady



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PREFACE

These papers were written by friends and colleagues of Bill Fortenbaugh. On the occasion of his retirement from Rutgers University in 2001, at the age of 65, John Bodel and Corey Brennan, his colleagues in the Rutgers Classics Department—where Bill had taught for more than 35 years—conceived the plan for a conference in his honor, which was held September 27–28, 2002.¹ They kindly asked me to take a role in its planning.

What was to be the theme for this conference? Bill's enormous skills and energies as a team builder and conference organizer had already exhausted, for the present, many areas that might have included a broader gathering of people. Under his leadership Project Theophrastus has held biennial conferences for more than twenty-five years on a vast array of topics related to his interests. However, one area that suggested itself as being particularly timely for Bill's work on his commentary on the rhetorical writings of Theophrastus was the influences on Peripatetic rhetorical thinking, what activities in the generation before and during Aristotle and Theophrastus' lifetimes shaped what we receive as Peripatetic rhetoric. In 1991, Bill had himself co-organized a conference on the *Nachleben* of Peripatetic rhetoric. This conference, as is the model now in Hollywood moviemaking, would be its prequel. Almost all the papers in this collection were presented in draft form at that conference.

The choice of rhetoric as a theme for the Rutgers conference, its timing, and location unfortunately excluded several of Bill's many friends. However, a parallel conference to honor him, on a smaller scale, was held in London at the end of June 2003. The papers presented there, by Andrew Barker, Pamela Huby, Richard Sorabji, Robert Sharples, and Elisabetta Matelli, have been published in *The Bulletin of the Institute for Classical Studies* 47.

As the bibliography of Bill's works indicates, his scholarly activity has been prodigious. Over the last twenty-five years, this activity has chiefly centred around Project Theophrastus, which sought to col-

¹ For conference support thanks are due to the Kellogg Foundation, the Rutgers University Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and the Rutgers University Department of Classics.

lect, edit, translate, and comment upon the works of Theophrastus of Eresus. In these efforts, the Project Theophrastus team, principally Bill, Pamela Huby, Robert Sharples, and Dimitri Gutas (FSH&G), together with Andrew Barker, John Keaney, David Mirhady, David Sedley, Michael Sollenberger, and many others, has been enormously successful. Not only has all the Theophrastean fragmentary material been published, but new editions of his scientific *opuscula* as well. In addition, the Project has now embarked upon the publication of other members of Aristotle's school, Demetrius of Phaleron, Dicaearchus, Lyco, Hieronymus of Rhodes, Heracleides *et al.*

Before Theophrastus, thirty years ago, when Bill Fortenbaugh published *Aristotle on Emotion*, there was relatively little scholarly literature on that subject, and on philosophical issues relating to rhetoric in general. Well before his time, then, Bill attempted to show how issues from Plato's Academy led Aristotle to a better understanding of the nature and role of emotions, which had repercussions not only for rhetoric, but also for poetics, politics, and ethics. Bill has subsequently cast a philosophical eye on many other areas of rhetoric, and scarcely a paper within this volume does not owe him some debt.

Through the many conferences Bill Fortenbaugh has organized and participated in, scores of scholars have benefited from his service to scholarship. Those who have participated have also been aware, however, that just as in his research, so also at home, Bill is a team player, and Connie Fortenbaugh has played an integral role in his life and work for more than forty-five years. They are a formidable team. I am sure that I join all the participants in the conference and in this volume in wanting to dedicate this volume to both Connie and Bill.²

David C. Mirhady
Simon Fraser University
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² Thanks are due to many people for help in preparation of this volume: to the contributors for their patience and cooperation, and especially to Marilyn Brennan, Dennis Nattkemper, Emily O'Brien for help reading over the drafts, to Dania Sheldon for preparing the indices, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support.

A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations used in this volume generally follow those in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Third Edition (1996).

INTRODUCTION

DAVID C. MIRHADY

As with any scholarly work, this collection seeks to fill—or at least to start to fill—a void, one existing between studies of the beginnings of rhetorical theorizing and those on the rhetorical thought of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the other Peripatetics, who formulated most of the definitive ideas of classical Greek rhetoric. These essays study what influenced the Peripatetics.

Over the last twenty years or so, there have been several attempts to describe the beginnings of rhetorical theory.¹ Thomas Cole, Edward Schiappa, and Robert Wardy have all written books on this subject. There has also been a great deal of scholarship on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, including new translations by George Kennedy, Hugh Lawson-Tancred, and in German by Christoff Rapp.² Bill Fortenbaugh has done much to elucidate the contributions of Theophrastus—not least the publication of the complete source material on Theophrastus and now his commentary on Theophrastus' rhetorical texts³—and he also co-edited a collection of papers on the *Nachleben* of Peripatetic rhetoric.⁴ As the Project Theophrastus team continues to work through the members of the school of Aristotle, other new editions and book chapters on lesser known Peripatetics' rhetorical interests have also been receiving more attention.⁵

It has also been a very welcome development that several important figures in the generation before Aristotle have been studied again in recent years. Alcidamas has been translated in a very convenient form by John Muir, and Ruth Mariss has also now provided an exhaustive commentary on him in German.⁶ After a century of little attention, Isocrates is also now the subject of monographs, commen-

¹ Cole 1991, Schiappa 1999, Wardy 1999.

² Kennedy 1991, Lawson-Tancred 1991, Rapp 2002.

³ Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples, and Gutas (FSH&G) *et al.* 1992, Fortenbaugh 2005.

⁴ Fortenbaugh and Mirhady 1994.

⁵ See, e.g., on Demetrius of Phalerum 118–142 SOD, Montanari 2000 397–399; on Hieronymus, Mirhady 2004; and on Lyco, Fortenbaugh 2004.

⁶ Muir 2001, Mariss 2002.

taries, and a collection of papers.⁷ Anaximenes, or whomever we take to be the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, has benefited from a very thorough new edition, with translation and extensive introduction and notes, by Pierre Chiron, as well as an updated edition by Manfred Fuhrmann.⁸ The attic orators of Aristotle's day are also receiving renewed study, particularly from the standpoint of law,⁹ and Plato's thoughts on rhetoric, of course, continue to be the subject of numerous studies.¹⁰

What has received less attention is the intellectual background of Aristotle and Theophrastus' rhetorical writings *per se*. The new scholarship on Alcidas, Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Plato has been extensive, but the lines connecting their writings to the Peripatetics' remain elusive. More than sixty years ago, Friedrich Solmsen could outline in convincing fashion what was distinctive about the Aristotelian tradition in rhetoric,¹¹ but we still await definitive studies to explain how Aristotle came to his innovations. Admittedly, some lines of intellectual development have been traced in some detail. A generation ago, Antje Hellwig explored several of the lines of development from Plato, and of course Bill Fortenbaugh has delineated many of the connections to Plato in Aristotle's thinking about emotions.¹² But these studies have been exceptional. One study that has explored possible connections between Aristotle and the orators of his day, that of Jeremy Trevett,¹³ reported largely negative results: Aristotle was not in touch with the work of the orators contemporary with him. So there is room for more study, study for which Bill Fortenbaugh has helped to provide an excellent foundation.

Before going on to discuss briefly the papers in this volume, I would like to devote some thought here to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a rhetorical handbook and to the handbook tradition from which it arose.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is at one time both a theoretical treatise on the nature of civic discourse and a practical handbook for aspiring orators. As such a practical handbook, however, perhaps it is better to say that the work is an amalgam of rhetorical handbooks, for Aristotle

⁷ See Too 1995, Livingstone 2001, and Depew and Poulakos 2004.

⁸ Chiron 2002, Fuhrmann 2000.

⁹ See, e.g., Gagarin and Cohen 2005.

¹⁰ Despite his title, Wardy 1999 actually dwells a great deal on Plato.

¹¹ Solmsen 1941.

¹² Hellwig 1973; Fortenbaugh 1975.

¹³ Trevett 1996.

did not compose from scratch. Despite voicing strong objections to the handbooks (*technai*) of his day, it is clear that he uses material from at least some of them quite liberally in the *Rhetoric* as it has been handed down to us. As preparatory research for his handbook he collected at least one, perhaps two compendia of previous handbooks, so he clearly had a great deal of material from these at his disposal, and he recognized their value to his research.¹⁴ Theophrastus took up several aspects of rhetoric also, and in Diogenes Laertius' list of Theophrastus' works it is clear that Aristotle's student and colleague left behind discrete works on several areas that are covered within Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.¹⁵ But Theophrastus, unlike Aristotle (or his editors), seems not to have thought it important to collect the material into a single work. We should also note that, as well as using previous handbooks, Aristotle could rely on material he had worked out in other treatises, such as the *Topics*, *Analytics*, *Poetics*, and *Politics*, all of which he cites in the *Rhetoric*, as well as his works on *Ethics*, whose influence is apparent in several passages.

It is generally acknowledged that during the 5th century B.C. there arose in the Greek world at least three distinct traditions in rhetorical teaching: the sophistic, represented e.g. by Gorgias and Isocrates, the philosophical, championed by Plato in his dialogues, and the technical, based on the *technai*, or handbooks.¹⁶ These traditions certainly could and did interact, and they all influenced Aristotle, but his treatise most closely follows the last tradition in its formal appearance. Unlike the sophists Gorgias and Isocrates, or even Plato in the *Phaedrus*, Aristotle offers no model speech for analysis and imitation. And unlike the philosopher Plato, Aristotle seems to have no interest in belaboring the philosophical implications of rhetoric, even while he briefly locates the discipline in relation to dialectic, ethics, and political science. While engaging in occasional criticisms against the ethics of other handbook writers, Aristotle's primary concern, like that of the handbook-writers, is to explore recommendations about how to construct speeches for civic discourse. That would seem to be the point of a rhetorical handbook.

¹⁴ See Cicero, *De inv.* 2.6 and *Brutus* 46–48, Diogenes Laertius 5.24. Cf. Shōpsdau 1994.

¹⁵ See, e.g., the Theophrastean titles in Diog. Laert. (= FSH&G 1) 5.48 *On Invention*, *On Deliberation*, 5.46 *On Praise*, *On Forensic Speeches*, *On Non-Technical Pisteis*, 5.48 *On Examples*, 5.47 *On Enthymemes*, 5.46 *On the Maxim*, 5.47 *On Style*, 5.48 *On Delivery*, *On Solecisms*, 5.46, 49, and 40 *On Slander*, 5.48 *On Statement and Narration*, 5.45 *On Emotions*.

¹⁶ See Kennedy 1980 16–17.

In a previous study I detailed the points of departure for Aristotle and Anaximenes with regard to the *atechnoi*, or *epithetoi*, *pisteis*, the documentary evidence used in forensic oratory.¹⁷ I showed that in their recommendations about arguments to be used for and against each sort of documentary evidence, both authors follow the same format and recommend essentially the same arguments, even when they dress those arguments up in somewhat different language and conceptual apparatus. I concluded that both authors borrowed from the same earlier handbook, and I speculated that its author was Theodorus of Byzantium, whom Plato identifies in the *Phaedrus* as having developed a theory of *pistosis* and *epipistosis*, proof and supplementary proof. In a sense the real genesis for their corresponding discussions lay deeper, in the Athenian laws of judicial procedure about which documents could be read aloud in court in support of a speech. But whether the author of the original handbook dealing with those documents was Theodorus or another contemporary of his, it cannot be doubted that in this case, despite his criticisms of the handbooks on forensic oratory, Aristotle drew heavily on at least one of them for this material.

The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is more or less contemporary with that of Aristotle. Its author appropriated much of the same material as Aristotle did. If we can assume that its author is Anaximenes, we might take note that he was, like Aristotle, associated with the courts of Philip II and Alexander of Macedon. The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* have many affinities, but there are also many differences in approach. The chronologies of the two works rule out the possibility that Anaximenes used Aristotle's work in anything like its present form, or that Aristotle used Anaximenes,¹⁸ but the similarities suggest to me that Anaximenes had access to an earlier version of Aristotle's work, whether Aristotle himself penned it or not.¹⁹ A glance at the outline of their contents shows that structurally the handbooks are strikingly similar (I add Theophrastus' titles also for comparison).

¹⁷ Mirhady 1991. Pierre Chiron 1998 wrote a somewhat complementary paper, and Lucia Calboli Montefusco 1998 offers some correctives.

¹⁸ *Rh. Al.* 41.15 mentions the expedition to Carthage by Timoleon in 341 and Anaximenes accompanied Alexander on his expedition to Asia in 334, so the work must have been written during this time. Remarks of Aristotle at 2.24.8 1397b31 about the war between Athens and Philip of Macedon, which concluded in 338, and at 2.23.18, about the Common Peace imposed by Macedon in 336, pretty well rule out Anaximenes' use of the complete *Rhetoric*, as well as Aristotle's use of Anaximenes.

¹⁹ Barwick 1966 212–245 and 1967 47–55.

<i>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum</i>	Aristotle <i>Art of Rhetoric</i> ²⁰	Theophrastus ²¹ <i>On the Art of Rhetoric</i>
1. Species of Oratory	1.3	<i>On Invention</i>
2. Persuasive and dissuasive	1.4–8	<i>On Deliberation</i>
3. Eulogistic and Vituperative	1.9	<i>On Praise</i>
4. Prosecution and Defense	1.10–14	<i>On Forensic Speeches</i>
5. Investigative		
6. Common Elements	2.18–19	
7. <i>Pisteis</i> : (Probabilities)	1.2, 2.24.10–11, 2.25.8–11	
8. Examples	1.2.8–10, 2.20	<i>On Example</i>
9. <i>Tekmêria</i>	1.2.16–18	
10. Enthymemes	1.2.8–22, 2.22	<i>On Enthymemes</i>
11. Maxims	2.21, (3.17.9)	<i>On the Maxim</i>
12. <i>Sêmeia</i>	1.2.18, (2.24.5)	
13. <i>Elenchoi</i>)	3.17.13–15	
14. <i>epithetoi pisteis</i> : opinion of the speaker	1.15.1–2 1.15.3–12 Laws	<i>On Non-Technical Pisteis</i>
15. Witness testimony	1.15.13– 25 + Contracts	
16. Torture	1.15.26	
17. Oaths)	1.15.27–33	
18. Anticipation		
19. Appeals		
20. Iteration		
21. Irony	3.18.7	
22. Urbanity and Length	3.10–11	
23. Composition of Words	3.2–12 ²²	<i>On Style</i>
24. Two-fold Expression	<i>On Delivery</i>	
25. Correctness	3.1	<i>On Solecisms</i>
26. Antithesis	3.5.4	
27. <i>Parisosis</i>	3.9.9	
28. <i>Paromoiosis</i>	3.9.9	
29. Proem	3.14	<i>Prooimia</i>
.10 Slander	3.15	<i>On Slander</i>

²⁰ Diog. Laert. 5.24 records this title with two books.

²¹ The titles are found in Diogenes Laertius 5.5.46–50. Cf. Note 13 above and Fortenbaugh 2005 49–150, who discusses several other titles that may relate to rhetoric, including *On the Elements of Speech*, *On Kindness (Peri charitos)*, *Encomia of Gods*, *On Injustices*, *Theses*, *Rhetorical Precepts*, and *Arts*.

²² Cf. Diog. Laert. 5.24 *On Style*.

<i>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum</i>	Aristotle <i>Art of Rhetoric</i>	Theophrastus <i>On the Art of Rhetoric</i>
30. Narration .4–11 Style	3.16	<i>On Statement and Narration</i>
31. Arrangement	3.13	
32. Confirmation (<i>bebaiosis</i>)	3.17 (<i>pistis</i>)	
33. Anticipation, see 18		
34. Emotions	2.1.8–11.7	<i>On Emotions</i>
35. Praise and Blame	3.16.1–3	
36. Prosecution and Defense / .43–44 <i>Erotesis</i>	3.16.4–10 3.18	
37. Investigative		
38. Miscellaneous		

In the *Phaedrus* Plato extends his ironic wit toward the writers of handbooks and other teachers of rhetoric.²³ In doing so he also compiles a useful list of some of the most popular rhetoricians of the time. Each of these rhetoricians, or at least the specific material for which they are credited, is also mentioned either by Aristotle or by Anaximenes, often by both authors. Thrasymachus is cited for his mastery of pathetic appeal (267c; cf. *Rhet.* 3.1.7). Theodorus is credited with a book outlining the structure of a speech into preamble, narrative, testimony, *tekmêria* and probabilities, as well as proof and supplementary proof, *elenchos* and supplementary *elenchos* (266d–267a; cf. *Rhet.* 3.13.5 & 3.17.14). Evenus of Paros is cited for discovering covert allusion (*hypodêlosis*) and indirect praise (*parepainoi*) (267a; cf. *Rh. Al.*, *pr.* 16). Tisias and Gorgias are mentioned for their expertise in probabilities (273a–c; cf. *Rhet.* 2.24.11) and Prodicus for claiming to make a speech the right length (267b; cf. *Rh. Al.* 22). Polus is introduced for his displasiology, gnomology (cf. *Rhet.* 2.21) and eikonology (cf. *Rhet.* 3.4), Lycymnius for words contributing to poetic eloquence (cf. *Rhet.* 3.2.1 & 3.13.5) and Protagoras is introduced as a proponent of *orthoepeia* (cf. *Rhet.* 3.5.5; cf. *Pl. Crat.* 391c).

²³ See also Aristotle, *Soph. Ref.* 34 183b36–184b2, who sketches a tradition from Tisias to Thrasymachus to Theodorus. Cf. Cicero, *Brutus* 46–48, and Isocrates, *Soph.* 12–13, 16–18 (cf. *Panegy.* 9, *Helen* 11).

Aristotle criticizes the writers of rhetorical handbooks especially for their concentration on forensic oratory and for resorting to argumentation that is off the point and misleading. In 1.1.3 he appears especially vexed over argumentation that is directed toward the emotional manipulation of judges, and notes that the contemporary composers of *technai* have worked on only a narrow part of the subject. At that point, perhaps playing a sort of *advocatus diaboli*, he considers only persuasion (*pistis*) that is associated with the subject of the speech (*to pragma*) to be part of the *technê*, and he considers *pistis* to be embodied in the enthymeme. He specifically mentions verbal attack (*diabolê*), pity (*eleos*) and anger (*orgê*) as lying outside the subject of the speech, yet within a few pages the extant *Rhetoric* gives recommendations regarding the emotional state of the listeners as one of the *pisteis* that do properly belong to the rhetorical art.

The different parts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* show many such signs of wavering attitudes, perhaps the result of their having been composed at different times, perhaps the result of an implicitly dialectical approach, with differing attitudes toward rhetoric coming forth.²⁴ There is now almost universal agreement that Book 3, on style and arrangement, was originally a separate work.²⁵ In order to establish a basis for how Aristotle integrated material from previous handbooks into his *Rhetoric*, it seems necessary to attempt to sketch out different stages of the work, however preliminary such an attempt may be at this point. From a consideration of the authors and material mentioned by Plato and how they were collected and used in the final handbooks, we might even infer that an early version of the *Rhetoric* was referred to simply as the *Synagogê Technôn*. The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* provides a useful guide, since it seems to have been formed from some such early version of the *Rhetoric*, which could certainly have been circulated, as well as serving as the basis of Aristotle's continuing lectures on the subject.

Allowing for several later interpolations here and there, it appears an early version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* consisted roughly of

²⁴ The first part of 1.1 shows affinities to the Gryllus K83. The discussion of *topoi* 2.23 recalls that of the *Topics*. The theory of the enthymeme and example is like that of the *Prior Analytics*. *Êthos* and *pathos* result from a reaction to the *Phaedrus*. Grimaldi 1972 argues passionately for the unity of the text, although he is willing to concede that parts may have been composed at different times. Cf. Fortenbaugh 1990, Kennedy 1991 299–305.

²⁵ But see esp. Schütrumpf 1994. The fact that the *Rh. Al.* concurs with the *Rhet.* in including stylistic issues also seems to weigh against an initial separation of book 3.

1.4.7–13, 1.9.3–41, and 1.10 and 13–14 (11 followed soon after), followed by some version of 2.20–25, and then 1.15. That formed Aristotle's entire *technê*, although it was accompanied by another handbook, *On Style*, in two books, remnants of which perhaps correspond to the latter part of *Rhet.* 3.1 and 3.12–13, all of which, again, show Platonic elements. By this time Aristotle has recognized a tri-partition of rhetorical speeches into deliberative, epideictic and forensic, but he has not yet progressed very far with epideictic. Indeed, he probably did not yet use the term "epideictic", but settled for the names of the species, eulogistic and vituperative, as does Anaximenes. Aristotle has not yet worked out the elaborate justification for the tri-partition, based on the roles of the three kinds of listeners, which appears in 1.3.1–6, for he is yet to recognize the philosophical rationale for discussing the role of the listener, which is the basis of that tri-partition. The separation of the deliberative, epideictic and forensic species is based entirely on the distinct goals of the three *genera*, namely, the beneficial (*to sumpheron*), the noble (*to kalon*) and the just (*to dikaion*), although the contexts in which the three types of speeches were delivered, the assembly, a public ceremony, and the courtroom, added some empirical confirmation to the scheme.

Anaximenes follows essentially the same tri-partition, and in the same order as Aristotle, although he progresses no further than the terminology of the six contrasting species, rather than the three *genera* of speeches. Moreover, he retains a remnant of a previous division by including a seventh species, that of investigation (*exetasis*). That earlier tri-partition, which is mentioned by Plato and Alcidas,²⁶ combined deliberative and epideictic into one genus, called demegoric ("public") oratory, and included, as well as forensic oratory, some form of private discourse as a separate genus on which sophists gave instruction. Training in private discourse was useful for the sort of circumstances dramatized so often by Plato in his dialogues,²⁷ but Aristotle consigns that activity to dialectic and separates it off as a "counterpart" to the entire *technê* of rhetoric. He only just alludes to *exetasis* in *Rhet.* 1.1.1 by referring to one of the two primary activities of dialectic with the verb *exetazein*, the only instance

²⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus* 261A, Alcidas, *On the Sophists* 9. Barwick 1966 219. Cf. Barwick 1922 35.

²⁷ It may also have been useful in litigation during the preliminary investigation before a magistrate (*anakrisis*) or in the interrogational portion (*erotesis*, see *Rhet.* 3.18, *Rh. Al.* 36.43–44) of the litigation, before the court contest, where the litigants were required to answer each other's questions. Cf. Plato, *Apology*.

of that verb in the treatise. Isocrates 4.27, on the other hand, seems to put special emphasis on the ethical role of *exetasis*.

In his first version Aristotle has not yet formed his views on the three entechnic proofs, or on the enthymeme as a rhetorical counterpart to the syllogism, and, as he details in 3.13, he largely rejects any discussion of arrangement. At this stage for Aristotle, a speech consists of propositions (*protheseis*), which are distinguishable into deliberative, epideictic and forensic matters (*pragmata*), logical proofs and, in addition to these logical proofs, what he later calls the “atechnic” proofs. In his finished version Aristotle has these proofs follow the section on forensic oratory by specifically explaining that they are restricted to it (1375a23–24).

At 1.4.7–13 Aristotle enumerates and discusses five subjects on which people deliberate: finances (*prosodoi* Xen., *poroi* Arist.), war and peace, defense, trade (*sitos* 13, *eisagomena*) and legislation (*nomothesia*). The similarities between Aristotle’s discussion and that of Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.6.3–13) are too precise to deny Aristotle’s dependence on that source, or on one like it, but the corresponding discussion of Anaximenes reveals some interesting points of departure. Anaximenes also has five categories, but they are not the same five: he has religion, legislation, international relations, war and peace, and finance. On war and peace, legislation, and finance, he agrees with Aristotle, but on international relations, and especially on religion, Aristotle has nothing that corresponds. Likewise, Anaximenes does not treat Aristotle’s foreign trade or defense. Moreover, Anaximenes goes on at much greater length, almost three full Bekker pages to what Aristotle treats in half a page. For Anaximenes the three Bekker pages are his entire discussion of the subject matter of deliberative oratory, while for Aristotle they fill only a small part. It appears that Aristotle originally took over the material that had been treated by Xenophon, but without elaborating it. Instead, he filled out his discussion of deliberation by including material from his ethical studies. The disparity with regard to religion may likewise reflect a special interest of Anaximenes on this point.²⁸

Since it was only recently recognized as a distinct genus, epideictic receives much less attention in Aristotle’s final version than the other two genera. Isocrates, for instance, uses the term “epideictic” more widely, for any speech given for the purpose of display

²⁸ As with the *atechnoi pisteis*, it may be important here to recognize that the ultimate source of the common points of deliberative discussion in the two handbooks were the laws that regulated which topics should come up for discussion in the assembly.

rather than for practical purposes (10.12, 11.44, 15.55). Anaximenes appears to underline the inchoate conception of these species by assigning to them the same set of goals (*telê*) as he had to the deliberative species, namely what is “just, lawful, beneficial, noble, pleasant and easy.” (1.4 and 3.1).²⁹ Although Aristotle goes into more philosophical detail than Anaximenes about the nature of the various *aretai* associated with these goals, both authors emphasize the special role of amplification (*auxêsis*) in the epideictic species.³⁰ Moreover, Anaximenes may signal the germ for Aristotle’s use of the term “epideictic”, and indeed for Aristotle’s later elaborate justification for the tri-partition of rhetorical speeches, when he mentions that with regard to encomium and invective, “for the most part we speak for the sake not of a contest, but of a demonstration (*epideixis*)” (35.2).³¹ The more precise correspondences between the *Rhet.* and *Rh. Al.* follow these lines:

Rhet. 1.9.3–13 on virtues = *Rh. Al.* 3.1

Rhet. 1.9.14–27 on things associated with virtuous people = *Rh. Al.* 3.2–5

Rhet. 1.9.28–31 *ta suneggus* 1367a34 = *Rh. Al. sunoikeiosis* 1425b38

Rhet. 1.9.38–39 on amplification = *Rh. Al.* 3.6–12

The points of contact in the chapters regarding forensic oratory are harder to discern; after what Aristotle says in 1.1 about the technographers’ fixation on forensic oratory, it may be that Aristotle is at special pains to distance himself from the handbooks in this area. Nevertheless, vestiges of the original handbook’s treatment do appear. It is best to start with the *Rh. Al.*: the author first directs his discussion of prosecution to distinguishing argumentation appropriate to acts of injustice, *adikêmata*, on the one hand, and errors, *hamartêmata*, on the other (1426b25–29). The former he associates with baseness, *ponêria*, the latter with stupidity, *abelteria* (1426b29–37). Anaximenes also points out the need to amplify the gravity of an injustice in cases where the judges, rather than statute, set the penalty (1427a1–21). Interestingly, for the defense, after introducing a brief proto-form of *stasis*-theory, Anaximenes elaborates his distinction by suggesting three points of defense, not two, namely, on the basis of injustice, error and also misfortune

²⁹ In his discussion of probabilities in chapter 7 Anaximenes illustrates arguments for deliberative and forensic speeches, but not for epideictic speeches.

³⁰ Cicero, *Brutus* 47 attributes the connection between amplification and praise to Gorgias.

³¹ Cf. Mirhady 1994 61–62.

(*atychia*). In this regard Anaximenes makes a methodological shift between the species of prosecution and defense.

Aristotle actually begins from the same starting point, namely, by inquiring into the reasons for unjust actions. Moreover, he cites two characteristics, wickedness (*kakia*) and weakness of will (*akrasia*) that more or less correspond to Anaximenes' baseness and stupidity (10.4). So, after quickly defining injustice, Aristotle like Anaximenes comes back to distinguishing the causes for unjust actions. But corresponding to Anaximenes' two or three categories, Aristotle now presents seven: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger and longing (1369a6–7). And then, because longing is associated with what is pleasurable, Aristotle digresses for a full chapter, chapter 11, about the nature of pleasure.³² Philosophical considerations proliferate in Aristotle's later version.

In chapter 13 Aristotle returns to the definition of justice. After distinguishing between written and unwritten, specific and common law, he explains that in some defense speeches people admit having done something, but do not admit that it fits the specific terms of the accusation (1374a1; cf. 3.15 & 17). In this way he too touches on a proto-form of *stasis*-theory, and as if in confirmation of his consistency with Anaximenes on this point, after his discussion of fairness, Aristotle in section 16 mentions that errors (*hamartêmata*) and misfortunes (*atychêmata*) are pardoned fairly. Then, in chapter 14, in place of Anaximenes' distinction between statutory punishments and those to be decided by the judges, Aristotle discusses the magnitudes of various acts of injustice—the sort of thing that would need to be emphasized where the judges had to set the penalty—so that while Aristotle diverges from Anaximenes on points of detail, the structure of his account still seems to stem from a common source.

With regard to the logical proofs, the points of contact between Aristotle and Anaximenes are easy to discern at a structural level, but more complex on closer inspection.³³ Both authors devote several chapters to discussing probabilities, examples, *tekmêria*, enthymemes, maxims, *sêmeia* and *elenchoi*, but it is at times as if they are discussing altogether different conceptions, even though they use approxi-

³² Although he announces his intention to discuss the general characteristics of wrongdoers and those wronged at the beginning of chapter 10 and then does so in chapter 12, he nowhere explains why this is necessary. It seems in many ways to duplicate in a more general way what he says about the reasons for actions in chapters 10–11.

³³ Grimaldi 1972 76–82. It should be recalled that all the references to events after 340 occur in 2.23–24.

mately the same terminology. A complete explanation of this disjunction must await further study—indeed, some explanations are offered in this volume by Tobias Reinhardt and Lucia Calboli Montefusco—but some observations and speculations can be made now. First, it should not be overlooked that the two authors do share that common terminology. In chapters 7–14 Anaximenes lays out definitions and descriptions of almost exactly the same terms as does Aristotle both in 1.2 and at the end of Book 2.³⁴ Second, Aristotle has already worked out much of his thinking on the logical proofs at the end of Book 2 of *Prior Analytics*. Third, on three terms, example, maxim and *sêmeion*, Aristotle and Anaximenes actually do share similar definitions. Their disagreements occur only with regard to enthymemes, probabilities, *tekmêria*, and *elenchoi*.

To what Anaximenes loosely calls probabilities, Aristotle applies the term enthymeme. These are arguments wherein, as Anaximenes says, the hearers have in mind (the reasoning) behind what is being said (1428a26–27), so that to them it appears probable.³⁵ Aristotle actually does classify probabilities, with *sêmeia*, as the material of enthymemes (1.2 1357a34), so the difference between the authors is not as great as it might seem. Second, with regard to the *tekmêrion* and the *elenchos*, Aristotle and Anaximenes have seemingly reversed their definitions. What for Aristotle is a *tekmêrion* and for Anaximenes an *elenchos* is a necessary sign, an irrefutable indication. Conversely, what for Aristotle is an *elenchos* and Anaximenes a *tekmêrion* is a direct contradiction of something said by the opponent.³⁶ Aristotle's usage is certainly closer to that of the orators.

That leaves only Anaximenes' use of the word "enthymeme", which he also sees as highlighting or rebutting a contradiction on the part of the opponent, but not so much with regard to the facts of the case as with regard to, as he says, "whether the speech or the actions of the opponent are contrary to what is just or honourable," and so on (*Rh. Al.*). Anaximenes associates his enthymeme very closely with his investigative (*exetastikon*) species of oratory, which is devoted to the actions and intentions of the person being investigated. Elsewhere in his text, Anaximenes includes enthymemes when he

³⁴ Plato's review of rhetoricians in the *Phaedrus*, which was mentioned earlier, confirms that by his time the terminology of rhetorical analysis was very well developed. Fuhrmann 1960 125–126.

³⁵ But see Burnyeat 1994.

³⁶ In 2.25 Aristotle calls this a loosening of a syllogism, but in 3.17.13 he uses the word *elenchos*.

makes recommendations about what sorts of logical proofs are appropriate or inappropriate for given situations, but these passages offer no clearer idea of what he means by the term.

Points of comparison on matters of style occur in two areas, with regard to several figures, such as antithesis, *pariosis* and *paromoeosis* (*Rhet.* 3.9), and with regard to *ta asteia*, or the qualities of urbane speech (*Rhet.* 3.10–11). The correspondence in this second area is especially striking since as a category of rhetorical thought it does not reappear after Aristotle. I need not say much about this correspondence since it has been thoroughly explored recently by Dirk Schenkeveld,³⁷ but what needs to be emphasized is that by *asteismos*, which we might translate as “urban-ness” rather than as “urbanity”, both authors are referring to the qualities of polished, urban speech that distinguish it from rusticity. Neither suggests anything humorous or witty. Both authors emphasize the need for brevity, which allows the listeners to fill in parts of the reasoning. Anaximenes restricts his discussion to this emphasis, as well as remarks here and there about the different points in a speech where something *asteion* might be said. For Aristotle, however, *asteismos* takes on great significance as he incorporates into it lengthy discussions about metaphor, figures and the whole notion of *energeia*, of bringing the subject matter ‘before the eyes’ of the listeners.

The points of contact between Aristotle and Anaximenes that I have reviewed provide ample evidence that lying within our received text of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* there is an earlier version, whether by Aristotle’s hand or someone else’s, that lay perfectly comfortably within the tradition of the sophistic rhetorical handbook, as the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is often characterized. As Grimaldi, who champions the unity and originality of the *Rhetoric*, freely put it, “we find in Aristotle an advanced and more developed analysis of matter seminally present in Anaximenes.”³⁸ The first version probably had a definition of rhetoric much like that in the *Topics* 6 149b26 to the effect that the orator is he who can observe the persuasive in each situation. Aristotle continued to develop this view until he achieved the more philosophically cogent definition found in the *Rhetoric*. In many other areas also, it appears, Aristotle was content to elaborate on ideas that had been conceived by others. At the beginning of *Soph. Ref.* 34 Aristotle makes some candid admissions about the relative significance of those who discover concepts versus those who then

³⁷ Schenkeveld 1994 1–14.

³⁸ Grimaldi 1972 80.

only develop them. We might have hoped that he would have shown somewhat more respect in crediting the ideas of his predecessors in the writing of his rhetorical handbook.

The first seven chapters in this volume are organized along the lines of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The first two chapters deal with *êthos*, the third with *pathos*, the fourth, fifth and sixth with *logos*, and the seventh and eighth with style. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh papers deal with influences from drama, the twelfth with historical circumstances of a Peripatetic, Theophrastus, composing oratory, rather than theorizing about rhetoric. The last two papers turn in different directions, to vituperation and, finally, to feelings of thanks.

Dirk Schenkeveld explores something too often left out of discussions of rhetoric, namely, oratorical practice. There is, in fact, little explicit evidence of influence from the oratorical practice of the 4th century on Aristotle and Theophrastus, with Isocrates being perhaps an exception. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the sorts of issues that Schenkeveld explores, namely, the *persona* adopted by speakers in the Athenian assembly. He argues that they take the role of teachers, instructing the Athenians, rather than simply exhorting or dissuading them. Aristotle's remarks on *êthos*, though profound, are tantalizingly short, and, as, Schenkeveld points out, they are silent about the "teachership" of the orators.

Eckart Schütrumpf follows a different lead with regard to *êthos*, arguing that Aristotle's conception of the success of persuasion from character actually depends on a rather optimistic view of the audience. He traces views of listeners from Plato's *Republic* and *Gorgias* through the *Laws* and on to Aristotle's *Politics*, drawing comparisons between the audience's reactions to rhetoric and to music.

In my paper, I attempt to identify the significance of Aristotle's emphasis on the term "enthymeme" in Aristotle's recognition of the role of emotions in the decisions influenced by rhetoric. Such decision-making is inherently emotional, and an enthymeme appears as a thought process "in the *thymos*". I speculate about how Aristotle may have been influenced by Plato's description of the psychology of the "spirited" (*thymoeidês*) class in the *Republic* as a model for the listeners in an *ecclesia*, *dikastêrion*, or funeral oration.

Jan van Ophuijsen explores the various meanings of the word *logos* in the *Rhetoric* and in Aristotle's other writings. It comes as no surprise that the word has a wide range of meanings, many of

which are philosophically significant. Van Ophuijsen moves through this range, delineating *logos* at times simply as an extended passage of speech, at other times even as a weapon. There is also ethical significance to how one may use speech.

Tobias Reinhardt discusses the *koinoi topoi* in *Rhet.* 2.23–24. By unpacking their logical structure, he allows himself the opportunity to make connections first with Aristotle’s discussions of *topoi* in his *Topics* and also with passages in the *Rh. Al.* As with my discussions of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as a handbook, Reinhardt seeks to identify a source text for Aristotle in the works of two technographers from the late 5th or early 4th century.

Lucia Calboli Montefusco compares several of “argumentative devices” as they appear in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, including *eikos*, *paradeigma*, *tekmêrion*, and *enthymêma*. Though unwilling to state any firm conclusions, she tentatively states that the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* reveals “suggestions” of what is to appear in Aristotle.

Gualtiero Calboli diverges slightly from the conference theme is exploring the post-Peripatetic, Hellenistic and Roman, fate of Aristotle and Theophrastus’ teachings on metaphor. The activities of the Rhodian schools of rhetoric played a role here. *PHamb.* 128 offers a possible glimpse into Theophrastus. In general, the Romans diverged from the unified teaching regarding metaphor outlined by the Peripatetics and sought a more differentiated system, which was complicated by increasing interest in grammar.

Doreen Innes discusses the relationship between speech and text, the oral/performed as opposed to the written/read, which underpins the distinctions Aristotle draws in terms of genre and style. Here more than anywhere the influences of close forerunners, Isocrates and Alcidamas in particular, is apparent.

Elisabetta Matelli tackles a problem that has divided scholars for some time: the relationship between Aristotle and Theodectes of Phaselis, and the authorship of the ambiguously titled *Theodecteia* and *Technês tês Theodectou Synagôgê*. Theodectes has been accused of plagiarizing Aristotle and dismissed as one of his second-rate pupils. Using a broad range of textual evidence and turning away from what she calls an “Aristotle-centric” attitude towards ancient Greek rhetoric, Matelli offers a new assessment of these issues: it wasn’t Theodectes who depended on Aristotle’s ideas about rhetoric, but rather the other way around. Indeed, Aristotle, who Matelli determines was the younger of the two, considered Theodectes’ rhetorical writings to be a source of authority (though only fragments

of them remain today), and he likely became familiar with them when they were circulated informally.

At the centre of Andrea Martano's article is fr. 6 Snell—a fragment of one of Theodectes' lost tragedies. Martano compares the fragment with verses of Euripides and Agathon. The similarities he finds reveal something about Theodectes' methods of composition: he had an excellent memory and used both Euripides and Agathon—perhaps referring to their texts directly—when writing his own. Martano's study also has important implications for our limited understanding of 4th-century dramatic poetry more generally. Theodectes' methods reveal the period as a kind of “prelude” to Hellenistic composition, one that depended primarily on the book to transmit literature (and to create heavily allusive texts) and one that emphasized mnemonic teaching techniques in schools of rhetoric.

Carl Werner Müller goes outside the strictly rhetorical texts to the source for one of the most common anecdotes about Aristotle's life and teaching, his remark that it would be a shame to allow Isocrates to speak, that is, to teach the art of speaking. The remark originated in Euripides' now lost *Philoctetes*, in a passage in which Odysseus says that it would be a shame to allow the barbarians (Trojans) to speak. Aristotle knew the *Philoctetes*, and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* even quotes a passage from it. Aristotle's implicit identification of “Isocrates” with “barbarians” is telling, given Isocrates' political program, which advocated Panhellenic unity.

Stephen White explores the influences that shaped a work not so much of Peripatetic rhetoric as of Peripatetic oratory, Theophrastus' *Callisthenes, or On Mourning*. His argument is that the *Callisthenes* illustrates Aristotelian and indeed Theophrastean theory responding to popular belief, literary tradition, and the seismic impact of Alexander. It is an occasion for Theophrastus to discuss luck, virtue, intelligence, and happiness against the background of earth-shaking political events.

In a paper that might as easily have been located alongside those on *êthos*, Tom Conley looks both at the accounts of vituperation in Aristotle and at its practice in Attic oratory. Deliberative and especially forensic oratory is filled with *psogos*, although by the Aristotelian framework it should only occur in epideictic. Moreover, it is a genre that has to be integrated with these other genres with care, relying as it does on positive notions of communal values, with which their negative counterparts must be compared.

The argument of David Konstan's paper on *charis*, or rather *charin echein*, in *Rhetoric* 2.7 might serve as a sort of *leitmotiv* for this

volume honouring Bill Fortenbaugh. Konstan argues that the emotion Aristotle is discussing is not kindness or friendship, but rather thanks. Indeed, the feeling of owing a debt of gratitude is commonly cited in the Attic orators as a motivation for people's actions. Konstan offers a word-by-word explanation of the complicated idioms in *Rhet.* 2.7, which have baffled many interpreters.

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CHAPTER ONE

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN FOURTH-CENTURY ELOQUENCE. THE CASE OF THE SPEAKER AS A TEACHER OF THE DEMOS

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The last decades have shown considerable progress in our understanding of the relationship between the practice of eloquence (henceforth to be called “oratory”) and the theory of eloquence (to be called “rhetoric”) in the fourth century B.C. This subject has always drawn the attention of scholars and already in the first century B.C. Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote his *First Letter to Ammaeus* in order to demonstrate that Demosthenes did not learn the rules of rhetoric that he applied in his own speeches from Aristotle. In this context Cicero is a striking example, because in his own rhetorical works he shows a nice blend of theory and practice: on the one hand, he puts forward the rules of rhetoric but at the same time he declares that he had often deviated from them; on the other, because of his practical experience, he changes the theory. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of our era this relationship between practice and theory has been studied to a great extent. Very useful in this respect is the summary of this research which we can find in the excellent article *Rhetorik* written by Wilhelm Kroll for *RE*. In his *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, George Kennedy also gives some attention to the subject.¹ It is natural to suppose that the theory grew out of the practice, and not that theory was first and the practitioners followed its rules. The latter view, the wrong one, was held by the unknown follower of the Peripatos who was shown to be wrong by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and no scholar, as far as I know, would dare to revive this view, not even when with Thomas Cole² one thinks that the real theory of rhetoric was founded by Plato and Aristotle. At the same time, it is naïve to suppose that theory has always come after practice or that practice developed independently from theory. Wilhelm Süss has made a strong case

¹ Kennedy 1963 261–263.

² Cole 1991.

for the reverse view when he concludes that rhetorical theory lived a life of its own.³ And even when with Jacob Wisse⁴ one disagrees with a large part of Süss's argument, Aristotle is living proof that independent growth of rhetorical theory from actual practice was possible.

As I said above, research on the independence and interdependence between rhetoric and oratory has been intensive and given nice results. Here I think of the studies such as Neil O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas, Aristophanes, and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*, the collection of essays put together by Ian Worthington, *Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action*, the incisive study of Harvey Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, the provocative book of Jeffrey Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*, in which he tries to weaken the link between rhetoric and oratory, and those of Edward Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, and Josiah Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens*, a sequel to his *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*. These and other books, and I leave aside most articles and papers, are proof of a renewal, sometimes a revival, of interest in fourth-century practice and theory in Classical Athens.

In this connection I single out two studies, that of Harvey Yunis, which brought me to the theme of my paper, and the paper of Christopher Carey, "Rhetorical Means of Persuasion," in Ian Worthington's *Persuasion*. Carey's knowledge of oratory is very extensive and he points to some phenomena in practical oratory that have not been taken over by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, nor by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Carey focuses on means of persuasion that have to do with Aristotle's distinction of proof by *êthos* and *pathos*. The rhetorical handbooks stress the importance of creating *eunoia* by the speaker in his opening words, but in practice this is done in the parts of narrative and proof also. The complement of this means, that of creating prejudice against the opponent, is discussed by Aristotle and Anaximenes under conclusion and introduction, respectively, but "this element is at home in every part of speech," as Carey shows.⁵ I shall not go on and mention more elements neglected by Aristotle and Anaximenes and pointed out by Carey. I refer to his paper as a link to my own subject.

³ Süss 1910 225 ff.

⁴ Wisse 1989 61–63.

⁵ Carey 1994 31.

This subject is the presence of a strongly didactic element in the speeches of the deliberative genre. The speaker not only knows what according to him is the best policy for the assembly to accept and tries to persuade his public to follow his advice, but the way he expresses his ideas also has all the characteristics of a teacher of the people, the *didaskalos*. If one is rather touchy about this kind of persuasion, one might mutter under one's own breathe: "Oh, oh, father knows best again". When reading in Yunis' study *Taming Democracy* and the relevant texts of Thucydides, Demosthenes and Plato's *Laws*, I was struck by the "heavy tone" of the speakers, and got the feeling that a severe preacher had the floor. Then I looked at the few other examples of deliberative speeches we have in the hope to find parallel situations and went to the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as well for observations pointing in this direction. I thought that they would say something on this aspect when discussing the *êthos* of the speaker. The result of my research I will present now here.

The extant corpus of deliberative speeches is rather small. (Why this is so, we do not know. In his edition of Andocides, Michael Edwards⁶ discusses some possible reasons.) It certainly is small in comparison with the number of forensic speeches from the fifth and fourth century B.C. Andocides' *On the Peace with the Spartans* (Or. 3) is the first deliberative speech we have as an independent oration. It was delivered in 392/1 in the assembly of Athens. After a long interval we come to the deliberative speeches of Demosthenes. In between, the orations of Isocrates on political subjects were published, but these were never delivered in a real assembly. Our harvest is thus very poor. Fortunately, from the works of the historians Thucydides and Xenophon (his *Hellenica*) come many examples of speeches given in the Athenian assembly by Athenian politicians and those given by ambassadors in various circumstances. Finally, the preambles of Demosthenes and those of the lawgiver in Plato's *Laws* must also be mentioned.

The clearest examples of the characteristic I am talking about come indeed from Plato's *Laws*. In this dialogue Plato presents many laws for the new state (Magnesia on Crete). The lawgiver does not wish to present these laws in the assembly without any introduction for two reasons. The first is that a law speaks as a tyrant to his slaves in a commanding tone, and that attitude is the wrong one in this

⁶ Edwards 1995 105–106.

state. The second is that the citizens are free people who must be persuaded to accept the new laws. Therefore, the lawgiver introduces the laws by *prooimia*, preambles. The lawgiver is in a nice position, for there are no opponents who must be defeated. Accordingly, he can address the assembly in what he thinks is the best style. Plato himself speaks of the teacher in this connection, but several scholars, including Yunis,⁷ characterize this mode of communication as one of the preacher, because of the authoritative tone by which the lawgiver proclaims his message. In this connection Yunis even uses the term “sermon”. However, these preambles are supposed to be delivered in an assembly of the new state, and are therefore examples of deliberative oratory. But they are not instances of real deliberative speeches. One example of these preambles may suffice here: *Laws* 854B.⁸ It introduces the law against temple robbing:

My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go temple-robbing is neither of human origin nor of divine, but it is some impulse bred of old in men from ancient wrongs unexpiated, which courses round wreaking ruins; and you must guard against it with all your strength. How you must thus guard, now learn. When there comes upon you any such intention, betake yourself to the rites that avert guilt, betake yourself as suppliant to the shrines of the curse-lifting deities, betake yourself to the company of men who are reputed virtuous etc. (*tr. Bury*)

At 722E–723A Plato discusses the use of these proems and then says:

The tyrannical command which we compared to the commands of slave physicians is the law pure and simple; and the part that comes before it, which is essentially persuasive, has the function of a preamble in a speech. It seems clear to me that the reason why the legislator gave that entire persuasive speech was to make the person to whom he promulgates his law accept his command in a well-disposed frame of mind (*eumenôs*) and with a correspondingly greater readiness to learn (*eumathesteron*).

Eumenês (*eunous*) and *eumathês* are well-known terms from rhetorical theory on the tasks of a speaker to be fulfilled in his proems (*prosektikos* is the third requirement), and Plato alludes to these ideas. He apparently thinks that a preaching tone will make the audience well disposed and ready to learn. Is this view of Plato’s peculiar to him or does it have a basis in real life?

⁷ Yunis 1996 228–229.

⁸ Yunis 1996 283.

More like real life speeches are the proems of Demosthenes, collected in antiquity and now found in the excellent edition of Robert Clavaud.⁹ Their authenticity is now generally accepted,¹⁰ and they conform to the accepted genuine speeches in diction, rhythm, hiatus, word order and sentence structure, whereas the general level of argument is usually as sharp and taut as that displayed in the acknowledged genuine speeches.¹¹ I take as my example *prooimion* 28:¹²

First of all, Athenians, it is nothing new that there are some among you who speak against previous decisions just when action is needed. If they were doing this after you had granted the floor while you were still deliberating, it would be right to censure them for forcing their way to speaking again on a subject on which they had been defeated. But in fact it is not surprising that they wish to say what you would not submit to hearing previously. You, rather, are the ones who deserve to be criticized, Athenians, because whenever you deliberate about something, you do not allow an individual to say what he thinks, but if one side gets hold of you with their speech, you do not even listen to the others. The result is unhappy: the advisers whom you might have listened to before making a mistake you applaud later for their accusations. The same thing will happen to you again etc.

Demosthenes here asks for a fair hearing, but his tone is one of censure. He is, as it were, castigating his audience. If someone is to be blamed, it is not Demosthenes but the audience, the Athenian assembly! Demosthenes knows better. This is the tone all of us remember from his real speeches, such as the *Philippics* and suchlike speeches, e.g. the introduction of *On the Peace*:

I perceive, men of Athens, that the present outlook gives rise to much vexation and perplexity, because not only have we suffered serious losses, which cannot be mended by fine speeches, but there is also complete divergence of opinion. [...] While deliberation is naturally a vexatious and difficult task, you, Athenians, have enhanced its difficulties; for all other people deliberate before the event, but you after the event. And the result is that, as long as I can remember, the man who attacks any mistakes you have made gains your applause as an able speaker, but meanwhile the events and the real object wholly escape you. (*trans. Vince*)

⁹ Clavaud 1974.

¹⁰ Yunis 1996 app. II.

¹¹ Yunis 1996 289.

¹² Yunis 1996 290.

Demosthenes is critical of his public, does not refrain from castigating them, and implies that if they listen to him, their decisions will be wiser. He is not afraid of speaking his mind, looks for what is best for the people, and is willing to give his advice. All this is said in an authoritative tone, almost never with any doubt. His advice is presented by a teacher, who knows better what is to be done.

The same kind of criticizing one's audience and the wish to instruct them from his superior knowledge is already present in Pericles' address to the Athenian Assembly, when the *demos* has become critical of their leader, his authority is gone and his policy in shambles:¹³

Not only was I expecting this outburst of indignation against me (because I perceive the reasons for it), but I actually summoned a meeting of the assembly for the express purpose of reminding you of your decisions and of reproving you for your inconsiderate anger and your inconstancy in the face of misfortune. (*Thuc.* 2.60)

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*On Thucydides* 44), for his part, disapproved of this opening of a speech in defense. No, he says, "the best manner of address for Pericles' purpose would have been, not this reproachful one, but rather a more conciliatory one: political speakers should soothe, not inflame the anger of crowds". Nevertheless, Pericles was successful and won the day.

So far we have looked at the presentation of three speakers and politicians. They speak with authority; they are, if necessary, critical of their audience, and try to teach them the best course to take. Harvey Yunis connects these three instances with the approach of politicians to the *demos*, the people who do not know what to do, are in constant need of guidance and at the same time can act very irresponsibly. The title of his study is very revealing: *Taming Democracy*, with its subtitle *Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens*. But do these three examples stand alone, or can we find similar approaches in other speeches? What I am especially concerned with here is the didactic attitude of the speakers, not so much their possible criticism of their audience, the assembly. Let us now have a look at the other deliberative orations.

Andocides' *On the Peace* is on the whole mild in tone and in this respect unlike earlier examples we have seen. But, and this is my point, its desire to instruct the audience is very much present. Thus already at the very beginning:

¹³ Yunis 1996 83–85.

That it is better to make a just peace than to make war you all seem to me, Athenians, to understand; but that the public speakers accept the name of peace, but are opposed to the actions by which peace might be concluded, this you do not all perceive. (3.1 trans. Edwards)

Andocides then leads his audience through the history of their city, quietly discusses possibilities and chances, and without any trace of doubt concludes that to make peace now and accept the terms of the treaty, which he and his colleague-ambassadors to the congress held at Sparta in 392/1 had agreed to with representatives of Sparta and other cities, is the better course to take. The tone remains calm, as I have said, but firm, and there is nothing in this oration of a demagogue arousing the rabble. No, it is a piece of instruction.

In this connection I mention the thesis of Anna Missiou, *The Subversive Oratory of Andocides*,¹⁴ that this speech was subversive to Athenian democracy and that as an adherent of oligarchy he tries to get the assembly on his side, although accepting that the peace treaty would benefit the rich land-owning class and damage those of the lower classes. This thesis has been accepted by Michael Edwards,¹⁵ who thinks that Andocides cannot have had any hope of persuading the assembly at that point and therefore made a long-term attempt to transform popular attitudes. This background may explain the calm approach I was speaking of. At any rate, I cannot follow Edwards when he characterizes the speech as an emotional appeal. For this description more exclamations and other means are needed.

Isocrates composed several speeches having to do with government and policies, but their approach to their public is not always the same. In his *Archidamos* the young Spartan Archidamos, son of the ruling king Agesilaos, does instruct his audience about the best policy—better to die than abandon Messene—but in Spartan circumstances a young man addressing in public a meeting is unheard of and therefore his tone must be soft. In *On the Peace* Isocrates himself is speaking. He addresses the Athenian assembly and repeats his political ideal of Athens being at peace with the whole of Hellas. The tone here is much more instructive and sometimes critical of the audience, even if not with Demosthenic vigour. Thus at the very beginning:

I observe, however, that you do not hear with equal favour the speakers who address you, but that, while you give your attention to some, in the

¹⁴ Missiou 1992.

¹⁵ Edwards 1995 113.

case of others you do not even suffer their voice to be heard. [...] 5. Indeed you have caused the orators to practise and study, not what will be advantageous to the state, but how they may discourse in a manner pleasing to you. (8.3 *tr. Norlin*)

In Xenophon's *Hellenica* we find many examples of demegoric speeches. Very often they are given by ambassadors of a foreign city to an assembly in Sparta or Athens (thus 3.5.8 ff.; 5.2.11 ff.; 6.1.4 ff.; 3.4 ff.; 3.7 ff.; 3.10 ff.; 5.37 ff.; 7.1.2 ff. and 1.12 ff.). In all these cases we find an exposition of facts and situations, advice is given about what to do or to avoid, and the wish to instruct one's audience is everywhere present. Of course, there will be differences in tone, depending on the circumstances. I give one example out of many; it comes from the speech of the Athenian ambassador Callistratus before the Spartans in 371:

Men of Lacedaemon, that mistakes have not been made, both on our side and on yours, I for one do not think I could assert; but I do not hold the opinion that one ought never again to have dealings with people who make mistakes. For I see that no one in the world remains always free from error. [...] In your own case, also, I see that sometimes many reverses result from the things you have done with too little judgment ... (6.3.10 *tr. Brownson*)

We may suppose that more than once Xenophon gives the highlights of a speech, especially when it is a very short one. We do not know to which extent the speeches in Xenophon's book represent what has been said in reality. This question is of little relevance for my subject because if they do not, it means that they represent what according to Xenophon should have been said, and then too they bear witness to ideas in the fourth century about the nature of demegoric orations.

Instructional oratory is thus one characteristic of symbouleutic speeches. It is evident everywhere and it may be coupled with severity and reproof, or not. Now one may wonder if this trait is not typical of all oratory, or at least of forensic oratory also. In the *narratio* the defendant or his opponent will instruct his audience about what has happened. There, too, a teacher role may be presupposed, and, indeed, a few times a speaker says that he will "instruct" his audience in order that they will "learn" what has happened. Thus Demosthenes 29.1 ("I must only teach and narrate what has been done by this man"), Lysias 3.21 ("I shall try ... to teach you"); 6.35 ("it is necessary to teach you"); 10.15 ("I want to teach him about these things") and 13.4 ("I shall begin from that point where you may most easily learn") and 7.3; 9.3; 12.3 and 62 and 78; 13.4; 19.12. From Lysias most examples come very often exactly at the beginning of his narration.

More exceptional is Isocrates 16, *Concerning the Team of Horses*, where Alcibiades' son is the speaker; he is insistent on the speaker's task of instructing and educating the audience.¹⁶ There is, nevertheless, a big difference between the two genres, for the instruction in the forensic genre is always accompanied by a request for close attention. This request is almost always absent from my material. Moreover, the speakers in my genre speak with greater decisiveness, with more self-confidence and authority. In both genres speakers ask for a decision in favour of their proposals, but in the forensic situation the orator is personally involved and dependent on his judges, whereas the symbouleutic speaker has more distance and, in general, rejection of his ideas has no bad consequences for himself. The decisiveness and self-confidence, I think, contribute to the speaker conducting himself as the instructor with great knowledge and deep insight.

The next step will be to find out whether the theoreticians (Aristotle and the author of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*) have given attention to this aspect or not. Of course, we should not forget that the theoreticians do not intend to give a description of the actual state of oratory but put forward their ideas about how it should be done. They may illustrate their views with quotations from speeches that have actually been given in a court or an assembly, but fictive examples are possible as well.

I have not found a very clear statement about the aspect of a teaching mode in either book, not even in the best discussion on the impression the speaker must try to create, Aristotle's discussion of the *êthos tou legontos*. Our *honorandus* has done much work to clarify the relevant parts of Aristotle's works dealing with *êthos* and also given sharp analyses of Cicero's ideas on this aspect of speeches. I especially think of his papers in *Rhetorica* and in the *Festschrift* for Carl Werner Müller. Character is one of the technical modes of proof and persuasion through character has as its goal credibility (*axiopistos*). As Bill Fortenbaugh¹⁷ says: "The speaker presents three attributes which a sober-minded audience looks for in a credible speaker; and when the facts of a case are difficult to determine, the audience regularly and reasonably believes the speaker who exhibits wisdom, virtue and goodwill", referring to *Rhet.* 2.1. 1378a20–22. There Aristotle also says,

¹⁶ Too 1995 200–205 takes this speech as a starting point for her chapter on "The Politics of Discipleship." The passages from Demosthenes and Lysias I have taken over from her book.

¹⁷ Fortenbaugh 1996b 180.

a person seeming to have all those qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers. The means by which one might appear prudent and good are to be grasped from analysis of the virtues. (*trans. Kennedy*)

This analysis is found in 1.9. Alas, what is said there does not allude in any respect to the didactic tone, to the instructive mode, to the teacher-like approach by the speaker toward his audience. Neither in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* nor in Anaximenes' *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* do we find any statement we can interpret as their authors hinting at this facet of deliberative speeches.¹⁸ It would not have been awkward if they had done so, for a link between the speaker before the Assembly and the teacher of the people could easily have been made. Until the Classical Age poets were generally looked at as such, so why not the deliberative speaker, the *rhetor*?¹⁹ But they have not made this connection and are silent about the teachership of *rhetoires*.²⁰

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¹⁸ At the Rutgers Conference David Mirhady wondered whether Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1355a24–29 might not serve as a handle to solve the problem. There Aristotle mentions the second reason why rhetoric is useful and "argues that scientific knowledge *by itself* cannot win conviction in ordinary discussions with people because of the inability of untrained minds to follow such an argument" (Grimaldi *ad loc.*). He also says that "*discourse grounded in specialized knowledge is proper to formal instruction*" (*didaskalia*), apparently implying that *inter alia* deliberative speech is not proper to this instruction. However, this implication is not present here, and the "ordinary discussions" (*enteuxeis*) Aristotle is speaking about are different from the public speeches, as Kennedy 1991 292 n. 14 in his translation remarks.

¹⁹ Too 1995 ch. 6 sketches an impressive picture of interrelations between poets, politicians, philosophers and other intellectuals in their views on education. She does not, however, make enough distinction between politicians having a view on education and politicians educating their audience, the people, the latter view being what my paper is concerned with.

²⁰ Tom Conley kindly corrected my English.

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CHAPTER TWO

ÊTHOS IN PERSUASION AND IN MUSICAL EDUCATION IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

ECKART SCHÜTRUMPF¹

In Book 1 of Plato's *Politeia* old Kephalos finds comfort in his wealth because it saved him from having to lie or cheat against his will, whereas—we have to understand—poverty often forces others to commit such unethical acts (331a). Wealth made it easier for Kephalos to live a just life. However, Sokrates introduces special circumstances in which lying would be the right thing to do and rejects Kephalos' understanding of justice: "This is then the definition of truth, to speak the truth ...?"² Polemarchos, who takes over his father's part, disagrees with Sokrates, returning to and defending Kephalos' position.

Kephalos' view that a person of high ethical quality will *speak* the truth is the assumption underlying at least one element of one of the means of persuasion, *pisteis*, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: *êthos*.³ *Êthos* is one of the three technical means or modes of persuasion; they are technical because they are the product of the mastery of the rhetorical art and its rules by the orator⁴—as distinguished from the non-technical means, which are readily available for the orator's use, such as pieces of evidence, witnesses or written accounts.⁵ Aristotle regards *êthos* as a very powerful tool to render the speaker credible

¹ W.W. Fortenbaugh, the recipient of this *Festschrift*, has been, in his numerous contributions to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in the forefront of those who helped us to understand better Aristotle's concept of *êthos*. My contribution can only be a footnote on that subject, dedicated to a wonderful friend for the last two decades.

² Pl. *Resp.* 331d2 οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὄρος ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν...; Even closer to Aristotelian *êthos* is Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.31: Virtue addresses Vice in front of Herakles at the crossroads: "Who will trust you when you say something?"

³ Outside of a rhetorical context *Eth. Nic.* 10.2 1172b15.

⁴ They are exhibited through the speech: 1.8 1366a 9, cf. Hellwig 1973 260–261. Fortenbaugh 1996 151 explains the fact that "through the character of the speaker" (1.2 1356a2–3; a5) is not used in 2.1 because of the different orientation: in 1.2 Aristotle refers to judicial rhetoric, in 2.1 to deliberative.

⁵ Cf. Wisse 1989 35; Schütrumpf 1994a 95–110.

and trustworthy (1.2 1356a5; 9 1366a28) or trusted (2.1 1378a6, cf. a 15). Through *êthos* the speaker creates in his audience the impression that he is a good man⁶ and a man of practical wisdom, that is, of sound thinking or competence (2.1 1378a8), and finally that he is well disposed (1.8 1366a11) to the audience (2.1 1378a8–19). Aristotle indicates that these three personal requirements of the speaker are not of the same kind: for the first two he refers to his treatment of ethical qualities (*aretai*),⁷ for the last, goodwill, to that of friendship⁸ and generally emotion (2.1 1378a15–19).

Aristotelian *êthos*, by which a speaker appears to the audience to be a good man, establishes the link between character and the way of speaking that Plato had referred to at *Politeia* book 1. However, in all of Plato's treatments of rhetoric, nowhere, not even in the *Phaidros*, can anything even remotely resembling Aristotelian *êthos* be found. Does this mean that we should discard Plato with regard to the development of *êthos* as a mode of persuasion? There is good reason for taking this position since there is written evidence suggesting that the concepts bringing together the three qualities that formed Aristotelian *êthos* were already used in an assessment of an orator's performance as early as the 2nd half of the 5th century BC.⁹

Since Plato was able to create this fictional conversation between Kephalos and Sokrates, one might ask why he did not use the insight that a good person tells the truth and can, therefore, be trusted in order to create for himself this mode of persuasion, *êthos*, as Aristotle later did. To put it differently: why did Plato not embrace this most "ethical" means of persuasion as a desirable mode of speaking? My answer is that Plato had a problem, not with the speaker but with his necessary complement in the process of persuasion: the audience.

It has been argued that Aristotle's threefold division of technical proofs is based on the analysis of the rhetorical situation into speaker (*êthos*), listener (*pathos*), and argument (*logos*).¹⁰ While this

⁶ Cf. *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a 18 ἐαντὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον; 1.9 1366a25–28 λέγοντας καλῶς δεικνύντες ἐξ ὧν ποιοῖ τις ἐποληφθῆσόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος; according to 1.2 1356a6 a good man (*epieikês*) finds more credibility; cf. a23; 8 1366a10f.; 9 1366a25–28.

⁷ The reference is to *Rhet.* 1.9 1366a23–25.

⁸ Discussed in 2.4 1380b35ff. Cf. for friendship on the part of an orator *Pl. Grg.* 513a–b; 481d.

⁹ Schütrumpf 1993 12–17.

¹⁰ Cf. Fortenbaugh 1996 149n. 6.

helps to understand the underlying principle, it would be wrong to overlook the fact that Aristotle's concept of *êthos* implies both aspects: the speaker *and* the audience. This is clear with regard to goodwill (*eunoia*), which not only is directed towards the audience but changes its point of view as well, as Aristotle makes clear at *Rhetoric* 3.14 1415a34, where he mentions among the means of persuasion directed at the audience first goodwill and then stirring up emotions.¹¹ And this inclusion of the audience is true generally for persuasion through *êthos*:¹² when Aristotle states: *we* trust good men more and faster,¹³ he makes a statement about a typical inclination of the *audience* to respond to the character of the *speaker* in this specific manner. And the audience is the understood indirect object in the phrase: that the speaker *appears* in a certain way, of course he *appears* to the audience (cf. 2.1, 1377b26–27.), which will then trust him, e.g. 1.8 1366a10: we trust because the speaker appears to have a certain quality.¹⁴ In the same chapter, a chapter dealing with *êthos*, Aristotle demands that the orator knows the goals of the various constitutions since the people make their choices by referring to these goals (1.8 1366a 2 ff.); the orator needs to understand what is advantageous under the various constitutions since all men are persuaded by what is advantageous (1365b23–25). Here Aristotle reveals to the student of rhetoric a basic insight into mass psychology, namely that people are generally opportunistic and will easily accept whatever has been presented to them as advantageous. Such a knowledge of the psyche of his *audience* is the key to the speaker's success when employing *êthos*. In Aristotle's treatment of *êthos* the audience is clearly included since it is in a specific way affected by the way the speaker appears to be, and this will finally result in the audience being persuaded.

In this paper, I will address the angle of the audience in *êthos* and try to place the Aristotelian concept of *êthos*, on which a lot of ink has been spilled, into a larger context. I will focus on the assessment of the abilities of the audience mainly in Plato. I will do this because in my opinion, for Aristotle to develop this one mode of persuasion,

¹¹ *Rhet.* 3.14 1415a34 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι, cf. for the role of the audience 2.1 1377b26–27 καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πῶς διακείσθαι αὐτόν—Aristotle speaks of the perception of the audience.

¹² Hellwig 1973 252 limits the attitude of the speaker towards the audience to the part of *êthos*: *eunoia*.

¹³ Arist. *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a5–6 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπεικέει πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶπτον.

¹⁴ Arist. *Rhet.* 1.8 1366a10 τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν; cf. Hellwig 1973 265: “das moralische ἦθος wirkt nur, wenn es vom Zuhörer als solches anerkannt wird ...”, repeated 279.

êthos through a good character, he needed an uncharacteristically and maybe unrealistically optimistic view about the capabilities of the *audience*.

This view of Aristotle, that an audience looks in a speaker for all three qualities mentioned, namely to be a good man, a man of practical wisdom, and finally that he is well-disposed to the audience, was not shared by Plato in the *Gorgias*. There Sokrates' interlocutor, Gorgias, brags that when accompanying his brother, who was a doctor, on his house calls, the patients the doctor visits normally do not listen to his brother when he suggests a treatment; they listen to him, the orator (456b). If we generalize this anecdote we could say that the audiences Gorgias has experienced do not care at all about the quality or qualification of the speaker; the audience rejects qualified men and listens instead to the person who possesses only rhetorical skills. Kallikles later echoes this theme with regard to the quality of character: if Sokrates were to appear in front of an audience, e.g. a jury, he would be sentenced to death (486a–b). This most just man of his time, as he is called in the 7th letter (324e), would miserably fail when speaking—as his defense speech, which rejects *pathos* and is full of *êthos*, actually proved. For Kallikles the ethical quality of the speaker is irrelevant to the audience. Returning to the other aspect of the *pistis êthos*, sound thinking, everybody remembers Sokrates pointing out in the *Protagoras* that the Athenians demand the testimony of experts on building projects, but when it comes to politics they do not ask where the man who gives advice learned it or who his teacher was (319b–d). Plato expresses in these early dialogues a very low opinion of the audience, of its ability or even willingness to judge a speaker by the qualities he had or wanted to be perceived as having.

This is not just an inference I draw from the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*. Plato says so in as many words at *Politeia* book 8 558b7–8: democracy does not care about the personal habits their democratic leaders used to practise before they entered politics but holds them in high honor if they only claim to be well disposed to the people. It is understood that a critical look by the public at their leader's previous life would be the proper approach. However, under democracy, there is only one thing the people are interested in and that is receiving favors; therefore, they are concerned with whether or not the speaker promises to deliver them. I said “promises” or “claims” (φῆ), which refer to public statements of politicians, to political rhetoric. Here, in a context that evokes rhetoric (φῆ), two of the three elements of Aristotelian *êthos*, personal quality and goodwill, are mentioned side

by side. I have argued elsewhere¹⁵ that the three elements of what was to become Aristotelian *êthos* were already used in an assessment of an orator's performance as early as the 2nd half of the 5th century BC.

Judged in terms of Aristotelian *êthos*, according to Plato, *Politeia* 8, an audience in a democracy does not pay attention to any *quality* of the speakers, but it has a very keen eye or ear for a speaker's *eunoia*. This statement about people under democracy who do not care about their leaders' backgrounds because they care only about their goodwill reveals that Plato has a less favorable opinion about an audience than Aristotle, who after having listed the three requirements of *êthos* added: "necessarily the speaker who seems to have all these qualities is trusted by the listeners."¹⁶ The difference between Plato and Aristotle in their assessment of the audience can be easily described: according to Aristotle it expects from its speakers to possess *all* these qualities, but according to Plato it expects that they are only well disposed (μόνον εὖνους εἶναι). Plato sounds here like the Old Oligarch.¹⁷ On similar lines there is in Plato's *Politeia* book 6 an attack against orators who are able to manipulate a crowd because they understand its wishes like someone who handles wild animals. They write their tricks down in technical treatises and turn to teaching without understanding the true value of any of these qualities but follow the crowd, calling noble whatever pleases the crowd and calling evil whatever the crowd resents.¹⁸

The criticism of the politicians in contemporary democracy who have only one goal, namely to please the people, according to *Politeia* book 6 was already one main theme in the *Gorgias*.¹⁹ An orator who wants to be successful has to identify the desires of the people and fulfill their wishes. Sokrates argues that Kallikles would be ill advised to assume that he can become powerful while being at odds with the form of government he is living under or that he can contradict the character of its people. He has to do more than imitate it; he has to become truly like it since all men are pleased and happy with the character of speeches that is like their character and resent what

¹⁵ Schütrumpf 1993 12–17.

¹⁶ *Rhetoric* 2.1 1378a14–15 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροαμένοις πιστόν.

¹⁷ [Xen.], *Ath. Pol.* 1.7: the politicians in democracy know that their lack of education, depravity and goodwill are more advantageous than the opposite qualities; cf. Schütrumpf 1993 15–16.

¹⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 493c2–3 οἷς μὲν χαίροις ἐκείνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά.

¹⁹ 464b–465d; 481d–e; 515a–519d.

is unfamiliar.²⁰ Note that here as in the preceding passage from the *Politeia* Plato uses the same two verbs (“to be pleased”—“resent”, χαίρειν—ἄχθεσθαι) to express the positive and negative responses respectively to the presentation of a character—Plato might well refer here to an element of established rhetorical theory.

On the basis of his view about the ills of contemporary democracy, that is, about the low expectations of the public regarding the quality of their leaders, there was nothing that could even suggest that Plato was developing a means of persuasion *êthos*, namely a rhetorical strategy for influencing an audience through the presentation of a good character, as Aristotle later wrote. For different reasons, all three elements of *êthos* were out of the question for Plato: *eunoia* and its implicit consequences, namely, pleasing the people, Plato rejected; consideration by the public of the speaker’s *aretê* and competence, which he was demanding, he found missing.

One might object to this reading that Sokrates in the *Gorgias* forces the orator Gorgias to admit that an orator must be a just man.²¹ However, here Sokrates does not perceive the quality of character as a *rhetorical device* that enhances the speaker’s credibility with the audience. Rather, as the added words “being just he must wish to *do* just things” reveal, he talks about the quality of the action.²² Sokrates forces Gorgias—with tricks that Polos will later expose (461b–c)—to admit to a position Gorgias does not really believe in. Sokrates’ demand that the speaker possess justice reflects his rigorous moral standards as he applied them in the same dialogue to Athenian politicians as well (515c4 ff.), but it does not formulate a strategy to improve the chances of persuading an audience.

There is an additional obstacle for Plato against developing a means of persuasion *êthos*: in dialogues after the *Gorgias* we simply do not find situations in which an audience is given the power to accept or reject a proposal submitted by a speaker. Therefore, there is no orator who has to make an effort to persuade an audience, e.g. by appearing to be a good person. In the *Politeia* very little is said about the way the philosopher kings communicate with the guardians of this Utopia. There will be judges in the best state (3

²⁰ *Gorg.* 513c τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται.

²¹ Pl. *Grg.* 460c οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; cf. 503d6 ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων; cf. 508c.

²² In doing so, he builds here on Gorgias’ understanding of rhetoric, which enables a man to *rule* over others in his city and to *persuade* in political assemblies, *Gorgias* 452d5 ff.

408d2–410a), but whether there will be the opportunity for judicial rhetoric or whether its use will be restricted, as later in the *Laws*,²³ we have no way of knowing. The guardians do not have the powers of the Athenian citizens in the public Assembly (*ekklesia*) so that the philosopher king is under no pressure to convince them to adopt his proposals. Clearly here a situation typical for rhetoric, namely one in which an audience listens to the speaker and has the freedom to follow his counsel or reject it and where the outcome of a vote might be determined by the orator's skill, does not exist. Without doubt, the philosopher king wants the principles of his political actions to be accepted by his subjects, but there is no indication that he uses persuasion in the Aristotelian sense.

When all inhabitants of the utopia should believe that they are very different by nature and have to be assigned to different classes Plato is honest enough to write that a bold lie should be used (3 414b8ff.)—which is a very clear indication that the philosopher-kings do not have to engage in an honest exchange of opinions with their subjects and be believed to tell the truth—on the basis of their characters. And when the philosopher kings and their helpers want to make sure that only the fittest males and females engage in sexual activities and procreate equally fit offspring, even the guardians are told that the lucky winners were chosen by lot (5 460a8)—the only democratic feature in the *Politeia*.²⁴ Plato says clearly that frequent lies and deceit have to be used for this purpose (459c8). In any case, Plato does not show enough trust in the judgment of the guardians of his best state to use the art of persuasion in the arrangement of important issues affecting them.

On the other hand, the failure to *persuade* young men is mentioned once in Plato's criticism of the education of the timarchic state, which is modeled after that of Sparta. In *Politeia* 8 548b7–c Sokrates states that its citizens will disobey the law and seek pleasures in secret since they have been educated by force rather than by persuasion (οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι). This remark allows us to conclude that in the best state education employs persuasion. While education by means of persuasion might impart ethical values in the guardians, the philosopher kings do not seem to trust them very much—at least in the situations we mentioned, and Aris-

²³ Schütrumpf 1994b 99–116.

²⁴ In any case, even the guardians are not told the truth. Maybe Plato underestimates their intelligence a little bit as if they would never find out that the lottery picks always those who had distinguished themselves in warfare.

totle claimed that this was a general feature of the *Politeia*. At *Politics* 2.5 he remarks: it does not make sense that the man who wanted to introduce education, and who believed that through it the state was to become good, thought one could set things right by these means²⁵—these means (τοῖς τοιούτοις) refers to Plato's arrangements regarding property and family, and this includes the lottery where the winning ticket is sex. Aristotle criticizes Plato for not trusting education enough. Education was the area in which persuasion was used. Unfortunately Plato—at least in Aristotle's judgment—himself did not allow it, and by implication rhetoric, to become an important part of his utopia.

It is therefore surprising that in the *Phaidros* Plato outlines an approach to rhetoric. From George Kennedy's²⁶ section on the *Phaidros* one gains the impression that Plato—for reasons we can not quite understand—made this one-time attempt to write in a constructive way about rhetoric, an attempt which stands completely isolated from the topics of his philosophical interest discussed in his other works. This is a rhetoric that meets philosophical standards. Plato assumes that the speaker cannot competently perform his task unless he has given serious attention to philosophy (261a). Where the orator of the *Gorgias* according to Sokrates needed *justice*, the orator of the *Phaidros* is expected to know the *truth* about every subject matter on which he speaks (277b). Is the audience paying attention now? Plato must assume this since in the *Phaidros* he takes his audience seriously for the first time. Here rhetoric is the art of winning over the souls of the audience (*psychagôgia*). In order to succeed, the expert has to study the soul and to learn how many kinds exist. He has to classify the different kinds of men and adapt the appropriate kind of speech to each of them (271a–273e). Here Plato's focus is on the psychological makeup of the *audience* for which the orator has to compose a matching speech. However, in the *Phaidros* he did not establish an internal link between the expectations with regard to the *quality* of the orator, that is, his philosophical competence, on the one hand, and its possible effect on the audience, on the other, as Aristotelian *êthos* with its component *phronêsis* does (*Rhetoric* 2.1 1378a8).

Another obstacle against taking rhetoric seriously and developing a means of persuasion *êthos* is the fact that Plato is all too ready

²⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 2.5 1263b37 καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπουδαίαν ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἶεσθαι διορθοῦν.

²⁶ Kennedy 1963 74–80.

to forgo rhetoric and substitute it with the use of force. I will pursue this aspect by following up on a motif we encountered in the *Gorgias*, namely the role of an orator in his relation to a doctor. In the *Politikos* we again come across the medical doctor in a situation that requires rhetoric. Plato rejects the common sentiment that a ruler any more than a doctor should be blamed if he uses force instead of persuasion (296aff.; cf. *Politeia* 7 519e 4). Here we find some attempt by the doctor himself or by politicians to persuade their respective clientele or constituencies. Given the likelihood that the doctor will fail to convince the patient, as it was pointed out in the *Gorgias*, we are not surprised to find an alternative; but this time the alternative is not that the doctor brings with him a sweet talker who persuades the patient to submit to a treatment which the doctor could not convince him to undergo. Here the alternative is no longer persuasion but the use of force. Now only one criterion has to be met and this is that the principles of the *technê* are to be implemented to their fullest extent and without allowing deviation from them by paying attention to pesky opposition coming from people who do not understand how much they benefit from expert treatment. As in the *Gorgias*, Plato does not assume that people will listen to the advice from experts. There is little chance that rhetoric and its element *êthos*, which includes competence, could succeed.

Therefore Plato does not seriously think about rhetoric but readily accepts the alternative: force. In light of this the occasional attempt at using persuasion becomes pretty irrelevant. In the *Politeia* Plato himself allows the statesman to employ a strategy which he had described—clearly with disgust—there in book 6, in the famous description of a mutiny on a ship: the crew does everything in its power to gain control over the ship; if the crew does not succeed in convincing the master of the ship to hand over the control but others prevail, the crew will kill them or throw them off the ship;²⁷ killing is the extreme use of force if their attempt of persuasion fails. In this same context the methods used by the crew to take over control are either persuading the master of the ship or using force against him.²⁸

If one ignores for a moment the higher goal Plato pursues in the *Politikos*, the autocratic political strategy outlined there with regard to exercising power is not better than the behavior of the mutinous crew on a ship: in both cases, if for different reasons, there is no group

²⁷ Pl. *Resp.* 488c ἐνίστε δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτείνοντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς.

²⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 488d2–3 ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιάζόμενοι.

of people who are respected enough that their consent should be sought and an honest effort should be made by their leaders to win them over to their position.

I believe, however, that for the topic of rhetoric, Plato's *Laws* are normally overlooked. Here we again come across the comparison of the politician with the doctor—actually a comparison with two different kinds of doctors. At 4 720c Plato describes how slaves are treated by slave doctors, who do not give any explanation, but prescribe a treatment as a tyrant would. The free doctor, on the other hand, treats free people, he communicates (κοινοῦμενος) with the patient and his next of kin, and to the best of his abilities he gives information to the patient. He does not order a treatment until he has won over the patient *through persuasion*; only then does he give orders, which will lead the patient, whose resistance he overcame by persuasion at any given stage, to health.²⁹ Now, a rhetorician no longer accompanies the doctor and does the talking as in the *Gorgias*. This was an absurd situation in itself with the expert standing by and the non-expert speaking instead of him, a situation which invited a negative view both of this deceptive practice and of the gullibility of the audience. And no longer, as in the *Politikos*, is it irrelevant for the assessment of a statesman (291e) or a doctor, whether he uses persuasion or force. Now the distinction between a treatment people accept voluntarily and one imposed on them by force—a distinction which the *Politikos* eliminated knowing well that such a proposal ran against common sentiment (296c–d)—is restored. The tyranny of the use of force is limited to the despotic realm, slaves treating slaves, whereas among free men persuasion is the *conditio sine qua non* for a medical treatment. No longer must a patient accept a treatment because the expert armed with his true knowledge decides that this is the right thing to do whether the patient agrees or not. Force is again, what it always should have been, a treatment reserved for people one cannot influence by appeal to their reason.³⁰ Such an approach is now reserved for slaves, whereas persuasion is now the only way to deal with free men. Free men are taken seriously with their fears when they are confronted with illness and medical treatment and they are treated with respect. Their consent is sought. Persuasion is not the milder approach, which will be replaced by force if persuasion

²⁹ Pl. *Leg.* 720d καθ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν, διδάσκει τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐπέταξεν πρὶν ἂν πῃ συμπίσῃ, τότε δὲ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἡμεροῦμενον αἰεὶ παρασχευάζων τὸν κάμνοντα, εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν ἄγων.

³⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 10.10 1180a4–12.

does not seem to work. If the doctor fails to convince his patient, he cannot go ahead with the treatment. No longer is rhetoric the carrot while one will use the stick when one cannot persuade the listener. Here we have a *situation* in which rhetoric is possible in a meaningful sense: an informed man speaks to others who are free to reject his advice. The orator has to make every effort to convince those who listen to him.

How should one explain this change? In my opinion, in this his latest work the septuagenarian Plato has mellowed in his judgment of men, which was from the *Gorgias* to the *Politikos* quite harsh and negative. The *Laws* are remarkable in that Plato frees himself from some of his earlier, very rigid views and reveals an openness to, and rather a sympathetic understanding of people, recognizing the presence of good judgment in the citizens of the state of the *Laws* as one does not find it earlier in his work.

In the *Gorgias*, Sokrates could envision a form of rhetoric which met his ethical standards, but the disdain he showed for the audience, which seeks nothing other than to be pleased, an audience that would prefer the shopkeeper who sells sweets over the doctor who improves health, made a rhetorical situation impossible; the doctor needed to resort to manipulation instead. And in the *Politeia* Plato still did not show enough confidence in the judgment even of the guardians to include them in a situation in which they would be taken seriously as an audience. Plato still thought that they should be influenced through manipulation and lies. Finally, the authoritarian approach in the *Politikos*, where the superior knowledge invested in very few had to be implemented exactly the way they saw it, did not allow rhetoric to be practised, except for very rare exceptions. Only in the *Laws* does this second best state consist of citizens who are presented as people who will use their judgment responsibly and, therefore, deserve to be addressed in a respectful way. The comparison with the doctors in the *Laws* is central to his enterprise there: Plato will draft not just laws for this state, but first proems, through which the citizens should be *convinced* to follow those principles that the law will impose in a tyrannical fashion (4 722bff.). Plato is proud of his approach to appeal to his citizens through persuasion (πείθειν), which, as he says, cannot be found in any earlier lawgivers.

In spite of the repeated references to persuasion (πείθειν) in the *Laws*, this work does not contain any element of Aristotle's means of persuasion *êthos*. Does this mean that we should discard Plato with regard to the development of this mode of persuasion *êthos*? I want to argue here that this is not the case.

In *Politeia* book 3 Plato requires from painters, sculptors, poets and all artists that they represent in their works of art only good characters (401a). While growing up, the guardians will be surrounded only by works that are beautiful. They will make this beauty the standard by which they judge whatever they encounter: they will perceive the shortcomings of works of art and will dislike, reject, and condemn the ugliness shown while they will embrace and like everything beautiful. Plato stresses here that musical training is so important since music penetrates the soul deeply and can shape it as nothing else can (401d). Music consists of harmony, rhythm and words. The properly educated guardian will love *poetry* if it has been written according to Plato's prescriptions. If Plato had allowed a role for rhetoric to play in his utopia of the *Politeia*—which he did not—the properly educated guardians would have loved *speeches* in which the speaker revealed a character like that which the guardians have been educated to develop.

I feel reminded here of the conversation between Sokrates and Kallikles in the *Gorgias* in which Sokrates argues that Kallikles can never become powerful unless he assimilates himself completely to the values of the society he is living under. As a speaker he has to meet their expectations since all men are pleased and happy with the character of speeches that is like their own character.³¹ The audience in the *Gorgias* does exactly what the well educated guardians according to *Politeia* 3 402d do: they respond favorably to presentations that express the *êthê* they themselves have—note that Plato uses *êthos* in both cases. The young man brought up in this environment will have an acute perception and, by making the proper distinction, he will praise what is noble, and, by taking delight in it and absorbing it in his soul, he will be nurtured by it and become a truly good man, but he will condemn what is offensive and hate it already as a youth.³²

It seems to me that there is a connection between the theory of musical education in *Politeia* book 3 and the critical remarks

³¹ Pl. *Grg.* 513c τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται.

³² Pl. *Resp.* 3 401e–402a ὁρθῶς δὴ διακρίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχροῦ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὁρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν. διακρίνων is the conjecture I introduced for δυσχεραίνων of the manuscripts, see Schütrumpf 1980 181–186. Plato here uses again—as in *Gorgias* 513c—the same verb χαίρειν to express the response of accepting what they are exposed to, instead of ἄχθονται in the *Gorgias* he uses an equally strong μισεῖν for the rejection of offensive things.

about the audience's response in *Gorgias* 513c and *Politeia* book 6 493c respectively. I am not arguing that the common response to rhetoric on the basis of one's character and the improvement of such a response through musical education are one and the same concept. I am arguing that in their relative fields of rhetoric or music respectively they are the application of a popular idea. Xenophon in the *Education of Cyrus* states that everybody loves things that suit himself.³³ Xenophon refers among other things to clothes. The ancients noted that some people had a peculiar way of dressing: Hippodamus of Miletus³⁴ wore the same coat summer and winter, and there is Sokrates or Krates of Thebes.³⁵ People have their preferences for a wide range of things, food, music, books, etc., and this preference has to do with who they are. If we read this in Xenophon we can be confident that this idea was hardly conceived by philosophers but is at best "popular morality". The remark about rhetoric at *Gorgias* 513c is the application to rhetoric of this trivial truism that everybody responds positively to what is in line with his personal preference. And the theory of musical education in *Politeia* book 3 is based on this same principle that people embrace characters that conform to their nature and reject the opposite ones.

When in the *Gorgias* Plato expressed the idea that people respond to speeches according to their character, he did so in a critical spirit. Clearly he disliked the way people he had in mind commonly responded, but he had even more contempt for the spineless adjustment of the speaker to whatever he felt his audience desired. In *Politeia* book 6 this criticism is even more pointed, since he now observes how orators take advantage of the public response and develop it into a technique, a method of speaking or of teaching to speak. However here, in the act of founding a new state, Plato does not simply accept whatever people might prefer, as was the situation in the *Gorgias*. Here in the *Politeia* he forms them and shapes their character. All who are older than ten years will be removed from the state. The younger ones are obviously not yet corrupted. Here it is the works of music, that is their harmony, rhythm and words, or the works of fine art that first form a character through their principles of symmetry and moderation. Once a young man or woman is formed in the intended way he or she will respond to what is seen or heard in accordance with the character they have received: they will

³³ Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.10–11 ἕκαστος γοῦν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐρεῖ.

³⁴ Aristotle, *Politics* 2.8, 1267b25.

³⁵ Diog. Laert. 6.91.

accept everything that agrees with their character and reject what contradicts it. Since music includes text, they will enjoy reading or listening to works of literature that represent men as they themselves are or strive to become. They would listen as well to a speaker whose speeches contain the character they have been brought up with, and they would easily be persuaded by what such a speaker would say. However, musical education in Plato is not the preparation of the guardians to become an audience that is better than that of democracy as it was described in the *Gorgias*. Education in the *Politeia* serves many purposes, but none that is related to rhetoric.

Aristotle picked up where Plato had left off: his concept of musical education in *Politics* books 7–8, the two books that discuss the best state whose citizens live a life of happiness, closely follows that of Plato. Aristotle describes his concept of musical education in *Politics* book 8.5. Music in Aristotle's best state is not an esoteric, purely esthetic affair. It is the only form of pastime Aristotle discusses.³⁶

In these books we find Aristotle's concept of happiness as he developed it in his *Ethics*.³⁷ We find as well the concept of the bipartite soul,³⁸ but do not find, what seems to have gone unnoticed, Aristotle's usual understanding of *aretê* as a *hexis* in the middle between two extremes.³⁹ Instead we read: "since it so happened that *aretê* deals with the proper way of enjoyment, love and hatred, one must obviously learn and get used to nothing as much as to judging correctly and to enjoying good characters and noble actions."⁴⁰ A good person will take delight in good characters (ἐπικιέσιν ἡθεσιν).⁴¹

If we apply this general attitude of a good man to the specific situation of rhetoric, Aristotle would argue that a good man will love a speech in which a good character is revealed and trust such a speaker while he will reject the opposite one. Aristotle establishes here a response of others to the qualities of character as they appear to them. This is the very concept underlying Aristotle's ethical means of persuasion in the *Rhetoric*. There are specific qualities in which an author presents himself and which the audience then embraces and rewards with trust.

³⁶ Solmsen 1964 193–220.

³⁷ Cf. the reference *Politics* 7.13 1332a7 ff.

³⁸ *Politics* 7.14 1333a16 ff.

³⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 2.6 1106b36 ff.

⁴⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 8.5 1340a15–18 ἐπει δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι ... τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μὴθὲν οὕτως ὥς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικιέσιν ἡθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν.

⁴¹ Cf. Schütrumpf 1993 12–17.

It was my intention to show that the ethical means of persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are not a notion specifically developed for rhetoric but that it is a special application of a pattern of thought found elsewhere and in particular in musical education. When Aristotle at *Politics* 8.5 1340a14–18 makes taking delight in good characters (ἐπιεικέσιν ἡθεσιν) one element of the description of *arête*, he uses the same adjective as at *Rhetoric* 2.1 1378a 12, where he defined one of the qualities in which an author presents himself, a quality which the audience embraces and rewards with trust. According to Aristotle, *Politics* 8.5 1340a18ff., the responses evoked by the representation of characters through music come close to having these same responses in real life. This means that in real life people react to good characters with delight and to bad ones with hatred—these are the same emotional responses described with regard to rhetoric in Plato *Gorgias* 513c, *Politeia* 6 493c,⁴² and in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

With regard to the Aristotelian means of persuasion *êthos*, I would like to argue here that Aristotle is indebted to a multitude of influences. There is first the insight expressed in Plato's *Gorgias* 513c about the response of the audience to the character expressed in speeches, namely that all men are pleased and happy with the character of speeches that is like their own character while they resent the opposite one. However, Aristotle chose to free this tenet from Plato's negative bias. In *Politeia* book 3 Plato had already shown that there can be a positive version of the maxim in *Gorgias* 513c; according to *Politeia* book 3 well educated people enjoy good characters, but this was not applied to rhetoric. One could say that Aristotle combines the principle about the response of an audience from Plato's *Gorgias* with the expectations for a response to character by men educated through the arts that Plato expresses in the *Politeia*. But Aristotelian *êthos* is not reserved for a utopian society; it applies to any audience. This is in line with Aristotle's optimism about the qualities of an audience.⁴³

We noticed that according to Plato, *Politeia* 8 558b6–8 nobody in a democracy is concerned about the life of politicians, and that includes their quality and qualifications. Aristotle on the contrary assumes that the audience listens attentively to a speech for any

⁴² Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 3 401e3ff.

⁴³ For his positive view concerning the abilities of all men for truth, see *Rhetoric* 1.1 1355a15–17 (Hellwig 1973 274), cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1.6 1216b30; for their mental, intellectual capacity for the tasks awaiting them see *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354a4–7.

sign that the speaker is a good man. Compared with the view of Plato, Aristotle somehow restored faith in the basic decency of the common man in the sense that an audience cares about the quality of the speaker who addresses it and regards his appearance as a good man as the most persuasive part of his speech. This is reminiscent of *Politics* 3.11, where Aristotle argues that the demos when assembled is a better judge than a small number of very qualified people might be. The role given by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* to the technical *pistis êthos*, through which the speaker by appearing a good or intelligent man is trusted, reveals a new and positive judgment about the abilities and quality of the *audience*:⁴⁴ Aristotle believed that an audience would believe a speaker who is good, competent or intelligent, and well-disposed to them.

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⁴⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 12.950b7 ff. concedes even to bad men the ability to distinguish between good and bad men.

CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOTLE'S ENTHYMEME, *THYMOS*, AND PLATO

DAVID C. MIRHADY

“Enthymeme” is the central term of Aristotelian rhetoric, yet Aristotle offers precious little indication why he found this term so striking. Nominally, an enthymeme (*enthymêma*) should be the “result or effect”¹ of an action “in the *thymos*”. The *thymos* was for Aristotle, as it was for the Greeks in general, the seat of the emotions, particularly anger. The word itself is related to *thusia*, the word for (generally burnt) sacrifice, and to *thysis*, meaning “seething”, or, to use a Latin cognate of *thymos*, “fuming”.² The word *thymos* seems therefore to refer to excited states of the soul or at any rate to the place where that excitement, that “fuming”, takes place. That would make the *enthymêma* the result or effect of an action in the place where the soul is excited.

The term *enthymêma* appears in authors as early as Sophocles, and it entered into the technical terminology of rhetoric already by the early teaching career of Isocrates (13.16). Alcidas also uses the term (19). But none of these authors reveals any precise meaning.³ In the generation before Aristotle, however, although Plato did not use the term *enthymêma* itself, he did appropriate the term *thymos*

¹ Smyth 1920 841.2: “The result or effect of an action is expressed by the primary suffixes 1. ες and 2. ματ.”

² Cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 419d–e οὐδ’ “ἐπιθυμία” χαλεπὸν τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούση δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. “θυμός” δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα. *Nor is there any difficulty about epithymia (desire), for this name was evidently given to the power that goes on upon (epi) the soul (thymos). And thymos has its name from the raging (thysis) and boiling of the soul.*

³ Soph. *OC* 1198–1201 καὶν κείνα λεύσσης, οἷδ’ ἐγὼ, γνώσει κακοῦ θυμοῦ τελευτὴν ὡς κακὴ προσγίνεται. ἔχεις γὰρ οὐχὶ βαιὰ τάνθυμήματα, τῶν σὼν ἀδέρκτων ὁμιμάτων τιτῶμενος. (*If you look at those things, I know that you’ll understand the consequence of an evil spirit, that it turns out evil. For you have no scanty enthymêmata, bereft of your unseeing eyes.*) 292–294 ταρβεῖν μὲν, ᾧ γεραῖέ, τάνθυμήματα πολλή’ στ’ ἀνάγκη τὰπὸ σοῦ· λόγοισι γὰρ οὐκ ὠνόμασται βραχέσι. (*There is great compulsion, old man, to respect the enthymêmata from you; for they have not been set forth in light words.*) Burnyeat 1994 11 suggests that enthymeme “refers to the ideas expressed in a speech as contrasted with the language.” That seems particularly true of Alcidas’ usage (*Soph.* 3–4, 18–20, 24–25, 33).

to describe one of the three elements in his psychology, the one intermediate between reason (*nous*) and appetite (*epithymia*), the second of which, of course, literally refers to something, or some activity, “on top of” (*epi*) the *thymos*, as he says in the *Cratylus*. Plato assigned specific roles to the class of people who were dominated by the *thymos*, the *thymoeideis*; he associated them with certain martial values, as well as with a somewhat limited intellectual capacity. It seems entirely possible, therefore, that in his choice of this term for rhetoric, Aristotle was influenced by this striking usage by Plato. It is the primary goal of this paper to explore this possibility.

The orators contemporary with Plato and Aristotle, with the exception of Isocrates, do not generally use the noun *enthymêma*, but several do use the verb *enthymeisthai*. It occurs as regularly as other logical terms, such as *tekmêrion* or *eikos*.⁴ The verb often appears as an imperative, and it is almost always directed to the judges in a law court. The speaker demands of them that they “think” or “consider”—we might now say “fume over”—some point of the speaker’s. It seems as if *enthymeisthai* might be stronger in its emotional force than other verbs for thinking that could be used in its place, such as *nomizein*, *oiesthai*, *skopein*, or *hegeisthai*, and the point to be considered is usually somewhat complex. But there really is no sense in which an emotional force is a necessary aspect of each usage. The relationship of the verb *enthymeisthai* to the noun *thymos* seems therefore to reveal a dead etymology, one no longer in the minds of the verb’s users or listeners. The speaker’s point, however, seems to be identifiable, from a rhetorical point of view, as an *enthymêma*, at least in the fairly vague sense in which theoreticians such as Isocrates and Alcidamas use the term (see e.g. Isoc. 9.10, 12.2, and 15.47).⁵

When Aristotle came to engage in rhetorical theorizing and had gathered the various rhetorical handbooks then in circulation into his *Technôn synagôgê*,⁶ he must have given close attention to the range of terms used by his predecessors to describe forms of thought, terms including *eikota*, *paradeigmata*, *tekmêria*, *enthymêmata*, *gnomai*, *semeia*, and *elenchoi* (cf. *Rh. Al.* 7.2). When deciding how to distinguish them, besides observing common usage, he must have

⁴ The number of instances of the verb ἐνθυμεῖσθαι in the corpus of Attic orators in every 10,000 words: Aeschines 0, Andocides 5.16, Antiphon 3.31, Demosthenes 2.2, Demades, Dinarchus and Hypereides 0, Isaeus 3.15, Isocrates 4.96, Lysurgus 2.77, Lysias 11.74.

⁵ Walker 1994 49 links the enthymeme in Isocrates to stylistic matters. Cf. Conley 1984 172.

⁶ On the *Technon synagoge*, see Schöpsdau 1994.

been struck by the term *enthymêma* and by its etymology, just as he makes a point of understanding the word *tekmêrion* in terms of its etymology (see 1.2 1357b9–10 τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν *tekmâr and peras are the same in the old language*), even if this was a dead etymology among current users of the term. He cannot have failed to notice that the term's etymology (in the "old language"), if not its then current usage, implied the engagement of the *thymos* and its close association with emotional response, just at a time when he was himself forming the view that the emotional response of the listener was in fact integral to and philosophically appropriate for rhetoric. Here he was turning the corner that he does at *Rhetoric* 1.1.11 (1355a2), where, after conceding all of rhetoric's warts, he begins to formulate what belongs to it nevertheless as an *entechnos methodos*. From the same list of terms for logical thought, his contemporary Anaximenes gives the *enthymêma* no privileged status. Anaximenes' definition of the term, moreover, is even more idiosyncratic than Aristotle's, associating it specifically with "contraries" and with his "investigative species" (*eidôs exetastikon*), for use only in attacking the opponent's position (*Rh. Al.* 10).⁷

Aristotle makes *enthymêma* his central term, criticizing writers of other rhetorical handbooks for saying nothing about enthymemes (1354a14) and calling the enthymeme at various times the "body of *pistis*"⁸ (1354a15), "a rhetorical demonstration" (1355a5–6), "a rhetorical syllogism" (1356b3), and the "most authoritative of the proofs"⁹ (1355a7–8). He even makes it a point of rhetorical excellence that someone might become "enthymêmatic" (1354b22). By

⁷ Conley 1984 173 nicely outlines Anaximenes' discussion of enthymemes, although I cannot share his view that Anaximenes influenced Aristotle regarding them.

⁸ Various interpretations of the phrase "body of *pistis*" have been offered. Kennedy 1991 30 n. 10 writes, "*Body* is here contrasted with 'matters external' in the next clause. Though Aristotle does not say so, one might speculate that the soul, or life, of persuasion comes from ethical and emotional qualities." McCabe 1994 139 sees the passage referring to the body as opposed to clothing. My own understanding sees the enthymeme as body as opposed to the head alone. That is, the *pistis* involves both a statement, the head, and the support for that statement, the enthymeme, the body. Of course, there is a sense in which the head both is and is not a part of the body. But see the next note.

⁹ Kennedy 1991 33 translates *kuriotaton ton pisteon* as "strongest of the *pisteis*", but perhaps we should understand *kuriotaton* rather as "most genuine" in the sense that the enthymeme *embodies* what is most properly a *pistis*. Aristotle also calls the enthymeme a "syllogism of a kind" (*syllogismos tis* 1355a8, 1400b37); see Burnyeat 1994 12, 30. At 1356b4–5 Aristotle contrasts it, as a deductive proof, with an example.

emphasizing the term *enthymêma* (whose etymology is linked to the *thymos*) Aristotle seems to acknowledge that rhetorical discourse is pervaded by emotion just as he is criticizing his predecessors for discussing only emotional manipulation.

There have been divergent views about what constitutes an Aristotelian enthymeme, and colleagues including Tobias Reinhardt in this volume can pursue the logical aspects of the enthymeme that Aristotle explores at the end of book 2 without touching on its emotional aspects.¹⁰ Here I would like to promote an understanding of the enthymeme as a form of cognitive activity that takes place within the context of emotional response and to extend the analysis of Bill Fortenbaugh's *Aristotle on Emotion*, particularly with regard to the irrational aspects of emotion. He explains that for Aristotle emotion belongs to the alogical side of a bi-partite soul, but that it nevertheless has a cognitive capacity. In fact thought is the effective cause of emotion.¹¹ The sort of reasoning of the enthymeme, the "rhetorical syllogism", thus differs from that of the dialectical syllogism in being constrained by the limited rational, but still cognitive capacities of the emotions. One way that emotions might influence judgments would be simply that they entail certain judgments. Opposing judgments could thus not be held simultaneously, by a law of non-contradiction. But that is a law of logic. It holds equally well for dialectic. It thus tells us little about the alogical aspect of the enthymeme.

Emotions are for Aristotle *logoi enuloi*, en-mattered statements (*De anima* 1.1 403a25). A natural scientist would define an emotion differently from a dialectician: the dialectician gives one account—"anger is an appetite for returning pain for pain, something like that" (403a30–31)—and the natural scientist gives the material account—"anger is a boiling of the blood surrounding the heart" (403a32–b1). The material account of emotions is significant. In the process of experiencing emotions, the material cause, the human physiology, changes in ways that lead to different judgments: "the emotions are those things because of which people (when) changing (them) differ with regard to their judgments (and) which are accompanied by pain and pleasure" (*Rhet.* 2.1 1378a20–22). A lover judges his beloved differently than a non-lover would (2.1 1377b30–1378a4, 2.4 1380b35–81a2). The lover has certain physiological activity associated with thoughts of the beloved that affects his judgment. A

¹⁰ See Conley 1984 and Burnyeat 1994, who nicely dismiss the view that the enthymeme is simply an abbreviated syllogism and survey a range of other views.

¹¹ Fortenbaugh 1975 23–44, 115.

group with its anger satisfied and cooled feels less vindictive against those with whom it still feels angry (2.3 1380b11–14). In a rhetorical context, Aristotle says that a speech actually has the power to put judges into a state in which it is impossible for them to feel an emotion like pity.¹²

How then are the rational capacities of the emotions limited? One way does have to do with the connection of emotions to the body and in particular to its feelings of pleasure and pain (*De Anima* 1.1 403a16–24, *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a20–21). In Aristotle's definitions of the emotions, the presence of pleasure and/or pain with the holding of a belief is the major distinction between a thought and an emotion (*Eth. Nic.* 2.5 1105b21–23; *Eud. Eth.* 2.2 1220b12).¹³ Each emotion entails a disposition of the emotional people (*pôs te diakeimenoi*), which describes its material aspect, as well as an object (*tisin*) and conditions (*epi poiois*) (*Rhet.* 2.1 1378a24–26). Pleasures and pains reflect the disposition, which inhibits the cognitive capacity.¹⁴ Aristotle at one point faults the emotional manipulation of hearers by likening it to the bending of a ruler, a *kanon*, and this metaphor can be employed here. Pain is felt when the ruler is bent out of its natural shape, pleasure when it is returned to normal. Of course, the natural shape is itself pleasurable, but not noticeably;¹⁵ one only notices a pleasurable feeling as the ruler is being returned to its natural shape from an unnatural shape, as thirst is satisfied, a tightened muscle is massaged, or a lost loved one is found again. Thus, when the *kanon*, the soul of the hearer, is being moved out of and back into its natural shape, the hearer's judgments, and even his perceptions, are affected, *irrationally* (*On Dreams* 2 460b3–16; cf. *De anima* 2.6 431a8–

¹² *Rhet.* 2.9 1387b18–21. Cf. 2.10 1388a26–29 and 2.2 1379a23–24: one emotion can also set up another.

¹³ In the *Eud. Eth.* passage, Aristotle introduces some qualifiers, saying the “in general (ὁλως) perceptual pleasure or pain for the most part (ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) follow” emotions. I agree with Fortenbaugh 2002 109, 119 that Aristotle has in mind particular emotional episodes rather than, as Leighton 1984 135–138 argues, “emotions” such as hatred, which lack pleasure and pain.

¹⁴ Here I would disagree slightly with Bill Fortenbaugh 1975 110–111 about the relationship between the emotion and pleasure and pain. He sees the emotion causing pleasure or pain, a relationship of cause and effect. I would say that the pleasure or pain reflect, through the biological faculty of sensation, the physiological aspect of the emotion, that is, its material cause. If Aristotle were doing physics instead of rhetoric, he might describe unpleasant heart palpitations (see Fortenbaugh 1975 112–113), but for the purposes of rhetoric it is enough for him to mention only the pain (that results from such palpitations). Cf. Leighton 1982 155–157, who emphasizes that pleasure and pain are part of the concept of emotion.

¹⁵ *Rhet.* 1.11 1369b32–1370a39.

10). Although emotions are affected by rhetorical speech, once they provoke feelings of pleasure and pain, these feelings—or rather the bodily dispositions that they reflect—influence judgment without regard to their logical basis in ways that are analogous to drinking alcohol. The peripatetic author of *Problems* 30 notes that wine may make people feel emotions, an indication being the drinker who is induced to kiss someone whom no one would otherwise kiss (30.1 953b16–18). In these conditions, like a person asleep, a person may have some knowledge, but temporarily not have it (*Eth. Nic.* 7.3 1147a11–18). In rhetorical practice, the enthymeme is directed toward the current and defined judgments of assemblymen and judges, who are affected by immediate emotions, such as love, anger, and desire, not the general, dispassionate questions of legislators. The *rhêtor* thus necessarily takes into consideration pleasure and pain, Aristotle's indication of the physiological aspect of emotions.

Now this sort of explanation is consistent with Aristotle's views on emotion and Bill Fortenbaugh's explanation of them. It indicates that emotional reasoning, *enthymêma*-tic reasoning, is different from dialectical, dispassionate reasoning because of its material cause, human physiology. But we need to go further in explaining Aristotle's appropriation of the term *enthymêma*, and here Plato seems instructive in ways that may not yet have been fully considered. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates says that the part of the soul in which the desires (*epithymiai*) are located is most susceptible to persuasion (493a). These are the basest of human drives, and Socrates is very critical of them. But in the *Phaedrus* he is saying that a rhetorical *technê* must "classify the kinds of *logoi* and of souls and the emotions (*pathêmata*) of them, describing all their causes (*aitias*)" (271b). Plato is setting the stage for Aristotle's philosophical rhetoric.

In the *Republic*, Plato seems to form his characterization of the high-spirited person, the *thymoeides*, partly with a view to his criticisms of the Homeric values he wishes to transcend. His guardians themselves are to be high-spirited, *thymoeideis*, every bit as invincible as an Achilles or an Odysseus (2 375b). But they are to be guided ultimately not by *thymos* but by *nous*, reason. In Plato's psychology, as Bill Fortenbaugh¹⁶ has pointed out, each of the three parts of the soul brings with it values, particular ethical points of view, and cognitive abilities. The person whose *thymos* is dominant is motivated, like a Homeric hero, by love of honor, which leads to envy, and by love of

¹⁶ Fortenbaugh 1975 38–39.

victory, which makes him sometimes violent (8 548c, 55ob, 9 581a, 586c).¹⁷ Spirited people are simple, more suited to war than peace (8 547e). They like physical training and hunting (3 41ob, 8 549a). The well trained will become gentle to their friends and the opposite toward their enemies (2 375e, 3 410e–411e). Socrates likens the *thymos* to a lion, a brave animal that, like the human, rational, part, might be dominated by the multiform beast of the appetites (9 588d, 59ob). In particular, *thymos* is associated in the *Republic* with defending justice, as when Socrates asks, “when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his *thymos* in that case seethe and grow fierce ... and make itself the ally of what he thinks just?” (4 440c–d).

Aristotle has his own views of the *thymos*. In a famous passage, he explains that the *thymos* mishears speech somehow; he gives as analogues servants who run off before hearing everything said, so that they mistake their orders, and dogs who bark at a knock before seeing whether it is a friend who is knocking. Because of its heat and the swiftness of its nature, the *thymos* hears without understanding and so springs to vengeance (*Eth. Nic.* 7.6 1149a24–31). Like Plato, Aristotle sees the *thymos* as integral to a person’s sense of justice, as well as to courage.¹⁸ He grants that actions done under the influence of *thymos* are voluntary (*Eth. Nic.* 3.1 1111a29–30) but denies that they involve deliberate choice because the *thymos* does not have reason (*Eth. Nic.* 3.2 1111b18). Unlike Plato, however, he does not assign ethical values to the *thymos*, but simply talks in terms of its mean disposition between being overly gentle and overly irascible.¹⁹

The rhetorical audience must be somewhat like Aristotle’s slave, who can perceive reason even if he does not have it (*Pol.* 1.5 1254b23–24, 7.14 1333a16–18). The audience’s role is likewise passive. To say that it is passive is not to say, however, that it is simply a blank sheet ready to be stamped by the speaker. Emotions also involve complexes of thought, developed through habit, that also react in somewhat active ways to rhetorical stimuli. Besides their material cause, the human physiology, emotions also have effective (*epi poiois*)

¹⁷ One passage adds “control” (*kratein*) to victory and high repute (9 581a). Like the appetites that must be satisfied (but no more) before the philosopher goes to sleep, the spirit must be soothed so that anger does not disturb him (9 572a). Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 7.7 1327b39–40a7. For a recent discussion of *thymos* in Plato, see Hobbs 2000.

¹⁸ Justice *Eud. Eth.* 2.5 1222b5–8, 3.3 1231b10–26; courage *Eud. Eth.* 3.1 1229b26–34, 3.8 1116b23–30, citing Homer, 1117a4–5.

¹⁹ Gentle *Eud. Eth.* 2.5 1222b2–4; irascible *Eth. Nic.* 4.5 1126a19–21. Cf. *Eud. Eth.* 3.3 1231b10–26.

and final causes (*tisin*), both of which result from complexes of thought patterns developed through habituation.

For Aristotle, as for the handbook writers from whom he began his thinking, forensic oratory is the paradigmatic genre of rhetoric, the primary listeners are law court judges, and the primary emotion is anger. Aristotle certainly argues against this paradigm in *Rhetoric* 1.1—he wants to make deliberative oratory primary (1354b23–27)—but he never escapes it. Throughout the first chapter of the *Rhetoric* he uses the law court as his model even as he rails against the current formulators of rhetorical handbooks devoted to forensic oratory. In forensic rhetoric, other people's affairs, not those of the judges, are at stake (1354b29–33). It thus runs against a basic Greek value of minding one's own business. Here special consideration must be given to the engagement of the listeners' emotions, which can only be engaged when they feel that they themselves, or those they perceive as close to them, are involved.

For Aristotle, the enthymeme must deal with the *pragma* of the speech, its proper subject matter (1354a16). If Aristotle assumes that the word *enthymêma* has the connotation of emotional involvement, he must be at pains in 1.1 to dissociate enthymemes from emotional *distortion* of judges. Of course, in Aristotle's scheme, one of the three *entechnoi pisteis* is directed at the emotional state of the judge. But the force of his statement that the enthymeme is the body of proof seems to be that all three *entechnoi pisteis* always apply simultaneously, that every argument must give consideration to the emotion of the listeners, the character of the speaker, and to the logical construction of the words.²⁰ That would give the *entechnoi pisteis* a status altogether different conceptually from that of, e.g., the *atechnoi pisteis*. The *atechnoi pisteis* of *Rhet.* 1.15 clearly come into play only where laws, witnesses, etc. are being discussed. Moreover, Aristotle devotes book 2 of the *Rhetoric* to discrete treatments of *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, as if they were discrete. Nevertheless, every rhetorical situation does simultaneously involve the credibility of a speaker's *êthos*, the *emotional* reaction of the audience, even if it is not always a vehemently emotional reaction, and a logical structure to the *logos*. Aristotle's *enthymêma*-tic *rhêtor* seems to need to be aware

²⁰ *Rhet.* 1.1 1354b19–22 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὅθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός *They concern themselves with nothing except how to put the judge in a certain frame of mind, and about the entechnoi pisteis they show nothing, but this is how one may become enthymematic.* Cf. 1.2 1356a14–16.

of all three in order "to observe the potentially persuasive in each situation" (1.2 1355b25–26). Book 2 deals thus with the ethical, emotional, and logical aspects of enthymemes, even if he refers to them as enthymemes only in the logical section.

Aristotle uses the term *enthymêma* in several senses. In the broadest sense, I suggest, in the sense in which he calls it the most authoritative/genuine (*kuriotaton*) of the *pisteis* (1355a6–7), he means by it a properly constructed rhetorical argument, one that, being used in a particular speech on a particular occasion, is formulated with consideration to all of the *entechnoi pisteis*. Only in a second sense does Aristotle distinguish the enthymeme from a *paradeigma*, an example (1356b6–7). In this sense, the enthymeme is the rhetorical analogue to a deductive proof.

Jeffrey Walker has written a stimulating paper on the psychology of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.²¹ I came upon the paper after the essential points in my own were worked out, but our approaches have much in common, so I would like to devote attention to some of his points here. Walker argues that "by attempting to include an account of *pathos* in his theory of rhetoric, Aristotle ... commits that theory to a recognition that all practical reasoning is pathetic reasoning, that all enthymemes are enthymemes of *pathos*" (91). On these points I wholly agree with him. But when he says that Aristotle does this "implicitly if unintentionally", I would disagree, as I think my foregoing discussion would indicate. Aristotle appears to me fully aware of his commitments to pathetic reasoning. Walker puts too much emphasis on passages like that in *Eth. Nic.* 10.9, in which Aristotle reflects on the challenges facing those who wish to bring "the many" to virtue.²² The *pathos* that Aristotle is discussing when he says that "passion does not seem amenable to reason, but to force" (1179b28–29) does not seem to be the passion belonging to the *thymos*, but that of *epithymia*, which is entirely irrational. Hunger and sexual desire are not reliant on beliefs for their existence in the way anger is. Walker also puts emphasis on Aristotle's talk about audience *mochthêria* (75, 88, cf. 3.1 1403b34–35 and 1404a8). But Aristotle's complaints about the deficiencies of the audiences in tragedy are actually much more common. These deficiencies are an aspect of these popular media that the practitioners have to deal with. As Walker acknowledges, the word *mochthêria* need not have a particularly moral force.

²¹ Walker 2000.

²² Walker 2000 75.

Walker draws Aristotle's views on the *katharsis* of emotions into his discussion of rhetoric in a very interesting way, and if we are to have a clear understanding of Aristotle on emotions we should certainly be able to say how *katharsis* relates to rhetoric. Walker's view is that *katharsis* does not involve emotion being purged away, but rather its becoming manifest with an appropriate conceptual frame (78), one that is a purification of otherwise diffuse emotional turmoil (83). The task of the speaker, therefore, would be to achieve such a *katharsis* of emotional responses by shaping them appropriately. At least two points need to be made in response. First, in the brief mention of *katharsis* in the *Poetics*, Aristotle says that the *katharsis* of emotional states (of such emotions as pity and fear) is to be achieved "through" the pity and fear. Whatever this admittedly unclear passage means, it surely implies that the pity and fear may exist without their *katharsis*, as well as with it, so that *katharsis* cannot be only the manifestation of such emotions, ordered or disordered. Second, Aristotle does not actually mention *katharsis* in the *Rhetoric*, though he lacks no opportunity to do so. Its place as a goal of tragic mimesis in the *Poetics* suggests, however, that it lies more in that realm, a *katharsis* of aesthetic and religious observance (*theoria*) rather than the pragmatic needs of rhetoric. While *katharsis* of emotions may be a positive good, it would seem to lie outside the persuasive goals of rhetoric, though perhaps a place might be found for it in the response of the epideictic *theôros* (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b5–6).

In the opening chapter of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle seems to have to steer a course between his students trained in dialectic, for whom he has written his treatise, and the rhetorical *technai* assembled in his *Technôn synagôgê*, which are the raw material for his own thinking on rhetoric. Dispassionate dialectic is the reference point from which he develops his view of rhetoric as its *antistrophos* (1.1 1354a1). He must also consider the stimulus of Plato, whose *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, however, show an increasing appreciation of the emotions. Aristotle's students in dialectic will have taken a dim view of the *technai*, which prescribed ways of evading the truth, or making the weaker argument the stronger, and of manipulating listeners' emotions. From the Academic tradition, they may have gained more than a healthy distrust for "rhetoric" entirely. Aristotle must therefore acknowledge their concerns about emotional manipulation and character assassination (thus the inclusion of the word *diabolê* 1354a16).²³ But he also

²³ On *diabolê*, see Isoc. 11.5; Pl. *Phdr.* 267d.

points out the necessity for rhetoric, the fact that groups of people must take decisions within short spaces of time and in emotionally charged situations (*Rhet.* 1.2 1357a2–4; cf. *Pl. Grg.* 455a).²⁴ He must thus impress upon his students that rhetoric is philosophically, and practically, worth their attention. They are not budding orators, anxious to learn tricks from a handbook, but they do appreciate the worthiness of philosophical and practical, political problems.

Aristotle's use of the term "enthymeme" is striking in *Rhet.* 1.1, when he declares, seemingly out of nowhere, that enthymemes are the body of *pistis*. He appears to assume that some of the terminological issues have been settled in the now lost *Methodics* (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356b20). But with the term *enthymêma* Aristotle appears, without explanation, to resurrect a dead etymology and to assign the democratic listeners of the assembly and law courts the martial and timocratic dispositions that Plato associates with his spirited class, the *thymoeides*. Like the slaves of Aristotle's *Politics*, these massed thymetic and epithymetic listeners can apprehend reasoned speech, though they cannot produce it. The former will be responsive to it, the latter less so. They are disposed, however, to orient themselves to issues of justice and gain, and they follow not necessarily the truth, but what resembles the truth, employing commonly held opinions, *endoxa* (1.1 1355a17), and being guided by the *enthymêmata* fashioned by a speaker. There was doubtless some rhetorical handbook that put the enthymeme in the foreground before Aristotle did, but as with so much else, Aristotle's work has completely overshadowed it.

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²⁴ Burnyeat 1994 13 words it as follows: "certainty and proof are not to be had (1.2 1367a7–8, 1357a1–2), yet a judgment must be made (1.3 1358a36–b8, 2.1 1377b21–78a6, 2.18 1391b8–20, 3.19.1420b2–3)... There are things to be said on either side (2.25 1402a31–34)."

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CHAPTER FOUR

REASON IN SPEECH? *LOGOS* AND MEANS OF PERSUASION IN ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

JOHANNES M. VAN OPHUIJSEN

One influence on Aristotle's rhetoric is so ubiquitous that it is easily overlooked: that of Aristotle's philosophy. To do justice to this influence would be a demanding task, but there are parts of such a project that could usefully be attempted in one paper. In the one that follows, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is explored from the angle of a search into uses of the word *logos* for the light they might throw on the evolution of a concept of reason. I propose a lean, thin conception of *logos* in I below, and apply this hypothetically to the *Rhetoric* in II and III. In II, I argue that most occurrences in the *Rhetoric* can be interpreted as instances of a lexical *meaning* not more specific than that of a *stretch of speech*, or the *content* of one, or a *subject* for one, to be narrowed down in various ways by the particular context. These uses are exemplified in 1 to 19 below. Items 20 to 30, discussed in III, illustrate uses of *logos* and its kin that may seem to hold clues to a concept of reason in the making. These raise a few questions and suggest a few points about the *Rhetoric* as a whole, and about Aristotle's interest in the subject. It is shown that a lean conception of *logos* and of reason is no obstacle to an understanding of the most sophisticated rhetoric of antiquity.

I. *legein and logos*

i. *Relations between Aristotle's uses of logos and his account of means of persuasion*

The question I propose to discuss is: Can we establish any relations between Aristotle's uses of *logos* and his account of the means of persuasion in the *Rhetoric*?

I take three propositions for granted:

- (1) All three of the means or modes of persuasion or proofs within the art (*pisteis entekhnai*) detailed in the *Rhetoric* proceed “through the *logos*”, presumably in the sense of “speech”.
- (2) The third of them—which is, according to *Rhetoric* 1.1, the pre-eminent means of persuasion—consists of ways of *reasoning* and forms of *argument*.
- (3) We are used to interpreting the ancient Greek word *logos* in many places within the *Rhetoric* and elsewhere in terms of *argument*, and to make it central to the emergence of concepts of *reason* and *rationality*.

Our point of departure may be Aristotle’s familiar division of means of persuasion or proofs falling under the art and provided “*through the speech*” into three *species* (*eide*); the third of these types is said to reside “*in the speech itself*”:¹

(1) 1.2 1356a1–19

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the *spoken word* there are three kinds (τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πείσσεων τρία εἶδη ἔστιν 1–2 Barnes—by the *speech* Freese) ...

the third [kind depends] on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the *words of the speech* itself (αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι 3–4—the *speech*)

... when the *speech* is so *spoken* as to make us think [the speaker] credible (ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα 5–6—when his *speech* is *delivered*) ...

Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the *speech* stirs their emotions (διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν 14–15—by his *speech*) ...

Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the *speech* itself (διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν 19—by the *speech* itself).

The two other species, too, are supposed to take effect *through* the speech. The first type, *character*, is said to be a matter of the *way*, of *how* the speech “is spoken”. The sequel makes it clear that this is not a matter of delivery or “diction” (*lexis*) but of *content*, more precisely of how a certain content is *formulated*. Something similar applies to the

¹ I quote from the *Rhetoric* in the Oxford translation by Rhys Roberts as revised by Barnes, and sometimes (between brackets, usually following the transcription of the Greek) the Loeb translation by Freese, *exempli gratia*, without implying an evaluation of either of these versions or of any of those *not* collated for the purpose.

second type, *emotion*: an audience is “led on” to some state of feeling “by the speech”, which turns out to mean: by a presentation of the case geared towards certain emotional effects. The third type, by contrast, is operative “through the speech” alone, or perhaps rather, in view of the plural, “through the *things said*” (διὰ τῶν λόγων).

These twenty lines by themselves would show, if proof were needed, that *logos* has more than one use even within the *Rhetoric*, as it appears to range from what might be called a purely “extensional” reference to any *stretch* of *speech* of a length defined by oratorical practice or rhetorical instruction, to a more abstract use connoting a core of *content* capable of being formulated in ways that vary to suit purposes we would now call pragmatic.

Such variation in the use of *logos* is familiar enough. In the *Rhetoric* it may be worth looking for a possible relation of varieties of *logos* to the degrees of accuracy and the kinds of justification appropriate to different disciplines, where rhetoric occupies an intermediate situation between the sciences from which it borrows, and the lay person’s discourse that defines its limits.²

ii. *legein sorting out and summing up, logos a summing up (by A, of a “real” B, as C)*

Traditional wisdom has it that Greek *logos* covers both Latin *ratio* and *oratio*; see for instance the entry in Bonitz’s *Index*.³ There exists moreover a common notion of a gradual development of and from the Greek term towards “our” concept of reason; see for instance the introduction written by Ross for the World’s Classics edition of what, revised by Ackrill and Urmson, is still one of the most often used translations of Aristotle’s *Ethics*.⁴

Until recently the accepted translation was “reason”,⁵ but normally in Aristotle it stands not for the faculty of reason, but for something grasped by reason, or perhaps sometimes for an operation of reason. Its connexion with “reason” is so close as to make “irrational” the most natural translation of *alogos*. But for *logos* I have used ... such render-

² It is fair to warn the reader that these notes on *logos* are meant to bear on the emergence or evolution of the concept of “reason” and on the character and status of Aristotelian rhetoric rather than on the interpretation of the passages quoted from the *Rhetoric* in detail.

³ Bonitz 1870 *s.v.* *logos*, 436b49: *logos* ... et rationem et orationem significat.

⁴ Ross 1980 4 n. 1.

⁵ Or, as the “Note on the revision” by Ackrill and Urmson (Ross) 1980 xxvii has it: “The word is often translated ‘reason’”.

ings as *rational principle, rational ground, rule ... , argument, reasoning, course of reasoning*. The connexion between reason and its object is for Aristotle so close that not infrequently *logos* occurs where strict logic would require him to be naming the faculty of reason, and it is possible that in some of the latest passages of his works in which *logos* occurs it has come to mean “reason”—which it certainly had come to mean, not much later in the history of philosophy.

Here I will, until we are forced to accept the opposite conclusion, take it as a reasonable working hypothesis that different uses of *logos* bear senses between which a family resemblance is operative at a level relevant to our understanding of the texts;⁶ and will moreover assume, following Ackrill⁷ and others, that these senses relate to fairly basic uses of the underlying verb *legein*. We will therefore begin with *legein*, for whose “primary meanings” Ackrill, commenting on *logos* as it is used in Aristotle’s *De interpretatione*, offers the English equivalents “count”, “tell”, “say”, “speak”. Readers of Greek will note that among these four uses of *legein* the non-verbal one, for counting, is by far the rarest, and of the other three “say” may be expected to fit most frequently and “tell” least. In historical times *legein* is squarely a verb, if not the verb, of saying.

Nevertheless I submit that, with a view to accommodating the uses of *legein* with its various compounds and derivatives in one network bound together by family resemblance, “count” and “tell” should be regarded as more basic than “say” or “speak”: The earliest attested uses of compounds, *sullegein* “gather, collect” and *eklegein* “choose, select”, bear witness to a root meaning of (a) “sorting (out)”, “classifying”, “dividing and arranging into sets”, which could lead naturally to both (b) “counting” and (c) “summing up”, including application to registering and recording, listing, giving an inventory, setting out, and so to expounding and describing. This would imply that the verb, unlike “speak”, is (d) primarily transitive, and that in this use it, unlike “say”, (e) primarily involves objects that are “out there”: external and real as opposed to merely verbal. This would make “tell” and “state” closer approximations of *legein* insofar as it denotes verbal action than “say” or “speak”.

⁶ This is a slightly weaker claim than that made by Ross: “I cannot hope to please everybody. ... I have ... tried to limit my renderings of such terms [as *logos* or *arkhê*] to a reasonably small number of alternatives, so that the *thread of identical significance* may not be entirely lost” (Ross, Translator’s Preface 1954 xxiv; italics JMo), but I uphold his implicit rejection of accounts that would assume polysemy at a deep level.

⁷ The Greek word *logos* ... is the verbal noun from a verb whose primary meanings are “count”, “tell”, “say”, “speak” (Ackrill 1963 124 on 16b26ff.)

A use of the noun *logos* that we might expect to correspond with the verb *legein* as sorting out and summing up would be that for a list, an inventory or record, of the type of the archives preserved in linear-B, rather than a sentence or claim. As with the verb, with the noun too we find such a presumably basic use in a compound, here with a different prefix: *katalogos*, for instance the catalogue of ships in the Homeric *Iliad*, Book II. In view of the compounds *eklegein*, *sullegein* and *katalogos*, we may surmise that *logos* too applies primarily to an actual external object, and take uses of *logos* for the description of such an object or for the paraphrase of a name (*onoma*), i.e. for expressions at the logical level of a term, as more basic or central than uses more or less equivalent to sentence or claim, i.e. expressions at the level of a proposition. The transition to the latter level is illustrated in the context of definitions, where a *logos* in the sense of a referring expression, the nominal phrase used to paraphrase a name, equals a *definiens* rather than the definition as a whole.

The term *logos* would thus originally carry an implicit realist commitment, which might be called naïve in the sense that it is not reasoned and argued: unless otherwise stated, a well-formed *logos* is expected to be veridical, accurate and adequate to some object. From the earliest instances, as in Hesiod's *Theogony*,⁸ down to Plato's *Sophist* at least, it is the negative and especially the false *logoi* that are secondary and need to be explained.

The transition from *logos* as the description of an external referent to *logos* as speech act pure and simple may be understood through use of the verb as a predicate with three places: not "A mentions—", or "—claims—", or "—says B", but "A counts B a C", or "—classifies B as (a) C", or "—holds that B is C". This C, for instance "rational animal" in the traditional Aristotelian definition of the human being, is at once the *logos* "of A" in the subjective use of "of" as of the Greek genitive case, i.e. in the sense that A, here Aristotle, is the subject authoring it, and the *logos* "of B" in the objective use of "of" as of the Greek genitive case, i.e. in that B, in this case human, is the object to which it applies, and the subject term of the descriptive or definitory proposition "(that) B is (a) C" as a whole. Beyond this, several distinctions that we have come to take for

⁸ When in *Theogony* 27–28 Hesiod's Muses assure him that,
 We know (how) to tell many untruths that are like things true
 And we know, when we like, (how) to sing things that are true
 the wonder is at least as much in the first accomplishment as in the second.

granted are conspicuous by their absence: (1) modern vocabulary usually indicates whether the process of *legein* implied is restricted to the mental realm or is put into words, and sometimes whether in spoken words or in writing, whereas *logos* leaves it to the context to specify, as and when needed, which of these applies; (2) modern vocabulary draws a number of fine distinctions among speech acts and types of statement, for instance between narrative, exposition and argument, and between describing and explaining, whereas *logos* encompasses all of these; (3) modern vocabulary distinguishes between utterances from the size and rank of a phrase through clause, sentence, period, chapter and episode up to a self-contained literary composition, whereas *logos* may denote any extent from two words to book length.

Let us now confront these putative semantic components of *legein* and *logos* hypothetically with the instances found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. I quote translations⁹ not as authorities for one interpretation or another but as vantage points for spotting differences between modern languages and early philosophical Greek in ways of mapping out a conceptual area. In face of such differences, the object of identifying common factors underlying a family resemblance between uses is not threatened if an instance can be interpreted in terms of more than one use; on the contrary, a special interest attaches to passages suggesting a transition or a continuum between well-defined uses. Along these lines, I am testing a conception of *logos* that goes beyond mere words, yet falls well short of what we would recognize as a full-fledged faculty of reason. My *logos* of *logos*, the comprehensive description from which I would derive interpretations of instances, is that a *logos* is (1) a specification, possibly expressed in words, of features that make up some functional complex structure and hence, (2) in an external object, the structure thus specified itself, and (3) in the subject that does the *legein*, (a) an act of perceiving or imposing such a structure, and (b) the potency or disposition towards this act.

⁹ See note (1) above.

II. “extensional” *logos*, equivalent or correlative to a stretch of speech

iii–vi. *logos* a stretch of speech or a speech act, variously specified by context

iii. *logos* a speech, a part of one, a type of speech, the content for one or the subject of one

The most clearly defined use of *logos* in the *Rhetoric* is one that might be called “extensional”, denoting a stretch of speech; the most obvious example is *logos* referring to a speech in the sense of a formal oration, as in (2.d), where we note that such a speech has a purpose (*telos*), just as other artifacts, as well as products of nature, do. In the same context we find it illustrated (2.a) how one may hesitate whether such a speech as a whole is referred to (Freese) or only a part of it, a shorter stretch (for instance the *prologue*, Roberts), and also (2.b–c) whether a particular type of speech is intended (*tale* Roberts 1.c, *story* Freese 2.b), or perhaps rather a possible content for one (*theme* Freese 2.c, *argument* Roberts 2.b). Similarly the question may arise (3–4) whether *logos* is a speech (Freese 3, Roberts 4), its content (Roberts 3) or its subject-matter (Freese 4).

(2) 3.14 1415a13–24

(a) In *prologues*, and in epic poetry, a foretaste of the *theme* is given, intended to inform the hearers of it in advance ... (ἐν δὲ προλόγοις καὶ ἔπειτα δείγμά ἐστιν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ἣν ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμῃται ἢ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ—In (*note*: forensic) *speeches*)

(b) give them a grasp of the beginning, and they can hold fast to it and follow the *argument* (ὁ δὲ οὖν ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.—the *story*)

(c) So we find ...

Lead me to tell a new *tale* (διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἡγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον—Inspire me with another *theme*)

(d) the most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction, to show what the aim of the *speech* is (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστιν τὸ τέλος οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος)

(3) 2.1 1377b22 to make the *argument* of his *speech* (the *speech* itself) demonstrative and worthy of belief (convincing—πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικός ἐσται καὶ πιστός)

- (4) 3.14 1415b3–5 all this has nothing to do with the *speech* itself (πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα—outside the *question*)

iv. *logos* at once a *phrase* as opposed to a *noun*, and a *formula* as opposed to a *name*; associated with the notions “*explanatory*”, “*reasonable*” or “*regular*”; in the context of *argument*

The extent of speech involved approaches its lower limit when the reference is to a phrase equivalent to a name or noun (*onoma*) as in (5), where the word for a circle is replaced by what defines one.

- (5) 3.6 1407b26 describe a thing instead of naming it; do not say “circle” but “that surface which extends equally from the middle every way” (τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ’ ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ’ ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον—use of the *description*)

Another context (6.a) presents a slightly different pair of alternatives: we are told to reply not concisely, i.e. by yes or no, but by drawing distinctions, more precisely by dividing the objects involved.¹⁰ Here *logos* covers the formulas in which we do so, and translators have brought out other frequent associations with, and so connotations of, this use: the division has explanatory force (Freese), resting on a kind of regularity (Freese) or reasonableness (Roberts).

The sequel (6.b) hints at how your questioner may use your answer in dialectical argument: a simple affirmative or negative reply will allow her to turn the original question or dialectical proposition into a premise and draw a conclusion. In other words, the preceding context has justified a narrower interpretation of the second instance of *logos* (23 = 6.b, last line) as an argument.

- (6) 3.8 1419a19–23

- (a) In replying, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing *reasonable* distinctions ... (ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαιροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως—by defining them with a *regular explanation*)
- (b) In meeting questions that seem to involve you in a contradiction, offer the explanation at the outset of your answer, before your opponent asks the *next question* or draws his *conclusion* (πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπιὸν ἢ συλλογίσασθαι). For it is not difficult to see

¹⁰ Active *diairein* is normally transitive, and may amount to *defining*, as Freese makes explicit.

the drift of his *argument* in advance (οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος)

We may analyse (7) along the same lines: a simile is a phrase or a clause and so formally a *logos*, but deprived of the operators “(is) like” or “as” that mark it as a *logos*, it reduces itself to a noun.¹¹

- (7) 3.4 1407a15 similes, with the *explanation* omitted, will appear as metaphors (αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι—metaphors without the *details*)

v. “*argument*” a connotation that accrues to *logos* from its context, rather than a semantic component of *logos*

Passage (8), in which instruction is identified with *logos* conforming to scientific knowledge, is similarly ambiguous between what I have called an “extensional” use of *logos* and uses that connote particular types of speech act. Here I would prefer to take the word translated “instruction” (*didaskalia*) in a more extensional and concrete sense too: “a *piece of instruction* is the utterance that conforms to scientific knowledge”, in line with Aristotle’s mention of “didactical” syllogisms in the *Sophistici Elenchi* referring to scientific, demonstrative ones. *Logos* may thus retain the *sense* of “stretch of speech”, even if the present context determines that its *reference* is to contexts we might classify as argumentative.

- (8) 1.1 1355a26 *argument* based on knowledge implies instruction (διδασκαλία ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος—scientific *discourse* is concerned with instruction). (N. b. opposite of a28 = 15 below)

The same could be said of several contexts in which the reference of *logos* to arguments in a technical sense is explicit, as in (9–10) on sophisms, and in a less formal vein (11), where the context makes it likely that the discussion envisaged will involve giving reasons.

- (9) 3.2 1405b8 that upsets the fallacious *argument* (ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον)
 (10) 2.24 1401a28 how Euthydemus *argues* ((ὃ) Εὐθυδήμου λόγος—the *argument* of Euthydemus)
 (11) 1.2 1356b37 materials that call for *discussion* (ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων)—subjects that demand *reasoned discussion*)

¹¹ A metaphor, in the language of *Rhetoric*, Book 3, is not our extended metaphor but, more often than not, a noun that is used metaphorically, syntactically equivalent to the proper noun or *kurion onoma*.

The reference to argumentative speech is obvious in a familiar stock phrase:

- (12) 2.24 1402a24 this sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse *argument* seem the better (καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν).

Yet it is worth noting that this need not imply full-scale reasoning in argumentative steps but only the offering of some verbal support for the position one is trying to secure;¹² and further that the adjectives *hêttô* and *kreittô*, whose connotations are “stronger” and “weaker” rather than “better” and “worse” respectively, would be enough by themselves to narrow *logos* down from a general *sense* of “utterance” to a *reference* to competitive and polemical speech acts in particular.¹³

One could analyze (13–16) on the same lines: in (13) the necessary specification is provided by “unfairly” and “confute” or more literally “(re-, dis-)solve” (*luein*), in (14) by “subtle” or (Freese) “exact” (*akribês*), in (15) by the “means of persuasion” (*pisteis*) preceding and in (16) by this same word *pisteis* as well as by the pair of epithets “demonstrative” and “ethical” or rather “expressive of character”. For the latter passage I find the wide sense I have imputed to *logos* corroborated in (17), which is closely parallel except that instead of the noun *logos* it features the verb *legein*, variously taken to envisage subject-matter (“talk about” Roberts) or manner of speaking (“language” Freese).

- (13) 1.1 1355a32–33 in order ... that, if another man *argues* unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him (ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχομεν—to counteract false *arguments*)
- (14) 3.17 1418b1 if you have no enthymemes, then fall back on character: after all it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle *reasoner* (ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἡθικῶς καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπεικεῖ ἀριόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ—than that his *speech* should be painfully exact)
- (15) 1.1 1355a28 use, as our modes of persuasion and *argument*, notions possessed by everybody (διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους—our proofs and *arguments*). (N.b. apposite of a26 = 7 above*)

¹² Just like “account” and “reason” itself—cf. *vii.* on (23) below—“argument” in English is ambiguous, denoting in many contexts not so much reasoning as verbal disagreement. The availability of equally and similarly ambiguous terms by which to render *logos* in modern languages helps to explain why we have not made more progress in understanding the Greek concept.

¹³ Compare, from the same roots, *kratos* “superior brute force” and *hêttasthai* “to be defeated” respectively.

- (16) 1.8 1366a9 rhetorical persuasion is effected (proofs are established) not only by demonstrative but (also) by ethical *argument* (οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι' ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἠθικοῦ)
- (17) 3.17 1418a38–39 if you have proofs to bring forward, *bring* them forward, and also *talk about* character (ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς—your *language* must be both ethical and demonstrative)

vi. *logos applied to speech acts more basic than arguing*

A passage (18) on the common objective and the universal interest of dialectic and rhetoric offers another context in which “argument” in some sense applies; different in that here the, or one, alternative interpretation is not, extensionally, a stretch of speech, but another type of speech act, in particular the more basic one of stating or describing. Here too I submit that we should allow the word *logos* the widest scope the context allows: the implied subject, the practitioner, is examining and upholding any *logoi* that the twin sister arts of speech may encompass.

- (18) 1.1 1354a5 discuss *statements* and maintain them (καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον—criticize or uphold an *argument*)

In (19) the word applies with the same comprehensive scope: all the elements discussed down to the end of Book III are included in the “capability” rhetoric imparts to the educated speaker.

- (19) 1.2 1356a33 faculties for providing (of furnishing) *arguments* (δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους)

III. *logos abstracting from speech*

vii–viii. *logos divorced from stretches of speech*

vii. *logos in uses addressing numeracy rather than literacy*

All this is not to deny that *logos* is used in the *Rhetoric* as elsewhere in a more abstract, figurative sense. We may begin with a few familiar idioms that might well relate to the use, mentioned earlier, of *legein* to refer to counting. In “contrary to calculation” (*para logon*) it seems that what is as often as not a speech act is generalized to a (not verbal but) mental act, or the internal object of one:

- (20) 1.5 1362a7 contrary to reasonable expectation (*para logon*—beyond calculation)

The idiom, familiar from Plato, of (21) “giving an account” (*logon didonai*), may well have originally denoted something like handing over one’s account-book, showing one’s record, opening one’s books, offering documentation:

- (21) 3.15 1416a35 ... *answer for my words* ... (ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον, ἣ δώσειν εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν)

With (22–23) *axios logou* “worth considering” or perhaps rather “worth factoring in”, Aristotle at (23) calls explicit attention to its idiomatic special sense.

- (22) 2.6 1384a25 ... whose opinion of [him] *matters* to [him]. Such persons are those who ... (... ὧν λόγον ἔχει· λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν ...—whom they esteem ...)
- (23) 2.24 1401a23–24 not ... worth money but ... worthy of *esteem* (*consideration*)—the phrase “worthy of esteem” also having the meaning of “worth *speech*” (οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἶσιν ἄξιον· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται)

In all, I submit that these usages do not take *logos* beyond a rudimentary concept of accounting in the sense of bookkeeping. A technical use that presupposes a more advanced level of numeracy is that which refers to the establishing of a ratio in a mixture, a mathematical proportion or, by extension, any other relation. Within the *Rhetoric* this is found in the context of rhythms defined in terms of the phonetic quantity of prosodic syllables:

- (24) 3.8 1409a6 Between the two last *ratios* comes the ratio of one-and-a-half to one (ἔχεται δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος—... whose *proportion* is 1 1/2 to 1)

Although this might appear to be rather a specialised and isolated use, it may be understood as a ramification of a wider class of uses in which the basic notion of selecting and highlighting a thing’s distinctive, defining and determining features is expanded to that of relating a thing or fact to some condition or explanatory factor as its ground. This class includes those uses in which we assimilate *logos* to *aition* and *aitia* and translate by cause or by reason, in one sense of this likewise ambiguous term.¹⁴ A presupposition of this understanding is that describing and explaining are not so much fixed natural kinds

¹⁴ Cf. (v.) on (12) above.

as areas brought into relief from a continuous range, and that *logos* covers the whole range.¹⁵

viii–ix. *logos in various oppositions*

In a number of other passages *logos* serves as one term in, and is defined by, some very diverse but equally telling oppositions:

viii. *logos a faculty used for self-preservation*

In (25) *logos* is contrasted with force of body as a means of defence, a faculty used for self-preservation. Here as elsewhere in Aristotle,¹⁶ we learn that this faculty is more distinctive of humans than some of their other options. From *De interpretatione*, chapter 1, we know how human *logos* goes beyond animal noises in signifying things to others: its sounds (*phônai*, not mere *psophoi*) are tokens (*sumbola*) by which we evoke in each other the same thought content (*noêma*) so as to communicate and subsequently collaborate.¹⁷ Against this background the present *logos* can be construed as something like significant speech; it tells us little about how we jointly and separately manipulate the shared notions or concepts involved—not enough to classify this as a reference to reason.

- (25) 1.1 1355b1 to defend himself using his limbs, as opposed to *rational speech* (τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ—speech)

The use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs (μᾶλλον ἰδιὸν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας).

In (26) the contrast between a legislator's literal words and his intention implies a certain autonomy on the part of both. However, the *logos* of the *nomothetês* is presumably simply identical with the *nomos*, and so does not connote anything beyond a stretch of speech with a certain content.

- (26) 1.13 1374b11–13 to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he *said* than about what he *meant* (τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον

¹⁵ Cf. (ii.) above.

¹⁶ As well as in Aristotelian apocrypha: Anaximenes 10–11 1421a8–9, 12–13.

¹⁷ A classic text on human collaboration as needed for survival is the myth of Plato's *Protagoras*.

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν—not to the *letter* ... but to the intention)

This leaves just a few highly intriguing references to *logoi* in the *Rhetoric*.

ix. *logoi as objects and products in their own right*

In (27) speeches or words (*logoi*, plural) are opposed to external objects as objects of knowledge. The adverb *monon* “only, alone” recalls the fact that all the various branches of scientific knowledge involve knowledge of *logoi* in the sense of utterances of various kinds—descriptions, definitions, hypotheses, premises and conclusions, etc.—as well as of the objects these *logoi* refer to. By contrast, the twin sister arts of speech have no proper object besides these and other utterances. Thus *logoi* come to appear as objects and products in their own right: a realm of itself.

- (27) 1.4 1359b16 sciences dealing with definite *subjects* rather than simply with *speeches* (ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων—whose subjects are certain definite things, not merely *words*)

But while rhetoric may have no “definite things”, *pragmata*, of its own for its province, still a passage later in the *Rhetoric* (28) specifies its relation to an object called “actions”: *praxeis*, with another noun derived from same verb *prattein*. Here it is said that the speech is “made up of” or “based on” (*ex*) these acts and actions, which are not within the scope of the art because the speaker is not the cause (*aitios*) of them. What is drawn from the art is showing that something is the case, i.e. that the action has taken place, the deed has been done, if the audience needs to be convinced of this; and/or what kind of deed has been done, and/or how “big” a thing it really is.

- (28) 3.16 1416b18–19 there must be some survey of the actions that form the *subject-matter* (*subject*) of the *speech* (δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελεθῆν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος).

The *speech* is a composition containing two parts. One of these is not provided by the orator’s art, viz. the actions themselves, of which the *orator* is in no sense author ... (σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων))

The other part is provided by his art, namely, the proof, where proof is needed, that the actions were done, the description of their quality or of their extent, or even all these three things together (τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἔστι δεῖξαι, ἐὰν ἢ ἄπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα—showing that the action did take place, if it is

incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together)

It is worth noting how this passage recalls some of the moves made in other branches of Aristotle's arts and sciences. (1) Showing or proving *that* something is the case (*hoti esti*), is presupposed by and contrasted with the scientific presentation of causes (*to dioti*) in *Ar. Poet.* (e.g. 1.13, 2.1). (2) The situation where there is no need to persuade an intended audience that something *is the case* is also familiar from what may count as a scientific context: in *Physics* 2.1 Aristotle declines to prove that nature exists, since this would be a case of proving what is obvious by what is not.¹⁸ (3) The object that "constitutes" our *logos* (cf. ἐξ ὧν, σύγκειται ἔχων) is traced and outlined working through the categories—or the first three, substance, quality and quantity—as if it *were* a genuine thing-that-is (an *on*: compare again *hoti esti*).

But a *praxis* is *not* a thing; it is, as we know from *the Nicomachean Ethics*, an action or act of a thing or rather person, or a state of one, e.g. of well-being, and so perhaps a fact about one.

This has implications for the way in which rhetoric is parasitic upon disciplines dealing with the external world. From dialectic, Aristotle indicates, it derives the deep structure of its arguments, from ethics its insights into human nature: in character and passions. In both areas it reverses the tendency called by Wittgenstein the craving for the general, which is characteristic of proper science in the Aristotelian vein: the objects of rhetoric's methodical, quasi-scientific discussions are merely particular events, though it describes them on the analogy of substantial realities—for want of any other methodical way to describe them. Rhetoric is happy to stick with process (*genesis*) and appearances (*phainomena*), changeable things as they appear to us, and with what is familiar, accessible, and obvious (*gnôrimon, prodêlon*) to us, rather than what is an object of knowledge (*epistêton*) by nature and without qualification. To this level clearly belongs the second among the means of persuasion distinguished in *Rhetoric* 1.2, emotion. The first one, character, is in some ways intermediate and indeed mediating between emotion and the means

¹⁸ It might be objected (a) that this is an instance of the *question whether* something is *there* (*ei esti*) rather than of the claim *that* something is *so*, and (b) that the *Physics* may contain subject-matter of what we call science but is in Aristotle's scheme *dialectic*, not science in the strict sense of "imparting scientific knowledge" (*epistêmonikon*) by being *demonstrative*. But for the purpose of the present contrast the *Physics* is sufficiently remote from rhetoric.

of persuasion that works through the speech itself, the one employing enthymemes.

Emotion, like character, is treated in the *Rhetoric* with a pragmatic and non-judgmental view to its effect as instrument. To be appropriately included in an art capable of producing *logoi* of moral worth, it must be subjected to procedures for discriminating between desirable and undesirable emotions, whether this discrimination itself belongs to rhetoric or not. For *pathos* as such is just being acted upon, and takes place through the body. Think of Aristotle's definitions of anger in the first chapter of *On the Soul*, one of them dialectical, defining this emotion as a certain desire to inflict pain, the other more pertinent to physics, defining it as a seething of the blood around the heart. The peculiarly human types of *pathos* that we have come to single out as emotions are found at a relatively high level of being affected. Though they occur through the matter of a body, their effect is on the form that is a soul. The organ involved in the emotions discussed in the *Rhetoric*, hearing, is that through which learning (*mathêsis*) is done. The medium is the distinctively human *logos*. Perhaps we may view the emotions of the *Rhetoric* as a more elevated analogue to the *pathê*, here more usually rendered as affections, of pleasure and pain accompanying sense perception as the side effects that motivate choice and avoidance. The *pathê* of the *Rhetoric* motivate us to choose the part either of the prosecutor or of one who "flees" (*pheugei*) in the legal sense of parrying, defending himself. Still, *pathos* as such remains by definition more a liability than an asset, both a residue and a potential reservoir of resistance to the solid formation of active habits. Aristotle indicates that the appeal to emotions in its less creditable forms is the lowest appeal *logoi* as speeches can make "through the speech", i.e. by the technical means of persuasion, or insofar as depends on invention (*heuresis*, the subject of Books I–II).¹⁹

However, emotions are involved with *logos* in another sense, documented in the *Rhetoric*, that helps to give content to *logos* as a human faculty for cognition and decision, not necessarily expressed in words, but reaching beyond words to realities for its objects. The *logoi* we have found to constitute a realm of itself, parasitic upon the external world and describing processes and phenomena on the

¹⁹ For subordinate *lexis* etc. cf. 3.1, and cf. *Poet.* on *sustasis*, *dianoia*, *êthos*, *lexis* and *hupokrisis*. The subordination of *lexis* to *heuresis*, and of *hupokrisis* to *lexis*, by itself marks the *logos* as in some way and to some extent distinct from the words and the act of uttering them.

analogy of substantial realities, do their job not only by exploiting emotions *ad hoc*, but just as much by appealing to habits, dispositions and tendencies.

x. *logoi appealing to habits, dispositions and tendencies*

At (29) intentional actions are reduced to either habits or desires, and desires, or rather strivings (*orexeis*), are divided into rational and irrational ones. Examples of irrational strivings are anger and “appetite” (*epithymia*), in the wide sense of the *pathos* of desire for what is pleasurable that was mentioned above as motivating “choice”, a desire that may be kindled through any of the senses. Pleasure here acts upon us as an *apparent* good: an external object exerts attraction and so becomes a moving cause.

- (29) 1.10 1368b37–69a4 all actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or desire; and of the latter, some are due to *rational* desire, the others to *irrational* (ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὐτοὺς καὶ ὄν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον)

Rational desire is wishing, and wishing is desire for good ... *Irrational* desire is twofold, viz. anger and appetite (ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν βούλησις (ἡ δὲ βούλησις Spengel) ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις ὁ ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία)

(30) explains how this comes naturally to us. This time, in a passage marked by its editor Kassel as an addition that “is or may be” Aristotle’s, we learn that “appetites” too may after all be rational: this is when they rest on a supposition (ὑπολαμβάνειν) instilled by a process of persuasion (πεισθῆναι) through hearing (ἀκούσαντες). It should be noted that it is not implied that the reports persuading us are true, even less that the conviction based on them amounts to a justified belief. Just what difference, then, does that implied *logos* make whose presence purportedly differentiates “rational” from “irrational” (*alogos*) strivings or appetites? Only, I submit, that we balance the impulse present to the bodily sense against other factors, in particular representations (*phantasma*) and notions (*noëma*)²⁰ of things absent; that we *select* features relevant to decision.²¹ This reading may be corroborated by the observation that Aristotle’s term translated “rational” (*logistikos*) is not the Greek form (*logikos*) underlying English “logic(al)”, derived directly from *logos*, but that

²⁰ Rendered as “thought content” in (*viii.*) above on *De interpretatione* 1.

²¹ The discussion in Locke’s *Essay*, II may usefully be compared.

underlying “logistic”, deriving from *logos* through the verb *logizesthai*, “doing sums” and “doing accounts”, hence *calculating*: “logistic” or “calculative” strivings and appetites are desires that submit to the discipline or avail themselves of the expedient of a calculus, whether a hedonistic or a more comprehensive one; desires that “factor in”, “take account of” or “take into account”, and “turn to account” competing desires for other ends demanding other means.

- (30) 1.11 1370a18–27 Everything ... is pleasant for which we have the appetite within us, since appetite is desire for pleasure (οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν ὄρεξις)

[[Of the appetites some are *irrational*, some associated with *reason*. By *irrational* I mean those that do not arise from any opinion held by the mind (τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἄλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν—not the result of any assumption) ...

Rational appetites are those we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good (μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες (additamentum *Kassel*)—are convinced that they are good]]

Just now in (29), besides desire, habit was invoked to explain action. Like emotion, habit here operates as a value-neutral descriptive category. Evaluation of the habits we form belongs to ethics, discussion of character and its formation. Character formation actually comes down very much to habit formation. Character too is discussed in the *Rhetoric*, but like emotion only as a means of persuasion. Its import is brought out in:

- (31) 3.16 1417a18–20 The narration should depict character; to which end you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of choice; the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued (τί ἥθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἥθος τῷ ποιᾶν ταύτην, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιᾶ τῷ τέλει—to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose)

Thus it is that mathematical *discourses* (*treatises*) depict no character; they have nothing to do with choice, for they represent nobody as pursuing any end (διὰ τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἥθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν)—... have no moral character, because neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end)

On the other hand, the Socratic dialogues do depict character (ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν—discuss such questions)

In speeches given before a court of law, narration ought to display character (*êthos*). Character may be reduced, through the quality (*poia*) of our moral choice (*proairesis*) as the middle term, to the end (*telos*) or that for the sake of which (*to hou heneka*) a person acts. The end envisaged is not, as it was back in (2.d), the aim of the speech, but the purpose in life adopted by the speaker: the point of reference for that habit formation in him, by which the audience may be assured of his all-round probity. The *Nicomachean Ethics* outlines the links between character, choice, and “habit” both as everyday routine and in the sense, peculiar to Aristotle, of a trained disposition. These connections here remain implicit. The questions of which habit formation and hence what character building are desirable, and how they can both be achieved, fall to the practical sciences, but the art of rhetoric should include sufficient knowledge of what character types are actually found so that the practitioner may apply this to make “our” characters credible, and so creditable, or the opposite. Rhetorical *logoi* are different in this respect from mathematical expositions, but similar to Socratic conversations: these too (end of 31) “discuss such questions”—or more likely “speak about *persons* of such and such a kind”: we should recall that, according to *Metaphysics* 4 (*Gamma*), the difference between dialectic and sophistry is in the “choice”, attitude, intention or mentality (*proairesis*) of the interlocutors.

So the speaker, who may generally be content to skim the kaleidoscopic surface of appearances, will find it incumbent upon her to ascend to the *tendencies* manifested by these, to “what happens for the most part”, insofar as this can furnish her with probabilities (*eikota*); compare the “quality” (*poia*) of choice (*proairesis*) and character (*êthos*) in 31 with the quality of an action (*praxis*) in 28 above. She has no more room or use for the fixed structures underlying these tendencies in turn than the educational level and attention span of her listeners permit. In the terms used in the *Poetics*, to contrast poetry favourably with history, rhetoric is at the level of history, whereas poetry, since its pronouncements aspire to be true in general, is closer to the level of ethics and physics, and so “more philosophical” than rhetoric as well.²²

²² Ironically, these limitations have something to do with why we still read the *Rhetoric*. For adequacy of description, Aristotle’s phenomenology of human behaviour

The speaker, *qua* speaker, will appeal to habits, dispositions, tendencies and exploit emotions for *ad hoc* purposes, but has no independent angle on the facts of either *êthos* or *pathos*, nor does a theoretical grasp of, as opposed to a practical grip on, *êthos* and *pathos* necessarily make him a better speaker. Compare the need, upheld in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1 against Plato, for practical intelligence (*phronêsis*) in the affairs of the *polis*, and the uselessness, for the legislator and the educator, of theoretical understanding (*nous*) and scientific knowledge (*epistêmê*), even though these add up to nothing less than wisdom (*sophia*). His job is to find (*heuresis*) what is persuasive about them as about everything else, and to arrange (*taxis*) and phrase (*lexis*) all this to good effect. His know-how revolves around *words*, his *tekhne* is a *logos* about *logoi*, not in the way other *logoi* are supported by an object of their own. And if thus far the same could be said of dialectic, rhetoric moreover crucially lacks that ulterior aim of dialectic, which is to:

- (32) *Top.* 1.2 101a35–36 ... discern more easily in each matter what is true and what is false (ῥᾶον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοπινόμεθα τὰ ληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος)

Eloquence as a formal art, then, is neutral with regard to both truth-value and moral value. *Logos* as a generalized faculty of speech cannot help generating false speeches as well as true ones; *logos* cultivated as speech-making is actually forced to exploit this option, and rhetoric as the art of speech-making cannot avoid offering guidance on how to do this. The fall of *logos* has now completely divorced it from the knowledge of good and evil and reduced it to a tool. Possession of this tool remains, as it was for Plato, a knife in the hand of a child, for as with all other goods except excellence of character (*aretê*) itself, the damage it does when used “unjustly” is proportional to its beneficial effect when used “to do right”:

- (33) 1.1 1355b2–7 that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm ... is a charge which may be made in common against all good things save excellence (ὅτι μεγάλα βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος)

has stood the test of time better than his attempts at science. When it comes to values, Aristotle makes no concessions to sophistic nihilism, but in our age of relativism we find it soothing to have his moral assessments tied up with strictly pragmatic considerations of what is feasible because people will swallow and “buy” it, and his wryly straight-faced observations of human folly and vanity have what it takes to satisfy the discerning cynic. With its everyday realism, dealing in hypothetical imperatives, focusing on *ways* and means rather than ends, the *Rhetoric* invites comparison with Machiavelli’s *Prince* as much as with Aristotle’s own *Ethics*.

ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων
τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἁρετῆς)

a man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and
inflict the greatest harm by using them wrongly (τούτοις γὰρ ἂν τις
ὀφελήσῃε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψῃεν ἀδίκως)

How can Aristotle hand this knife to a moral infant? The answer, I suspect, lies in the division of the sciences, or less impersonally, in the fact that no speaker is only a speaker and nothing but a speaker. For Aristotle there is no comprehensive knowledge of a transcendent good, which makes all other intellectual pursuits illegitimate; the most we may hope for is piecemeal illumination, and becoming better is a matter of forming the right habits.²³ In this habit formation, two uses of *logos* as attested in the *Rhetoric* come together. First, we learn, in the way indicated by (30), to develop rational desires at the expense of irrational ones, i.e. to weigh instant satisfaction against distant and long-term inducements, transforming a visceral, instinctive hedonism into a calculus of enlightened self-interest that assesses genuine goods. Secondly, in establishing and fortifying this self-adjusting balance that is our inner *logos*, we have recourse to “intentional objects”: goods merely envisaged, things heard of but not seen. In other words, we need to be persuaded. When Aristotle in (33) tells us of the “greatest of benefits” a person may confer by the right use of “this power of speech”, I submit it is the gifted educator and the wise legislator he has in mind: people who combine learning with moral integrity.

Cicero, writing that Plato in the very act of disparaging orators showed himself a “consummate orator” (*summus orator*), gives Aristotle’s exoteric writings high marks for eloquence too.²⁴ Whether or not Aristotle was himself an accomplished stylist, his monograph on *Rhetoric* incorporates a deep-seated and subtle ambivalence between theory and practice. Aristotle’s levelheaded, common-sense, and in some ways eminently practical treatment of the subject is among the

²³ No matter how much or little progress we make, we do need to come to terms with others; good public relations are of literally vital interest, as the trial of Socrates brought home to both Plato and Aristotle. Outside the sphere of technical applications, dialectic and rhetoric apply to the “encounters” (*enteuxeis*) with the “majority” that philosophers should be prepared for, in which it enables them to obey the injunction in Spinoza’s *Treatise on Improving the Understanding* to speak according to the comprehension of ordinary people (Rule I: *ad captum vulgi loqui*), if only to make them listen to the truth (*quod tali modo amicas praebebunt aures ad veritatem audiendam*).

²⁴ Cic. *De or.* 1.43–47; cf. *Brut.* 121.

most useful of all. Yet, strictly speaking, it is only analogous to the art (*tekhnê*, *ars*) laid down in a handbook in turn called an “Art”, just as it is analogous to a science; it is not itself an art in the sense of a manual for the production of speeches, but a survey of the analysis an orator needs to be capable of in order to “envisage” (*theôrein*) what will make a speech persuasive. In this sense, Aristotle’s productive “art” of rhetoric, thriftily and elegantly borrowing, adapting and redeploying conceptual tools developed in the theoretical and practical sciences, may stand as a triumph of intellectual compromise if there ever was such a thing.²⁵

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²⁵ It is a pleasure to acknowledge a debt to Bill Fortenbaugh’s encouragement as well as his example of putting the study of ancient rhetoric in its proper perspective, taking account of the ways in which Peripatetic rhetoric relates to Aristotle’s dialectic, to his *Ethics* and to his thought at large, bridging the divide between the camps where philosophy and rhetoric lie entrenched, and doing justice to the intimate love-hate relationship the two have sustained from Aristotle onwards.

CHAPTER FIVE

TECHNIQUES OF PROOF IN 4TH CENTURY RHETORIC: AR. *RHET.* 2.23–24 AND PRE-ARISTOTELIAN RHETORICAL THEORY

TOBIAS REINHARDT

In this paper I hope to shed some new light on the diverse array of argumentative devices which we find in Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.23ff. and to explain how these argumentative devices work. Further, since Aristotle explicitly mentions some earlier rhetoricians in connection with certain *topoi* discussed in this section, the question arises which format the source material which Aristotle used had and how exactly he transformed it.

This, as it were, systematic question has of course a historical dimension, and one that has bearings on an ongoing scholarly discussion concerned with the evolution of prose literature in 5th-century Greece and more particularly with the way rhetoric, in the sense of abstract, analytical, and descriptive study of persuasive public discourse, came into being. In this context, Thomas Cole has proposed a hypothesis that in the late 5th and very early 4th century there were no technical handbooks of rhetoric, and that if something people referred to as *logôn technai* existed, they were collections of exemplary arguments on certain subjects as opposed to abstract precepts on how to generate arguments.¹ I believe, however, that there were handbooks offering abstract precepts and that they fulfilled the main condition for being a “craft” in Aristotle’s (and his contemporaries’) view, namely, the condition of “accountability”.²

¹ See ch. 5–6 in Cole 1991, reviewed by Fortenbaugh 1993, Martin 1993, Russell 1992.

² See, e.g., Gomperz 1910 on [Hipp.] *De arte*; Heinimann 1961; Blank 1998, at xx: “From the arguments employed against the technicity of certain fields we can infer that the sophists made the following demands of a *technê*: it should have a certain goal, distinct from those of other *technai*; it should be useful; it must be able to reach its goal; it must establish what is right and wrong to do, so that, while even an untrained person may accidentally do the right thing, only the technical practitioner can explain that and why it is right (the position of the debater is implied here). All the demands will be the focus of attacks by Sextus because they remained basic to

“Accountability” I call that feature of a craft in virtue of which it is able to explain within its own conceptual framework why a certain action undertaken in accordance with and guided by its rules was successful or unsuccessful; that is, in the case of rhetoric, why an argument designed to persuade was successful or unsuccessful.³ One reason why such an excellent debate is to be had about these matters is of course that we have little primary evidence to go on. I shall try to identify some new evidence for such an early handbook in the process of my survey of proof techniques in 4th century rhetoric.

A large number of the *koinoi topoi* of *Rhet.* 2.23–24 derive from dialectical *topoi* discussed in Aristotle’s *Topics*, and it is to the *Topics* that one has to turn in order find out how exactly these *topoi* work. For instance *Rhet.* 2.23 1397a7–11 may be analysed with reference to dialectical invention as expounded in the *Topics*:

- (1) ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. (*Rhet.* 2.23 1397a7–11)

One *topos* of demonstrative [enthymemes] is that from contraries; for one should examine if the opposite [predicate] holds of the opposite [subject], [thus] refuting the thesis if it holds not, and establishing the thesis if it does, for example: to be temperate is a good thing; for to lack self-control is harmful.

Rhetorical *inventio* usually means, first, knowing what you want to argue for from the start (e.g. because one has to contest a certain charge in a forensic context or take a certain stance in a political

the conception of a *technê*, and this formulation was refined in the debates of the 4th and 2nd centuries.” For Aristotle’s notion of a *technê* see Broadie 1987. Needless to say, the whole issue is also relevant to our picture of how rhetorical theory developed in the Hellenistic era.

³ Another debate on which the issues discussed in this paper have bearings is concerned with the theory of the enthymeme and more particularly whether the logical standards which Aristotle normally applies to deductions have in some sense been lowered in the case of the *Rhet.* Representatives of the two possible views include Sprute 1982, who promotes what has been called strict deductivism, and Burnyeat 1994, who argues in favour of a more relaxed interpretation of the rhetorical deductions discussed in *Rhet.* Depending on which view one takes on this issue, one will judge 2.23–24 differently: strict deductivists will note that the argument patterns discussed there do not fit with their theory, and will usually try to solve this problem with a developmental theory like the one proposed by Solmsen 1929. Those in favour of a more relaxed interpretation of the enthymeme find it easier to accommodate the section. However, in this paper I will not investigate what bearings my findings have on this discussion.

debate) and then working out how to “get there”. The text just quoted presupposes this basic situation, but interprets it in a specific way: what we want to argue for is a *proposition*, and a subject-predicate-proposition in particular in which a logical predicate is predicated of a logical subject (“B is A” or “A holds of B”). In order to use this *topos*, the user of the *Rhet.* is instructed first to analyse the proposition he wants to argue for as a subject-predicate-proposition proposition, then to find the *enantion* of the terms of his intended conclusion and to see if the *enantion* of the predicate can be predicated of the *enantion* of the subject (sc. in a true or at least plausible proposition). If that is the case, he can construct an argument like the example given.

The whole *topos* is based on a principle

- (2) *If and only if the contrary of A holds of the contrary of B, A holds of B*

and relies on inferences of the types *modus ponendo ponens* and *modus tollendo tollens*. Every *topos* in the central books of the *Topics* has a sub-structure like this one. Certain modes of presentation follow from the fact that all the *topoi* in the *Topics* work on this principle. For instance, if it is clear—from the context or simply because it has been said earlier—that in a given book, e.g. B, every *topos* provides a way to argue for or against a proposition “A holds of B” in which A holds of B in an unqualified sense (as opposed to being its genus, peculiar property, or definition), then it is not necessary to spell out principles like the one given above, or even to provide examples, in order to describe a given *topos* sufficiently. It suffices then to say

- (3) “Argue from contraries” or “examine the contraries” (σκοπεῖν in Greek),

i.e. to give merely a precept, and the reader familiar with this kind of work will be able to supply the principle for himself and to construct examples. Note that in the *Topics* Aristotle calls “precepts” and “principles” *topoi*, but never examples.

If we now assume that the original audience of the material that became our *Rhetoric* was the same as the original audience of the *Topics*, and if we further acknowledge that the methodology of the argument patterns in 2.23–24 is strongly informed by that of the *Topics*, that indeed knowledge of the *Topics* is consistently presupposed in the *Rhetoric*, we can imagine that the contemporary readership would employ certain hermeneutical strategies, which it developed for the training in dialectic, when reading the *Rhetoric*: they would, for instance, “fill out the gaps for themselves” if they were presented with something like this:

- (4) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, ποία κίνησις ἡ ψυχῇ· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;” (2.23 1399a7–9)

Another *topos* is from the parts, as discussed in the *Topics*: (for example) what kind of motion is the soul? For it is either this or that. This is an example from the *Socrates* of Theodektes: “what sort of temple has he profaned? Which gods recognized by the state has he not honoured?”

They would remember the corresponding dialectical *topoi* (*Top.* 2.4 111a33–111b11) and the principle on which it was based:

- (5) *If and only if the predicate A holds of the subject B, then one of the eidē of A holds of the subject B.*

They would fully formulate this principle for themselves if they only get a highly condensed version as here, and in this they would rely on experience gathered in connection with dialectical exercise. This in turn gives *us* some guidance as to how *we* should interpret 2.23–24: it gives us an idea how far we can go in our interpretation of rhetorical *topoi* in dialectical terms.

Many of the patterns of argument in *Rhet.* 2.23–24 may be explained on this model: they may be considered as dialectical *topoi* that were slightly adjusted in one way or another.⁴ We can use the experience gained from studying this body of material when turning to those *topoi* that Aristotle claims to have found in earlier handbooks, and we can do this in two ways: (i) we can check to what extent these *topoi* conform with what we take to be dialectical *topoi*, and (ii) we can look at dialectical *topoi* in order to describe the element of analysis Aristotle may have brought to material he found in an earlier handbook. I shall return to the issue.

Before that I want to look at some sections of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which, I believe, reflect the same type of handbook that Aristotle was relying on for some of the *topoi* in 2.23–24. If it were possible to prove this, we would have the interesting case of a piece of pre-Aristotelian rhetorical theory and its Aristotelian re-interpretation. I am particularly interested in ch. 1–6 of the *Rh. Al.*, i.e. the long section preceding the discussion of *pisteis*.


At the heart of the techniques of invention discussed in ch. 1–6 lies a series of divisions of what one might vaguely call value-terms:

⁴ This is of course a simplification. It could be shown, for instance, that actually there is cross-fertilization between dialectical and rhetorical τόποι; put differently, there are good reasons for suspecting that early attempts to analyse rhetorical arguments entered into Aristotle's attempt to analyse dialectical arguments.

- (6) δίκαιον, νόμιμον, συμφέρον, καλόν, ἡδύ, ῥάδιον. (cf. *Rh. Al.* 1.4)

These terms are then subjected to an extensive analysis; after all, there are countless answers to the question what a society deems, for instance, just. For instance, as an elementary division of “the just”, we get the following:

- (7) δίκαιον = τὸ τῶν ἀπάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἔθος ἄγγραφον (1.7)




The definition of “the lawful” is this:

- (8) νόμος (νόμιμον) = ὁμολόγημα πόλεως κοινὸν διὰ γραμμμάτων προστάττον πῶς χρὴ πράττειν ἕκαστα. (1.8)

For “the useful” we are given this division:

- (9) συμφέρον (1.9)



Within “the useful”, a distinction is made between “what is useful for the *polis*” and “what is useful for individuals”; the latter is divided as follows:

- (10) συμφέροντα ἰδιώταις (1.10)

εἰς σῶμα	εἰς ψυχὴν	εἰς τὰ ἐπικτήτα
– ῥώμη	– ἀνδρεία	– φίλοι
– κάλλος	– σοφία	– χρήματα
– ὑγίεια	– δικαιοσύνη	– κτήματα

Note also that the user of the manual is implicitly invited to *extend* these lists of divisions; for there is always a complementary negative division to be mentally supplied (as well as related ones):

- (11) τὰ μὲν οὖν δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ ῥάδια καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν εὐπορήσομεν δὲ περὶ τούτων λέγειν ἐξ αὐτῶν τε τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἤδη κεκρυμένων ἢ ὑπὸ θεῶν

ἢ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἢ ὑπ' ἐνδόξων κριτῶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἡμῖν.
(1.13)

Such is the nature of the just, the lawful, the expedient, the honourable, the pleasant, the easy, the practicable and the necessary. *We shall find plenty to say about them by using these (concepts? terms?) themselves as stated above, and also those similar to them and their opposites* and the previous judgments of them made by the gods or by men of repute or by judges or by our opponents.

One may imagine that a different technographer would not have left it to the reader to provide these additional divisions.

These divisions are to be used in arguments. Let me say again that the fundamental situation from which rhetorical *inventio* starts is to know what one wants to argue for and to discover means to support this position, whether we analyse it as an intended conclusion, i.e. a proposition, possibly with a certain internal structure (like a subject-predicate-proposition), or refer to it vaguely as a certain stance we have on a subject. So what is the formal description of “the position we want to argue for” from which the process of *inventio* starts in *Rh. Al.*? The answer has to be given with respect to the various types of rhetorical discourse the treatise distinguishes; within the two *genera*, which the author calls *protreptikon* and *apotreptikon*, they are described in this way:

(12) προτροπή μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ προαιρέσεις ἢ λόγους ἢ πράξεις παράκλησις, ἀποτροπή δὲ ἀπὸ προαιρέσεων ἢ λόγων ἢ πράξεων διακώλυσις. (1.3)

Exhortation is an attempt to urge people to some choices, or lines of speech or action, and dissuasion an attempt to hinder people from some choices, or lines of speech or action.

In the field of forensic oratory, one class of possible “conclusions” is described like this:

(13) ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορικὸν συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν ἀδικημάτων καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων ἐξήγησις, τὸ δ' ἀπολογικὸν ἀδικημάτων καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων κατηγορηθέντων ἢ ὑποπευθέντων διάλυσις. (4.1)

To put it briefly, the oratory of accusation is the recital of offences and errors, and that of defence the refutation of offences and errors of which a man is accused or suspected.

These descriptions of what one might aim for in an argument include two categorically distinct items: the first group consists of terms for what we might call the “subject of our argument” or “the things we talk about” (in item (12) *proaireseis*, *logoi*, *praxeis*; in item (13) *adikēmata*, *hamartēmata*), the second group consists of terms that

refer to the course of action we promote with respect to these items or the statement we make about these “things we talk about” (in both cases nouns are used for this too: in (12) *paraklêsis* and *diakôlusis*, in (13) *exêgesis* and *dialusis*).

So for instance, if we want to argue

(14) *We must strengthen the city's fortifications,*

“the strengthening of the city’s fortifications” would be the *praxis* we are advertising, “we must undertake it/do it” would be the *paraklêsis*-element. Note that the first of these categories, “the things we talk about”, is something the author of *Rh. Al.* relies on *passim*; e.g. when he tells how the divisions of value-terms are to be applied, he may refer to these “things we talk about” in the neuter plural:

(15) οὕτω δὲ τούτων διωρισμένων τὸν μὲν προτρέποντα χρὴ δεικνύειν ταῦτα ἐφ’ ἃ παρακαλεῖ δίκαια ὄντα καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ὀφείδια πραχθῆναι. (1.4)

These being their definitions, one delivering an exhortation must prove *that the courses to which he exhorts are just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant and easily practicable.*

Needless to say, there is in itself nothing technical about this; “things we talk about” is a conceptual category ordinary language has always relied on (be it Greek, Latin, or modern languages).

In constructing or finding an argument, one is now supposed to rely on the division of value-terms, in that the would-be speaker is to apply them to the “thing one talks about”; for instance, if we want to argue for the signing of a peace treaty in a long-lasting war, we would invoke the fact that this is “useful”, in this way:

(16) Signing a peace treaty with x is useful/will end the shortage of food in the city. Therefore, one must sign a peace treaty.

Or in the case of forensic oratory:

(17) Killing his father was not useful for the accused, because he was third in line. Therefore, he did not kill his father.

The procedure as such is very basic, but it is clear that it can be used to generate very complex structures of argument. Note also that the procedure is very vague. When our division of value terms ((9) above) has produced τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κακῶν ἀποβολή as one of the subdivisions of “the useful”, we can use this in all kinds of ways: we can just say that signing a peace treaty will be a useful thing without spelling out why, e.g. when one is addressing an audience of starving citizens who can appreciate the point anyway; or one can spell it out if one

is addressing an audience which is less obviously affected by the bad things (*kaka*) that the war brings. And as to item (17), the divisions are neutral with respect to the distinction of objective and subjective usefulness (what appears useful to me, with respect to my own concerns). The theory of *Rh. Al.* allows for any of these possibilities.

What is more, there are distinct traces of an abstract and descriptive vocabulary such that it elevates the method of invention applied in the *Rh. Al.* above the level of altogether intuitive invention of arguments.

To begin with, the verb *μετιέναι* is used in the sense of “draw up a list in one’s mind/ run through a list” to denote the mental scanning of the divisions of value terms in search for a source of an argument):

(18) τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον οὕτω μετιὼν πολλαχῶς λήψη. (1.17)

This is how you will pursue what is just, taking it in several senses.

τὸ μὲν οὖν νόμιμον οὕτω μετιόντες πολλαχῶς δείξομεν. (1.20)

This is how we shall show what is lawful, taking it in several senses.

τὰ μὲν οὖν ὅμοια τῷ συμφέροντι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον μετιὼν πολλὰ ποιήσεις. (1.22)

Taking in this way those things similar to what is expedient, you will multiply them.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ νομίμου καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὕτω μετιὼν εὐπορήσεις. (1.24)

Taking in this way what is just, what is lawful, and what is expedient, you will have plenty to say.

τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ῥάδιον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοιοτρόπως τούτοις μέτιθι. (1.24)

Take what is honourable, what is pleasant, what is easy to do, what is possible, and what is necessary in a way similar to the treatment of the earlier items.

The author is writing for a potential orator and of course not for the prospective writer of a rhetorical handbook; this limits the scope for what *μετιέναι* can mean here.

The next step after that would be a conceptual category that allows us to identify those items in the division that can be employed in devising an argument; ideally, this distinguishing feature could also be referred to in an explanation of why this element in particular gives rise to a good argument:

- (19): τὸ δὲ συμφέρον αὐτὸ μὲν οἶόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὥρισται, δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν εἰς τοὺς λόγους (ὥς ἐκ) τῶν προειρημένων καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ἂν ὑπάρχῃ τι, ... (1.20, cf. 1.17)

The nature of the expedient has been defined in what came before; and we must include in our speeches with the topics previously mentioned any argument from expediency also *that may be available*

...

When we ask why in a given rhetorical situation one of the value terms (with all its subdivisions) “is not available sc. for devising an argument”, we quickly arrive at a causal story that may involve, for instance, reference to certain predispositions of the audience. This would go some way towards accountability, the hallmark of a *technê*, which I mentioned above.

But there is more:

- (20) ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ὧδε τὸ συμφέρον ἔσται καταφανές· εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς τιμᾶν τῶν πολιτῶν, συμφέρον ἂν εἴη καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς κολάζειν. (1.22) (Cf. the section on the format of “conclusions” in this *genus*)

(i) It is beneficial to honour good citizens.

(ii) It is useful to punish bad citizens.

(iii) One must punish bad citizens.

“That the contrary should make the useful *plain*” (where usefulness is invoked to support a certain course of action) is quite significant. If we cite one claim as grounds for another claim, i.e. as a reason for accepting and believing it, it is of course paramount that the first claim is in some sense more intelligible; if one claims that it is impossible to predict position and momentum of an electron at a time t_1 , because there is an ontic limitation to applying the concepts “position” and “momentum” to particles, then one has given a valid reason (at least on one theory), but most listeners, unless they happen to be physicists, may be somewhat puzzled. The author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* has, in a very casual fashion, made a rather important point here. Further, it is a point that would have rung a bell with Aristotle had he been reading this kind of handbook; in his eyes it would have been a crucial step towards an argumentative method’s ability to account for its own successes and failures. What I am thinking of is of course his theory of demonstration and the stipulation that the premises of scientific demonstrations must be better known than the conclusion they are supposed to support.⁵

⁵ See, e.g., Arist. *An. Post.* 1.2, 71b29–30, with Barnes 1994 95–96 *ad loc.*

Finally (as far as my discussion of *Rh. Al.* is concerned), I should signal here that I accept the majority view that *Rh. Al.* represents a tradition of rhetorical handbooks that is in substance independent from the views on rhetoric that Aristotle puts forward in his *Rhetoric*.⁶

I shall now look at two further *koinoi topoi* in Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.23. My objective is to show that the two *topoi* represent two *alternative* attempts to analyse the kind of argumentative device we have seen in the *Rh. Al.* and to demonstrate that they are significantly different from the “dialectical” *topoi* discussed earlier, while in crucial respects they resemble the argumentative devices we have just seen in the *Rh. Al.* Finally I shall explain how we can account for this *prima facie* odd juxtaposition of the two *topoi*.

Consider the following:

- (21) ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἔπεσθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, οἷον “τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν (ὄν), τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ”. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλιππου τέχνη, προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἄλλα ὡς εἴρηται (εἴρηται codd.; εἰρήσεται conl. Radermacher). (*Rhet.* 2.23 1399a11–17 = Rad. *Art. Scr.* xxix. “Callippus” No. 2)

Again, since it happens that any given thing usually has both good and bad consequences, another line of argument consists in using those consequences as a reason for urging that a thing should or should not be done, for prosecuting or defending anyone, for eulogy or censure. E.g. “education entails unpopularity, which is bad, and wisdom, which is good. It is therefore not good to be educated, since it is not good to be unpopular; or it is good to be educated, since it is good to be wise.” The *technê* of Callippus consists in this commonplace, with the addition of the possible and the other concepts of that kind already described.

Consider also the following:

- (22) ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφοιβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμβουλευούσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχη δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχη, μὴ

⁶ See, e.g., Kennedy 1994 49–51, who writes (at 50), “Anaximenes, if he was the author, made no direct use of Aristotle’s major treatise, for he has nothing to say about Aristotle’s most characteristic and original theories and does not use his terminology; the three Aristotelian means of persuasion, the three kinds of rhetoric, and the theories of enthymeme, example, and metaphor are all ignored. There is nothing corresponding to Aristotle’s important account of emotions and character in book 2. The word *rhetorike* never occurs in the treatise, only in the title, which is probably a later addition, and no definition of the art is offered.”

πράττειν, οἶον, εἰ δυνατόν καὶ ῥάδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερόν ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ἢ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προτρεπόνται [δ'] ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρεπόνται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη (ἢ) τέχνη ἢ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἢ Καλλίππου. (*Rhet.* 2.23 1399b30–1400a5 = *Rad. Art. Scr.* xxix. “Callippus” No. 4)

Another is common to forensic and deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding actions in question. These are the reasons which make us bound to act if they apply, and to refrain from action if they do not apply: that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds they exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. These same arguments also form the materials for accusation and defence—the deterrents being pointed out by the defence, and the inducements by the prosecution. The topic forms the whole *technê* both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.

Before I look at the two passages in more detail, let me outline what my basic point is. Assume we want to argue that

(23) *We must strengthen the city's fortifications.*

Rh. Al. would provide under the heading “*sumpheron*” the subheading “τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν φυλακή” ((9) above). This would provide an argument such as the following:

- (i) *The fortification of the city is useful/is useful because it allows us to protect our wealth.*
- (ii) *We must strengthen the city's fortifications.*

The “protection of our wealth” can on one level of description be seen as a *consequence* of the fortification, on another level of description as a potential *motivation* for someone to fortify the city. Note also how easily we can read the example in text (21) in terms of the analysis given in text (22): that education entails wisdom may *motivate* me to get an education, that it entails envy may *put me off* getting an education. As to the assignment of the two *topoi* to Callippus, there are two puzzling things about it: first, that a single *topos* is to make up a whole *technê* (or at least be sufficiently central to this *technê* to warrant the claim that it is essentially what a *technê* consists in); this has led some interpreters to dismiss the reference completely, and others to assume—rather amusingly—that these *technai* must have been very short. The second puzzling

thing is that this is said about two different *topoi*. The explanation just outlined (and to be detailed below) would resolve both puzzles in that Aristotle's reinterpretation of the type of theory we find in *Rh. Al.* would do away with the extensive divisions of value terms by supplanting them by two elementary categories (consequence, motivation), so that what is one *topos* in Aristotle corresponds to long stretches of text in the *Rh. Al.*, and it would explain why two different *topoi* are assigned to Callippus by the same phrase—because they are two *different* interpretations of the *same* method. This raises the question why Aristotle allowed both *topoi* to stand; I shall answer it below.

Let me begin with text (22). We note, first of all, that it is not obvious how we could analyse the *topos* in terms of a principle involving two subject-predicate-propositions as we did above (which is not to say that this would be impossible, of course; in a sense, it is always possible in statements). What we are offered as the main conceptual category is a vague notion of motivation. For this we could refer to obvious, though much more sophisticated parallels in Aristotle's ethical writings, but we may also want to bear in mind that the *eikos*-proof, as it is used already in early sources (Antiphon for example, to leave aside the problematic case of Corax-Tisias), crucially relies on a concept of motivation in that it attempts to show that a statement about a particular individual is plausible given the individual's character and motivation.

If we now ask again how exactly text (22) refers to “intended conclusions” and the grounds offered to support them, we can observe that the phrase δεῖ πράττειν (and, as we can supply, οὐ δεῖ πράττειν) gives us a typical format of conclusions in a symbouleutic argument, which we may compare to the παράκλησις ἐπὶ πράξεις and ἀπὸ πράξεων διακώλυσις in item (12). This is of course an incomplete description of intended conclusions in this genre of oratory, and it is obvious that our passage too, like the *Rh. Al.*, relies on the notion of a “thing we talk about” (a course of action we promote, a choice we recommend, etc.), referred to in text (22) in ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. As to the way in which the grounds offered for conclusions of this format are referred to, we are told to look for possible motivations for the course of action or choice in question. Crucially, we are given a list of value terms that are supposed to guide our search for an argument further, beyond the initial category of motivation; these value terms show obvious similarities to the value terms used in *Rh. Al.* down to the level of detail (e.g. the subdivision of “the useful”; cf. item (10) above). It seems reasonable to suppose that

these value terms are the point where Aristotelian re-interpretation and the original handbook meet in that “motivation” becomes the overarching category imposed on the material used, which we are to follow up by using the value terms to guide the associative process of finding an argument. Note that ἂν ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχη in (22)—“if such a term applies”, which seems a more natural rendering here than the technical Aristotelian “if it is predicable of”—has an exact parallel in *Rh. Al.* (item (19) above).

I move on to item (21). The possible origin of the primary conceptual category of the *topos*, consequence, may be illustrated by the following passage:

- (24) ἔτι ὅταν δύο τινὰ ἢ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ὑπεροχὴν μηδεμίαν συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ὅρᾳ ἀπὸ τῶν παρεπομένων. ὃ γὰρ ἔπεται μείζον ἀγαθόν, τοῦθ' αἰρετώτερον· ἂν δ' ἢ τὰ ἐπόμενα κακά, ὃ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ' αἰρετώτερον· ὄντων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων αἰρετῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει δυσχερές τι παρέπεσθαι. διχῶς δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔπεσθαι ἢ σκέψις· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔπεται, οἷον τῷ μανθάνοντι τὸ μὲν ἀγνοεῖν πρότερον, τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον. βέλτιον δ' ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ ὕστερον ἐπόμενον. λαμβάνειν οὖν τῶν ἐπομένων ὁπότερον ἂν ἢ χρῆσιμον. (*Top.* 3.2, 117a5–15)

Moreover, when two things are very much like one another, and we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them, we should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. For the one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable; or, if the consequences be evil, that is more desirable which is followed by the less evil. For though both may be desirable, yet there may still be some unpleasant consequence. Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two directions, for there are prior consequences and later consequences: e.g. if a man learns, it follows that he was ignorant before and knows afterwards. For the most part, the later consequence is the better. You should take, therefore, whichever of the consequences suits your purpose. (transl. Pickard–Cambridge, adjusted)

The notion of consequence here and even more so in our passage seems to have little to do with logical consequence in any sense, though: that envy follows wisdom may be an accurate observation and in that sense a fact about a given society, but it is hardly a matter of logic. As in *Rh. Al.* and in item (22), we find in text (21) the notion of a subject under discussion (comprising courses of action, choices etc.), here referred to by ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων. The consequences mentioned are consequences of these subjects. These consequences are, on the most general level, divided into good and bad ones (cf. the example given).

When Aristotle tells us that Callippus' *technê* consisted in this *topos* and that he relied on the notion of "the possible and the others",⁷ it seems natural on the background of what has been said above to regard the notion of consequence as the crucial element of analysis Aristotle brought to Callippus' method and that τὸ δύνατον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα refers to the list of value terms hinted at in text (22). That this is what Aristotle must have had in mind was the impression of many though not all interpreters from very early on, most notably, the anonymous commentator on *Rhet.*, and also Spengel and Radermacher, who emended εἴρηται to εἰρήσεται to make text (21) refer forward to text (23) instead of backwards.⁸

A less invasive solution to this problem is to suppose that the reference is to *Rhet.* 1.3:

- (25) τέλος δὲ ἑκάστοις τούτων [sc. the *genera orationis*] ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὗσι τρία, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ ψέγουσιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν. (1358b20–29)

The "end" of each of these is different, and there are three ends for three [species]: for the deliberative speaker [the end] is the advantageous and the harmful (for someone urging something advises it as the better course and one dissuading dissuades on the ground that it is worse), and he includes other factors as incidental: whether it is just or unjust, or honourable or disgraceful; for those speaking in law courts [the end] is the just and the unjust, and they make other considerations incidental to these; for those praising and blaming [the end] is the honorable and the shameful, and these speakers bring up other considerations in reference to these qualities. (transl. Kennedy)

This would give us the list of value terms we need as a point of reference without changing the text.

But we are not yet finished with the statement that the *topos* is said to make up the whole *technê* of Callippus (note the slight difference in the formulation of the phrase—text (22) allows us to give a more precise meaning to the sentence in text (21)). I pointed out above how the interpretation offered goes some way to explaining how a single *topos* can make up a whole *technê*—because the cate-

⁷ Cf. LSJ s.v. προσλαμβάνειν no. 1 "take, receive besides/in addition, get over and above."

⁸ Anon. in *Rhet.* 139.10–15 *ad loc.* (CAG xxi. 2); Spengel 1867 317.

gories of consequence and motivation do away with the extensive division of value terms. This would still be a manner of speaking, but would not cause a problem of understanding. However, there is yet another sense in which the sentence cannot be taken entirely at face value, for it can in a sense not be *this topos* of which Callippus' art was made up; for this *topos*, the one involving consequence or motivation, is Aristotle's creation. On the other hand, I observed above that in the *Topics* Aristotle can call "precepts" or "principles" *topoi*, but never examples, i.e. mere instantiations of a given pattern of argument. To solve this tension, we have to remind ourselves that the earlier examination of *Rh. Al.* had produced sufficient grounds for understanding why Aristotle may regard someone like Callippus as a somewhat primitive predecessor in the analysis of rhetorical argument, but as a predecessor nonetheless.

This brings me to the question why we find both *topoi* in our *Rhet.* One explanation would be from practicality. Both *topoi* are useful devices in their own right, which in itself is sufficient ground for letting them both stand. And while the great majority of the arguments one can construct with the type of method we have seen in the *Rh. Al.* can be analysed in terms of both patterns of argument, it is implausible to see them as absolutely coextensive. By the same token, the juxtaposition of *eidê* and *koinoi topoi* in the *Rhet.* does not mean that there is not a substantial overlap between the two methods. The second explanation for the juxtaposition of the two *topoi* has to do with the mode by which the *Rhet.* came into being. The systematic gathering of data and the setting up of files was of course invented in the Peripatos. We have reason to believe that the doxographical tradition originates from the collections of *endoxa* Aristotle recommends in the *Topics*.⁹ We can infer that dialectical *topoi* were systematically gathered in much the same way. In particular, we

⁹ In 1. 14, 105b12–15 a manual for drawing up an inventory of *endoxa* is given, i.e. of the reputable propositions which are discussed in dialectical conversations: ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρή καὶ ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων, τὰς δὲ διαγραφὰς ποιεῖσθαι περὶ ἐκάστου γένους ὑποτιθέοντας χωρὶς, οἷον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ περὶ ζώου, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ παντός, ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ τί ἐστίν. "One should also collect premises from written works, and make up tables, listing them separately about each genus, e.g. about good or about animal (and about (every sense) of good), beginning with what is" (transl. Smith). According to this paragraph, the dialectician should survey appropriate writings in search for propositions which are *endoxa* and classify them according to a certain pattern. The ordering principle is the thing the *endoxon* is about, more precisely: the subject of the *endoxon* analysed as a subject-predicate-proposition. Each file on a given subject—the good, the living being—should begin with a definition (τὸ τί ἐστίν). Clearly, this is supposed to make the dialectical *topoi* more easily applicable.

can point to double versions of essentially the same *topos* in bks. 2 and 5 of the *Topics*, which are different only in terms of presentation and economy of expression.¹⁰ Clearly, it is only reasonable to assume that our two rhetorical *topoi* were formulated at different times but then ended up in the same collection of patterns of argument. If we combine this second explanation with the first, we do not even have to assume that it was someone other than Aristotle (or a careless Aristotle) who put together what is *Rhet.* 2.23–24 today.

After all this, an interesting question imposes itself: who was Callippus? To judge by the other references to individuals in this section (Theodorus 1400b17, Corax 1402a18), Aristotle seems to count him among the early technographers; this is significant inasmuch as the well-known polemical sections in *Rhet.* 1.1 all refer to contemporary rhetoricians in the present tense, as was already noted by Solmsen.¹¹ So we seem to get two kinds of references to rhetoricians in the *Rhet.*—generic ones to contemporaries, others by name to earlier writers—and Callippus must be classed with the latter.¹² This is consistent with the usual identification of our Callippus with a pupil of the first generation of pupils of Isocrates, mentioned in the latter's *Antidosis* (93).¹³ Blass¹⁴ observed that a certain Philomelus, mentioned in the same passage as a pupil of the second generation, must have become a pupil of Isocrates before 390, which would give us the last decade of the 5th century or the first decade of the 4th as the period when Callippus became Isocrates' pupil. If the Callippus against whom Apollodorus in 369/8 gave a speech according to [Dem.] 52 is the same as our Callippus, then we get a *terminus post quem* for his death. If one now combines the two observations, the one about the writers on rhetoric mentioned in the vicinity in the second book of the *Rhet.* (who are all 5th century figures) and the information that emerges from Isocrates, then it is clear that they fit better with each other the earlier we put Callippus. So I would date the writing of the handbook Aristotle refers to to the period when Callippus was a pupil of Isocrates. Pamphilus, unfortunately,

¹⁰ Book 2: Brunschwig 1968 3–21; book 5: Reinhardt 2000 96–98.

¹¹ Solmsen 1929 215 ff.

¹² See Brunschwig 1994 92–94.

¹³ See, e.g., Spengel 1867 317 (tentative); Grimaldi 1988 317 (confident). Cf. Kirchner 1901 no. 8074, where the references to him are collected. He should not be confused with the Callippus who was a pupil of Plato and had a role in the death of Dion of Syracuse in 354 B.C. (no. 8065 in Kirchner 1901), *pace* Kennedy 1991 29 n. 8.

¹⁴ Blass 1897–1898 18.

is a very shadowy figure indeed; we only come across a rhetorician of that name in the Roman period. In Cic. *de Orat.* 3.81 he is mentioned in a context where also Corax's name comes up; if anything, this tells us that in the Hellenistic period readers of what is today *Rhet.* 2.23–24 came to the same conclusion as I did above about how the rhetoricians mentioned should be placed relative to each other. One important observation, though, may be made with reference to Pamphilus: his mentioning here shows that the kind of method we find in *Rh. Al.*, and which I postulate for the late 5th and early 4th century, was something that could be associated with more than one individual and thus was, I would argue, not unusual for a rhetorical handbook at the time.

To conclude: We know from the oldest treatises of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* that there was a fairly strong notion of *technê* in place already in the late 5th century B.C.; by “strong notion” I mean a developed notion which, in addition to certain formal requirements—such as that a *technê* should be beneficial and teachable—included the systematic requirement, which I called “accountability” above, explicitly specified or merely underlying.¹⁵ I then argued for the view that the *Rh. Al.*, perhaps more clearly than is commonly thought, meets the standard of “accountability”. And I made the additional assumption that *Rh. Al.* is in its substance a representative of a handbook tradition that is uninfluenced by views on rhetoric that can be found in Aristotle's *Rhet.* To this work I turned then and identified two passages in 2.23 in which a method for finding rational arguments very similar to the one I retrieved from the *Rh. Al.* is assigned to two earlier rhetoricians in such a way that we can plausibly separate a pre-Aristotelian core of material and the element of Aristotelian analysis. In the process we gained some insights that resolved puzzles that might have been caused by the way Aristotle refers to these earlier *technai*. The date of one of the authors of these *technai* can plausibly be given as the late 5th or very early 4th century B.C. All this would suggest to me that by the turn of the 5th century there were technical handbooks on rhetoric in existence that, at the very least, included precepts on constructing rational arguments; I see no reason why they should not have included precepts on other areas of rhetorical instruction too, for instance style, elementary perhaps, but not confined to examples.

¹⁵ It is of course possible to argue for what I call “formal” requirements in systematic terms; my point is that what I call systematic requirements cannot be reduced to formal requirements.

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CHAPTER SIX

ARGUMENTATIVE DEVICES IN THE *RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM*

LUCIA CALBOLI MONTEFUSCO

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* has always raised a great deal of interest. Scholars have investigated not only the authorship and the composition of this work, but also its doctrine and its relationship to the previous handbooks of rhetoric or to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle;¹ even a new edition of the text, with introduction and notes, missing till now in the collection *Belles Lettres*, has been recently published.² A common acknowledgement is the pragmatism of the author in comparison with Aristotle's speculations: Pierre Chiron speaks of "empirisme" and "amoralisme d'une technique visant à guider l'orateur dans la défense de n'importe quelle cause, fût-elle juste, injuste ou douteuse".³ Antoine Braet calls attention to "the opportunism" of this handbook, which teaches that "the important thing is to win the case, at whatever cost and by whatever means."⁴

This is certainly true, but we should not forget that beyond his speculations Aristotle also means to give the orator practical guidelines,⁵ which to some extent have even been considered amoral⁶

¹ Cf., e.g., Cope 1867 401 ff.; Buchheit 1960 189 ff.; Fuhrmann 1960 11 ff.; Barwick 1966 212 ff. and 1967 47–55; Goebel 1989 41 ff.; Mirhady 1991 5 ff. and 1994 54 ff.; Braet 1996 347 ff.; Patillon 1997 104 ff. and the studies of Chiron 1998 349 ff., 1999 313 ff., 2000 17 ff., 2002 VII ff., and in an article still forthcoming.

² Chiron 2002.

³ Chiron 2002 IX; cf. 1998 356 and the severe judgement of Cope 1867 442 who, referring to the precepts of the προοίμιον, said "here the unscientific and immoral—or if not immoral, at any rate *unmoral*, regardless of all moral considerations—character, which ... pervades this treatise ... is brought out into strong relief"; cf. also p. 458.

⁴ Braet 1996 348.

⁵ Cf. Grimaldi 1980 3–4 who, referring to the possibility mentioned by Aristotle right at the beginning of his *Rhetoric* "to make a road, to trace out a path" (1354a8 ὁδοποιεῖν), comments: "A. implies that what follows in the treatise will be just such a road"; throughout the three books Aristotle often hints at this function of his handbook: cf., e.g., *Rhet.* 1355b22–23; 1359a26 ff.; 1368b1 ff.; 1375a25 ff.; 1378a15 ff.; 1388b31 ff.; 1393a23–24; 1410a8.

⁶ Cf. Oates 1974 107–108; Sprute 1994 124 ff.; Braet 1996 357 n. 5. In favour

and that, by contrast, the continuous concern of the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* to show “from where” (ὅθεν; πόθεν; ἐκ + genitive) the orator can have “a good supply” (εὐπορεῖν; πολλὰ λαμβάνειν) of his argumentative devices reminds us of his intention to offer a μέθοδος, following which the orator can speak “according to the art”⁷ as it appears best from his statement that his long treatment of the εἰκός represents the μέθοδος that allows us to develop this argument in the most technical way (1429a19–20 τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς διὰ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου τεχνικώτατα μέτιμεν.). On the other hand, the so frequent use of the verbs εὐπορεῖν and λαμβάνειν to highlight the heuristic function of his precepts also gives this handbook a theoretical dimension. In other words, his guidelines mean to focus on the topics from which we can have a rich quantity of material at our disposal.⁸ We can quote, just as one example, the passage where the author, after listing the πίστεις, recalls the need to know not only the nature of each of them and the differences between them, but also “the sources that will supply us with arguments for each”: *Rh. Al.* 1428a23–25 δεῖ δὲ τούτων ἐκάστην αὐτὴν τε συνιέναι, ποία τίς ἐστι, καὶ πόθεν τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν λόγων εὐπορήσομεν, καὶ τί ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν; some pages later, after dealing with their first category, he sums up saying that he has already told how to know their nature, “the sources from which we shall obtain a supply of them” and their differences: *Rh. Al.* 1431b4–7 ὥστε τὰς μὲν (ἐξ αὐτῶν) τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν πρᾶξεων (καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων) πίστεις, οἷαι τέ εἰσι καὶ ὅθεν αὐτῶν εὐπορήσομεν καὶ τίνι ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἴσμεν. Aristotle definitely uses the verb εὐπορεῖν in the same way also to refer to the utility of his advice. The most impressive passage is at the very end of book II, where he considers the whole content of the first

of a morality of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is, on the contrary, Wörner 1990. Many scholars have debated the question: cf., just as one example, the long discussion of Engberg-Pedersen 1996 116 ff.

⁷ Four times the author explicitly refers to his precepts as to a μέθοδος: 1427b16–17; 1429a19; 1435b23–24; 1436a28; cf. also Fuhrmann 1960 20. Four times, almost at the end of this work (1444b7; 1445a28; 1445b23; 1445b27), we find the adverb ἐντέχνως to hint at a way of speaking “consistent with the precepts of the art”. According to Patillon (1997 122) the use of this adverb suits the linguistic tendencies of a second author (“auteur 2”), whose work could be considered as the basis of the third part (chapters 29–37) of our handbook (cf. 111 ff.). That, however, belongs to the difficult question of the composition of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, which has been recently dealt with at length also by Chiron 2002 Xff.

⁸ On the εὐπορία offered by the topics cf. Pernot 1986 269.

two books as enough about paradigms, maxims, enthymemes and in general *about the sources from which we will have a good supply* of them.⁹

However, even if we cannot deny these analogies between the two works, when we look in detail at their ways to deal with the πίστεις we meet one of the most relevant and well-known differences, which David Mirhady and Pierre Chiron have already focused on in two complementary studies.¹⁰ I will only add some remarks on a couple of them. The first question that arises from the comparison of these texts is the different criterion in the distinction of two groups of πίστεις: ἄτεχνοι and ἔντεχνοι according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1355b35), ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων and ἐπίθεται τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ τοῖς πραττομένοις according to the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1428a16–19).¹¹

Aristotle himself explains the meaning of his distinction: the πίστεις ἄτεχνοι “are not provided by us but are pre-existing”; the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι, on the contrary, “can be prepared by method and by us”; consequently “one must use the former and invent the latter”.¹² Here lies the speculative aspect of his practical guidelines: as any τέχνη has the task to discover why things happen in a certain way, rhetoric also, *qua* τέχνη, has the task to discover the sources of persuasion by means of πάθος, ἦθος and λόγος (*Rhet.* 1356a1–4), which is to say to investigate how it is possible to arouse feelings, to appear credible, or to find premises for logical reasoning.¹³ Aristotle’s precepts about the topics that allow the orator to exploit these kinds of πίστεις are the result of this theoretical activity.

The distinction made by the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is more obscure. Arguments drawn from words (λόγοι), deeds (πράξεις) and persons (ἄνθρωποι) are not embodied in the art but are not at the disposal of the orator by themselves either. Only by following the practical guidelines offered by the author, as we have seen, will we be able to secure “a good supply” of them (εὐπορήσομεν, πολλά

⁹ *Rhet.* 1403a34–b3 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμαμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὥς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως, cf. 1366 a 20; 1385 a 15 and Pernot 1986 269.

¹⁰ Mirhady 1991 5 ff. takes into account problems related to the πίστεις ἄτεχνοι, Chiron 1998 349ff. discusses the group of the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις.

¹¹ Cf. Calboli Montefusco 1998a 22–23.

¹² *Rhet.* 1355b35–40 ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν πεπορίσται ἀλλὰ προϋπῆρχεν, οἷον μάρτυρες βράσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, ὥστε δεῖ τούτων τοῖς μὲν χρῆσασθαι, τὰ δὲ εὐρεῖν. Cf. Grimaldi 1980 37 ff.

¹³ In this regard cf. Calboli Montefusco 1998a 19 ff. and 2000a 48n. 36.

ληψόμεθα). Differently from the πίστεις ἐπίθετοι which, like Aristotle's πίστεις ἄτεχνοι only need direction about how they are to be used to the speaker's profit or to contradict the opponent,¹⁴ the first category of proofs seems to be founded on those *topoi* which later, in Cicero's *De inventione*, are said to represent the essential elements of any argumentation: *Inv.* 1.34 *omnes res argumentando confirmantur aut ex eo, quod personis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis est adtributum*.¹⁵ In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, however, these *topoi*, far from being a dry taxonomy, as was probably the case in the sources of Cicero's *De inventione*, appear inside a very complex doctrine of proofs that, though different, is rich with suggestions of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

The first of them, for instance, is particularly interesting: εἰκός, the author says, is that of which the hearers "have examples in their minds": 1428a26–27 εἰκός μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὗ λεγομένου παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες. Then he explains: "I mean, for instance, if a person said that he desired his country to be great, his friends prosperous and his enemies unfortunate, and things like these in general, the statements would seem probable, because *each member of the audience is personally conscious* of having corresponding desires about these and similar matters himself."¹⁶ Some chapters later, this personal knowledge of the hearers is considered the *differentia specifica* of the εἰκός (1431a25 τοῦ μὲν εἰκότος ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες ἔννοιαν). Referring to it, Goebel points out that "Anaximenes' probability is defined primarily in terms of its effect on the audience,"¹⁷ and following him Chiron has stressed "l'importance, en termes d'adhésion du public, de cette 'connivence' entre ce que dit l'orateur et les données de l'expérience ainsi intériorisées."¹⁸ Neither of them, however, has called enough attention to the fact that the hearers share what the speaker says only because it is what happens frequently. In other words, the probability of the εἰκός is rooted here, as it is in Aristotle, on objective facts.¹⁹

¹⁴ Arist. *Rhet.* 1375a22–1377b11; *Rh. Al.* 1431b8–1432b4; cf. Mirhady 1991 6ff.; Calboli Montefusco 1998a 29ff.

¹⁵ Cf. Calboli Montefusco 2000a 37ff.

¹⁶ *Rh. Al.* 1428a26ff. λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις φαίη τὴν πατρίδα βούλεσθαι μεγάλην εἶναι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους εὖ πράττειν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀτυχεῖν ... ἔκαστος γὰρ τῶν ἀκονόντων σύννοιδεν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὁμοιοτρόπων ἔχοντι τοιαύτας ἐπιθυμίας. For the English translation of this and all the other passages of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* quoted throughout this paper I am indebted to the Loeb edition of Rackham 1937.

¹⁷ Goebel 1989 43.

¹⁸ Chiron 1998 352; cf. id. 2002 139.

¹⁹ Cf. the first part of Aristotle's definition of the εἰκός in *Rhet.* 1357 a 34 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον) and the comment of Goebel 1989 42: "it

Rather than to a merely subjective opinion, “having examples in the minds” refers to knowledge very similar to the knowledge alluded to by Aristotle when in the *Prior Analytics* he defines the εἰκός as that “which people *know* to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be *usually* in a particular way” (transl. Tredennick).²⁰ When the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* mentions the arousing of the emotions (πάθη) as a source for the εἰκός, he takes care to underline that they are feelings “well known” (γνώριμα) to the audience because they are “experiences *customary* to man by nature” (1428b4–7 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια κοινὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὄντα πάθη γνώριμα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐστὶ. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰθισμένα γίνεσθαι τοιαῦτά ἐστιν). When sources for the εἰκός are custom itself (ἔθος) or profit (κέρδος) it is again the frequency of the actions that makes them probable (1428b8–11 ἕτερον δὲ μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν εἰκότων ἔθος, ὃ κατὰ συνήθειαν ἕκαστοι ποιοῦμεν. τρίτον δὲ κέρδος· πολλάκις γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν φύσιν βιασάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἥθη προειλόμεθα πράττειν).

On the other hand, the role of frequency in this cognitive process, which by means of παραδείγματα leads the hearers to consider a statement εἰκός, is evident if we read carefully the precepts the author gives about the παραδείγματα themselves. According to the author, these are “actions that have occurred previously and are similar to, or the opposite of, those which we are now discussing. They should be employed on occasions when your statement of the case is unconvincing and you desire *to illustrate* it, if it cannot be proved by the argument from probability, in order that your audience may be more ready to believe your statements *when they realise* that another

is defined in terms of observable fact”. This objectivity, however, does not make the Aristotelian εἰκός a “necessary” premise: despite its “stability and regularity” (Grimaldi 1980 62), the εἰκός is actually only a πρότασις ἐνδοξος (*An. Pr.* 70a4) because it belongs to those realities that can be other than they are (*Rhet.* 1357a35–b1 τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκείνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκός ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος). For a discussion of this question and for suitable literature cf. Calboli Montefusco 1998b 9–10.

²⁰ *An. Pr.* 70a4–5 ὃ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον ἢ ὃν ἢ μὴ ὄν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἰκός. We have to do here with the same inductive knowledge that Chiron 2002 139 has rightly pointed out with regard to the probability of the εἰκός in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. The difference between the two authors, therefore, does not concern the cognitive process that leads people to consider probable (εἰκός) what happens with a certain frequency. What is different, by contrast, is its perception and usage: a general premise for deductive reasoning in Aristotle vs. a particular assertion that works persuasively because it is shared by the audience in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.

action resembling the one you allege has been committed in the way in which you say that it occurred.”²¹ Παραδείγματα, therefore, are needed when we cannot use the εἰκός. There is between them, as Chiron rightly says, “une sorte de relation de complémentarité”,²² but we need to explain how this happens: our statement cannot be proved by the εἰκός because what we are saying is not φανερόν and for this reason it is unknown to the hearers; using παραδείγματα, that is, quoting *similar actions*, we illustrate it, and the hearers, after knowing (καταμαθόντες) that this kind of action happens in a certain way, are ready to agree with us. To sum up: παραδείγματα give the hearers the necessary knowledge to consider probable what could not be so considered before because it was unknown.

Differently from Aristotle, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* does not take into account the logical process which leads to this knowledge;²³ he confines himself to pointing out that we need to show that what we want to maintain is probable because it is supported by actions that *frequently* happen in the same way; even more, we can also exploit the frequency of similar actions to let what normally is considered improbable appear probable or to discredit what is based on probability. This comes out clearly from what the author lets follow. Among the actions that we mean to use as παραδείγματα, some—he says—are reasonably expected to happen (κατὰ λόγον), but others are contrary to any reasonable expectation

²¹ *Rh. Al.* 1429a21–27 παραδείγματα δ’ ἐστὶ πράξεις ὁμοίαι γεγενημέναι καὶ ἐναντίαι ταῖς νῦν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν λεγομέναις. τότε δὲ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀπιστον ὢν τὸ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον [εἶναι] φανερόν ποιῆσαι θέλης, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦ εἰκότος μὴ πιστεύηται, ὅπως προᾶξιν ὁμοίαν ἑτέραν τῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένη καταμαθόντες οὕτω πεπραγμένην, ὥς σὺ φῆς πεπράχθαι, μᾶλλον πιστεύουσι τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένοις.

²² Chiron 1998 357.

²³ Aristotle twice defines the παράδειγμα, and on both occasions he points out that in the relationship of two similar things that fall under the same genus one must be “better known than the other” (*An. Pr.* 69a15–16 ὅταν ἄμφο μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ ταὐτό, γνωριμὸν δὲ θάτερον; *Rhet.* 1357b29–30 ὅταν ἄμφο μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρου). Only in the *Prior Analytics*, however, does he explain in detail the logical process that leads a person to “know” what was before unknown: cf. Calboli Montefusco 2000b 32 ff. with literature. With certain caveats we might consider Aristotle’s παράδειγμα as the logical rationalisation of the εἰκός taken into account in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Indeed, “having examples in the minds” refers to what, being already known, is the first step of the parabolic movement that leads inductively to the general assertion from which we deductively make known a particular case. In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, referring to the βεβαίωσις in deliberative speeches (1438b40–1439a3), the author explicitly mentions the need to use “examples that are akin to the case and those that are nearest in time or place to our hearers, and if such are not available, such others as are most important and best known (γνωριμώτατα).”

(παρὰ λόγον): “those happening according to expectation cause credit, those not according to expectation incredulity.”²⁴ The first kind of παραδείγματα is needed when, producing actions which are *usually* (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) carried through successfully in the way we assert, we can prove that what we are saying is itself κατὰ λόγον (1429b26–30).

Indeed, the apparent rationality of what happens κατὰ λόγον consists in this happening ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ: the hearers share what we want to prove because at question is whether what is happening usually has become generally accepted as happening. This is the case, says the author, “if somebody asserts that the rich are more honest than the poor and produces cases of honest conduct on the part of rich men”; then he comments: “examples of this sort appear to be κατὰ λόγον, because *most people* obviously think that those who are rich are more honest than those who are poor” (1429a36–37). Again, after quoting παραδείγματα showing that a large number of allies in war is of a great help to defeat adversaries, he says that that is “*what everybody believes*” (1429b2–3). Of particular interest here is the fact that what happens, i.e. what is εἰκός, is clearly explained in terms that remind us of Aristotle’s concept of the ἔνδοξον.²⁵ The similarity with the Aristotelian overlap εἰκός = ἔνδοξον is striking.

As to the παραδείγματα παρὰ λόγον, by contrast, it is up to us to exploit the frequency of the facts to support our argument or to discredit what our adversary maintains. When our adversary wants to confirm an improbable action by means of similar cases that have happened successfully we only have to say that they were “lucky accidents” (εὐτυχήματα), which occur *rarely* (ἐν τῷ σπανίῳ),²⁶ whereas what we want to maintain has *often* (πολλάκις) occurred (1429b30–

²⁴ *Rh. Al.* 1429a27–31 εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν παραδειγμάτων δύο τρόποι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ παρὰ λόγον. ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον γινόμενα πιστεῦσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ λόγον ἀπιστεῖσθαι. According to Alewell 1913 8, fn. 2 the real difference is here not in the nature of the examples, but in their use. Price 1975 fn. 33 disagrees. What matters, however, is always the similarity (or contrariety, which is a particular form of similarity, cf. *Arist. Top.* 108a13ff.; *Rhet.* 1405a17) of the actions taken into account. On textual problems of this passage cf. Price 1975 17; Chiron 2002 app. ad loc.

²⁵ At the beginning of the *Topics* Aristotle repeatedly says that ἔνδοξα are those things that represent the opinions of all or of the majority or of the wise (*Top.* 100b22–23 ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς; cf. 104a9ff.; 105a35ff.); cf. Raphael 1974 155; Most 1994 167–190; Pritzl 1994 41–50; Piazza 2000 132 ff.

²⁶ About the use of this expression cf. the discussion of Chiron 1999 335.

34);²⁷ when we need what is *παρὰ λόγον* to appear probable we have to produce as many examples as we can “to show that unexpected occurrences are just as *common* (εἴωθε) as ones that were expected” (1429b34ff.). Only in this way does what is in itself improbable (*παρὰ λόγον*) become probable and we can succeed in discrediting even what is based on probability (1429b22 ff.).

The situation is different when we use as *παραδείγματα* actions that are the opposite of what we want to maintain. What leads the hearers to share our purpose is in this case not the frequency of the *παραδείγματα*, but the knowledge that we offer our listeners by showing the unsuccessful result of an opposite action. In short, as Price has rightly pointed out, we want to show that what we assert is the opposite of a mistake.²⁸ “I mean, for instance, says the author, if you produce a case of people overreaching their allies and their friendship consequently being dissolved, and say ‘but for our part we shall keep their alliance for a long time if we deal with them fairly and on terms of partnership’; and again, if you produce an instance of other people who went to war without preparation and who were consequently defeated, and then say ‘we should have a better hope of victory provided we are prepared for war’” (1429b38–a6).

Here, without any allusion to the logical process at the basis of this kind of argument, the author means to exploit the persuasive power of the combination of contraries which builds the first of the common topics for demonstrative enthymemes in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: “one *topos* for demonstrative [enthymemes] is that from opposites (ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων); for one should look to see *if the opposite [predicate] is true of the opposite [subject]*, ... for example [saying] that to be temperate is a good thing, for the lack self-control is harmful.”²⁹ This is what in the *Topics* Aristotle explains even better as a direct sequence of a “contrary following upon a contrary,” where the “object of choice” is contrary to the “object of avoidance”.³⁰ In our cases it is evident that what we want to assert is the object of choice (*dealing fairly and on terms of partnership / being prepared for war*) while what the *παράδειγμα*

²⁷ Cf. Chiron 2002 143n. 294 quoting Alewell 1913 9n. 1. For textual difficulties in this passage see the discussion of Price 1975 19ff.

²⁸ Price 1975 22f., 35.

²⁹ *Rhet.* 1397a7–11 ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ὃ οἶον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν.

³⁰ *Top.* 113b27–30 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔπεται, ἢ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ὃ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἢ ἀκολουθήσῃς, οἷον τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ δειλίᾳ· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ ἀκολουθεῖ, τῇ δὲ κακίᾳ, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ αἰρετόν, τῇ δὲ τὸ φευκτόν.

shows (*overreaching the allies / going to war without preparation*) is the object of avoidance.

What is of particular interest, however, is the fact that the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, though without theoretical speculations, seems to be quite comfortable not only with this, but also with other uses of contraries. Arguing ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, for instance, is one of the four criteria (ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐκ τῶν ἤδη κεκοιμένων) that we can exploit to build arguments from the common topics just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, easy, practicable, and necessary (1422a24–28). Among the examples offered by the author we find this sequence of a contrary following upon a contrary only once, to illustrate an argument based on the expedient: “If you think it *inexpedient* for us to go to war with Thebes *single-handed*, it would be *expedient* for us to *make an alliance* with Sparta before going to war with Thebes” (1422b41–43); the object of choice overlaps here obviously with the expedient, the object of avoidance with the inexpedient. More common is here, by contrast, a different way to combine contraries. The first example refers to the just: “As it is just to punish those who do us harm, so it is also proper to do good in return to those who do us good” (1422a36–38). Here both statements (“*punish those who do us harm*” and “*do good in return to those who do us good*”) are received opinions which are not opposed to each other: if we again applied Aristotle’s categories we could indeed say that “each of the contrary verbs is combined with each of the contrary objects”³¹ and that we do not have a contrariety because both actions “are objects of choice” (*Top.* 113a1–3; cf. 104a28–30), which is exactly what the author means to show. Following the same pattern the author also builds arguments ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων from the lawful (1422b15–17: “If the laws enjoin that those who direct the affairs of the community honourably and justly are to be honoured, it is clear that they deem those who destroy public property deserving of punishment”) and again from the expedient (1422b39–41: “If it is profitable to honour virtuous citizens, it would be expedient to punish vicious ones”).

Aristotle’s categories were, however, only the rationalisation of what people had always done empirically. The opposition of contraries had been for ages exploited not only for rational arguments, but also for stylistic choices. In Homer’s comparisons opposites

³¹ *Top.* 112b32 ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκατέρῳ τῶν ἐναντίων συμπλακίησεται.

are supposed to work persuasively,³² and the widespread use of the ἀντίθετον among the Sophists is a witness of it.³³ We need not wonder, then, if the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* also devotes so much attention to contraries. Leaving aside his careful description of possible oppositions of contraries in the ἀντίθετον,³⁴ which would go beyond our purposes, we should make some considerations about the persuasive power of contraries when they are sources for τεκμήρια and for ἐνθυμήματα.

According to their definition τεκμήρια are “previous facts running counter to the fact asserted in the speech, and points in which the speech contradicts itself”,³⁵ and ἐνθυμήματα are “facts that run counter to the speech or action in question, and also those that run counter to anything else.”³⁶ What is impressive here is first that contraries are the only source for both πίστεις and second that because of that τεκμήρια and ἐνθυμήματα seem to overlap each other, at least in part.³⁷ The author himself, however, takes care to distinguish them: “an ἐνθύμημα possesses this difference from a τεκμήριον, that whereas a τεκμήριον is a contrariety in word and deed, an ἐνθύμημα also selects contrarieties in regard to other forms of things; that is to say, that whereas we cannot obtain a τεκμήριον unless there exists some contrariety in regard to deeds or words, speakers can produce an ἐνθύμημα from many sources” (143 1a28 ff.). We could add that the τεκμήριον is usable only against our adversary, while the ἐνθύμημα can be helpful also to support our case. But there is more. Τεκμήρια are definitely neither arguments ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων nor previous actions opposite

³² Particularly evident is the role played by contraries in Hom. *Il.* 4.275 ff.; 4.422 ff.; 16.589 ff.; cf. the fine discussion of Nannini 2003.

³³ Cf. Gorgias’ use of the antithesis in his argument in defense of Helen (§7); Calboli 1983 58–59.

³⁴ *Rh. Al.* 1435b26 ff.; we find here the same threefold division (antithesis in sense, in word, in both at once) which we find also in Dem. *Eloc.* 22 f.; cf. Chiron 2001 96. An overview of texts and literature on this topic is in Calboli 1993 318 f.

³⁵ *Rh. Al.* 1430a14–16 τεκμήρια δέ ἐστιν ὅς ἂν ἐναντίως ἢ πεπραγμένα τῷ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος καὶ ὅσα ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἐναντῶ ἐναντιοῦται. About the peculiarity of this definition and its difference from Aristotle’s understanding of the τεκμήριον, cf. Chiron 1998 360 ff.; id. 1999 327; id. 2002 143 ff. Grube 1961 162 considers this meaning of τεκμήριον “not Classical.”

³⁶ *Rh. Al.* 1430a23–24 ἐνθυμήματα δέ ἐστιν οὐ μόνον τὰ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ πράξει ἐναντιούμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. Contraries are also for Aristotle particularly effective in enthymemes: cf. *Rhet.* 1401a6.

³⁷ Cf. Chiron 1998 364 f. According to him the difference between the two πίστεις becomes evident in their use: “si tu veux ruiner complètement ton adversaire, use du tekmerion, si tu veux lutter contre un comportement qui te paraît aberrant, use de l’enthymème”; cf. id. 2002 146.

to what we want to maintain. Contraries work here in a particular way: they are objective inconsistencies³⁸ of the speaker, who either contradicts himself during the speech or says something that is contrary to what he has done. Once highlighted, they weaken what he says because they lead the hearers to infer that everything he has said or done is unsound.³⁹ Thanks to their objective nature these inconsistencies cannot be denied: the only way to refute them is to explain why it happened to be inconsistent (1443b40–41). We could say that in the case of τεκμήρια contraries affect the *êthos* of the speaker and make him unworthy of credit. Peculiar, therefore, seems to be the fact that the author mentions the need to use τεκμήρια only in forensic speeches to confirm the evidence of witnesses and confessions obtained by torture when the accused denies the fact (1443a1).

Much more widespread, by contrast, is the use of ἐνθυμήματα, considerations founded upon any kind of contrariety. In comparison to τεκμήρια they have a wider reservoir indeed. When needed against the adversaries we “will obtain a good supply of them,” says the author, “by pursuing the method described under the investigatory species of oratory, and by considering whether the speech contradicts itself in any way, or the actions committed run counter to the principles of justice, law, expediency, honour, feasibility, facility or probability, or to the character of the speaker, or the usual course of events” (1430a24–30). To support our case we will use them to prove that what we did or said is contrary to actions and words that are unjust, unlawful, inexpedient, and to the usual behaviour of bad men (1430a32–36).

Looking at this careful description, Pierre Chiron has rightly made two important remarks: first, that here we are dealing not only with the inconsistencies that are sources for τεκμήρια but also with “déviances” from agreed standards; and second, that when used in our support the ἐνθύμημα “se fonde sur la ‘déviance’ (par rapport aux valeurs inversées) mais non pas sur l’absence de contradiction discours-discours, discours-action.”⁴⁰ We could go further and say that

³⁸ Cf. Cope 1867 425.

³⁹ *Rh. Al.* 1430a16–19 τῶν γὰρ ἀκούοντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τοῖς συμβαίνουσι περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ τὴν πράξιν ἐναντιώμασι τεκμαίρονται μηδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι μήτε τῶν λεγομένων μήτε τῶν πραττομένων. In this regard Chiron 2002 144 quotes a very interesting passage of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (1417b37–39) where the term τεκμήριον seems to hint at this inductive process of generalization rather than to its logical function of necessary premise in deductive reasoning (cf. *Rhet.* 1357b1 ff.; *An. Pr.* 70a7 ff.).

⁴⁰ Chiron 1998 362, 365; in his forthcoming article, Chiron comments: “Cette

in this different nature of contraries lies the key to understanding why τεκμήρια are usable only against the adversary and why ἐνθυμήματα in our support only exploit the second kind of opposites. Objective inconsistencies, resulting from the investigations proper to the εἶδος ἐξεταστικόν, work one way; they are negative elements that can never be employed for our support; they can only be useful to discredit our adversary by means of τεκμήρια or ἐνθυμήματα. Both parties, by contrast, can exploit what Chiron calls a “déviance” from agreed standards, because that is a reasoned argument. In this case contraries play an argumentative role because once again the “object of choice” is opposed to the “object of avoidance”. We can indeed agree with Grimaldi that we are dealing here with an “opposition” and not with a “contradiction”, as suggested by Grube,⁴¹ and we can share his conclusion that, “if we were to seek an exact parallel to this in Aristotle we find it in the enthymeme which he derives from the general topic of opposites (B 23, 97a 7 ff.).”⁴²

Let me quote one of the examples offered by the author to illustrate how in a law court we can meet interruptions at the beginning of the speech: *Rh. Al.* 1432b36–40 “is it not unreasonable that when the lawgiver enjoined that every litigant should be allowed two speeches, and when you of the jury have sworn to try the case according to the law, you yet refuse to listen even to a single speech?” Here the actual behaviour of the jury (refusing to listen even to a single speech) is proved to be unlawful, and therefore an object of avoidance, because it is the opposite of what the jury should do according to the law, i.e. to a behaviour object of choice. When enthymemes are used for the speaker’s own support the situation is simply inverted: his action is proved to be an object of choice because it is contrary to an action that, being unlawful or unjust, is an object of avoidance.

The argumentative nature of this kind of enthymeme is on the other hand asserted also by Sprute who, against the opinion of those who consider Anaximenes’ enthymemes merely considerations containing an opposition, openly says that some of them are “Thesen ..., die selbst eine Argumentation enthalten.”⁴³ Even if I cannot share his arguments—because instead of taking into account the topic

technique évoque bien davantage la pratique des eristiques—qui guettent les contradictions, nous dit Isocrate dans le *Contre les Sophistes*—que celle des dialecticiens”.

⁴¹ Grube 1961 160.

⁴² Grimaldi 1972 78.

⁴³ Sprute 1982 141.

ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων he considers the argumentative process of these enthymemes consisting “im Hinweis darauf, daß jemandes Verhalten im Gegensatz steht zu einem Zweck, den der betreffende verfolgt oder verfolgen sollte”—what matters is the fact that according to Sprute this kind of argumentation also works in a way similar to the argumentation founded on the general topics in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.⁴⁴

In Sprute’s discussion there is, moreover, another interesting statement. After quoting the first of the two examples used by the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* to illustrate how to address noisy hearers in deliberative speeches by means of a maxim or an enthymeme (1432b27–30 “it is extremely odd of them to have come there for the purpose of taking the best counsel about the matter, and yet to fancy that they can take wise counsel if they refuse to listen to the speakers”) Sprute says that this enthymeme, despite its aim to prove a foolishness, could also be used as a maxim for which there is no need to produce reasons.⁴⁵ This statement focuses on an important detail: γνώμαι and ἐνθυμήματα appear in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* not only almost always coupled together,⁴⁶ but also very similar in nature and content. The only difference between them, pointed out by the author himself, is that “whereas considerations (ἐνθυμήματα) can only be constructed from contrarities, maxims can be exhibited both in connexion with contraries and simply by themselves” (1431a35–37). Indeed we should not forget that in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* a maxim is “an individual opinion about general matters of conduct” (1430b1–2 γνώμη δέ ἐστι μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ καθ’ ὅλων τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματος ἰδίου δήλωσις), the content of which can be ἔνδοξος or παράδοξος. When the maxim is ἔνδοξος there is no need to produce reasons because what is said is already known (οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνοεῖται τὸ λεγόμενον), when παράδοξος, by contrast, the reasons should be briefly stated.⁴⁷ Only in the first case and only when drawn from contraries, can maxims overlap enthymemes in form, but that

⁴⁴ Sprute 1982 142.

⁴⁵ Sprute 1982 141–142.

⁴⁶ Reasoned lists of passages are to be found in Sprute 1982 143; Chiron 1998 363 f. Differently from Aristotle, however, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* never considers a maxim part of an enthymeme.

⁴⁷ *Rh. Al.* 1430b1 ff. At first glance we could compare this distinction with Aristotle’s distinction between γνώμαι with supplement (μετ’ ἐπιλόγου) and γνώμαι without supplement (ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου), because—as he says (*Rhet.* 1394b8 ff.)—“those that need demonstration are those that say something paradoxical or disputable, but those that involve no paradox [can stand] without a supplement” (trans. Kennedy). Looking more carefully, however, we note that the two authors have a totally different understanding of the function of the γνώμαι: cf. Calboli Montefusco 1999b 27 ff.

they do comes out from the statement of the author that there is just one way to refute both of them, namely by showing that they are “either paradoxical or ambiguous” (1443b41–42 τὰς δὲ γνώμας καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἢ παρὰδοξα ἀπόφαινε ἢ ἀμφιβόλα).

This is very important because, leaving aside the question of the relationship between maxims and enthymemes,⁴⁸ the stress on the necessary endoxal content of the enthymemes proves that arguing ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων exploits the persuasive power of received opinions. This allows the speaker to condense his enthymemes “into the briefest possible shape” (1430a35–37 δεῖ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα συνάγειν ὥς εἰς βραχύτατα καὶ φράζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ὀλίγοις τοῖς ὀνόμασιν) or even to state only half of them so that the hearers may understand the other half themselves (1434a35–37 τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγοντας ὅλα ἢ ἡμίση, ὥστε τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς ἀκούοντάς).⁴⁹ Indeed only what is commonly agreed can be left understood.⁵⁰ In the example quoted by Sprute (*Rh. Al.* 1432b26–29), for instance, the opposition of contraries is not evident because the wrong behaviour of the listeners (*refusing to listen to the speakers*), i.e. the object of avoidance, is not opposed to the object of choice (*listening to the speakers for the purpose of taking the best counsel about the matter*) because, being commonly believed, it can be supplied by the hearers themselves.

Should we consider that as a bridge to the Aristotelian understanding of enthymemes? It is not easy to answer this question, and it is not possible to do it now. Certainly we find in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* plenty of suggestions of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the reason for the brevity and the incomplete formulation of the enthymemes could be one of them. But we are not allowed to draw any quick con-

⁴⁸ On this question cf., e.g., Sprute 1982 144–145; Grimaldi 1988 259–260; Piazza 2000 71–72.

⁴⁹ Brevity is certainly the most evident formal characteristic of enthymemes in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. The author, however, does not consider their concise or incomplete formulation either as help for the weakness of the hearers, who would not be able to follow lengthy reasoning (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1357a16–21; 1395b25–27; 1419a17–19), or as a kind of flattery to get the assent of those who feel intelligent because they understand what has been left out (cf. the famous passage of Theophrastus quoted by Demetr. *Eloc.* 222 [696 FHS&G]); Aristotle, moreover, considers the brevity of enthymemes within the wider question of the pleasure stirred in the hearers when they have a μάθησις ταχέα (*Rhet.* 1410b21); cf. Calboli Montefusco 1999a 83 ff.

⁵⁰ Cf. also Aristotle’s comment in *Rhet.* 1357a19–21: “[to show] that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is enough to have said that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for *everybody knows that*” (transl. Kennedy).

clusion. Before that we need to look more carefully at many other important details in order to understand better first of all the text itself of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and then its relationship to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. These few remarks only mean to be a stimulus for further analysis.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE METAPHOR AFTER ARISTOTLE

GUALTIERO CALBOLI

Looking at the first writings to exploit the metaphor after Aristotle's treatment of it in the *Poetics* and in the *Rhetoric*, that is, looking in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.34-45, one can see that much has changed. For there is a great difference between Aristotle's large view and the half page dedicated to the *translatio* (μεταφορά) by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Cornificius, in my opinion).¹ How much time had passed? About 250 years if we date Aristotle's *Rhetoric* very approximately to 332 B.C. (between 335–322 B.C. during his second stay in Athens) and consider the last book of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, where we find the *translatio*, which the most plausible arguments tell us was written in 82 B.C. On the other hand the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* was only the third Roman handbook (*ars*) on rhetoric after the incomplete *ars* written by the great orator Antony, which may be dated between 99 and 95 B.C.,² and Cicero's also incomplete handbook, which is called *De inuentione*. This latter

¹ I defended the authorship of Cornificius in Calboli 1965 1–56 and reconsidered this question in Calboli, 1993b 1–7 and Calboli 2002 120 (where I wrote: “However, what matters in this issue is not just the possibility of giving a name to the author of the *Ad Herennium*, since such a name would be without any specific reference, but the fact that Quintilian, as a very competent rhetorician, knew the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.”)

² That Antony's *ars* was incomplete is attested by Quintilian (*Inst.* 3.1.19 *Romanorum primus [...] condidit aliqua in hanc materiam [sc. in artem rhetoricam] M. Cato, post M. Antonius incohauit: nam hoc solum opus eius atque id ipsum imperfectum manet*). On the other hand, the date of Antony's incomplete *ars* must be put between 102 and 92 B.C. These two extremes are represented, on the one hand, by the time when Antony was politically close to Marius, i.e. in 95 B.C. when, defending Norbanus, he spoke in praise of the *seditiones* and, on the other hand, by the 92 B.C. intervention of the censors against the Latin rhetoricians—and it is strange that Antony wrote an *ars rhetorica*, his *libellus*, when the censors of 92 B.C. condemned this activity in Rome (see Scholz 1962 98; Calboli 1972 149f.). Of the *libellus* (Cic. *De or.* 1.94) we know only the doctrine of the *status*, the same doctrine we find in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (cf. Calboli Montefusco 1988 197–205). It is natural that both works, Antony's *libellus* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, were written relatively close each other, Antony's *ars* in 95–94 and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in 86–82.

work was written during 88–87 B.C. and so about two years before the first book of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which is dated at 86 B.C. As I have mentioned, both Antony's and Cicero's handbooks are incomplete. Of the first we have only a fragment referring to the theory of the *status*, and in the second there is a complete treatment of the *inuentio*. In Cicero's *De inuentione* the *elocutio* isn't discussed and neither is it at all likely that *elocutio* was taken into account in Antony's incomplete *ars*. Therefore the first treatment of the metaphor in a Latin handbook is what we meet in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. These Roman *artes* originated from Greek treatises used as handbooks (τέχναι) in the Rhodian teaching schools.

The Rhodian origin of the rhetorical τέχνη, the mother of the *ars* that was the model for the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De inuentione*, deserves note because it means that these handbooks were produced in a primary centre of philosophical, rhetorical and grammatical culture where Peripatetic and Stoic philosophies and Alexandrian philology were all present. All the great scholars of Roman rhetoric and grammar went to Rhodes, including Aelius Stilon, Varro's teacher, Antony the orator, Cicero, Caesar and the great lawyer Serv. Sulpicius Rufus. The Rhodians, after 167 B.C., the year when they feared the Romans would declare war against them as a consequence of the favour the Rhodians showed to Perseus, King of Macedon at the time of the third Macedonian war,³ dedicated themselves to the development of school teaching practice and even got a contribution of wheat and barley from the king of Pergamum, which they converted into money for the schools. The Rhodians had the monopoly on the grain and even the Romans acknowledged it and gave the Rhodians permission to import 100,000 medimnoi from Sicily during the war.⁴ The Rhodian educational system had also been supported by the temporary decline of Alexandria when power passed to Ptolomaeus Fison, and many scholars left for Rhodes, as did Aristarchus' pupil Dionysius Thrax, while his master fled to Cyprus. Dionysius Thrax was the author of the earliest τέχνη that has come down to us (I reject Di Benedetto's opinion that this τέχνη isn't authentic, which rejection is shared by the great specialist of τέχναι γραμματικάί, Alfons Wouters, and many others).⁵ Of course the

³ The Rhodians were worried by the disappearance of the Macedonian kingdom because they were crop merchants normally selling in Macedonia what they purchased in Egypt (see Meloni 1953 344–347; Schmitt 1957 144f.).

⁴ See Calboli 1978 103, 111.

⁵ I quote only Pfeiffer 1968 270–272; Fuhrmann 1960 29–34; Erbse 1980 255–

beginning of the Dionysian τέχνη is above such suspicion because it is quoted at the beginning of Dionysius' τέχνη by Sextus Empiricus (*Adu. gramm.* 57) and so the authenticity of this part of the τέχνη is beyond doubt. But was this really a τέχνη or only a series of precepts (παραγγέλματα) as quoted by Sextus? This question has been brought to our attention by Di Benedetto, who thinks that Dionysius only wrote some precepts and that Asclepiades produced the real Technê some years later.⁶ The two possible responses to it are that the name of Dionysius' work was Παραγγέλματα (the opinion of Di Benedetto and others who believe that the τέχνη we have is false, for instance D. Schenkeveld), or to reject it (as do those who, like myself and A. Wouters, accept the authenticity of the τέχνη).⁷ I don't want to discuss this question here but would only add to my argument that Παραγγέλματα is a generic name⁸ the fact that Dionysius himself, as quoted by Sextus, calls the grammatical activity τέχνη: (Dion. Thrax 1.1 μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἕξ· ὁ ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ).

Sextus's quotation doesn't include the key expression τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ and therefore everything depends upon the authenticity of the Τέχνη we have. But it would be strange for a false Τέχνη to begin with the very words employed by Dionysius. It is more likely that everything from the beginning to the logical and linguistic conclusion was written by Dionysius:

γραμματική ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων. μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἕξ· πρῶτον ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβὴς κατὰ προσοδίαν, δευτέρον ἐξηγήσις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, τρίτον γλωσσῶν τε καὶ ἱστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις, τέταρτον ἐνυμῶν λογίας εὗρεσις, πέμπτον ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός, ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. (Dion. Thrax 1 p. 5 f. Uhlig)

258; Flobert 1990 228f. On the question of the authenticity of the Τέχνη see Lallot 1995 27–39.

⁶ Di Benedetto 1958–1959 182.

⁷ See G. Calboli 1962 162–169. Barwick 1922 217ff. had already averred that Dionysius' work could not be called Τέχνη because Dionysius wrote at §1 Γραμματική ἐστὶ ἐμπειρία and thus, in Barwick's opinion, he took the position in the discussion that grammar was either a τέχνη or an ἐμπειρία. However, Dionysius concludes the passage by saying that the study of poetry is the best of everything that can be made in τῇ τέχνῃ, which means that he used the term τέχνη in a general sense as it could be that of a title of a work (see below in the text). The name of the Technê is also discussed in Wouters 1979 124 and Calboli 2001 35 n. 3.

⁸ Cf. Calboli 1962 164. My argument against Di Benedetto's opinion, i.e. that the work quoted by Sextus Empiricus was called Παραγγέλματα by him and that Sextus used this name as a generic one, has been accepted by Wouters 1979 124.

The text quoted by Sextus Empiricus is different because it gives ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον instead of ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, a typically Aristotelian expression:

Διονύσιος μὲν ὁ Θοῤῃξ ἐν τοῖς παραγγέλμασί φησι ‘Γραμματικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον λεγομένων. (Sext. Emp. *Adu. gramm.* 57)

Di Benedetto thinks that the authentic Dionysian definition was that quoted by Sextus (ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον) but Jean Lallot, though accepting Di Benedetto’s opinion about the lack of authenticity of the Τέχνη, notes that some Scholia to Dionysius Thrax did not distinguish between ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον and ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (cf. Hilgard 301.16) and that Uhlig suggested that Sextus quoted from memory but that it failed him at this point.⁹ On the other hand Sextus (*Adu. gramm.* 250) confirms that Dionysius divided the grammar into six parts, one of which was the κρίσις ποιημάτων.¹⁰ Of course it cannot be ignored that the expression ὁ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ may be a gloss entered into the text, but to embrace such a doubt would prevent one working with these data. It seems therefore probable that Sextus knew and quoted either directly (§57) or indirectly (§250) from the first chapter of Dionysius’ Τέχνη and that it corresponded in all particulars with the text of the *Technê* we have now. That Ptolemaeus (Sext. Emp. *Adu. gramm.* 60), Asclepiades (Sext. Emp. *Adu. gramm.* 72) and Demetrius Clorus (Sext. Emp. *Adu. gramm.* 84) contested Dionysius’ opinion that grammar is an ἐμπειρία and asserted that this is a τέχνη does not relate to the generic name Τέχνη, but to the definition of grammar.

Nevertheless, even if the τέχνη that has come down under the name of Dionysius Thrax was not written by him, it is certain that an important grammatical development resulting in the production of at least one τέχνη γραμματική took place on the island of Rhodes.

Rhetoric and oratory also flourished on Rhodes under Apollonius the Sweet (ὁ μαλακός) and Apollonius Molon while, after Aristotle and Theophrastus, rhetorical theory was developed by Hermago-

⁹ Di Benedetto 1958–1959 197 f.; Lallot 1998 69, Uhlig 1883 5 “Neque Sextum Emp., qui adv. gramm. §57 Dionysii definitionem adfert, in suo exemplari ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον invenisse credere licet, sed memoriam illum fefellisse censendum est.”

¹⁰ Sext. Emp. *Adu. gramm.* 250 (p. 62 Mau) Διονύσιος δὲ ὁ Θοῤῃξ ἔξ μέρους γραμματικῆς εἶναι λέγων [...] εἶναι γάρ φησι γραμματικῆς μέρη ἀνάγνωσιν ἐντροβήν κατὰ προσῳδίαν, ἐξηγησιν κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, λέξεων καὶ ἱστοριῶν ἀπόδοσιν, ἐτυμολογίας εὗρεσιν, ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμὸν, κρίσιν ποιημάτων.

ras of Temnos and Athenaeus of Naucratis. Philosophy was already under careful study in Rhodes in Aristotle's time by Eudemus, who features prominently in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and discussed physics with Theophrastus.¹¹ Later, at the beginning of the 1st century B.C., a Stoic school also thrived in Rhodes under the scholarship of Posidonius, a pupil of the Rhodian Panaetius who didn't return to the island and was living in Rome. All this has been explained by Francesco Della Corte and by Felicita Portalupi in her paper on the Rhodian School.¹² I mention all this only to show what the Rhodian origin of the doctrine we find in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *De inuentione* could mean from a philosophical, rhetorical and grammatical point of view. As a matter of fact Peripatetic (and Stoic) philosophy, rhetoric and grammar came together in this tight cultural space.¹³ On the other hand the reference to Rhodes in both the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *De inuentione* is confirmed in many ways, such as by the quotation of Rhodian naval legislation (Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.153 f. and *Rhet. Her.* 1.19), the mention of Cares, the author of the Rhodian Colossus (*Rhet. Her.* 4.9), and by presenting the doctrine of the *pronuntiatio* (ὑπόκρισις) (*Rhet. Her.* 3.19).¹⁴

We will now consider the explanation of the metaphor given in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* with reference to the English translation by Harry Caplan (in my notes I cite my own Italian translation):

(1) *Rhet. Her.* 4.34-45 *Translatio est, cum uerbum in quandam rem transferetur ex alia re, quod propter similitudinem recte uidebitur posse transferri. Ea sumitur rei ante oculos ponendae causa, sic: "Hic Italiam tumultus expegefecit terrore subito." Breuitatis causa, sic: "Recens aduentus exercitus extinxit subito ciuitatem." Obscenitatis uitandae causa, sic: "Cuius mater cottidianis nuptiis delectetur." Augendi causa, sic: "Nullius maeror et calamitas istius explere inimicitias et nefariam crudelitatem saturare potuit." Minuendi causa, sic: "Magno se praedicat auxilio fuisse, quia paululum in rebus difficillimis aspirauit." Ornandi causa, sic: "Aliquando rei publicae rationes, qui mali-*

¹¹ See Moraux 1973 9-11. On Eudemus see the recent book edited by Fortenbaugh and Bodnár 2002.

¹² Della Corte 1939, 1937 95-104, Portalupi 1957.

¹³ M. Cato the Censor thus played a bigger role in the development of Roman culture than he could have imagined when, in 167 B.C., he pleaded successfully against the proposal of Iuuentius Thalna to declare war upon Rhodes and so not only saved the wealthy island from the avidity of the Roman publicans, but opened to the Romans a source of Hellenic culture in the field of oratory and rhetoric. Of course it isn't certain that he would have been pleased at such an outcome (on Cato's action see Astin 1978 123 f. and Calboli 1978 99-224).

¹⁴ Other references to Rhodes can be found in my Commentary on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1993b 494.

tia nocentium exaruerunt, uirtute optimatum reuirdescunt.” *Translationem prudentem dicunt esse oportere, ut cum ratione in consimilem rem transeat, ne sine dilectu temere et cupide uideatur in dissimilem transcurrisse.*

Metaphor occurs when a word applying to one thing is transferred¹⁵ to another, because the similarity seems to justify this transference. Metaphor is used for the sake of creating a vivid mental picture, as follows: “this insurrection awoke Italy with sudden terror,” for the sake of brevity, as follows: “The recent arrival of an army suddenly blotted out the state:” for the sake of avoiding obscenity, as follows: “Whose mother delights in daily marriages”; for the sake of magnifying, as follows: “No one’s grief or disaster could have appeased this creature’s enmities and glutted his horrible cruelty”; for the sake of minifying, as follows: “He boasts that he was of great help because, when we were in difficulties, he lightly breathed a favouring breath”; for the sake of embellishment, as follows: “Some day the prosperity of the republic, which by the malice of wicked men has withered away, will bloom again by the virtue of the Conservatives.” They say that a metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate, reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike thing.¹⁶

In this passage the metaphor is dealt with as one among ten *exornationes uerborum*, which correspond in the Stoic system to the *tropoi*. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* only gives them with Latin names on account of its expressed antipathy to Greeks (1.1.1; 3.23.38; 4.1.1; 4.7.10). This antipathy is not allowed to undermine the weight of Greek doctrine substantiated with Roman examples and derived both from the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*’s attachment to

¹⁵ Note that Caplan reads *transferetur* with the manuscripts H[eribipolitanus]P[arinus] Lat. 7714] B[ernensis]V[adianus] not *transfertur* of C[orbeiensis]F[risingensis]E[xpleti]. Achard too in the Budé edition 1989 reads *transferetur* and translates: “quand un mot sera transféré.” The same as in Caplan’s edition occurs in the recent edition by Müller 1994 where *transferetur* is translated “wenn ein Wort von einem anderen Sachverhalt her auf eine Sache herübergezogen wird.”

¹⁶ “La metafora si ha, quando una parola verrà trasferita da una cosa a un’altra, perché sembrerà potersi trasferire senza errore a causa della somiglianza. Viene presa per porre una cosa davanti agli occhi, così: “Questa insurrezione destò l’Italia con un terrore improvviso.” Per brevità, così: “Il recente arrivo dell’esercito ha cancellato d’un tratto lo stato.” Per evitare un’espressione oscena, così: “Uno la cui madre si diletta di un matrimonio al giorno.” Per accrescere l’importanza della cosa, così: “Non vi fu dolore né sventura di alcuno che potesse saziare l’odio e le nefanda crudeltà di questa belva.” Per diminuire l’importanza di una cosa, così: “Va dicendo di essere stato di grande aiuto, perché in occasioni molto difficili ha soffiato appena un poco in nostro favore.” Per ornare il discorso, così: “Un giorno le condizioni dello stato, che s’inaridirono per colpa di cittadini malvagi, rinverdiranno per merito dei migliori cittadini.” Si dice che la metafora deve essere moderata, così da passare all’oggetto vicino e simile con buon motivo, perché non sembri gettata senza discernimento, imprudentemente e a capriccio su un oggetto diverso.”

the popular and Marian group, which Friedrich Marx first proposed and I defended,¹⁷ and from the *dissimulatio artis* and the Roman habit of despising the conquered Greeks.¹⁸ The ten *exornationes uerborum* or *tropoi* of *Rhet. Her.* 4.31.42–34.46 are the following: *nominatio* (ὀνοματοποιία), *pronominatio* (ἀντονομασία), *denominatio* (ὀνοματοποιία), *circumitio* (περίφρασις), *transgressio* (ὑπερβατόν), *superlatio* (ὑπερβολή), *intellectio* (συνεκδοχή), *abusio* (κατάχρησις), *translatio* (μεταφορά), *permutatio* (ἀλληγορία). They correspond therefore to the ten τρόποι of the Stoics and are an amplification of the eight *exornationes uerborum* (I avoid the term τρόποι in order to distinguish them from the *tropoi* of the Stoic tradition), which, according to Karl Barwick, Athenaeus of Naucratis developed.¹⁹ The question now arises of who worked out this group of *exornationes uerborum* or *tropoi*.²⁰ Three groups of scholars could have done it: the Peripatetic philosophers, the Alexandrian grammarians, and the Stoics together with the grammarians of Pergamon. This is because the Alexandrian grammarians inclined towards Peripatetic philosophy after Demetrius of Phaleron, a pupil of Theophrastus,²¹ promoted the building of the Alexandrian Library and, in the same way, the Pergamenian grammarians Diogenes of Babylon and his pupil Crates of Mallos, inclined towards Stoic doctrine.²² In the description of the metaphor given in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* Peripatetic doctrine occurs, but it is an elaboration by the Rhodian scholars Athenaeus of Naucratis and Apollonius Molon, according to the hypothesis of Karl Barwick which I have accepted and as, more recently, Ilaria Torzi

¹⁷ See Marx 1894 147–150, 1891 423 f.; Calboli 1965 1–57, 1993b 3–11; 1993c 2–7.

¹⁸ We find, however, such an expression as the following: “*Armis Italia non potest uinci nec Graecia disciplines*” (*Rhet. Her.* 4.32.43), which sounds anti-Roman and reflects, only few years after the Italian war, a theme of Italian propaganda (see my Commentary 1993b 292 and 383).

¹⁹ Barwick 1957 88–97.

²⁰ The tropes are ten here, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, eight in [Plut.], *Vit. Hom.* 16, thirteen in Anonymus in the Papyrus of Würzburg (Wilcken 1970), fourteen in Tryphon (Spengel, *Rhet.* 3.191), twenty-one by the Anonymus of the Tropes (Spengel, *Rhet.* 3.207). The number of the tropes is important, see Barwick 1957 90f., who believes that the reduced number is closer to the Stoic origin of this doctrine.

²¹ That Demetrius was a pupil of Theophrastus is attested by many sources: Cicero, Strabo, Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch (see SOD 2000 38).

²² See on this subject Pohlenz 1955 182–184, Mette 1952 1–47, and Ax 1986 218–223. See also now Broggiato 2001 lxiii–lxv (who also discusses the recent criticism J.I. Porter expressed against the *communis opinio* that Crates leans towards the Stoic school, Broggiato 2001 xv–xvii). Broggiato confirms, albeit critically, Crates’ connexion with the Stoics.

has discussed and confirmed.²³ Some details pertaining to the Stoic doctrine are absent; in particular the μεταφορά (*translatio*) is still distinguished from the κατάχρησις (*abusio*) but without the particular that the κατάχρησις is necessary because it is used when the proper word is missing, while the μεταφορά occurs only to embellish speech and substitutes for an existing proper word. This is clearly explained by Ps. Plutarch:

(2) [Plut.], *Vit. Hom.* 18: κατάχρησις, ἥπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίως δηλουμένου μεταφέρει τὴν χρῆσιν ἐφ' ἕτερον οὐκ ἔχον ὄνομα κύριον.

The catachresis is the procedure of transferring a word from an object properly called to another one lacking of a proper word.

Moreover in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* the term τρόπος is absent and the metaphorical transfer occurs only through *similitudo* (*per similitudinem*). Transfer is also made by means of catachresis (*abusio*) and through *uicinitas* (*per uicinitatem*), but in both these cases the transfer *per contrarium* fails:

(3) *Rhet. Her.* 4.33-45 *Abusio est, quae uerbo simili et propinquo pro certo et proprio abutitur; hoc modo: "Vires hominis breues sunt"; aut "parua statura"; aut "longum in homine consilium"; aut "oratio magna"; aut "uti pauco sermone". Nam hic facile est intellectu finitima uerba rerum dissimilium ratione abusiois esse traducta.*

Catachresis is the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one, as follows: "The power of man is short," or "small height," or "the long wisdom in the man," or "a mighty speech," or "to engage in a slight conversation." Here it is easy to understand that words of kindred, but not identical, meaning have been transferred on the principle of inexact use. (trans. Caplan)

The distinction between metaphor and catachresis that Ps. Plutarch suggests—in text of pure Stoic doctrine in Karl Barwick's opinion—is lacking in Aristotle, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* or even in Cicero, where it is reduced to mere *delectare* at best.²⁴ Cicero said this in a celebrated passage of his *Orator*, which also deserves to be taken into account in the examination of other aspects of the doctrine of figures and in particular, I would suggest, the idea to unify the other figures under the overall concept of the metaphor. This concept comes from Aristotle and should be investigated in greater depth because it is the key to our question. In the aforementioned passage Cicero treats the three *genera dicendi*, the low, middle and high, starting from

²³ Barwick 1957 93 f.; 96, Calboli: 1993b 50–54, and 390sg.; Torzi 2000 25 f.

²⁴ Barwick 1957 94.

a personality Cicero especially liked, Demetrius of Phaleron, a very important scholar and politician to whom Theophrastean colleagues dedicated a whole volume.²⁵ I give now Cicero's passage from the *Orator*:

(4) Cic. *Orat.* 92–94 in qua [sc. in orationis forma of the middle style] multi floruerunt apud Graecos, sed Phalerius Demetrius meo iudicio praestitit ceteris; cuius oratio cum sedate placideque labitur, tum illustant eam quasi stellae quaedam translata uerba atque mutata—tralata dico, ut saepe iam, quae per similitudinem ab alia re aut suauitatis aut inopiae causa transferuntur; mutata, in quibus pro uerbo proprio subicitur aliud, quod idem significet, sumptum ex re aliqua consequenti. Quod quamquam transferendo fit, tamen alio modo transtulit cum dixit Ennius 'arce et urbe orba sum' [Andromacha 77 Ribb., 88 V², 83 Joc.], alio modo 'horridam Africam terribili tremere tumultu'²⁶ [ann. 310 V², 309 Sk.]: hanc ὑπαλλαγήν rhetores, quia quasi summutantur uerba pro uerbis, μετωνυμίαν grammatici uocant, quod nomina transferuntur; Aristoteles autem translationi et haec ipsa subiungit et abusionem, quam κατὰχρησιν uocant, ut cum minutum dicimus animum pro paruo, et abutimur uerbis propinquis, si opus est uel quod delectat uel quod decet. Iam cum fluxerunt continuae plures transitiones, alia plane fit oratio; itaque genus hoc Graeci appellant ἀλληγορίαν: nomine recte, genere melius ille, qui ista omnia translationes uocat.

Among the Greeks many have distinguished themselves in it, but to my mind Demetrius of Phalerum surpasses the others. His oratory flows gently and quietly, but at the same time it is brightened, as if by a kind of stars, by the “transferred” and “mutated” use of words—I mean by “transferred”, as often, those things that through some similarity or because of some sweetness or poverty are transferred; by “mutated” (I mean) those cases in which another word, which signifies the same thing and is taken from some suitable sphere, is substituted for the proper one. It is, to be sure, a transfer of one sort when Ennius says, “I am orphaned of citadel and town,” and another when he says, “dread Africa trembled with terrible tumult.” The rhetoricians call the latter *hypallage* (exchange), because words are as if exchanged for words. The grammarians call it *metonymia*, because names are transferred. Aristotle, however, classified these as metaphor (transferral), as well as misuse of language, which they call *katachresis*, because the names are transferred, as when we say “minute” mind instead of “small”, and we misuse suitable words, whether it is necessary or because it gives pleasure because it is appropriate. Now when many continuous metaphors have come forth, it

²⁵ Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000.

²⁶ ‘Arce et urbe’ for ‘patria’, and ‘Africam’ for ‘Afris’ seem to be glosses entered into Cicero’s text. Kroll 1913 91 sees in the first a reference to Hector, and therefore a metonymy of an object connected with somebody to indicate him, as the *sarissae* indicate the Macedonians in the first example of metonymy’s theory (*Rhet. Her.* 4.32.43). Kroll expunges both from Cicero’s text.

plainly becomes another style of speech, which the Greeks call *allegoria*. With regard to the name they do so correctly, but Aristotle is better in calling them all metaphors. (trans. SOD 124 and Hubbel modified)

In Cicero's text *ille* refers to Aristotle, to whom Cicero turns for both *κατάχρησις* and *ἀλληγορία*. This is the core of the theory and concerns the specific characteristic the Stoics ascribed to the *τρόποι*, as metaphor, catachresis and allegory, namely that all these figures refer to only one word and correspond in the *virtutes orationis* (ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως) to the fault called *barbarismus*. For there is correspondence on one side between *barbarismus* and *τρόπος*, because both concern only one word, and on the other side between *σολοικισμός* and *figura* (σχῆμα), because both concern more than a single word.²⁷ Evidence occurs in the treatise by Alexander of the 2nd Century A.D.:

(5) Alex. (Spengel, *Rhet.* 3.9.19–25) διαφέρει τοίνυν σχῆμα τρόπου, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τρόπος περὶ ἓν ὄνομα γίνεται ἄρετή, ὥσπερ ὁ βαρβαρισμὸς κακία, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα περὶ πλείω ὀνόματα κόσμησις, ὥς ὁ σολοικισμὸς ἀκοσμία, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι διαφορὰν βαρβαρισμοῦ τε πρὸς σολοικισμὸν ὥς ἐν κακία, καὶ τρόπου πρὸς σχῆμα ὥς ἐν ἄρετῇ λόγου.

A figure is therefore different from a tropos, because a tropos is a virtue of a single word as barbarism is a fault concerning a single word whereas the figura is an ornament concerning more than a single word in the same way as a solecism is a fault (in respect of a group of words). In this way there is the same difference between barbarism and solecism in the fault as between tropos and figures in the virtue of speech.

Such a difference had already been presented in *Rhet. Her.* 4.12.17, and some modern scholars, including Scheps, Reitzenstein, Kroll, and especially Karl Barwick,²⁸ ascribe to the Stoics the making of this sharp distinction between barbarism and solecism, though they acknowledge that the Peripatetic philosophers already knew of both faults. Moreover, Hellfried Dahlmann suggested that Theophrastus, who wrote a *Περὶ σολοικισμοῦ* (Diog. Laert. 5.48), already made a distinction of this kind.²⁹ However, Marc Baratin has recently refuted Barwick's hypothesis in general while accepting it in parts.³⁰ In Baratin's opinion, the Stoics, from the beginning, made the important distinction that a barbarism is a fault concerning form, λέξις, without reference to meaning, while a solecism is a fault of

²⁷ See Barwick 1957 93 f.

²⁸ See Scheps 1875 15 ff., Reitzenstein 1901 90, Kroll 1924 105 n. 44, and especially Barwick 1957 93 f.

²⁹ Dahlmann 1953 126 n. 4. See Calboli 1993b 302 ff.

³⁰ Baratin 1989 297 f.

sense and so concerns λόγος. Later, under the influence of the Alexandrian grammarians the notion of λέξις was assimilated into the meaning of “word” and the distinction was reduced to the number of words concerned, a single word for barbarisms and tropoi and more than one for solecisms and figures.³¹ Cicero’s passage and related questions were reconsidered two years ago by Ilaria Torzi in a book dedicated to figures, in particular to the ἀλλοίωσις group.³² There she also gives an interpretation of Cicero’s expression *inopiae causa*, i.e. a usage induced by the lack of a specific word as in the case of the κατάχρησις as discussed in Ps. Plutarch’s passage (Nr. 2) where it is distinguished from the μεταφορά. Cicero, Torzi suggests, explains this as a consequence of the way the usage developed from a response to a lack of specific words to its use for pleasure.

(6) Cic. *De orat.* 3.155 *Tertius ille modus transferendi uerbi* [for he distinguishes between three kinds of *ornatus in uerbo simplici*, i.e., *inusitatum uerbum, nouatum, translatum*] *late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem delectatio iucunditasque celebravit. Nam ut uestis frigoris depellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, sic uerbi translatio instituta est inopiae causa, frequentata delectationis.*

The third mode, that of using metaphor, has a wide application. It was necessity, caused by poverty and shortage, that first produced metaphor, but afterwards its pleasantness and charm made it popular. Just as clothes were first invented to ward off the cold, but later began to be used also for giving the body distinction and dignity, so metaphors were first established because of a shortage of words, but came to be used frequently because of their charm. (trans. May and Wisse)

I agree with Torzi but would like to add a couple of considerations, which concern a use of grammar, which invades the field of rhetoric and the return to Aristotle’s theory. As for the first, I recall that at this time Cicero tried to persuade Varro to dedicate to him some books of his work *De lingua latina*, discussed analogy with Caesar, and was a recognised authority in the field of Latin language. As for the second, Cicero goes back to Aristotle, as Horace did in the *Ars poetica*.³³ Cicero was probably prompted by the new availability of a

³¹ Baratin 1989 319; Calboli 1999 44f.

³² Torzi 2000 27–29.

³³ It does not matter whether Horace was influenced by Neoptolemos of Parium or drew directly from Aristotle’s *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* or both, as I would like to suggest. The first possibility was accepted by Brink 1963 90–134, 1971 228f., without excluding the second possibility, whereas Gordon Williams preferred the second (see Williams 1968 333; Calboli 1997 943).

lecture of Aristotle's that, after Aristotle's library had passed through Neocles' and Apellicon's hands and been brought to Rome by Sulla, and organised by Tyrannion, was now finally accessible. However, the more important reason was Cicero's reaction against the too mechanical character of the *ars rhetorica* and the doctrine of figures and tropes. It was the same reaction he had in *De oratore* (55 B.C.), when he rejected his earlier work *De inuentione* (Cic. *De or.* 1.5). In his later works, the *Partitiones oratoriae* and the *Topica*, he turned to *dialectica* and, in the *Orator*, to grammar. But something strange happened at this point: the doctrine of figures we find in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is Peripatetic, perhaps the most Peripatetic part of the whole of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and also the most developed section of the work. As I pointed out earlier, we find in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* the same order in the distribution of the figures that occurs in Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* considered together, while the metaphor is different because in Aristotle's work this is not yet divided into metonymy,³⁴ synecdoche etc. Cicero, though accepting the Peripatetic doctrine of figures, went back to Aristotle himself as he also, in the combination of rhetoric and philosophy, had gone back to Plato. Brian Vickers' revalorization of the figures as the "psychagogical" middle misses the core of the question, which concerns the relation between rhetoric, as a kind of thought, and the rhetorical handbook and the point at which the doctrine of figures became rather mechanical.³⁵ Cicero noticed this danger and tried to avoid it by returning to the philosophical source. The metaphor is important here because in it we meet an oscillation between the general metaphor as in Aristotle and the development of different aspects of transfer in the different figures. Now we come back to the metaphor as presented in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. In the passage quoted in (1) we find a caveat: *Translationem pudenter dicunt esse oportere, ut cum ratione in consimilem rem transeat, ne sine dilectu temere et cupide uideatur in dissimilem transcurrisse*. Giulio Guidorizzi and Simone Beta observe in their recent book on the metaphor that Theophrastus recommended metaphor being moderate, i.e. to use it in a moderate way as Cicero pointed out in a letter to his *libertus* Tiro:

³⁴ Roman Jacobson's distinction between metaphor (lexical and concerning single words) and metonymy (syntax and concerning combinations of more than one word) is an empirical one and without any connection with ancient theory as it is being used by linguists who, having no mastery of classical antiquity, use classical terms without understanding them completely (see Jacobson 1960 368–375).

³⁵ Vickers 1989 410f.

(7) Cic. *Ad fam.* 16.17.1 *Sed heus tu, qui κανών esse meorum scriptorum soles, unde illud tam ἄκρως “ualetudini fideliter inseruendo”? unde in istum locum “fideliter” uenit? cui uerbo domicilium est proprium in officio, migrationes in alienum multae; nam et doctrina et domus et ars et ager etiam ‘fidelis’ dici potest, ut sit, quo modo Theophrasto placet, uerecunda tralatio.*

But look here, you who are accustomed to being the measure of my writings, how did that so improper (phrase) “ministering faithfully to health” arise? How did “faithfully” find its way into such a place? The word’s proper home is in the sphere of duty: (its) migrations into alien territory are many. For learning, a house, an art, or even a field can be called faithful, within the bounds of apologetic metaphor, in a way acceptable to Theophrastus. (trans. FHS&G 689B)

Other evidence of such a *uerecundia* appears in a text alleged to be by the author of the *Περὶ ὕψους* and quoted in the Theophrastus fragments by Fortenbaugh:

(8) [Long.] *Subl.* 32.3 διόπερ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος μειλίγματα φασὶ τίνα τῶν θρασειῶν εἶναι ταῦτα μεταφορῶν, τὸ “ὥστερεῖ” φάναι καὶ “οἶονεῖ” καὶ “εἰ χρὴ τούτον εἰπεῖν τὸν τρόπον” καὶ “εἰ δεῖ παραινιδυνευτικώτερον λέξαι”. ἡ γὰρ ὑποτίμησις, φασίν, ἰᾶται τὰ τολμερά.

In this connection Aristotle and Theophrastus say that bold metaphors are softened by these (phrases): by saying “just as if” and “as it were” and “if it befits one to speak in this manner” and “if one must use a more audacious expression”. For excuse, they say, is a cure for daring (metaphors) (trans. FHS&G 690).

In their commentary Guidorizzi-Beta suggest that the term *μειλίγματα* could have come from Theophrastus.³⁶ Aristotle had already outlined this aspect in a passage of Book 3 of his *Rhetoric*, a passage quoted in the careful commentary on the *Περὶ ὕψους* by Russell; this is a passage that Quintilian also employed, Quintilian following Aristotle as he did, albeit with some changes.³⁷ I now quote the two passages by these classical authors and add another from Demetrius (alleged also by Russell) *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, which I do because in it this kind of moderation of a metaphor is connected with the simile:

(9) a. Arist. *Rhet.* 3.8 1408b1–4 ἄκος δ’ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄληθές εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα.

³⁶ Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 163ff.

³⁷ Russell 1964 152. See the Commentary on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* by Cope and Sandys 1877 3.78.

There is a commonly used defence for every hyperbole: the speaker should preempt criticism; for something seems true when the speaker does not conceal what he is doing. (trans. Kennedy 1991).

b. Quint. 8.3.36sg. *Nam cum sint eorum alia, ut dicit Cicero, "natiua", id est, "quae significata sunt primo sensu", alia "reperta, quae ex his facta sunt"; ut iam nobis ponere aliqua, quod illis rudes homines primique fecerunt, fas non sit, at deriuare, flectere, coniungere, quod natis postea concessum est, quando desit licere? Sed si quid periculosius finxisse uidebimur, quibusdam remediis praemuniendum est: "Vt ita dicam", "si licet dicere", "quodam modo", "permittite mihi sic uti." Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius tralata erunt proderit, nihilque non tuto dici potest in quo non falli iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ipsa manifestum erit. Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praecipitur προεπιπλήσσειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ.*

c. Dem. *Eloc.* 80 ἐπὶ μὲντοι κινδυνώδης ἡ μεταφορὰ δοκῇ, μεταλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς εἰκασίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλεστέρα γίγνεται· ἂν. εἰκασία δ' ἐστὶ μεταφορὰ πλεονάζουσα, οἷον εἴ τις (τῷ)· τότε τῷ Πύθωνι τῷ ῥήτορι ῥέοντι καθ' ὑμῶν προσθεῖς εἶποι· "ὥσπερ" ῥέοντι καθ' ὑμῶν. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ εἰκασία γέγονεν καὶ ἀσφαλέστερος ὁ λόγος, ἐκείνως δὲ μεταφορὰ καὶ κινδυνოდέστερος. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐπισφαλές τι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν μεταφοραῖς μᾶλλον χρώμενος ἢ εἰκασίαις, ὁ μὲντοι Ξενοφῶν εἰκασίαις μᾶλλον.

When the metaphor seems daring, let it for greater security be converted into a simile. A simile is an expanded metaphor, as when, instead of saying "the orator Python was then rushing upon you in full flood," we add a word of comparison and say "was like a flood rushing upon you". In this way we obtain a simile and a less risky expression, in the other way metaphor and greater danger. Plato's employment of metaphors rather than similes is, therefore, to be regarded as a risky feature of his style. Xenophon, on the other hand, prefers the simile. (trans. Roberts)³⁸

These three passages must be considered at the same level. Quintilian is interested primarily in grammatical doctrine and only secondarily does he turn his attention to metaphor and refer to Aristotle: grammar occupied a large portion of the Aristotelian rhetoric.

³⁸ "A chaque fois que la métaphore semble risquée, il faut la transformer en comparaison; on la rend ainsi plus sûre. Une comparaison est une métaphore développée, comme lorsqu'à la phrase: *Alors, à l'orateur Python qui se déversait sur vous* (Dem. cor. 136) on fait une addition du genre: *qui, "pour ainsi dire," se déversait sur vous*. L'expression s'est transformée en comparaison et la phrase est plus sûre; dans le premier cas, c'était une métaphore et la phrase était plus risquée. C'est pour cela que Platon passe pour un auteur à risques, lui qui préfère les métaphores aux comparaisons. Xénophon, lui, préfère les comparaisons" (trans. Chiron; cf. Chiron 2001 216).

Theophrastus worked on the solecism and perhaps on the metaphor too. Can we think that the system of relationships “tropes (metaphor)—barbarism on one hand and figures—solecism on the other” came from him, not from the Stoics, as Barwick thinks, or from the Alexandrian Grammarians and Stoics together, as Baratin supposes? It seems to me that we must look at things this way if Theophrastus’ work *Περὶ σολοικισμοῦ* made original contributions and Theophrastus was more than a mere organiser of some Aristotelian ideas, though we cannot actually ascribe to him much more than this *uerecundia* albeit connected with the similarity theory. At least we can reasonably think that Theophrastus began to make distinctions, i.e. started making the distinctions, which were to develop into the whole system. While in Aristotle metaphor was all embracing, in the subsequent system metaphor was distinct from metonymy, synecdoche, catachresis and the other tropes, and grammar fulfilled the needs of the rhetorical *elocutio*. As a matter of fact, of the four of Theophrastus’ virtues of speech (*virtutes dicendi*—ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως), namely σαφήνεια, Ἑλληνισμός, πρέπον, κατασκευή, the virtue of Ἑλληνισμός was sorted out by the grammarians as attested by *Rhet. Her.* 4.17. But what can be ascribed to Theophrastus?

To answer this question in a precise way, we would need much more of Theophrastus than we have. There are two ways we can approach matters: we can take into account Theophrastus’ contributions in this field in order to have a framework with connections and boundaries, and we can consider attentively the fragment of the Hamburg Papyrus attributed to the *Περὶ λέξεως* by Bruno Snell, who translated the text. Fortenbaugh put this text in the Appendix to Theophrastus’ works in his recent edition. The following is from this edition and the English translation is by Fortenbaugh. It is notable that this is a papyrus of the 3rd century B.C. and therefore close to Theophrastus’ time and activity:

(10) P. Hamb.128 (*Griechische Papyri der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek*, Bd. 4, 1954, B. Snell, p. 36–39) ll. 37–64; Theophrastus app. 9 FHS&G)

με-

ταφορὰν δὲ (τὸ) τῶν αὐτῶν ὀ-
νομάτων ἢ ὀημάτων συν-
40 θέτων ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς
ἐπ’ ἄλλο πρᾶγμα μετενη-
νεγμένον, οἷον· τὸ γῆρας
δυσμᾶς βίου, καὶ τὴν ἔρη-
μον νῆσον χηρεύειν ἀνδρῶν,

- 45 καὶ τὸμ βασιλέα ποιμένα
 λαῶν. ἐπίθετον δὲ τὸ
 μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λε-
 γόμενον, οἶον· σίδεροισι αἴ-
 θων, καὶ χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις.
- 50 γίνεται δὲ καὶ διπλοῦν
 καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ
 μὴ συμβεβηκό[ς], ὃ δὴ στέρη-
 σίν τινες καλοῦσιν, οἶον·
 τὸν σακεσφόρον, ἀρήφιλον·
- 55 τὸ δὲ τριπλοῦν· [βο]τρυο-
 καρποτόκον καὶ ἀστερομαρ-
 μαροφegγές, τὸ δὲ μὴ κα-
 τὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός ἀπ[λ]ουν,
 ἄπτερον. μετουσίαν δ' ἐ-
- 60 κ τοῦ παρεπομένου διτ-
 ταχῶς ἀγλαμβάνουσιν,
- 62a ἐνίστε μὲν³⁹ ἄπο γένους ἐπ εἶδος
 62b ἐνίστε δ'· [ἀπ'] εἶδους ἐπὶ
 γένους, οἶον ἀπο γένους
 μὲν ἐπ' εἶδος, ὅταν τ[.]ν

(Men call) metaphor the transfer of unchanged substantival or verbal composite expressions from something similar to another thing, e.g. old age (is) “the setting of life” and the desolate island “is bereft of men” and the king (is) “shepherd of the people”. (Men call) epithet that which is used in conjunction with ordinary words, e.g. “blazing” iron and “dazzling” gold. There is also a double and triple (epithet) and (that) in respect to what does not apply, which some call privation, e.g. (double): “shield-bearing”, “Ares-lover”; triple: “grape-fruit-productive” and “star-crystal-bright”; and that which is not in respect to what does apply: “footless”, “wingless”. Men classify *metousia* from what follows in two ways: sometimes from genus to species and sometimes from species to genus, e.g., from genus to species, when (trans. FSH&G).

As to the point about Theophrastus’ contribution to rhetorical *elocutio* and grammar there is little to add to the book by Johannes Stroux.⁴⁰ Nevertheless I have tried to merit Theophrastus with the introduction of the *tria genera dicendi* (χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως, high, middle and low, which first occur in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.11–16). Here I have followed the opinion of Kroll, Körte, Solmsen, Dahlmann, Douglas, and Kennedy, while other scholars such as

³⁹ I follow here the text by Fortenbaugh, but we must consider more attentively this point: see Calboli 2005 111n. 20.

⁴⁰ Stroux 1912.

Stroux and Quadlbauer put the invention of the three *χαρακτῆρες* after or before Theophrastus.⁴¹

Discussing the opinion of Doreen Innes,⁴² I have pointed out that Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 3.1 1403b 26 ff.) already distinguished in respect of the *ὑπόκρισις* (*pronuntiatio*) three kinds of voice, *φωνή*, i.e. *μεγάλη*, *μικρά* and *μέση*, and three *τόνοι*, to get an *ὀξεῖα*, a *βαρεῖα*, and a *μέση* voice, and explained in addition that Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.1 1404a15 f., though admitting the *ὑποκριτικόν* to be *ἀτεχνότερον* insists that it is *ἔντεχνον* in respect of the *λέξις*. Therefore the old objection of Hendrickson that the Peripatetics had to accept for the *λέξις* also only a middle style, a *λέξις μέση*, seems untenable and, on the contrary, they already acknowledged, already from Aristotle, three possibilities, and there is nothing to say that Theophrastus could not think there were *tria genera dicendi*. Of course Doreen Innes is right in asserting that “there is no compelling reason to attribute such a three-style theory to Theophrastus.” The general loss of Theophrastus’ work means it is impossible to find enough evidence.

On the other hand, if we accept Schenkeveld’s position and ascribe such a development to Alexandrian philology and to Alexandrian *τέχνη ποιητική*,⁴³ we cannot forget that Alexandrian philology was strongly influenced by the Peripatetic school which, since Demetrius of Phaleron, was settled in Egypt (307–297).⁴⁴ Another Peripatetic scholar, Praxiphanes from Mitilene or Rhodes and active in Alexandria, contributed, in my opinion, to this development.⁴⁵

The Hamburg Papyrus 128 has been published with a rich commentary by Bruno Snell, who suggested the hypothesis that it could be a fragment of Theophrastus’ *Περὶ λέξεως*. This hypothesis has been questioned by Innes and rejected by Schenkeveld. More recently it has been considered by Simone Beta in Guidorizzi-Beta, who ascribes the text to Theophrastus.⁴⁶ After considering the arguments of all these scholars I think that Snell’s hypothesis is the best solution. Of course I do not have time to discuss this question thoroughly and must restrict myself to a few remarks on it.

⁴¹ See Calboli Montefusco 1979 446–452. The authors to whom I referred in the text are all quoted by Calboli-Montefusco.

⁴² Innes 1985 261 ff.

⁴³ See also Schenkeveld’s 1993 opinion on the Hamburg Papyrus 128, defined by him in the title of his paper as “A Hellenistic Ars Poetica.”

⁴⁴ Cf. Tracy 2000 343.

⁴⁵ Calboli 1998 53 f. See also Wehrli 1968–1969.

⁴⁶ Simone Beta in Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 165–170.

At the end of his commentary, Bruno Snell asks who was the author of this work, which was already being read in Egypt around 200 B.C. His answer is that it is Theophrastus and that the work must be the beginning of the *Περὶ λέξεως*.⁴⁷ I would now make three points before considering Innes' and Schenkeveld's criticisms: (1) the text of the papyrus is very close to Chapter 21 of Aristotle's *Poetics*. Snell presented this point very clearly in a schema. The major innovation lies in putting two of Aristotle's four kinds of metaphors, namely that from genus to the species and from the species to the genus (ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος and ἀπὸ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος),⁴⁸ under the μετουσία. At any rate, all three examples of metaphor given in the papyrus, old age being 'life's sunset', a desert island being 'bereft (widowed) of men', a king being his 'people's shepherd', are of the fourth Aristotelian type, κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, and the first, γῆρας δυσμὰς βίου, had occurred already in Plato, *Laus* 6 770A, and had also been employed by Aristotle, *Poet.* 21 1457b25. An Aristotelian influence is therefore unmistakable and the reading of the papyrus was possible because of its similarities with Chapters 20 and 21 of Aristotle's *Poetics*, as Snell reminds us.⁴⁹ The point (2) concerns the reference to the *virtutes orationis*, in particular to 'Ἑλληνισμός as Stroux has suggested.⁵⁰ In the papyrus we find a correspondence, though not complete, to what was said by Porphyry, who quoted not only Theophrastus' doctrine but also that of his followers (οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες). The point (3) is by way of an objection Snell addresses to himself about the use of examples from poetry not suiting a work about rhetoric by Theophrastus to which the answer is that Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric*, quotes from poets and refers to his *Poetics*. I would add that in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* too we find examples from poets in the first three books. However, the poets are abandoned as a source in book four because of a polemic with Hermagoras, a good rhetorician but a very bad orator, and so the author of the *ad Herennium* used himself as a source except where he gives examples of mistakes. This is a particular and personal reason and the author needs to explain why he doesn't give examples from poets and other writers in Book IV while they are used in Books I, II and III (as examples of mistakes). Poetic examples aren't limited to works about poetry.

⁴⁷ Snell 1954 49.

⁴⁸ Arist. *Poet.* 1457b7f.

⁴⁹ Snell 1954 40.

⁵⁰ Stroux 1912 25, through a passage of Porphyry quoted in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Cat.* 10.20–11.2 = 683 FHS&G).

Now we must consider Innes' and Schenkeveld's objections to Snell. Innes judges it suspect that μετουσία, when introduced by such an authority as Theophrastus, failed to enter into the normal terminology, and Schenkeveld adds that it was substituted by metonymy and synecdoche. This is an argument *e silentio* but, in this matter where we are forced to employ even marginal arguments, it cannot be ignored. However, an answer can be still found in Snell's hypothesis that Theophrastus was working on the *uirtutes orationis* and could not yet have elaborated a clear idea of metonymy and synecdoche and that μετουσία could have been a first step in this development. The second criticism made by Schenkeveld is similar but more contingent: why did Demetrius, Περί ἑρμηνείας, who referred largely to Theophrastus, never mention the μετουσία? Notwithstanding that the last answer (i.e. Snell's hypothesis) is applicable to this criticism too, we must recognize that such an objection coming from one of the best specialists on Demetrius is interesting. However, I have found a good answer in the recent book by Pierre Chiron, another specialist on Demetrius (I quote his own words): "Le témoignage du Papyrus Hamburgensis 128 [...] montre qu'au tournant des IIIe et IIe siècles av. J.-C. la notion de métaphore était démembrée en méthaphore proprement dite (réduite à la métaphore par analogie) et en μετουσία (participation), où il faut sans doute voir l'ancêtre du couple métonymie / synecdoque. On a vu plus haut que la restriction de la métaphore à la métaphore par analogie constituait la meilleure explication au rejet des métaphores fondées sur la simple ressemblance (§88 [of Demetrius]). C'est un point de contact entre Démétrios et l'état de la théorie à la fin du IIIe siècle qui n'est pas négligeable et qui tend à montrer que, sur la métaphore aussi, Démétrios a utilisé des sources intermédiaires entre Aristote et lui."⁵¹ Chiron's conclusion is that the μετουσία is an "ancêtre", an ancestor of metonymy and synecdoche. Maybe the author was Theophrastus or somebody else active between Aristotle and Demetrius. It cannot be, in my opinion, one of the many τέχνη ποιητικά, which were widespread as the τέχνη γραμματικά in the Alexandrian world. As to how widespread, Alfons Wouters is collecting and editing these τέχνη γραμματικά and we must wait for the result of his work, but I am fairly sure they were not many.

Another point rightly emphasised by Schenkeveld is the lack of distinction between proper and common names in the treatment of

⁵¹ Chiron 2001 214–215.

the ἐπίθετον, and we find the same lack in Aristotle and the Alexandrian grammarians. This distinction does occur in Dionysius Thrax (34.3–4) under Stoic influence, while it is lacking in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which doesn't distinguish between *nomen* (ὄνομα) and *uocabulum* (προσηγορία). I have already used this argument to prove the influence of Alexandrian doctrine in this work and specifically collected the passages 1.12.21, 2.12.17, 2.28.45, 3.4.7, 3.20.33 and 4.32.43.⁵² This is more important than it might appear at first glance because, while Theophrastus' authorship is of considerable concern, no less important would be the identification of the philosophical school related to the papyrus because we are sure that a relationship existed between philosophy and grammar. But we may proceed only through exclusion.

Among the philosophical schools related to grammar, Stoicism can therefore be excluded, but the Epicurean school must be investigated in depth. While in the Hamburg Papyrus 128, the metaphor and its development, μετουσία, ancestor of metonymy and synecdoche, are treated, Philodemus is critical of the theory of the metaphor:

(11) Philod. (*Rhet.* I, pp. 172–174 Sudhaus = *PHerc.* 1007–1673) παρ[α]πλ[ησί]ως δὲ [ἐν τα]ῖς χρή-/σεσιν οὐθὲν [ὥφ]ε[λο]ύμεθα/μα[θόν]-τες, ὁ πάντως ἀναγ-/κ[α] [ῖόν] ἐστιν ποιεῖν, ἐ[ὰ]ν με-/ταφ[ε]ρόμεν, ἀπ' ἐμφύχων/ ἐπ' ἄψυ[χα] μεταβαίνειν / ὁ [καί] ἔμπαλιν – ἢ ἀπ' ἐμφύχων/ ἐπ' ἔμ[ψυ]χα, πα[ρ]απλ[ησί]ως δὲ/ καὶ ἀπὸ γένου[ς] ἐπ[ὶ] εἶδος ἢ/ γένου[ς] ἢ ἀπ' εἶ[δ]ος ἐπὶ γέν[ος]/ ἢ εἶδ[ος].

Likewise by using (a metaphor) we will not be helped by knowing what must be done by using a metaphor, i.e. that the transfer must be from an animate object to an inanimate one or on the contrary, or even from inanimate to animate but likewise from genus to species and genus or from species to genus and species.

What matters in Philodemus' opinion is, as also pointed out by Simone Beta, to distinguish between a hard and repulsive metaphor (σκληρὰ καὶ ἀντίτυπος p. 173, Col. xiii 17f.) and a soft and easy one (πραεῖα καὶ ἄλυπος, I, p. 173, Col. xiii 20f.) and to recognise the criteria for choosing a precise and proper metaphor and excluding a worse one (τὰς μάλιστ' ἐπιτετευγμένας ἐξελεῖν καὶ τὰς παμπονήρους ἐνκρεῖναι τῶν μεταφορῶν, I, p. 174, Col. xiv 12–16).⁵³ However Philodemus writes further:

⁵² Calboli 1962 171–173.

⁵³ Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 180f. It is interesting that Philodemus distinguishes

(12) (Col. xv 15–18, I, p. 175 Sudhaus) καὶ πᾶσα τέχνη/ φων[ή]ν οὐ δύναται προ[ίεσ-]/θαί στερε[η]θεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τῶν/ μεταφορῶν εὐχρησ[τίας]

All the arts cannot utter a word, if deprived of the aid of metaphors.
(transl. Wigodsky)

As for Epicurus, Wigodsky thinks that “it is difficult to recognise hostility against metaphor in *Περὶ φύσεως* 28, on the contrary we may find some hints to reasons for accepting the metaphor by Philodemus.”⁵⁴ What matters is, however and in my opinion, that Philodemus not only knows and discusses the metaphor in its different kinds but perfectly masters the highly developed doctrine of tropes and figures. He considers, therefore, the metaphor a trope.⁵⁵

(13) Philod. (*Rhet.* I 164.18 ff. Sudhaus):

δια[ιροῦντ]αι δὲ
αὐτὴν [sc. φράσιν] εἰς εἴδη τ[ρί]α τρό-
πον σχῆμα πλ[άσμ]α· τρό-
πον μ[έν] οἵ[ον] με[ταφο-]
ρ[ᾶν]⁵⁶ ἀλληγορίαν [πᾶ]ν τὸ
τοιούτο, σχῆμα δὲ τὸ πε-
ριόδοις [κ]αὶ κώλοις [κ]αὶ κο[μ-]
μασιν [κ]αὶ ταῖς τ[ούτω]ν
πλοκαῖς καὶ ποιότη[σι] δια-
λα[μβάν]ον, πλάσμα δὲ τὸ
ἀ[δ]ρο[γρ]αφίαν ἔ[χ]ον ἢ ἰσχνότη-
τα ἢ με[σό]τη[τα] ἢ γλαφυ-
ρότητα.

They divide it [i.e. the speech] into three species, the trope, the figure and the type of style: on the one hand the trope like a metaphor, an allegory and suchlike, on the other hand the figure distinguished by

in this passage between a hard and repulsive metaphor and a soft and easy one and says that Theophrastus' opinion is that a metaphor must be “soft and easy.”

⁵⁴ Wigodsky 1995 62–63.

⁵⁵ I give the reading of Francesca Longo Auricchio, see Calboli 1998 58.

⁵⁶ That the reconstructed word is μεταφορᾶν depends not only on the letters we can read in the papyrus, με[...]αν but also on the position, because the μεταφορά is usually close to the ἀλληγορία and we find either ἀλληγορία μεταφορά as in Würzb. Papyr. 19 (Wilcken 1970 64), or some other combinations but with μεταφορά and ἀλληγορία near each other, see Tryphon (Spengel *Rhet.* 3.191) (μεταφορά, κατάχρησις, ἀλληγορία), Anon. *De trop.* (Spengel *Rhet.* 3.207) (ἀλληγορία, μεταφορά, κατάχρησις); see also on this topic Mitteis and Wilcken 1912 66f. In the *Rhet. Her.* 4.45–46 we have *translatio* (μεταφορά) and *permutatio* (ἀλληγορία) and the theory of toposes and figures which occurs in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* originated from Rhodes and was influenced by the Peripatos (Calboli 1998 80).

periods, cola and commata and their constructions and types, and the type of style in that it is a forcible or plain or middle or elegant kind of style.⁵⁷

Philodemus seems to have known the doctrine of tropes and figures in its more complete formulation, i.e. the Stoic doctrine.⁵⁸ On the other hand Philodemus didn't reject, in Wigodsky's opinion, the rhetorical use of emotional appeal (in this he represented an evolution of Epicurus' own view against rhetoric), "he probably viewed irrational and emotional means of persuasion not as illegitimate, but simply as too unreliable to be useful."⁵⁹ Moreover in Philodemus there is a polemic not against metaphor and rhetorical means of persuasion, but against the idea that rhetoric could add something to philosophy, and he says, as we have seen, that instead of the Peripatetic distinctions between genus and species and species and genus it would be more suitable to know how the metaphors that are used are built. On the other hand, because of the obscurity and ambiguity of some metaphors, a poet who knows philosophy "ought to be particularly careful [Philodemus thinks] in his choice of metaphors,"⁶⁰ and Philodemus knew Theophrastus' opinion on metaphors.⁶¹

As for Epicurus, his suggestions supported the practical use of metaphor and not Aristotle's and Theophrastus' theory of it. Though I acknowledge the influence exercised by Aristotle and Theophrastus on Epicurus and his followers⁶² in this question, I believe that we must rest on the text of the *Περὶ φύσεως*, where we find a passage where it is difficult to refer otherwise than to metaphor⁶³ as the "tropos" treated by Aristotle:

⁵⁷ See Calboli 1998 58–59.

⁵⁸ At least this element, namely the name *τρόπος*, seems to have been introduced by the Stoics, see Barwick 1957 88–97; Calboli 1993b 374.

⁵⁹ Wigodsky 1995 64.

⁶⁰ Wigodsky 1995 63. Philodemus' influence on Roman poetry seems to have been more important than has been supposed until now.

⁶¹ Cf. Philod. *Rhet.* = *PHerc.* 1007, Col. xiii, I pp. 172–174 Sudhaus (= Theophrastus 689A FHS&G). S. Beta in Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 183. On Philodemus see also Janko 2000 10.

⁶² See on this topic recently Sedley 1998 178–185 and in particular Gigante 1999 51–56 on Theophrastus' influence, 33–50 on Aristotle's influence.

⁶³ This is the opinion also of Sedley 1973 64, who thinks that the reference in such a context is to Aristotle's metaphor, not to a generic transfer: "μεταφοράς, given the context, must bear its Aristotelian meaning 'metaphors', not 'analogical inferences'."

(14) *On Nature* 28 fr. 13 col. V sup. 8–12, 17 IV – 18 I, 306f. Arrighetti (p. 48 Sedley)

καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς [γε, ὦ]
 Μητροδόωρε· πάνν γὰρ οἶμαί
 σε πολλὰ ἄ ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγ-
 κασθαι, ἃ ἐθε[ώρ]εις [γ]ελοίως
 τι[νάς] ἐγδεξαμένους καὶ [πάνν-]
 τ[α] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον
 κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν
 [ἐ]θισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν
 χρ[ω]μένων οὐδὲ **μετατιθέν-**
των⁶⁴ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ φανε-
 [ρ]ῶν [...]
 ο[ὐ] μόνον διὰ] **μεταφορὰς**
 ποι[άς, αἱ ἐπὶ]γο[ν] ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω-
 [στ' α]ὐτῶν ἀπ' ἀγνώστων, ἀλ-
 λά διὰ [τ]ὰς αὐ[τ]ῶμ πλάνας
 αἱ λέ[γο]μεν ἐν τοῖς Περι ἁμ-
 [φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμ-
 [18 I]μένοις.

Ma benissimo, o Metrodoro! Di certo credo che tu avresti molte cose da esporre che tu hai visto in che maniera ridicola furono intese da alcuni: in tutti i modi fuorché in quello che viene da pensare stando al significato delle parole, pur non avendo noi mai adoperato termini fuori dall'uso, né cambiato denominazioni a proposito di cose chiare e manifeste. [...] ma non solo a causa di certe metafore che applicarono a cose ignote prendendo per base cose altrettanto ignote, ma per i loro stessi errori di cui parliamo nei libri che abbiamo scritto *Sull'ambiguità*. (transl. Arrighetti, pp. 306f.).⁶⁵

It seems therefore that the Epicureans criticised the Peripatetic theory of metaphor while accepting its practical usage. It isn't easy to think that an Epicurean philosopher between Epicurus and Philodemus worked out such a text as that in (10). It is true that we know

⁶⁴ Bold is mine.

⁶⁵ See on this Fragment by Epicurus Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 170–171. Although recently Marcello Gigante 1999 passim and 49–50, 66–67, following Sudhaus, showed that Epicurus accepted Aristotle's doctrine more than has been supposed by recent scholars (e.g. Dorandi 1994 111–120), even Gigante could not deny that Epicurus engaged himself in polemic against Aristotle. I accept, therefore, the commentary on this passage by Guidorizzi and Beta 2000 170, who wrote: "Una delle caratteristiche di questo libro del *De natura* è infatti il massiccio attacco rivolto da Epicuro nei confronti della retorica aristotelica: come afferma Arrighetti [1973 618], 'i due motivi che dominano in tutto il libro' sono l'insufficienza del sillogismo e degli universali, e la teoria epicurea sull'uso della lingua."

that Philodemus wrote a *Περὶ λέξεως* (*PHerc.* 1423, col. xiii. 10–14, I, p. 156.10f. Sudhaus), but we don't know what was actually treated in this work. In view of the reference to ἀσάφεια, which was pointed out by Sudhaus (vol. I, p. xv), Tiziano Dorandi supposes that Philodemus discussed clear exposition in this work.⁶⁶ It would thus concern σαφήνεια, not κατασκευή (*ornatus*), and it is very difficult to imagine that he took into account the doctrine of tropes and figures. Therefore, after excluding Epicurus and Philodemus, we are forced to conclude that we have no reason to think that Epicurean philosophers took part in the development of the doctrine of tropes and figures and therefore in the rhetorical and grammatical development of the metaphor which happened after Aristotle.

All in all, it is not easy to recognise Epicurean doctrine in the Hamburg Papyrus (*PHamb* 128). There remain only the Peripatetics as philosophical reference, the Stoics and Epicureans excluded, among the philosophical schools that were interested in grammar and rhetorical *elocutio*.

In conclusion I would say that some aspects of the post-Aristotelian development of the metaphor are clear enough thanks to the *PHamb.* 128, whether or not it was written by Theophrastus, as I think, or someone else. The unspecified unity of the Aristotelian metaphor is abandoned and metonymy, synecdoche and catachresis are differentiated, while the metaphor is reduced to the *κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον*. What matters more, however, is the birth of grammar, a *τέχνη γραμματική*. In his rhetorical works Cicero tried to give up the arid *τέχναι* and return to Aristotelian unity. But Quintilian could never follow his ideal, Cicero, in this: the exactness of the *τέχναι γραμματικαί* and *ῥητορικαί* and the request for handbooks of the imperial school blocked this way. To escape this sandbank Augustine's and Boethius's dialectics were required, and the metaphor's action, as well as the logical mechanism which permitted its first identification, had to be enlarged widely outside its application to poets, which was the limit of the Alexandrian use of metaphor. This was necessary for the large application of the metaphor in the Middle Age.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Dorandi 1990 2340.

⁶⁷ On this subject see U. Eco's paper on medieval metaphor, Eco 2005.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

ARISTOTLE: THE WRITTEN AND THE PERFORMATIVE STYLES¹

DOREEN C. INNES

I

In *Rhetoric* 3.12 1413b2 ff. Aristotle completes his account of good style² by considering the styles appropriate to the three genres of oratory.³ He distinguishes (1) *lexis graphikê*, the written style, which is linked to epideictic and has especial formal precision (it is *akribestatê*), and (2) *lexis agonistikê*, the performative style, a translation I have adopted⁴ to highlight the implication in Aristotle's choice of terminology of a contrast between writing and oral performance. It is the style suited to speech in oral public debate, the *agon*, and is apt for deliberative and to a lesser extent forensic oratory. Aristotle also terms this style *hypokritikê*, i.e. it suits *hypokrisis*, the lively, dramatic oral delivery of an actor/performer.⁵

¹ It is a particular pleasure to offer this piece to Bill Fortenbaugh. I am also grateful for comments from him and others at the Rutgers conference.

² The chapter is well integrated into Aristotle's analysis of style. Contrast Graff 2001 37: "Admittedly, its placement and its content give *Rhetoric* 3.12 the character of an afterthought in the context of the preceding chapters on style." It is part of Aristotle's concern with the appropriate, picking up, as we shall see, on previous points and aptly preceding the discussion of the structural parts (3.13–19), where what is appropriate for the three genres is a continuing concern, and again epideictic is linked to writing: see 1414b24–25 *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν*.

³ On these see Hinks 1936, Buchheit 1960, Mirhady 1994, and Bons 2001. Aristotle's epideictic genre is speech concerned with praise and blame (1358b12–13). Contrast *epideixis* as a set speech for display, a term particularly associated with the sophists (e.g. Plato, *Gorgias* 447b–c): it often is encomiastic (hence the Aristotelian meaning) but it could include, for example, the deliberative speech of Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus* (cf. 235a *ἐπιδεικνύμενος*). Note that Isocrates both accepts and disassociates himself from that usage, approving only encomia that have a serious purpose and are not *ἐπιδείξεις* of self-display (e.g. *Panegyricus* 17, *Philipp* 25).

⁴ Cf. Hunter 2003 218.

⁵ On oratorical delivery/performance see Hall 1995, and on Aristotle Sonkowsky 1959, Fortenbaugh 1986, and Sifakis 2002, especially 155–158 on the *Rhetoric*.

The distinction of speech and writing has stimulated a number of recent studies, but Aristotle's analysis of the written and performative styles usually appears only marginally.⁶ Yet (a) it is itself a significant piece; (b) we can trace clear influence on Aristotle from previous and contemporary writers, notably Alcidamas and Isocrates; and (c) he influenced later theory in the emphasis on style and in the specific characterisation he gave to the two styles. In this paper I aim to explore ways in which the relationship between speech and text, the oral/performed and the written/read, underpins the distinctions Aristotle draws in terms of genre and style.

It is an immediate complication that the distinction of written text and oral speech is itself blurred. Texts, especially literary texts, were normally read aloud,⁷ and Aristotle assumes this at 1407b11–12: “what is written should in general be easy to read and easy to speak (εὐανάγνωστον ... καὶ εὐφραστον), which is the same thing.” What matters is an easy comprehension,⁸ and a good written style facilitates the good oral performance of that text. This link between writing and performance appears most clearly in Aristotle's theory of the sentence. (a) Prose-rhythm is an acoustic effect, yet the reading of a written text is firmly evidenced when Aristotle advises us to make the end of the sentence clear “not through the copyist or punctuation marks but through the rhythm” (1409a20–21 μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ἑνθμόν). (b) The period is intended for oral performance since it should allow good breath-control (1409b14 εὐανάπνευστος), yet the principal source for examples of the period is Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, a written epideictic speech; epideictic is thus the home of the written style but its periods suit oral performance. (c) Aristotle suggests a difficulty which would be found only in reading a written text when he condemns ambiguity in identifying when a sense-unit is complete (1409b8–12); compare the type of ambiguous punctuation illustrated by Heraclitus where Aristotle refers explicitly to the use of punctuation marks on a written text, διαστίξαι (1407b13 and 14). I return to this demand for organic punctuation later, but it is no accident that these examples all involve sentence-structure. Aristotle's distinction of the written

⁶ For specific concern with oratory in some recent collections on this issue, see e.g. Thomas 2003, Gagarin 1999, and Worthington 1996b and O'Sullivan 1996. More specifically on Aristotle, see Graff 2001 and O'Sullivan 1992 44ff.

⁷ On the vexed question of silent reading see e.g. Knox 1968, Gavrillov 1997, and Johnson 2000.

⁸ I return to this later. Note also the linked need for comprehensible size, μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον (1409b1).

and performative styles is essentially concerned with differing forms of arrangement, and differing levels of diction, if any, will relate primarily to the consequent demands of genre.

A second problem is that just as what is written may be read aloud, conversely spoken speech may reflect a written text, whether the speaker reads from that text or has memorised it (e.g. Alcidas, *On the Sophists* 31). The sophists in particular were associated with performed text. To quote Rutherford, "A sophistic *epideixis* was often the recitation of prepared written works." This oral performance is well illustrated by the richly elaborate style of Gorgias.⁹ His short cola with their assonance and symmetry have a strong acoustic impact and must surely presuppose oral performance,¹⁰ yet, as he states at the end of the *Helen* (21), he has written it (trans. MacDowell): "I wished to write (γράφαι) the speech as an encomium of Helen and as an amusement for myself." Writing and oral performance also characterise oratory in 13: it is "written with skill, spoken not with truth", τέχνη γραφεῖς, οὐκ ἀληθεῖα λεχθεῖς (I argue elsewhere that Gorgias is referring here to his own oratory).¹¹ This antithesis has usually been taken as if "written" and "spoken" are empty padding for what is essentially the same process (so MacDowell *ad loc.*, "unnecessary for the sense"), but the process of writing pointedly and aptly precedes the later stage of spoken performance.

Nor need writer and speaker be the same, since a speaker may deliver a written text composed by someone else, as Phaedrus, for example, recites the speech of Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus* (see 228a ff.). In Attic forensic oratory we can see this in the familiar figure of the *logographos* who wrote speeches for others to deliver.¹²

⁹ Rutherford 1995 111. Contrast, however, the style he adopts for forensic, as in the *Palamedes* with its use of characteristics like rhetorical questions (*passim* 6ff.), asyndeta (3, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 36), and a free use of hiatus. It is in one sense epideictic since it is a fictional show-piece, but it is forensic in style just as it is in structure, argumentation and choice of *topoi*. Note the "signal" of forensic in the opening words, ἡ μὲν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία. This is why it uses Gorgias' more ornate, formal style only in the polysyndeton and imagery of the list of inventions in §30, appropriately so since this is a topic of praise and the list derives from poetic tradition. These stylistic differences foreshadow those drawn by Aristotle.

¹⁰ So rightly e.g. Gagarin 1999 164–165, Schiappa 1999 85–113. Cole 1991 74 gives more emphasis to its status as written text, but he does allow for oral performance: (on the *Funeral Speech* fragment) "It is obviously a written piece, composed to be studied and deciphered by the eye as well as heard by the ear." The same is true of the style of Isocrates: the clausal elements are longer but their balance and symmetry similarly give strong aural effects to what are given circulation as written texts.

¹¹ Innes 2006.

¹² See Lavency 1964, Hesk 1999.

This met with disapproval, as we see from Plato, *Phaedrus* 257c–d, where *logographos* is a term of abuse and “active politicians are ashamed to write discourses and publish their writings (λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν), for fear of being called sophists.” Compare e.g. Alcidamas, *On the Sophists* §§6 and 13, Demosthenes 19.246 (in response to accusations from Aeschines: see Aeschines 1.94, 2.180 and 3.173), and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* 37–38, arguments for use if you are attacked for using a written text. Aristotle uses the term *logographos* only three times, twice where it carries neutral value, at 1413b13, where it is linked to the *akribeia* of the written style, and at 1388b21–22, where it refers to emulation of epideictic writers, ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ποιητῶν ἢ λογογράφων, “whose praises and encomia are spoken by poets or *logographoi*.” These two non-pejorative examples suggest that Aristotle thought the use of the *logographos* was appropriate for praise epideictic. But at 1408a33–36 there is the usual derogatory tone when he refers to the way “*logographoi* over-use phrases like “who does not know?” and “everyone knows”, phrases which shame the listener into agreement with everyone else.” This comes in a context where Aristotle is discussing the use of emotion and Cope, I think rightly, refers it to forensic/deliberative oratory.¹³

Publication took various forms, official and unofficial, ranging from informal private readings and the borrowing of an author’s text to open sale in a bookshop,¹⁴ but in any event Aristotle is concerned with the published written text, as we see from his comments on the intended audience. At 1413b7 he tells us that the written style is primarily intended for *others*, τοῖς ἄλλοις. Oral discourse addresses an immediate audience, one which is present and which is its target audience, but the written has its sights on a wider reading public. Isocrates and Alcidamas similarly link writing and a wider audience. In *Busiris* 10.44, Isocrates ironically counters that assumption in the case of his own written text: he claims to offer it, “not making an *epideixis* to *others* but wanting to suggest to you personally” (οὐ γὰρ ἐπιδείξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιούμενος, ἀλλ’ ὑποδείξαι σοι βουλούμενος).¹⁵ In *To Nicocles* 2.7 he describes written discourse, once completed, “becoming an *epideixis* to *others*” (τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιδειχθέντα). And in *Evagoras* 9.74 he notes how writings (he means his own)

¹³ On this “you all know” *topos* see also Ober 1989 148–151 and Hesk 1999 226–229.

¹⁴ Cf. Thomas 2003 170–173.

¹⁵ See the commentary of Livingstone 2001 185.

can circulate throughout Greece and be much talked about in civilised circles. Alcidas is even blunter in *On the Sophists* 31 (trans. Muir): “I employ writing for the popular dissemination of my display-performances (τῶν ἐπιδείξεων εἵνεκα τῶν εἰς τοὺς ὄχλους ἐκφερομένων) ... for those who come to hear us after some time and for those who have never before met us, we try to show something of what we have done in writing.” The text leaves the author for others to read, and it is of course this separation of text and author that is the basis of Plato’s criticism of the written text in the *Phaedrus*: Lysias, “father of the speech” (257b), is not present to defend his words when his text is taken away and read by Phaedrus; the written text is left orphaned by its author/father, and “rolls about everywhere” (275e κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ).

It reflects actual Greek practice that the significant audience of epideictic oratory¹⁶ is typically not any assumed original audience of an oral performance but a wider reading public. There might of course be an original spoken performance (e.g. Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* of 322 B.C.), but often there was none, even in the case of funeral, panhellenic or festival speeches (Gorgias’ *Helen* and *Funeral Speech* are both fictions). Aristotle may also be thinking of Isocrates, the most famous contemporary writer of epideictic. Isocrates gave no oral performance, claiming that his poor voice and diffidence led him to produce and circulate speeches for others to read: *Panathenaicus* 12.9–10, *Philippus* 5.81, and *Letter* 8.7 all reiterate his lack of voice, *phonê*, and boldness, *tolma*.¹⁷

The view that epideictic was intended for a wider (reading) circulation is underlined by Aristotle when he tells us that the job or *ergon* of the epideictic style is to be read (1414a17–18) τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις. The use of *ergon* makes this more than an empirical observation of the close connection in practice between the epideictic style and writing: reading is “the purpose which it was made to serve.”¹⁸ Thus Aristotle assumes a written text for epideictic,

¹⁶ The position is more fluid for earlier sophistic *epideixis* with its repeated performances by the author and (eventual?) circulation. See Thomas 2003 171, “The texts are servants to the performance.” But here too there is no single original performed action as there is in the case of deliberative and forensic oratory.

¹⁷ His readers, of course, were intended to read them aloud. Note also the lively scene in *Panathenaicus* 233: Isocrates claims to be unsure if his written text is ready for publication and invites a circle of ex-pupils to advise him: “The speech was read aloud (ἀνέγνωστο) and met with the praise, applause and the sort of reaction achieved by those who are successful in epideictic displays.” See Hudson-Williams 1949.

¹⁸ Cope and Sandys 1877 3.154.

and a written style develops to suit that written status.¹⁹ The text is self-standing, divorced from any one-off original occasion, intended for reading and re-reading by more than a single audience.

The relationship between audience and speech in epideictic is also necessarily different from that in deliberative and forensic oratory. At 1391b16–17 Aristotle notes that epideictic is aimed “towards the spectator as if to a judge” (ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν). This resumes 1358b2 ff., where we are told that an audience must be either spectator, *theōros*, or judge, *kritēs*. In the case of forensic and deliberative oratory, it is a *kritēs* (a jury *decides* whether to acquit or condemn, and a deliberative body *decides* whether to accept or refuse a proposal). In effect the difference is that in forensic and deliberative at the original occasion the audience²⁰ makes an immediate judgment on the result of which some action is taken, whereas in epideictic the audience will simply absorb the discourse, a role Aristotle terms “spectator”, *theōros*.

Some have assumed that this is a passive spectator.²¹ It is certainly tempting to compare the spectators, *theatai*, in Thucydides 3.38.7, where the Athenians are blamed for “falling victim to the pleasure of listening, sitting more like spectators of sophists than deliberating about their city” (ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἥδονῇ ἢ σσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένους μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις). Thucydides also explicitly links such speech with the *pleasure* of the audience, and later epideictic theory makes audience pleasure the goal of epideictic. Note in particular Cicero, *Partitiones Oratoriae* 10, in an echo of this very passage of Aristotle (1358b2 ff.): the two categories of audience for the three genres of oratory are judge and spectator, and the epideictic spectator does not decide anything but expects only pleasure (*delectetur*). Compare also the recall of *theōros* in *Orator* 37, where epideictic is essentially “to be *looked at*, for the pleasure

¹⁹ Conversely the performative style of oratory developed to suit speech intended for dramatic delivery, *hypokrisis*. This may be relevant to the disputed interpretation of 1404a16, where delivery is said to have an element of technique in terms of its style, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον: Aristotle may mean that delivery determines a type of style and to that extent contains an element of technique. Contrast Fortenbaugh 1986 252 “style actually determines delivery” and 1985 276 and 287 n. 27.

²⁰ In practice but irrelevant for our purpose, the original audience of deliberative and forensic oratory comprised not only the decision-makers but also the bystanders or corona, as in e.g. Aeschines 3.56, Demosthenes 18.196, 19.17 and 25.98. See references in Lanni 1997 184 n. 8.

²¹ See Cope and Sandys’ commentary 1877 1.52, on 1358b2 ff., cf. Schiappa 1999 200 and Hellwig 1973 133–134.

it gives", "quasi ad *inspiciendum* delectationis causa".²² But for Aristotle (1358b27–28) the goal or *telos* of epideictic is not pleasure but the honourable, *to kalon*, making it impossible that Aristotle approves a "spectator" concerned only with the pleasures of literary artistry.²³ Since later theory has moved away from Aristotle's view of the *telos*, it is also a less than safe guide to the meaning of *theōros*.²⁴ It is preferable and fits Aristotle's overall view of rhetoric to see the "spectator" of epideictic as an "evaluator", forming a cognitive understanding and judgment²⁵ of the text.²⁶ The epideictic audience will thus "see" how well the orator himself has (in the very terminology of the definition of rhetoric itself at 1355b26 θεωρεῖσαι) "seen" the available means of persuasion.²⁷ Elsewhere too Aristotle uses θεωρός/θεωρία/θεωρεῖν to indicate comprehension (e.g. "seeing" similarity at 1412a12 and "seeing" the speaker's character at 1417b8). The terms may also imply that one sees/comprehends a unity, as when the noun describes an "understanding" of how the parts of an animal's body fit together at *Parts of Animals* I.5, 645a35 ff. (cf. *Poetics* 1450b37 ff.). We may compare the parallel case of the term

²² Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.4.6 cites a related theory of three types of audience for the three genres, one for pleasure (*ad delectationem*, i.e. epideictic), one to receive advice (i.e. deliberative) and one to judge cases (*de causis iudicet*, i.e. forensic).

²³ A point Bill Fortenbaugh has rightly emphasised to me. See also Mirhady 1994 62 and 64; 1995.

²⁴ I suspect Theophrastus got this right: see 671 FHS&G (= Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.1), where he and Aristotle are said to divorce epideictic from practical oratory, *pragmatikē*, making the audience its exclusive concern, *totamque ad solos auditores relegasse*. Theophrastus introduced into Aristotle's account the term *pragmatikē* to cover forensic and deliberative: did he also contrast it with epideictic as *theoretikē*? That term would pick up on Aristotle's *theōros* and, if so, it would support a cognitive evaluation, as in the definition of *theoretikē* in Quintilian 2.18.1, *in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum*, adding that it aims at the understanding (*intellectu*) of the subject of study. (Quintilian however presents a later tripartite division of the arts: theoretical, practical and creative.)

²⁵ Grimaldi 1980 80 (commentary on 1358b2 ff.) notes that Aristotle's text here and at 1391b18 allows the *theōros* to be also in a sense judging. The judging is of "a speaker's command of the art", an inference he draws from 1358b5–6 where he defends the text (Kassel deletes), ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός. This is attractive, but the passage remains difficult and controversial (see e.g. Mirhady 1995).

²⁶ Cf. Bons 2001 104: "The person addressed in his capacity as "observer, examiner" will also listen to and evaluate the arguments presented to him".

²⁷ Cf. Bons 2001 103–104. Hellwig 1973 134 n. 71 cites *Politics* 1336b36–38 for a passive role: children should become "spectators" of lessons they must learn later. But the children will be beginning the process of understanding. Compare *Politics* 1338b1, where children learn to draw, not for any practical use but to create "understanding of the body's beauty", θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους.

εὐσύννοπος, which can similarly link sight with comprehension and unity: see 1409b1 and, of the unified plot of Homer's *Iliad*, *Poetics* 1459a33.

So what the audience admires is the orator's own skill, and Aristotle offers an example in the use of amplification. The amplification may be of content, 1368a26 ff.: "amplification is most suited to epideictic, since it deals with deeds agreed by all, so it only remains to add grandeur and beauty."²⁸ But it is the style that is more effective, 1404a18–19: "for discourses that are written have more impact through their style than their thought", οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. Here the context indicates reference to epideictic since Aristotle contrasts the dominance of oral delivery, *hypokrisis*, in the case of *rhêtores* (= forensic and deliberative orators).

Forensic and deliberative oratory are performed, but what happens when they are later read as written texts, as is envisaged at 1413bff.?²⁹ The aim of the original oral performance was to persuade the audience to take a decision (they are judges), and that is not something subsequent readers do, though they may appreciate the skill with which the orator has made the case. The change of audience would seem to introduce a change of *ergon*, whereby the reading of the written text leads towards the response Aristotle gives to epideictic.³⁰ This may be contrasted with the reading of a different performance genre, tragedy: it is clear from the *Poetics* that tragedy can achieve its proper effect even without performance: see 1450b18–19 "the force (*dunamis*) of tragedy exists even without public performance and actors", καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν, 1453b4 "even without visual sight", καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν, and 1462a11 "tragedy fulfils its function even without performance on stage," καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως, since what it is can be made clear through reading. But if tragedy can achieve its force and function (*dunamis* and *ergon*)

²⁸ Amplification of content as well as style is a point repeated in later critics, including Theophrastus: see 693 FHS&G (on Aristotle and Theophrastus) "encomia involve the amplification of what is agreed upon by all."

²⁹ See Ford 2002 288 n. 49, "In both works (i.e. *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*) Aristotle detaches the art of performance from the true core of the art. Rhetorical delivery ... is an inessential add-on to the text."

³⁰ Compare the "mixed discourse" Isocrates claims for his *Antidosis*. It is described (15.13) as a "a defence claiming to have been written about a judicial case (περὶ κρίσεως γεγραπθαι) but intended to reveal the truth about me." The reader is not a judge, as a juror is, and there is a paradox here in the juxtaposition of writing and judicial *krisis*.

off a written text without performance, this must be because the reader of tragedy can experience the proper response (1453b10ff. the specific pleasure through *mimesis* from pity and fear), and this is possible since, to use the terms in the *Rhetoric*, the audience is not a judge, *kritês* (no consequent action must be taken) but spectator, *theôros*.³¹

II

After these more general comments, I turn to a closer look at Aristotle's account of the two styles in 3.12, the written and the performative. After he draws the initial distinction, Aristotle's first illustration is drawn from tragedy. Actors and poets prefer the performative style, he says, but the reading public likes poets who use a reader-friendly style: so 1413b12–14, "Popularly carried in our hands are those who suit reading, like Chaeremon, for he is precise like a *logographos*," βασιτάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος). Tragedy *qua* genre is performed on stage with delivery, *hypokrisis*, but there were of course also published written texts (we know of these at least as early as Aristophanes, *Frogs* 52–53, where Dionysus reads to himself Euripides' *Andromeda*). Here Aristotle identifies popular texts of a class of poets whose *style* suits reading, the *anagnostikoi*, among them Chaeremon (also Lycymnius, a poet of dithyramb, another performance genre). Aristotle does not mean that Chaeremon composed solely to be read, not to be performed on stage,³² still less that there was a whole class of

³¹ But Aristotle uses the term θεατής for the audience of drama, e.g. *Poetics* 1453a35, 1462a2.

³² Demetrius, *On Style* 192–194 draws a similar contrast in the case of comedy, contrasting the styles of Menander and Philemon in a passage strongly influenced by Aristotle (Loeb translation of Innes): "Sentences which are unconnected and disjointed throughout are always unclear. For the beginning of each clause is obscured by the lack of connectives, as in the prose of Heraclitus, for it is mostly this lack which makes it darkly obscure. The disjointed style is perhaps better for immediacy (ἐναγώνιος), and that same style is also called the actor's style (ὑποκριτική), since the asyndeton stimulates dramatic delivery, while the written style is easy to read (εὐανάγνωστος), and this is the style which is linked closely together and, as it were, safely secured by connectives. This is why Menander, who mostly omits connectives, is acted, while Philemon is read. To show that asyndeton suits an actor's delivery, let this be an example: "I conceived, I gave birth, I nurse, my dear." In this disjointed form the words will force anyone to be dramatic, however reluctantly—and the cause is the asyndeton. If you link it together to say, "I conceived and I gave birth and I

such poets. Chaeremon's tragedies were performed.³³ It follows that Aristotle can associate a particular genre (in this case tragedy) with oral delivery, *hypokrisis*, but individual poets within that genre may illustrate the written style.³⁴ Such a contrast of style can only be drawn when the text is divorced from the context of performance and stands alone.

After citing the popularity of poets like Chaeremon, Aristotle turns to the written texts of deliberative and forensic oratory (1413b14–16): "If we compare them, some works of those who use the written style seem thin when uttered in debates, while some works of orators (*rhêtores* = deliberative and forensic speakers) seem ordinary when taken in our hands to read" (the translation accepts the text of Kassel: καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι <οἱ λόγοι> οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφίκων ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χειρσίν). This sentence proves the availability of *published* written texts of non-epideictic oratory, a point to bear in mind in asking why Aristotle prefers to cite quotations from epideictic.³⁵ The answer will lie not in the availability of texts but in Aristotle's own theory of good style. But what I want to draw attention to is the existence of a culture where oratorical texts have a literary status. Usher rightly emphasises in his commentary on Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 11, that forensic speeches in the fourth century "were read for pleasure and edification as well as for assessment of their effectiveness in presenting their case; and most important of all, they were studied as literary models."³⁶ Usher is commenting on this passage (I cite his trans-

nurse," you will by using the connectives substantially lower the emotional level, and anything unemotional is always undramatic."

³³ At least one fragment depends for its full value on the visual impact of the written text, an acrostic with lines where the initial letters spell out his name (*TGF* vol. I, F.14B Snell). See Zwierlein 1966 128–130, citing Demetrius, *On Style* 193, a text I quote n. 22. On Chaeremon see Collard 1970 and Sifakis 2002 157 n. 23.

³⁴ Asyndeton suits the performative, and at 1414a2–3 Aristotle includes an example from Homer, *Iliad* 2.671–673, "Nireus from Syme, Nireus son of Aglaia, Nireus the most beautiful of men." Aristotle may be thinking of oral performance of Homer by the rhapsode, but he is much more likely to be selecting an apt example from a poet who is a favourite source for his examples and he could just as readily have found a suitable passage from Homer for the polysyndeton of the written style. If so, a particular author or text may at different points exemplify both styles. This would have seemed natural to later critics: for instance, note Demetrius, *On Style* 62, citing the same Nireus example for asyndetic anaphora, and 54, citing Homer for polysyndeton (*Iliad* 2.497, with repeated τε ... τε ... in a list of names in catalogue style).

³⁵ See Trevett 1996.

³⁶ Usher 1990 151.

lation): “And yet there are some who criticise discourses which are beyond the powers of ordinary men and have been meticulously constructed (λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένους), and have made the extreme mistake of judging (σκοποῦσι) these elaborate compositions by the standards of speeches in private lawsuits, as if both should be in a similar style, not the one in a plain style and the other in a showy style (ἐπιδεικτικῶς).”

Isocrates here and elsewhere distinguishes two styles, a plain and an elaborate style.³⁷ He links the latter to epideictic and precision, *akribēia*, and assumes that forensic texts need to reproduce a simple spoken style. We find the same contrast in Alcidamas, *On the Sophists* 13–14 (trans. Muir): “those who write speeches for the courts avoid precision (τὰς ἀκριβείας) and mimic the style of extempore speakers, and they seem to be doing their best writing when they produce speeches which least resemble scripts. ... And it is inevitable that, whenever someone speaks extempore on some matters and on others hammers out (τυποῖ) a text, his speech with differences of style will produce criticism for the speaker, the text seeming more suited to the stage or a recital (ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψωδίᾳ), with the extempore speech seeming common and trivial beside the precise style of the text (ἀκρίβεια).”

There are clear links here with Aristotle, but Aristotle avoids a two-style contrast. He seems the first to distinguish different suitable styles for two different types of non-epideictic oratory, the forensic and the deliberative (presumably deriving from his formulation of three genres of oratory in the first place). There is, however, no strict, hard and fast division of styles. The written style has formal precision, *akribēia*, but *akribēia* can be used to a greater and lesser extent in all three genres.³⁸ Epideictic has the written style to the greatest extent (1414a17 it is γομφιωτάτη), but forensic comes second in its use (1414a18) and has greater precision than deliberative (1414a10–11 ἀκριβεστέγον). Aristotle thus assesses their style by their level of approximation to the formal precision, *akribēia*, of the written style.

³⁷ Both authors reflect the popular two-style theory, the plain and the grand. See here O’Sullivan 1992, but with the important reservation that he wrongly associates *akribēia* with concision rather than precision. Compare the translations cited from Isocrates and Alcidamas, “meticulously constructed” ... “precision” ... “precise style”.

³⁸ Similarly there are degrees of *hypokrisis*, see 1414a15–16, “where delivery is at its greatest, there precision is at its least.” Compare also Sonkowsky 1959 261: “he recognises a relative scale between them, along which, presumably, the two could be mixed together in varying degrees.”

Deliberative would seem closer to a plain style (1414a7–10),³⁹ while forensic proves to have a style of its own.

The performative style includes two subtypes, those with *êthos*/character and those with *pathos*/emotion (1413b10), topics already analysed in 3.7, 1408a10–19 under the appropriate, *to prepon*. But *êthos* and *pathos* are not necessarily entirely excluded from the written style of epideictic. At the end of his discussion of propriety (1408b13 ff.), Aristotle had included two phrases from an epideictic piece, Isocrates, *Panegyricus* (186 and 96), to illustrate the style of those who are caught in high emotional excitement, ἐνθουσιάζοντες. Inspired fervour or *enthousiasmos* is an emotion linked to poetry (1408b18), and we may infer that such emotion is better suited to encomium than deliberative and forensic oratory. Epideictic can also illustrate *êthos* (note Isocrates at 1418b27), and more generally some degree of *êthos* will often be advisable if we are to trust the speaker's authority. Here in 3.12 the emotional type is characterised by forceful asyndeton and repeated anaphora, as in an otherwise unknown example cited to illustrate the usage of orators, *rhêtores* (1413b20–21): “he is the one who robbed you, he is the one who cheated you, he is the one who, worst of all, tried to betray you.” This example, with its triple anaphora of οὗτος, shows how the performative style is not just a plain style but a style with characteristics of its own.⁴⁰

Forensic oratory is closer to the written style than deliberative, since it is more precise in style, *akribestera*. This, we are told, is particularly true of forensic spoken in front of a single judge (1414a10–11). Some see here a move to a different meaning of *akribēia*, precision of argument,⁴¹ but such a move seems in itself very unlikely. Moreover, before a single arbitrator, no doubt on some minor private case, the concern is with fairness, not the legalistic strictness of law (so 1374b20–22). The first aim of arbitration is after all reconciliation (*Athenaiôn politeia* 53.2).⁴² Aristotle intends a continuing reference to style, and a degree of *akribēia* fills the gap left by the loss of emotion, which suits only a large audience (Quintilian 11.1.44 ridicules the

³⁹ Compare Theophrastus 694 FHS&G (= Quintilian 3.8.62) and Cicero, *Partitiones Oratoriae* 97 (*simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatior esse quam verbis*); note also the sensible criticisms of Quintilian 3.8.62–64.

⁴⁰ It had a strong influence on later critics: see already Demetrius of Phaleron F162–163 (= 134–135A SOD) and 169 Wehrli (= 134 SOD), Hieronymus F52a–b Wehrli (= 38A–B White), and Demetrius, *On Style* 240 ff. (the forceful style, illustrated especially from orators like Demosthenes).

⁴¹ E.g. Cope and Sandys 1877 and Kennedy 1991; cf. Hunter 2003 218–219.

⁴² See Scafuro 1997 117–141.

idea that the orator might speak overwhelmed by emotion “in minor matters and minor cases ... speaking seated before an arbitrator”). But if *pathos* is excluded, there remains *êthos* and a degree of *akribeia* that will bring it closer to the written style, so that the sentences will have clear articulation and an easy flow from features like a regular use of connectives. This is precisely what we find in the scene of private arbitration in Menander, *Epitrepontes* 250ff.⁴³ Both speakers have a strongly marked *êthos* and appropriately different styles. The rustic slave has a blunt oral style, while the style of the more sophisticated Syrus shows features we may match to the written style: note the use of connectives, an example of assonance and antithesis (319) and what Gomme and Sandbach term “more complex periods”⁴⁴ (see below on the period’s link with the written style). We may also add the following: (a) Euripides, *Phoenix* fr. 812 Nauck (cited by Aeschines 1.152), for an emphasis on character and general behaviour: “I have often been chosen as arbitrator, *kritês*, and often heard conflicting witnesses on a single happening. So, like any wise person, I establish the truth by examining the character’s nature and his day by day behaviour”; (b) Cicero, *Pro Roscio Comoedo* 11, for the contrasting tones of trial and arbitration: “What is a trial like? Exact, clear-cut, explicit. And arbitration? Mild and moderate.”

Finally, on style and degrees of *akribeia*: Aristotle is concerned with the genre of oratory, but different performed and written genres will logically have different requirements. The letter is an interesting example, since it is by its nature written, and in a discussion strongly influenced by Aristotle, Demetrius, *On Style* 223–227 distinguishes the written dialogue and the letter. Both are strong in *êthos* (227) but dialogue imitates spontaneous oral speech and includes asyndeton (compare Aristotle’s performative style). Since it is written, the letter requires a modest degree of more formal style (224), it will avoid abrupt asyndeton (226) and it illustrates a plain style with an admixture of charm (235). Dialogue here refers to the apparently improvised conversation of a Platonic dialogue (226 cites *Euthydemus* 271a). But Aristotle’s own dialogues preferred set speeches within a group of friends and thus suited a smoother style more akin to the written style.⁴⁵ Even in his textbooks he can on occasion rise to

⁴³ See MacDowell 1978 203–204, Scafuro 1997 154–161 and especially Cohoon 1914, who emphasises Menander’s use of argument from equity and character.

⁴⁴ Gomme and Sandbach 1973 303.

⁴⁵ For their smooth flow compare Cicero’s praise of Aristotle’s style as “a river of flowing gold” (Plut. *Cic.* 24 = Cic. *Acad.* 2.119 *flumen orationis aureum fundens*).

a more formal level, and we then find a greater smoothness, with little or no hiatus and clearly articulated short units with antithesis and balance. Note, for example, *Pro Caelo* 2.1 (a passage brought to my attention by Donald Russell): it displays clear articulation, use of connectives, and a smooth flow from balanced cola and a relative absence of hiatus. Aristotle's practice may thus help us in filling out what sort of style he saw as the written style.

III

How does Aristotle's preceding analysis of good style in 3.2–11 relate to the distinction between the written and the performative styles in 3.12? I return to 1413b5–8, quoting now the whole passage: "we must know both styles. The one (the performative style) is knowing how to speak good Greek (ἐλληνίζειν), the other (the written) is avoiding having to stay silent if we want to communicate something to others, the fate of those who lack knowledge of writing." What Aristotle is saying here is only the initial starting-point for both styles. Thus in the case of the performative style, he cites the required knowledge of good Greek, but this is something he has already told us (1407a19–21) is ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως, the beginning of any good style. It gives clarity, the job, function or *ergon* of speech (1404b1–4): "let excellence of style (λέξεως ἀρετή) be defined as (a) to be clear (for discourse is a sort of signifying (σημεῖον γάρ τι), so if it does not make its meaning clear, it will not perform its function and (b) to be appropriate, neither mean nor over-grand." Clarity is thus the bare minimum requirement for all discourse. Good prose style will additionally require appropriate embellishments, the topics analysed in 3.2–11.⁴⁶ But this applies to *all* good prose, *whether spoken or written*, and it is only after this is fully analysed that in this final chapter on style (3.12) Aristotle discusses the appropriate embellishments that distinguish the spoken and the written. Thus the performative style, a style that suits delivery (*lexis hypokritikê*) will be more than spoken speech that is in good Greek. It will also have specific embellishment such as asyndeton, which will make it good prose for oral performance. So too the written style, the good style for reading, will be in good Greek, it will be clear, and it too will have its own appropriate embellishment.

On Cicero's own (Aristotelian?) style in his dialogues, see e.g. Powell 1995 9 "his accustomed elegance and lucidity of style".

⁴⁶ See Innes 1985 255–256.

I return then to the advice on clarity in 3.2, to look for evidence on how the *written* style will have that bare minimum requirement of good communication, and then move to consider the appropriate embellishment that will make it good style. First, what is easy to read? Again I go back to a passage and cite it now more fully (1407b11–14), “What is written should in general be easy to read and easy to speak (εὐανάγνωστον ... καὶ εὐφραστον), which is the same thing. This is not achieved by a plethora of connectives (οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι) or by what is difficult to punctuate, as in the case of Heraclitus.” What Aristotle demands is easy comprehension by the use of clear articulation of sense units,⁴⁷ and Heraclitus’ text fails this test since we do not know where to punctuate (we can compare what we find later in the case of the period, a disapproval of ambiguity in the articulation of sense-units, 1409b8–12). To achieve clarity he has already (1407a22 ff.) advised sense-units which are not too long and the proper use of connectives like μέν and δέ (these will act as pointers for the reader), and he has condemned over-elaborate internal subordination, where one connective is followed by another before the first finds its grammatical resolution. This last is what he means by plethora of connectives at 1407b12–13, as in the example he gave at 1407a26–27: “I, when he said to me (for Cleon came asking and claiming), set off, taking them along with me” (ἐγὼ δ’, ἐπεὶ μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γάρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἄξιός), ἐπορευόμεν παρὰ λαβὼν αὐτούς).

Plethora of connectives does not refer to polysyndeton.⁴⁸ Polysyndeton is the opposite of the asyndeton suited to the performative style, and it removes emotion.⁴⁹ But it will suit the written style: carefully crafted polysyndeton will produce a reader-friendly text, combining clear articulation with an element of *akribeia*. Other examples of written style will be the antithesis and balanced symmetry of the very specific types of dicolon periods that Aristotle describes and illustrates from Isocrates in 1409b33–36. For Aristotle sense-units of all good prose should be clearly articulated by internal organic structure: this makes the sentences easily comprehensible for reading or oral performance (εὐανάγνωστον ... καὶ εὐφραστον), but the period, illustrated by its many examples from Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, will fit the

⁴⁷ Cf. Lucretius 4.554–555 *necessesst verba quoque ipsa/ plane exaudiri discernique articulatim*.

⁴⁸ As is assumed by Kennedy 1991 233.

⁴⁹ Cf. Demetrius, *On Style* 192–194 (quoted above; note §193 “safely secured by connectives”) and 268 (asyndetic anaphora in Aeschines 3.202: emotion is removed if you add connectives), and Longinus 21 (asyndetic anaphora in Demosthenes 21.72: emotion is removed if you add connectives “as the Isocrateans do”).

written style because its balanced symmetry produces a very clearly defined ending.⁵⁰ This is good style, but also good written style, and this may be why it is in the case of sentence-structure that Aristotle cites with approval so many examples from epideictic.⁵¹ Hence too in 3.12 Aristotle need not provide so many examples of the written style since they have appeared in the preceding analysis, but he does expand on deliberative and forensic oratory, which are here recognised as having their own stylistic characteristics. It is however the written style that Aristotle prefers, as others have noted.⁵² This fits well of course with Aristotle's basic disapproval of *hypokrisis*, combined with an acceptance that it has its necessary and appropriate place: see 1404a1–9, especially 6–9.⁵³

To conclude, I hope I have aired some of the issues raised by the distinction between the spoken and the written in Aristotle and those who preceded him. I have also examined the two styles that Aristotle recognised as arising from that distinction between text and performance, and the resulting styles suitable for the three genres of oratory. I have emphasised in particular the importance he gave to the clear articulation of sense-units, and the link between the written style and periodic sentence-structure.

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⁵⁰ On the period see Innes 1994 37–40 and Fowler 1982. Note Aristotle's influence on later critics: epideictic is regularly seen as (a) a written piece more suited for reading (cf. Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.341 *magis legendi*) and (b) a genre to be elaborately decked with the balanced periods of antithesis, parallelism and assonance associated with Isocrates: see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isocrates* 2 and *Demosthenes* 4, and the explicit reference to periodic sentences in Cicero, *Orator* 207 *illa circumscriptione ambituque*.

⁵¹ Alcidamas, *On the Sophists* 16 already suggests a particular link between writing and sentence-structure: καὶ μετ' ἀκριβείας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ ("with precision and rhythm"); cf. the concern with arrangement of words in 20 and 25.

⁵² E.g. Trevett 1996.

⁵³ Cf. Fortenbaugh 1986.

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CHAPTER NINE

TEODETTE DI FASELIDE, RETORE

ELISABETTA MATELLI

Valerio Massimo, in una sezione dei suoi *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* dedicata ad aneddoti sulla ricerca smodata di gloria da parte dei grandi personaggi della storia, racconta uno specioso episodio che avrebbe avuto come protagonisti Aristotele e Teodette:

Regis et iuuenis flagrantissimae cupiditati similem Aristotelis in capessenda laude sitim subnectam: is namque Theodecti discipulo oratoriae artis libros quos pro suis ederet donauerat, molesteque postea ferens titulum eorum sic alii cessisse, proprio uolumine quibusdam rebus insistentis, planius sibi de his in Theodectis libris dictum esse adiecit. nisi me tantae et tam late patentis scientiae uerecundia teneret, dicerem dignum philosophum, cuius stabiliendi mores altioris animi philosopho traderentur. (*Val. Max. Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* 8.14 ext 3)

Secondo Valerio, dunque, in un primo tempo Aristotele (potremmo immaginare quando lasciò l'Accademia per andare in Macedonia) avrebbe consegnato a Teodette gli appunti delle proprie lezioni di retorica affinché li pubblicasse come se fossero suoi, ma avrebbe poi mal sopportato proprio il fatto che essi fossero usciti con il nome di Teodette. Per ricondurre a sé la paternità dello scritto, dunque, nella *Retorica* egli avrebbe specificato che di certi argomenti aveva già parlato nei Θεοδέκτεια (*Rhet.* 3.9 1410b2-3).

Quintiliano, in un passo in cui discute in cosa consista il potere dell'oratoria, presentando l'opinione di Teodette, apre una parentesi sulla paternità dell'*Arte retorica* che portava il suo nome, ma che secondo alcuni era opera di Aristotele:

a quo non dissentit Theodectes, sive ipsius id opus est quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, sive ut creditum est Aristotelis, in quo est finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id quod actor velit. (*Quint. Inst.* 2.15.10)

I. Θεοδέκτεια e la Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου Συναγωγὴ di Aristotele

La testimonianza di Valerio Massimo è stata da alcuni studiosi accolta e valorizzata a sostegno della paternità aristotelica dei Θεοδέκτεια di Aristotele,¹ mentre da altri venne interpretata come una fantasiosa, tardiva ricostruzione.² Il racconto, che pure contiene una incoerenza (per ragioni cronologiche Teodette di Faselide, a cui si riferiscono i Θεοδέκτεια, non può essere considerato 'discepolo' di Aristotele), ha il pregio di evidenziare un problema già sentito in età romana, ovvero come ricostruire il rapporto tra Teodette ed Aristotele, soprattutto alla luce dei problemi sollevati dal titolo di un'opera che collega in modo ambiguo le figure dei due uomini.³

Mi riferisco:

- al richiamo ai Θεοδέκτεια in Arist. *Rhet.* 3.9 1410b2–3,⁴
- alla presenza del titolo Τέχνης τῆς (τῶν Laur. Pl. 69, Cod. 13) Θεοδέκτου συναγωγὴ α' (συναγωγῆς α' codd. plerique) nella lista delle opere aristoteliche in Diog. Laert. 5.24,
- alle parole τὰ ἐν ταῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τέχναις Θεοδέκτη (Θεοδέκτους *Par. gr.* 2039; *Theodecti Urbanensis* 8, Vatic. Lat. 2083) γραφείσας della lettera prefatoria alla *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1421b1–2),
- al preciso riferimento a una teoria sull'epilogo nell'Anonymus Seguerianus *De orat. polit.* 208 introdotto dalle parole: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν ταῖς Θεοδεκτικαῖς τέχναις φησὶν ὅτι ...

testimonianze che a mio avviso andrebbero tutte riconsiderate in rapporto:

- alla lezione dalla *Vita* di Esichio Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγὴ ἐν γ' (συναγωγὴν codd.),⁵

¹ Tra gli autori antichi segue tale interpretazione l'Anon. Seguerianus 208; tra i moderni Diels 1886 1–34; Rose 1863 137, Dils e Kennedy 1997 59n. 208. Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 2.15.10 si mostra consapevole di opinioni contrastanti sulla questione della paternità dei *Theodekteia*: *a quo non dissentit Theodectes, sive ipsius id opus est quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur; sive ut creditum est Aristotelis, in quo est finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id quod actor velit.*

² Maercker 1835 21–22, Kennedy 1963 80n. 65, Chiron 2002 LXIn. 136.

³ Alcuni studi fondamentali sui problemi sollevati dall'interpretazione dei *Theodekteia* sono citati nel presente articolo. Utili *status quaestionis* in Arcoleo 1964 175 n. 14, Chroust 1973 105–116, e Vottero 1994 105–106.

⁴ Rose 1863 137 volle riconoscere in questo passo una glossa entrata nel testo (vedi sotto nota 15). Il titolo Θεοδέκτεια è attestato altrove solo in Anon. Seg. *Arx rhetorica* 208.2 Spengel-Hammer = fr. 134 Rose 1886.

⁵ Gigon 1987 27 nr. 74 e Vottero 1994 8b pubblicano la lezione dei manoscritti Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγὴν ἐν γ'.

- a un’epigrafe di Rodi del 2 sec. a. C. contenente un catalogo di libri in cui sono citati quattro libri dell’*Arte* di Teodette: Θεοδέκτου τέχνης τέσσαρα,⁶
- alla Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ ἐν βιβλίοις ζ’ attribuita dalla *Suda* al figlio di Teodette (s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 139 Adler),
- alle Τέχναι ῥητορικαί che, secondo la *Suda* (s.v. Συβύρτιος, Σ nr. 364 Adler), sarebbero state scritte da Sibirtio, “segretario di Teodette, schiavo,⁷ e tra gli schiavi il primo ad esercitare la retorica” (Θεοδέκτου τοῦ Φασηλίτου ἀναγνώστης, καὶ οἰκέτης, ὃς ἐρρητόρευσεν οἰκετῶν πρῶτος, ἔγραψε τέχνας ῥητορικὰς, *Suda* s.v. Συβύρτιος, Σ nr. 364 Adler),
- al verso di Antifane citato da Ateneo, *Deipnosophistae* 4 134b = Antiphanes *PCG* 2, nr. 111 che motteggia un personaggio ὁ τὴν Θεοδέκτου μόνος ἀνευρηκὼς τέχνην.

E’ abbastanza problematico collegare questi titoli con quello di un altro trattato di retorica attribuito a Teodette dalla *Suda*: la Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ ἐν μέτρῳ (s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler).⁸ Maercker propose di emendare questo titolo in Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ περὶ μέτρων: in questo caso potremmo considerare questo libro di *Arte retorica* “*sui metri*” come uno dei quattro libri che componevano l’*Arte* di Teodette secondo l’iscrizione di Rodi (Teodette si occupò della questione, ripresa da Aristotele e Teofrasto, del ritmo necessario alla prosa, identificandolo nel peone, ed escludendo altri metri, v. Cic. *Orator* 172 e 194). Se invece si volesse mantenere il titolo Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ ἐν μέτρῳ, esso sembrerebbe indicare un’opera a sé, forse collegabile ai discorsi oratori in versi di Teodette a cui si riferisce Steph. Byz.: ἐποίησε τραγῳδίας ν’ καὶ ῥητορικὰς τέχνας καὶ λόγους ῥητορικοὺς ἐπὼν †και†.⁹ Solmsen richiama a proposito il precedente di Eveno di Paro, menzionato da Platone nel *Fedro*, perché “per primo trovò la suballusione e la ‘paralode’ e, secondo alcuni, compose persino dei ‘parabiasimi’ in versi, perché più facili da memorizzare”.¹⁰

⁶ Il titolo è menzionato alla l. 11 dell’ed. Segre 1935 215 (segue alla linea 12 il titolo Ἀμφικτυνονικός ἐν). Sull’epigrafe vedi sotto nota 12.

⁷ “Utrum patris an filii, non liquet,” Radermacher 1951 203.

⁸ Maercker 1835 55n. 5 §25.

⁹ Steph. Byz. *Ethnica* I 660.6–9 Meineke = Vottero 1994 9a. Le *cruces* sono in riferimento al numero dei versi. Rostagni ap. De Sanctis 1926 66n. 1 e Vottero 1994 110–113, mantenendo la lezione manoscritta nella voce *Suda*, attribuiscono alla paternità di Teodette solo il titolo Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ ἐν μέτρῳ (vedi sotto n. 12).

¹⁰ Solmsen 1934 1733. Plat. *Phdr.* 267a ΣΩ. Τί μὲν; καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὥς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐνὸν ἐς μέσον οὐκ

L'aneddoto di Valerio Massimo e il rapporto di dipendenza tra Aristotele e Teodette devono a mio avviso essere reconsiderati non solo alla luce di tale insieme di dati, ma anche del riconoscibile Aristotelecentrismo di molte fonti, che già in epoca romana portava a ricondurre anche forzatamente ad Aristotele ogni grande esperienza retorica: tale tendenza era stata denunciata a chiare lettere da Dionigi di Alicarnasso nella *Prima epistula ad Ammaeum* (2.22). Da tali fonti Teodette venne indicato come un "allievo" di Aristotele, e dipinto come una figura di secondo piano, priva di originalità, destinatario del dono di un'opera di cui il donatore si pentì; Ateneo 13.20.43 566D racconta che Aristotele si sarebbe invaghito della sua bellezza, paragonabile a quella di Alcibiade; l'*hypothesis* del Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν di Isocrate presenta Teodette come responsabile di un litigio tra Aristotele e Isocrate: egli avrebbe lasciato la scuola d'Isocrate per passare a quella di Aristotele, suscitando le gelosie del più vecchio retore, che per ira avrebbe risposto poi con quella orazione.¹¹ L'inesistenza di un'*Arte retorica* composta da Teodette è uno dei τόποι di una certa parte della moderna storiografia retorica fedele a questo filone delle fonti antiche che pone Aristotele al centro di ogni fenomeno culturale di rilievo. Tuttavia altri studiosi, come Solmsen e Wendland, hanno mostrato le numerose dipendenze della *Retorica* di Aristotele dai frammenti di Teodette, ritenendoli indicativi di una tale *Arte retorica*.

Davanti a questa apparente antilogia è mio proposito analizzare l'insieme delle fonti che rendono lecita l'una e l'altra interpretazione. Un punto di partenza incontrovertibile, e che ha l'effetto di sbilanciare i pesi dell'equilibrio, mi pare il titolo Θεοδέκτου τέχνης τέσσαρα dell'epigrafe di Rodi,¹² il quale ci offre chiara testimonianza

ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσιν τε πρῶτος ἦρεν καὶ παρεπαίνους – οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραπρόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν – σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ (= Radermacher 1951 127 fr. 20.3).

¹¹ L'interpretazione è anacronistica: Aristotele nacque nel 384 a.C. (vedi sotto n. 23), mentre l'orazione di Isocrate è del 391–390 a.C. (Nicolai 2004 10); Blass 1892 30.

¹² Maiuri 1925 nr. 11. Successivi studi dell'epigrafe: De Sanctis 1926 63–73; Hiller v. Gaertringen 1926 365; Segre 1935 214–222; Segre 1936 40; Platthy 1968 148–150; Nicolai 1987 34–35; Papachristodoulou 1990 500–501; Blanck 1992 150 e n. 26. La testimonianza epigrafica è pubblicata come nr. 3 da Vottero 1994, che a p. 109 la giudica "un nuovo contributo, se pure non risolutivo" (giudizio a mio avviso poco condivisibile). Sono intervenuti collegando il titolo dell'epigrafe alla Τέχνη ἑτοιμαζή di Teodette: De Sanctis 1926 65–69 su questioni epigrafiche, Rostagni *ap.* De Sanctis 1926 66n. 1 in riferimento all'interpretazione del titolo (secondo Rostagni "Credo che i quattro libri registrati nella biblioteca di Rodi comprendessero: un primo

che nella biblioteca del ginnasio di Rodi nel II sec. a. C. erano conservati quattro libri dell'*Arte* di Teodette assieme a un λόγος oratorio dello stesso autore, dal titolo Ἀμφικτυονικός ἔν, non altrimenti noto. Il problema chiede dunque di essere riaperto senza sottovalutare alcun dato.

Le citazioni di Teodette in Aristotele

Un esame critico dell'insieme delle testimonianze (letterarie, papiroce ed epigrafiche) è complesso ma necessario, e non può prescindere dalla considerazione che Teodette ebbe un figlio a cui diede lo stesso nome, secondo la *Suda* anch'egli retore. Rileggendo tutte le testimonianze secondo la successione cronologica delle fonti (finché è possibile), osserviamo che sebbene quelle più antiche non sempre offrano informazioni esaustive, sono tuttavia meno contaminate dai tentativi di esegesi e riscrittura della storia, iniziati già nel tardo ellenismo e proseguiti in età romana.

Per il nostro scopo basti considerare che su Teodette abbiamo fonti pressoché contemporanee, e che Aristotele è certamente la più vicina e la più importante:

Aristotele che,

- in non pochi passi delle sue opere nomina e cita Teodette, dalle cui tragedie o orazioni trae esempi per le proprie argomentazioni,
- nella *Retorica* (1410b2–3, a proposito delle ἀρεταὶ τῶν περιόδων), rimanda a quanto scritto nei Θεοδέκτεια (Bonitz pur riconoscendo che nella formula di questa citazione mancano elementi autoreferenziali, pensa di potervi riconoscere un'autocitazione. Ma altri lo dubitano.¹³ Rose, non seguito dagli ultimi editori, interpreta il passo in questione come una glossa entrata nella *Retorica* aristotelica),¹⁴

libro da identificare con la Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ ἐν μέτρῳ di cui è testimone la *Suda*; e poi i tre libri della Συναγωγὴ τῆς Θεοδ. Τέχνης che sono più comunemente noti. ... La τέχνη ῥητορ. ἐν μέτρῳ doveva essere la sola e unica τέχνη veramente scritta da Teodette. C'erano poi i Θεοδέκτεια cioè i tre libri della Συναγωγὴ τ. Θεοδ. τέχνης, dove Aristotele aveva raccolto precetti e soprattutto esempi retorici ricavati dalle opere tutte di Teodette. ..."). Medesima conclusione anche in Vottero 1994 109.

¹³ Bonitz 1870 s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης, c. 104 A 33 ss. Vedi la dettagliata discussione del problema in Chroust 1973 109–112.

¹⁴ Rose, vedi sotto nota 16.

- scopriamo ora sostenitore, ora critico di argomenti trattati da Teodette (ciò è sicuramente attestato da altre fonti) anche in passi della *Poetica* e della *Retorica* in cui ne tace il nome.¹⁵

Elenco delle opere di Teodette esplicitamente menzionate da Aristotele:

Tragedie:

Aiace

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1399b28–29 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F1 Snell I)

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1400a27–30 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F1 Snell I)

Alcmeone

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1397b3–7 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F2 Snell I)

Elena

Aristoteles, *Politica* 1.6 1255a36–38 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F3 Snell I)

Filottete

Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* 7.8 1150b8–9 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F5b I Snell I)

Linceo

Aristoteles, *Poetica* 18 1455b29–31 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F3a Snell I)

Oreste

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.24 1401a35–b3 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F5 Snell I)

Tideo

Aristoteles, *Poetica* 16 1455a8–10 (= Theodectes 72 TGrF F5a Snell I)

¹⁵ Vedi sotto l'enco dei passi in cui cerco di mostrare le corrispondenze tra passi aristotelici che non menzionano Teodette e frammenti attribuiti da altre fonti a Teodette. Importanti al riguardo i lavori di Solmsen 1932 144–151; Webster 1954 294–308; Webster 1956 51–78.

Orazioni:

La Legge

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1398b5-9 (= Theodectes, *O.A.* 32 1.1

Baiterus-Saupprius)

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1399b1-4 (= Theodectes, *O.A.* 32 1.2

Baiterus-Saupprius)

Apologia di Socrate

Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2.23 1399a7-9 (= Theodectes, *O.A.* 32 2.1

Baiterus-Saupprius)

Inoltre *Theodecteia* in Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 3.9 1410b3 (fr. 132 Aristoteles, Rose, 145 Gigon, 1 Vottero).¹⁶

Elenco dei passi in cui Aristotele sembra aver utilizzato Teodette, o comunque essersi riferito a lui pur senza menzionarlo esplicitamente:

- *Rhetorica* 2.23 1398a15ss. cfr. Teodette, *Apologia di Socrate* in Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 1399a7-9 (= Theodectes, *O.A.* 32. 3.6 Baiterus-Saupprius)¹⁷
- *Rhetorica* 3.8 1409a1-21 (cfr. Cicero *Orator* 172.10, 194-195, 218.6 = Theodectes, *O.A.* 32. 3.6 Baiterus-Saupprius)
- *Rhetorica* 3.12 1414a18-20 (cfr. Quintiliano, *I.O.* 4.2.61-65 = Titel 82 nr. 140 Gigon; Theodectes, *O.A.* 32. 3.4 Baiterus-Saupprius)
- *Rhetorica* 3.13-19 1414a30-1420b4 (fr. 126-127, 133-135 Aristoteles, Rose)¹⁸
- *Poetica*: 11 1452a27-29 = (*Linceo*, Theodectes 72 TGrF F3a Snell I)
- *Poetica*: 9 1451b29-34 (intravedo una possibile allusione al *Mausolo* di Teodette, tragedia di contenuto storico, v. Theodectes 72 TGrF F3b Snell I)
- *Poetica* 13 1453a7-22 (possibile allusione anche alle tragedie di Teodette *Alcmeone*, *Edipo*, *Oreste* e forse *Telefo*, cfr. Theodectes 72 TGrF F1-2, 4, 5, 6 Snell I)

¹⁶ Arist. *Rhet.* 3.9 1410b3 αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηριθμῶνται è interpretato da Rose 1863 137 come una glossa entrata nel testo; così anche in Rose 1886 fr. 132 che peraltro emenda αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων in αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ τῶν περιόδων. Vedi Vottero 1994 108-109. Il passo da cui eravamo partiti di Val. Max. *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* VIII 14 ext 3 pare un tentativo antico di spiegare questo titolo problematico della *Retorica*. Cfr. Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.10.

¹⁷ Vedi Solmsen 1934 1734.

¹⁸ Vedi Barwick 1922 124, Solmsen 1932 144-151.

- *Poetica* 22 1458a18 (λέξεως ἀρεταί, cfr. Theodectes *O.A.* 32. 3.4 Baiterus-Saupprius; αἰνίγματα in *Poet.* 22 cfr. γρίφοι di Teodette in Theodectes 72 *TGrF* F4 Snell I)

Le numerose citazioni di Teodette retore e tragico in Aristotele rivelano che il primo offriva al secondo materia su cui riflettere e da cui attingere, e che in generale Teodette era per lui un autore rivestito di una certa autorità. Questa è una percezione che a mio modo di vedere non può non sorgere spontanea leggendo Aristotele e penso che essa non dovrebbe essere dimenticata allorché cerchiamo d'interpretare l'ambiguità dei titoli Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγῇ α' (γ' in Esichio) o Θεοδέκτεια, su cui gli studiosi si sono divisi, volendo gli uni riconoscervi un'opera di Teodette e gli altri una composizione di Aristotele.¹⁹

Quanto osservato sopra avvalora dunque la tesi, equilibrata, di Solmsen e Wendland che hanno prospettato un lavoro di "raccolta" (in questo senso συναγωγῇ) di scritti retorici di Teodette da parte di Aristotele.

A me pare che ci siano elementi per pensare a testi di una τέχνη forse non subito pubblicata dall'autore, ma alla maniera antica ancora "aperti" e circolanti entro un giro più o meno stretto di colleghi, maestri, amici e allievi, testi che Aristotele potrebbe aver raccolto per un proprio uso.²⁰ Sotto questo punto di vista potrebbe forse essere interpretata la *lectio singularis* Τέχνης τῶν Θεοδέκτου συναγωγῇ α' del Laur. 69, 13 f. 55v in Diog. Laert. 5.24. Tuttavia i termini più precisi del rapporto di Aristotele con Teodette possono essere chiariti solo a partire dalla cronologia dei due personaggi, un altro dei punti su cui si sono creati grandi divergenze tra gli studiosi a causa dell'ambiguità di certe informazioni delle fonti.

Cronologia di Teodette

Come già osservarono i primi editori, affrontando le testimonianze su Teodette, è necessario tener conto che due erano le figure con questo nome, Teodette padre e Teodette figlio, e quindi bisognerebbe saper distinguere i riferimenti all'uno o all'altro o le eventuali

¹⁹ Maercker 1835 48–52 (§23); Rose 1863 135–140; Diels 1886 1–34, Barwick 1922 23–32; Solmsen 1932 144–151; Solmsen 1934 1729; Moraux 1951 96–100; Zürcher 1952 283; Barwick 1967 47–55. Vedi sopra n. 3.

²⁰ Vedi Dorandi 2000 77–101.

confusioni già presenti nelle fonti antiche.²¹ Un compito esegetico molto complesso, cosicché per lo più i conti attorno alla cronologia di Teodette-padre (a cui ci riferiamo) sono stati fatti prescindendo dalla globalità delle fonti. L'anno di nascita di Teodette-padre proposto dagli studiosi oscilla entro un arco di anni molto ampio, tra il 405 e il 380/375 a. C., anche se i più concordano attorno alla data più bassa.

Le fonti di riferimento per la cronologia di Teodette sono sempre stati Plut. *Alex.* 17 (674A) e *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler. Secondo la *Suda* Teodette-padre morì a 41 anni “quando il padre era ancora in vita”; secondo Plutarco Alessandro Magno, nel 333 a. C. quando, diretto verso Oriente, passò per Faselide, vide nell'agorà una statua che commemorava Teodette defunto e questo dato sommato al precedente ha portato generazioni di studiosi a concludere che Teodette fosse nato attorno al 380/375,²² facendolo così di qualche anno più giovane di Aristotele (nato nel 384 a. C.).²³

Tuttavia questo quadro cronologico, pur accolto pressoché da tutti, messo alla prova, pare rivelarsi fallace, soprattutto se confrontato con un altro dato inconfutabile.

L'evidenza cronologica a cui mi riferisco è la seguente:

- IG 2² 2325 dell'anno 278 a. C = Did. A 3a,45 Snell. È una didascalìa. Contiene la lista delle vittorie dei poeti tragici alle feste Dionisie, in ordine cronologico dato dalla prima vittoria di ciascun poeta, a partire da Tespi. Il nome di Teodette, che fu non solo retore ma anche autore tragico, è menzionato tra i nomi di Astidamante giovane (che ebbe la prima vittoria nel 372 a. C.) e di Afareo (364 a. C.)²⁴ con sette vittorie: la sua prima

²¹ Maercker 1835 16–18; Radermacher 1951 202–203 (XXXVII Theodectes).

²² Maercker 1835 8–9; Haigh 1896 424–425 e n. 6 data la nascita al 375 a. C. e la morte al 334 per un arco di vita di 41 anni; Susemihl 1899 631–632, data la nascita tra il 382 e il 376 a. C., e la morte 41 anni dopo (comunque prima del 342 a. C.); egli data al 353 a. C. l'inizio della sua attività di tragico; Capps 1900 39–40 mette in guardia contro la difficile cronologia delle fonti e dopo aver dimostrato che è insostenibile come data di nascita il 375 a. C., conclude che essa sia “not far from 390”; Diehl 1934 1722–1723 data la sua nascita al 380 a. C. e gli attribuisce 41 anni di vita; Del Grande 1934 191: “...la data di nascita, poco lontana dal 380”; Gärtner 1975 col. 683 propone la data di nascita tra 405 e 400 a. C. e di morte poco prima del 334 a. C.

²³ Diog. Laert. 5.9 (Aristotele, nato nel I anno della 99a Olimpiade, morì a 63 anni).

²⁴ La data del 364 a. C. per Afareo è proposta da Webster 1954 303. La cronologia di Afareo (figlio adottivo d'Isocrate, a sua volta retore e tragico) si basa soprattutto su Ps. Plut. *X orat.* 839C–D.

vittoria è ricostruita tra il 368 e il 365 a. C. (Did. A 3a, l. 45, Snell *TrGF* I, pp. 12 e 29).²⁵ L'attestazione dell'ottava vittoria (a lui riconosciuta dall'epigramma sepolcrale menzionato da Stefano di Bisanzio s.v. Φασηλίζ) potrebbe essere probabilmente ricostruita in una lacuna della lista delle feste lenaiche della stessa epigrafe, anche qui di seguito al nome di Astidamante (vedi Did. A 3b, ll. 44-51, Snell, *TrGF* I, p. 30).

Se accordiamo attendibilità a questi dati, essi indicano che la data di nascita di Teodette non poté essere attorno al 380 (o addirittura 375 a. C.): infatti è del tutto inverosimile immaginare una prima vittoria di Teodette alle Grandi Dionisie all'età di soli 10/15 anni. Secondo Capps "he could hardly have entered upon a career as a poet before the age of 25."²⁶ Tra l'altro alcune testimonianze indicano che Teodette iniziò la propria attività come retore e passò solo in un secondo momento all'attività di poeta tragico.²⁷ Le ultime interpretazioni della iscrizione IG II2 2325, inducono ad attribuire la prima vittoria tragica di Teodette attorno al 368/365 a. C.²⁸

Senza addentrarci qui in ulteriori calcoli troppo complessi, notiamo solo che se Teodette compose in tutto 50 tragedie prendendo parte a 13 concorsi (questi dati ci provengono dalla voce *Suda*, s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler e da Steph. Byz. s.v. Φασηλίζ) è assai probabile che abbia messo in scena alcune tragedie dopo il 341 a. C., data che segnò il passaggio alla rappresentazione di 3 (non più 4) tragedie da parte di ogni poeta (nel 340 a. C. eccezionalmente ogni tragico ne rappresentò solo due).²⁹

²⁵ Capps 1900 40 e Webster 1954 303 e 1956 61. Vedi *infra* n. 28.

²⁶ Capps 1900 40.

²⁷ *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler (τραπείς δὲ ἐπὶ τραγωδίας), Ps. Plut. *X orat.* 837C (καὶ Θεοδέκτης ὁ Φασηλίτης ὁ τὰς τραγωδίας ὕστερον γράψας).

²⁸ E' evidente che non è più possibile datare la prima vittoria tragica di Teodette al 353 a. C., come un tempo sostenuto da Susemihl e ribadito da Diehl (Susemihl 1899 631-632; Diehl 1934 1725). Concorro in linea di massima dunque con Webster 1954 303, che tiene come riferimento i dati dell'epigrafe per confutare l'ipotesi di una prima vittoria di Teodette nel 353, sebbene mi sembri che ci siano elementi per alzare la data di nascita di Teodette rispetto a quella da lui proposta nel 390 a. C. ("In any case, Theodectes cannot have been born much after 390 and his tragedies were written in the sixties and the fifties"). Teodette inoltre rappresentò tragedie verosimilmente anche dopo gli anni '40 (v. *infra*). Secondo Snell *TrGF* I 12 la data della prima vittoria di Teodette ricostruibile dal dato epigrafico è ca. il 365 a. C.; Capps 1900 40 e Webster 1954 303 e 1956 61 sostengono invece che la prima vittoria di Teodette dovesse essere avvenuta nel 368 a. C.

²⁹ Pickard-Cambridge 1996 110.

Teodette-padre e Teodette-figlio

I dati cronologici della Did. A 3a,45 Snell denunciano dunque l'incompatibilità delle due testimonianze di Plut. *Alex.* 17 (674A) e *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler.

Secondo Plut. *Alex.* 17 (674A) Teodette era già morto nel 333 a. C. quando Alessandro M. vide la sua statua nell'agorà di Faselide. E in quell'occasione il Macedone rammentò con nostalgia l'ὁμιλία con Teodette "attraverso Aristotele e la filosofia". La verosimiglianza di questo episodio in riferimento al nostro Teodette potrebbe essere possibile solo se intendessimo ὁμιλία nel senso di una frequentazione indiretta:³⁰ Aristotele giunto a Pella per l'educazione di Alessandro nel 343–342 a. C. (vi rimase fino al 335) potrebbe aver parlato al giovane Macedone degli insegnamenti di Teodette, probabilmente frequentato da Aristotele nell'Accademia o in colti circoli di amici. Ὅμιλία sottintende una certa intimità e in questo caso potremmo pensare a ripetuti racconti di Aristotele: tale interpretazione darebbe una ulteriore prova a favore dell'importanza di Teodette per Aristotele, ma mi pare poco verosimile. Avanziamo allora un'altra possibilità, cioè che ὁμιλία debba essere interpretata nel senso più ovvio, come un rapporto di conoscenza diretta tra Alessandro e Teodette padre: in questo caso s'imporrebbe subito l'anacronismo del dato della *Suda*, secondo cui Teodette padre visse solo per 41 anni. Non si capirebbe infatti quando Alessandro avrebbe potuto, attraverso Aristotele, frequentare Teodette. Poiché sembra inverosimile che Teodette possa aver ottenuto una prima vittoria alle Grande Dionisie prima dei 25 anni, ecco che il riferimento cronologico della Did. A 3a,45 Snell indica che egli non poté essere nato dopo il 390:³¹ se vissuto solo 41 anni, Teodette avrebbe dovuto morire non oltre il 349 a. C., ma Aristotele arrivò alla corte macedone nel 343–342. Solo rinunciando all'ipotesi di un arco di vita così breve potremmo immaginare che il grande Alessandro avesse frequentato di persona il vecchio Teodette. Un'altra possibile interpretazione—ed essa permette di conciliare la possibilità di una ὁμιλία diretta tra Alessandro e Teodette con il dato della *Suda* per cui Teodette "morì ad Atene all'età di 41 anni, quando il padre era ancora in vita"—è quella di riconoscere dietro al nome di Teodette in queste due fonti non Teodette-padre, ma Teodette-figlio. Il figlio del nostro Teodette, infatti, anch'egli di nome Teodette, è ricordato dalla *Suda* (s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 139

³⁰ Possibilità già prospettata da Capps 1900 41.

³¹ Così Capps 1900 41, Webster 1954 303.

Adler) come retore: autore di un' *Arte retorica*, di ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά e di ὑπομνήματα βαρβαρικά, di chiara impostazione peripatetica.

Già Radermacher avanzò l'ipotesi che la notizia di una precoce morte di Teodette a 41 anni dovesse essere attribuita al *bios* del figlio, e Snell (*TrGF* I 43 T1) emenda il testo della *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler trasferendo la linea τελευτᾷ δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐτῶν ἐνὸς καὶ μ', ἔτι τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ περιόντος alla successiva voce della *Suda* su Teodette-figlio (*Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 139 Adler).³²

Un profilo di Teodette

Dimostrato dunque che i dati cronologici di *Plut. Alex.* 17 674A e *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 138 Adler non possono essere letti in riferimento al *bios* di Teodette-padre, cadono gli impedimenti a seguire tutti gli altri indizi cronologici della fonti, che ci portano a stabilire una data preferibilmente alta per la nascita di Teodette-padre, forse attorno al 401/400 a. C., o anche prima.³³ Se i riferimenti di Plutarco e della *Suda* devono entrambi essere letti in rapporto a Teodette-figlio, potremmo immaginare la nascita di quest'ultimo attorno al 377-375, e la sua morte attorno al 336-334, "quando il padre era ancora in vita".

Teodette-padre sarebbe allora circa 10/15 anni più vecchio di Aristotele (nato nel 384 a. C.),³⁴ e questa differenza di età (circa mezza generazione) può spiegare la natura del rapporto tra i due uomini. La prima vittoria tragica di Teodette, datata tra il 368 e il 365 a. C., cade in un giro di anni interessante: nel 367 a. C. infatti Aristotele giunse ad Atene e si fece allievo di Platone nell'Accademia, in anni in cui è probabile che anche Teodette, già oratore e tragico di successo, frequentasse come uditore la scuola di Platone; Webster sospetta che la produzione artistica di Teodette abbia giocato un certo ruolo nelle discussioni poetiche dell'Accademia che diedero come frutto il *Fedro*.³⁵ Anche il *Cratilo* potrebbe essere opera di questo "periodo intermedio" della produzione platonica (negli anni appena precedenti il secondo viaggio in Sicilia): in esso sembrano superate

³² Radermacher 1951 202-203. Così anche Weissenberger 2002 311.

³³ Vedi infra nota 41.

³⁴ Vedi sopra nota 22.

³⁵ Webster 1956 51-62. Anche studi recenti confermano la data di questo dialogo negli anni appena precedenti il secondo viaggio in Sicilia di Platone, 366 a. C., nel cosiddetto periodo intermedio, vedi Szlezák 2000 1100.

le obiezioni del *Gorgia* contro una τέχνη retorica, e si mettono a tema della discussione filosofica questioni grammaticali, di cui fino ad allora erano stati i sofisti e i retori a occuparsi.³⁶

Quando le fonti riferiscono che Teodette e Aristotele “riconobbero ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος quali elementi primari del discorso (πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως)”,³⁷ senza che noi troviamo in Aristotele questa precisa citazione,³⁸ potremmo riconoscervi il riferimento a un passo perduto in cui Aristotele esprimeva esplicitamente la propria dipendenza da Teodette (nella Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγῇ? Nei Θεοδέκτεια?). Scriveva Angermann: “Nam nominibus Artistotelis Theodectisque copulatis sola ars Theodectea significatur”.³⁹ Aristotele e Teofrasto andarono poi oltre questa elementare ed essenziale tripartizione (Arist. *Poet.* 20; Theophr. 681–683 FHS&G) ma Teodette potrebbe aver aperto loro questa strada.

All’inizio della *Retorica* (1.1 1354a11–31) Aristotele afferma l’originalità della propria opera polemizzando contro gli autori di τέχνηαι che, occupandosi delle diverse parti dell’orazione, trattarono una materia secondo lui estranea alla vera retorica. Ma nel suo terzo libro, parlando della τάξις τοῦ λόγου, egli esamina con attenzione le caratteristiche del proemio, della narrazione, delle prove, dell’epilogo, si addentra cioè in una trattazione delle parti dell’orazione. Tra i retori contro cui Aristotele sembra voler polemizzare all’inizio della *Retorica* riconosciamo facilmente Teodette: infatti i suoi frammenti retorici testimoniano una variegata teoria costruita sulle diverse parti dell’orazione, che rifluisce poi in ampie parti del terzo libro della *Retorica* stessa, come da sempre, anche se problematicamente, è stato riconosciuto dagli studiosi.

Teodette sviluppò il tema delle ἀρεταί confacenti alle varie parti del discorso, impostato nella scuola di Isocrate, introducendo le nozioni di ἡδύ e di μεγαλοπρεπές come qualità della narrazione (Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.61 e 63): idee che, pur criticate da Aristotele (cfr. *Rhet.* 3.12 1414a19–21), saranno riprese e perfezionate da Teofrasto (684 FHS&G). Le riflessioni sulle funzioni delle ἀρεταί usciranno dallo stretto riferimento a parti dell’orazione come la narrazione per diventare in seguito oggetto di ogni trattato sulla λέξις o l’*elocutio*.⁴⁰

³⁶ Ildelfonse 1997 12–13 e passim.

³⁷ Dionigi di Alicarnasso (*De compositione verborum* 2.4 = *Dem.* 48.1) e Quintiliano (*Inst.* 1.4.18).

³⁸ Nella *Poetica* 20 Aristotele enumera otto μέρη τῆς λέξεως (Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τὰδ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχείον συλλαβῆς σύνδεσμος ὄνομα ῥῆμα ἄρθρον πτώσις λόγος).

³⁹ Angermann 1904 50.

⁴⁰ Stroux 1912 43–54. Calboli Montefusco 1988 67 e n. 60, 71 e n. 68 (che però

Anche la sezione del terzo libro della *Rhetorica* in cui Aristotele insiste sul peone come ritmo ideale di un testo oratorio (*Rhet.* 3.8 1409a2–21), ripresa negli stessi termini da Teofrasto (FHS&G 698–704), potrebbe dipendere fondamentalmente dal nostro Teodette (cfr. Cicerone *Orator* 172.10, 194–195, 218.6 = Theodectes, *O.A.* 32. 3.6 Baiterus-Sauppis), sebbene Aristotele menzioni Trasimaco come ‘inventore’ dell’uso del peone in prosa e non nomi Teodette. Verosimilmente Teodette, proprio perché coniugava l’esperienza di oratore e di poeta tragico (binomio comune anche ai suoi contemporanei Astidamante e Afareo),⁴¹ apparteneva al circolo dei retori che cominciarono a riflettere sullo statuto artistico della prosa oratoria, emancipandola dalla ritmica ed elocuzione poetica che Gorgia le aveva attribuito al fine di renderla elevata. Mi domando se queste riflessioni sul ritmo della prosa non abbiano contribuito anche alla formulazione della complessa nozione di ποίησις differenziata da ποίημα nella *Poetica* aristotelica.

Nel capitolo 22 della *Poetica*, dedicato alla λέξεως ἀρετή (= σαφήνεια καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι) Aristotele accenna al valore degli enigmi (egli torna sull’idea delle metafore enigmatiche anche in *Rhet.* 3.2). Ed è interessante che Teodette sia passato come tragico alla storia anche per il suo particolare uso dei γῶντοι (vedi Theodectes 72 *TGrF* F4 Snell).⁴² L’enigma ha un particolare effetto poetico, che Aristotele definisce così:

αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὐτὴ ἐστὶ, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι

Conclusioni

Aristotele e poi Teofrasto derivarono dunque molto da Teodette in ambito oratorio e poetico. Rispetto al quadro di Valerio Massimo il rapporto di dipendenza appare capovolto. Interessante che, nel caso di Aristotele, giammai ci sentiremmo autorizzati a parlare di plagio, ma eventualmente solo di “debito” (talora taciuto).

Concludendo, non nascondo il sospetto che dietro alle ambiguità dei titoli Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή α’ (ο γ’ in Esichio), Θεοδέκτεια di Aristotele e Θεοδέκτου τέχνης τέσσαρα dell’epigrafe di

inverte i termini del rapporto scrivendo “Si trattava, sia per Teodette che per gli altri anonimi autori, di una trasposizione alla *narratio* di uno (μεγαλοπρέπεια) o di tutti e due (μεγαλοπρέπεια ed ἡδύ) gli aspetti della quarta virtù che secondo Cic. *Orat.* 79 Teofrasto avrebbe considerato propria dell’*elocutio*.”)

⁴¹ Webster 1956 63; Webster 1954 302–303.

⁴² Sugli enigmi di Teodette segnalo il recente studio di Monda 2000.

Rodi si nascondano fasi differenti della “pubblicazione” degli scritti retorici di Teodette che potrebbero non essere mai stati apprestati per una vera e propria pubblicazione da parte dell’autore, ma essere rimasti per un certo tempo vivi e aperti entro la cerchia degli amici e della scuola. Ciò poteva avvenire in una realtà culturale a cui era estraneo il concetto moderno di “proprietà intellettuale”, che solo in piena età ellenistica comincia a farsi strada.⁴³

Fin qui può spingersi la ricostruzione storica e filologica. Ma se fosse possibile travalicare la pretesa della ricostruzione di una *ἱστορία*, limitandoci consapevolmente a tratteggiare una delle vicende possibili dei Θεοδέκτεια, potremmo immaginare che Teodette, oratore per necessità⁴⁴ e poeta tragico per vocazione, avesse dato poca importanza a una diffusione pubblica dei propri scritti di arte retorica, che gli servivano soprattutto per uno scopo didattico nella scuola o per entrare in discussione con i colleghi.

Aristotele, che lo conobbe negli anni della propria formazione in Accademia (cronologicamente coincidenti con i primi successi tragici di Teodette, tra il 368 e il 365), potrebbe aver trovato quel materiale didattico di tecnica retorica non meno prezioso degli esempi di arte tragica del medesimo Teodette messi in scena con successo alle Grandi Dionisie di Atene: ne avrebbe operato allora una propria συναγωγή, che gli sarebbe servita poi come utile riferimento per le proprie successive elaborazioni di teoria poetica e retorica. Si trattava di quegli scritti di tecnica retorica sparsi forse in appunti, che forse anche il figlio Teodette e il suo segretario Sibirtio, “primo tra gli schiavi a diventare retore”, pensarono, indipendentemente, di “pubblicare” o magari “riscrivere”, a dimostrazione (per noi) della vitalità degli insegnamenti di Teodette.⁴⁵ Nel frattempo il poeta comico Antifane, contemporaneo di Teodette, scherzava a teatro con allusioni a un non precisato personaggio ὁ τὴν Θεοδέκτου μόνος ἀνευρηκὼς τέχνην.⁴⁶

⁴³ Vedi la monografia di Stemplinger 1912.

⁴⁴ Theopompus 115 FGrHist T3 = F25 da Photius, *Bibliotheca* (176) 120b31: ἀλλὰ Ἰσοκράτην μὲν δι’ ἀπορίαν βίου καὶ Θεοδέκτην μισθοῦ λόγους γράφειν καὶ σοφιστεῦν, ἐκπαιδεύοντας τοὺς νέους ἀκρίβειαν καρπομένους τὰς ὠφελείας, αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ Ναυκράτην αὐτάρκως ἔχοντας ἐν τούτοις αἰεὶ τὴν διατριβὴν ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ φιλομαθεῖν ποιεῖσθαι.

⁴⁵ *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης, Θ nr. 139 Adler: Θεοδέκτης, Φασηλίτης, ῥήτωρ, υἱὸς τοῦ προτέρου. ἔγραψεν ἐγκώμιον Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Ἡπειρώτου, ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα, Νόμμιμα βαρβαρικά, Τέχνην ῥητορικὴν ἐν βιβλίοις ζ’, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπομνήματα. *Suda* s.v. Σιβύρτιος, Σ nr. 364 Adler Σιβύρτιος, Θεοδέκτου τοῦ Φασηλίτου ἀναγνώστης, καὶ οἰκέτης, ὃς ἐρρηγόρευσεν οἰκετῶν πρῶτος. ἔγραψε τέχνας ῥητορικάς.

⁴⁶ Antiphanes PCG 2, nr. 111 p. 370. Importante sottolineare che il poeta comico Antifane, della Commedia di Mezzo, iniziò la propria attività drammatica negli anni

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della 98a Olimpiade (388/4 a. C.), essendo nato tra il 408/404 (93a Olimpiade), vedi Antiphanes, *PCG* 2, nr. 1 e nr. 2 312. L'allusione comica di Antifane a qualcuno che “scoprì l'arte di Teodette” sembra dunque alludere a un fatto contemporaneo, e potrebbe essere in riferimento sia all'arte retorica (la pubblicazione dei suoi scritti da parte di Aristotele?) che drammatica. Gottschalk 1980 160–161 ha ben mostrato come non sia possibile riconoscere Eraclide Pontico dietro a tale innominato personaggio, secondo la proposta di Trendelenburg accolta da Meineke nella sua edizione di poeti comici (3.60), sostenuta ancora da Vottero 1994 113.

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CHAPTER TEN

TEODETTE DI FASELIDE POETA TRAGICO: RIFLESSIONI ATTORNO AL FR. 6 SNELL

ANDREA MARTANO

I. Sul fr. 6 Snell di Teodette: “testo” e “contesto”

Il testo di Ateneo X 454b–d, parte di una lunga sezione dei *Deipnosophisti* dedicata agli enigmi, offre una interessante possibilità di raffronto fra tre frammenti molto simili tra loro e appartenenti a tre poeti tragici. Se fra questi certamente Euripide occupa il posto principale sia per priorità storica che per eccellenza artistica, tuttavia il ricorrere di questi versi in Teodette, mediati dalla versione di Agatone, consente di trarre delle utili considerazioni su alcuni aspetti della prassi compositiva del Faselide e, più in generale, su alcuni tratti peculiari della produzione letteraria del IV secolo a. C. Dal momento che l’obiettivo di questo studio è individuare alcune caratteristiche della scrittura drammatica del Faselide, si troveranno indicate nel testo con scrittura in grassetto le espressioni che accomunano i versi di Teodette a quelli di Euripide, in scrittura corsiva quelle che invece ricorrono in Teodette e Agatone.

(Euripide)

Εὐριπίδης δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ Θησεὶ τὴν ἐγγράμματον ἔοικε ποιῆσαι ῥῆσιν. βοτὴρ δ' ἔστιν ἀγράμματος αὐτόθι δηλῶν τοῦνομα τοῦ Θησεῶς ἐπιγεγραμμένον οὕτως (fr. 382 Kannicht):

ἐγὼ πέφυκα γραμμάτων μὲν οὐκ ἴδρις,
μορφάς δὲ λέξω καὶ σαφὴ τεκμήρια.
κύκλος τις ὥς τόρνοισιν ἐκμετρούμενος·
οὗτος δ' ἔχει σημεῖον ἐν μέσῳ σαφές.
τὸ δεύτερον δὲ πρῶτα μὲν γραμμαὶ δύο,
ταύτας διείργει δ' ἐν μέσαις ἄλλη μία.
τρίτον δὲ **βόστρυχός** τις ὥς **εἰλιγμένος**,
τὸ δ' αὖ τέταρτον ἢ μὲν εἰς ὄρθον μία,
λοξαὶ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς τρεῖς κατεστηριγμέναι
εἰσίν. τὸ πέμπτον δ' οὐκ ἐν εὐμαρεῖ φράσαι·
γραμμαὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ἐκ διεστώτων δύο,

αὗται δὲ συντρέχουσιν εἰς μίαν βάσιν.

τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ προσεμφερές.

⟨Agatone⟩

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ πεποίηκε καὶ Ἀγάθων ὁ τραγωδιοποιὸς ἐν τῷ Τηλέφῳ. ἀγράμμα-
τος γάρ τις κἀνταῦθα δηλοῖ τὴν τοῦ Θησέως ἐπιγραφὴν οὕτως (fr. 4 Snell):

γραφεῖς ὁ πρῶτος ἦν μεσόμφαλος κύκλος
ὀρθοὶ τε κανόνες ἐξυγόμενοι δύο,
Σκυθικῶ τε τόξῳ (τὸ) τρίτον ἦν προσεμφερές.
ἔπειτα τριόδους πλάγιος ἦν προσκείμενος·
ἐφ' ἐνός τε κανόνος ἦσαν {ἐξυγόμενοι} (—x—) δύο·
ὅπερ δὲ τρίτον, ἦν {καὶ} τελευταῖον πάλιν.

⟨Teodette⟩

καὶ Θεοδέκτης δ' ὁ Φασηλίτης ἄγροικόν τινα ἀγράμματον παρὰ γαίῃ καὶ τοῦτον
τὸ τοῦ Θησέως ὄνομα διασημαίνοντα (fr. 6 Snell):

γραφεῖς ὁ πρῶτος ἦν † μαλακόφθαλμος κύκλω.¹
ἔπειτα δισοὶ κανόνες ἰσόμετροι πάνν·
τούτους δὲ πλάγιος διαμέτρου συνδεῖ κανόν.
τρίτον δ' ἔλικτῷ βοστρύχῳ προσεμφερές.
ἔπειτα τριόδους πλάγιος ὥς ἐφαίνετο,
πέμπται δ' ἄνωθεν ἰσόμετροι ῥάβδοι δύο,
αὗται δὲ συντείνουσιν εἰς βάσιν μίαν.
ἕκτον δ' ὅπερ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶπον βόστρυχος.²

1.1. *Questione di modelli?*

I tre testi mostrano un'evidente somiglianza. Ma questa non è dovuta soltanto alla ricorrenza di un certo episodio all'interno di un certo *plot* drammatico.³ Infatti Agatone ed Euripide hanno ben pochi

¹ Il verso di Teodette mostra delle difficoltà testuali: μαλακόφθαλμος è stato variamente emendato (si veda l'apparato dell'edizione di Snell: μεσόμφαλος ex Agathone Valckenaer), così come anche l'ultima parola ricorre nei manoscritti o come κύκλος (C ed E) o come κύκλω (A). Per ultimo Monda 2000 accetta la congettura di Welcker μεσόφθαλμος.

² Snell pubblica: ἕκτον δ' ὅπερ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶπ' ὁ βόστρυχος, seguendo il testo offerto dai mss. EC.

³ Nel testo di Ateneo si legge che i versi di Euripide furono tratti dal suo *Teseo*, per il cui contenuto si veda Webster 1967 105–109; i versi di Agatone invece vennero tratti dal suo *Telefo*, per il cui contenuto si veda Welcker 1841 990 e Levêque 1955 96–100. Che non si trattasse di un *Telefo* ma di un *Tlepolemo* sospettò Meineke 1867 205–206, ma senza ragione: per quanto appaia difficile connettere l'episodio della descrizione del nome dell'eroe attico più nel caso della saga di Telefo che in quella di Teseo, tuttavia questo non consente di dubitare della correttezza della fonte. I due personaggi mitici non sono infatti così lontani in linea temporale: Teseo ed Eracle,

tratti comuni, mentre diverso è il caso dei versi teodettei, che molto devono ai trimetri di entrambi i tragici appena citati. Mettiamoli a confronto.

Per la lettera *theta* Euripide, Agatone e Teodette usano l'immagine del cerchio che ha nel mezzo un segno (σημεῖον) per Euripide, un "ombelico" (ὀμφαλός) per Agatone, un occhio (ὄφθαλμός) per Teodette. La descrizione euripidea occupa due versi; al contrario Agatone e, sulla sua scia, Teodette, che a lui deve anche il principio del verso (γραφῆς ὁ πρῶτος ἦν), risolvono i due versi euripidei in uno soltanto.

Per la lettera *eta* Teodette contamina le due descrizioni: da una parte usa la parola κανών al modo di Agatone (Agath. ὀρθοὶ τε κανόνες ἐξυγώμενοι δύο—Theodect. ἔπειτα δισοὶ κανόνες ἰσόμετροι πάνυ), dall'altra non ne imita la soluzione in un solo verso, ma adotta una forma più vicina al testo euripideo (Eur. ταύτας διείργει δ' ἐν μέσαις ἄλλη μία—Theodect. τούτους δὲ πλάγιος διαμέτρου συνδεῖ κανών), variando però nell'uso del verbo (διείργει [divide]—συνδεῖ [unisce]), nel termine specifico utilizzato (κανών in luogo di γραμμή) e nell'aggiunta dell'aggettivo πλάγιος.

Per la lettera *sigma* Teodette riprende la similitudine euripidea del βόστρυχος connesso con una voce del verbo ἐλίσσω di significato mediale o passivo (Eur. εἰλιγμένος—Theodect. εἰλικτῷ), ma mutua la struttura sintattica del verso da Agatone ([...] τρίτον [...] προσημφορές).

Per la lettera *epsilon* Euripide impiega poco più di due versi e la descrive secondo i quattro tratti che la compongono. Teodette preferisce la ben riuscita immagine del tridente di Agatone (ἔπειτα τριόδους πλάγιος), ma cambia la chiusa del trimetro (Agath. ἦν προσκείμενος—Theodect. ὧς ἐφαίνεται).

Per la lettera *hypsilon* Teodette sceglie la versione euripidea e ne cita quasi testualmente il secondo verso (Eur. γραμμαὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐκ διεστώτων δύο, αὗται δὲ συντρέχουσιν εἰς μίαν βάσιν—Theodect. πέμπται δ' ἄνωθεν ἰσόμετροι ῥάβδοι δύο, αὗται δὲ συντείνουσιν εἰς

padre di Telefo, erano figli di due cugine, e il legame di parentela era più volte ricordato (si veda, ad es., Eur. *Heracl.* 207-ss.). Teseo doveva essere però un po' più giovane di Eracle. I figli di Teseo presero parte infine alla spedizione contro Troia con un contingente di sessanta navi (almeno a detta di Eur. *IA* 207ss., e l'episodio di Telefo doveva seguire, almeno nella omonima tragedia di Euripide, quello del sacrificio di Ifigenia), spedizione che poté avvenire soltanto grazie all'intervento di Telefo. Nessuna notizia di Teseo nella *fab.* 101 di Igino, sulle cui fonti si veda Huys 1997 21-22.

βάσιν μίαν). Sostituisce però γραμμή con ῥάβδος, probabilmente influenzato dal fatto che Agatone usò a sua volta la parola κανών.⁴

Quanto all'ultimo *sigma*, i tre poeti rimandano, ciascuno a proprio modo, alla descrizione fatta pochi versi prima (Eur. τὸ λóισθιον δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ προσεμφερές—Agath. ὅπερ δὲ τρίτον ἦν καὶ τελευταῖον πάλιν—Theodect. ἔκτον δ' ὅπερ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶπον βόστρυχος).

Come è evidente, fra Euripide ed Agatone non è ravvisabile alcuna corrispondenza testuale. Se Agatone sembra aver composto i versi che descrivono il nome di Teseo autonomamente dal “testo” di Euripide, ciò non può dirsi per Teodette, che sia da Euripide che da Agatone trasse a larghe mani.⁵ Un aiuto a comprendere il modo in cui Teodette compose questi versi può venire dalla notizia che il nostro possedesse una memoria prodigiosa, che lo rendeva capace di ripetere lunghe serie di versi dopo averli uditi una sola volta:⁶ l'accento che Quintiliano, in una lunga serie di esempi, fa a questa caratteristica di Teodette (di per sé poco più che un aneddoto) acquisisce una sua validità se valutato all'interno dell'*institutio* retorica che il Faselite ricevette.⁷ Teodette, fra gli altri, fu allievo di Iso-

⁴ ῥάβδος, “baguette, badine” (Chantraine 1968 964) meglio si associa all'idea di κανών, “baguette droite, règle” (Chantraine 1968 493), di quanto non avvenga con γραμμή, che “est usuel au sens de ligne dans l'écriture, le dessin, la géométrie” (Chantraine 1968 236).

⁵ Monda 2000 40: “Senza alcun dubbio Teodette mostra di conoscere i passi dei due tragediografi che lo hanno preceduto, poiché si sforza di imitare entrambi”, e ancora: “Non si tratta, infatti, di un semplice caso di intertestualità poiché qui il richiamo ad un altro testo è necessario e condizionato dalle modalità stesse di pubblicazione e ricezione. La comunicazione dei testi teatrali, occorre ricordarlo, non si stabilisce mediante un rapporto scrittura/lettura, bensì secondo un rapporto di recitazione/ascolto: e proprio il fattore dell'ascolto è quello che spinge l'autore o ad una descrizione lenta, ben articolata e molto dettagliata che renda possibile al destinatario (...) visualizzare con l'immaginazione le lettere per scoprire il nome nascosto (è il caso di Euripide), o ad una descrizione più rapida e sommaria che può contare sul fatto che ormai il destinatario è abituato al gioco...”; e, in ultimo 44: “il fatto che il poeta vi ricorra [scil. all'espedito della descrizione delle lettere del nome di Teseo] va senz'altro misurato sul piano degli intenti allusivi nei confronti dei suoi predecessori”.

⁶ Cfr. Monda 2000 33–34 e nota 22, in cui si citano i passi di Polluce 6.108 e Quintiliano 11.2.51: *Ceterum quantum natura studioque valeat memoria ... quin semel auditos quamlibet multos versus protinus dicitur reddidisse Theodectes*.

⁷ Si veda, ad es., Quintiliano 11.2.40–41: *Si quis tamen unam maximamque a me artem memoriae quaerat, exercitatio est et labor. Multa ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri potest cotidie, potentissimum est: nihil aequae vel augetur cura vel negligentia intercidit. Quare et pueri statim, ut praecepi, quam plurima ediscant, et quaecumque aetas operam iuvandae studio memoriae dabit devoret initio taedium illud et scripta et lecta saepius revolvendi et quasi*

crate:⁸ alla sua scuola poté apprendere l'importanza dello studio dei poeti e della memoria degli *exempla*. Un esercizio di tale genere poté certamente influire nell'atto della creazione poetica quanto in quello dell'elaborazione retorica. Ma la rete di contatti che si evidenzia sia con i versi di Euripide che con quelli di Agatone è tale e tanto fitta da far sembrare che Teodette operasse in molti casi una sorta di "citazione libresca", che cioè componesse il brano avendo sotto gli occhi i versi dei due poeti tragici che lo avevano preceduto sulla scena.

Sicché Teodette, avendo a portata di mano (o "di memoria") i "testi" di Euripide ed Agatone, se ne servì per comporre un brano analogo a quello che trovava nei modelli. La rielaborazione teodettea di questi versi sembra quindi preludere ai mezzi di cui si serve l'arte allusiva, che siamo ormai da tempo abituati a conoscere per la letteratura ellenistica. Tuttavia, il fatto che l'opera drammatica si rivolgesse ad un pubblico ben diverso da quello della poesia ellenistica e con diversi intenti, ci induce a parlare di "preludio" ai mezzi dell'allusività ellenistica, letteratura "libresca" per eccellenza. Un "preludio" che però conferma, nello stretto ambito della creazione del testo, quanto scrive G. Xanthakis-Karamanos: "As regards the literary aspect of his [scil. Euripides'] influence on the Hellenistic age especially, the study of the fourth century dramatic poetry is of considerable importance. Fourth century drama is a transition, a literary interregnum between classical and Hellenistic poetry".⁹

Non si può tralasciare che proprio il IV secolo vide l'affermarsi del libro come veicolo principe della trasmissione della letteratura, e ne fece l'oggetto di possesso e studio in una larga fascia di intellettuali. Non si può escludere che questo cambiamento sia stato condizionato dall'impulso dato alla cultura libraria da Aristotele e dal suo circolo,¹⁰ circolo a cui Teodette, come ben si sa, dovette essere

eundem cibum remandendi. Quod ipsum hoc fieri potest levius si pauca primum et quae odium non adferant coeperimus ediscere, tum cotidie adicere singulos versus, quorum accessio labori sensum incrementi non adferat, in summam ad infinitum usque perveniat, et poetica prius, tum oratorum, novissime etiam solutiora numeris et magis ab usu dicendi remota, qualia sunt iuris consultorum.

⁸ T 1; T 7; T 10; cfr. Marrou 1984 117-132, spec. 122. Quanto alla mnemotecnica cfr. Idem 88 e, più in generale, sullo studio dei poeti, Idem 87-90.

⁹ Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 32.

¹⁰ Cfr. Martina 2000 140 n. 30, che, oltre all'importanza della lettura personale nella scuola di Aristotele, mette anche in evidenza come proprio il testo tragico possa avere una sua efficacia anche semplicemente διὰ τοῦ ἀναγνῶσθαι (Poet. 1462a1 ss.).

più che vicino. Ed Aristotele fu certamente l'esempio principe di un cambiamento già da tempo in corso che dovette interessare gli intellettuali ateniesi, le scuole di retorica e quelle che definiamo filosofiche.¹¹

L'insolito caso di questa "contaminazione di modelli" *ante litteram* operata da Teodette sembra essere, pur nella limitatezza dovuta alla brevità del frammento ed alla particolarità del tema,¹² un buon esempio di quel "periodo di transizione" che fu il IV secolo per i modi di composizione di opere teatrali e, più in generale, letterarie, nonché un frutto evidente dei cambiamenti che in quel periodo si affermavano nella diffusione e fruizione della letteratura scritta.

I.2. Alcune notazioni "paleografiche"

Le tre descrizioni offrono un interessante campione della prassi grafica più comune fra V e IV secolo. Un arco di tempo, quello fra Euripide e Teodette, non troppo ampio (poco meno di un secolo), ma assai significativo per la diffusione della cultura, della scrittura e del libro nel mondo greco.¹³

Le poche lettere che compongono il nome di Teseo¹⁴ possono essere confrontate con la documentazione epigrafica e papiracea coeva:¹⁵ la loro grafia, così come è descritta, certamente non offre dati sorprendenti; tuttavia dà una conferma a fenomeni che, seppure assodati, non sempre possono fondarsi su un numero elevato di testimonianze dirette.

La lettera *theta* è descritta come un tratto circolare che mostra nel centro un segno (Eur.), un ombelico (Agath.) o un occhio

¹¹ Cfr. Connors 1986 riguardo l'interazione fra affermazione della scrittura, filosofia e retorica.

¹² La ripresa di Teodette fu probabilmente condizionata dalla ricorrenza dell'episodio all'interno di un $\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ (di Teseo per Euripide, di Telefo per Agatone), ma non per questo priva, a mio avviso, di $\zeta\eta\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, di uno spirito di competizione con i modelli.

¹³ A titolo di esempio, fra la numerosa bibliografia, si veda, per l'alfabetizzazione dall'età arcaica al V secolo, Nieddu 1982; più propriamente sulla diffusione della scrittura faccio riferimento a Pasquali 1929, studio breve e di molti anni orsono, ma ancora prezioso.

¹⁴ Cavallo 1991 21: "Questa descrizione, fatta su una scena teatrale, resta pure sostanzialmente l'unica nel corso dell'antichità e assai oltre".

¹⁵ Se la documentazione epigrafica si presenta abbondante per il periodo in questione, lo stesso non accade, come è ben noto, per la documentazione papiracea, molto scarsa fino al III sec. a. C. inoltrato. Si farà quindi ricorso, durante questo intervento, soltanto a poche testimonianze e a titolo di puro esempio.

(Theodect.), così come appare tracciata sia nelle testimonianze epigrafiche che nei papiri databili al quarto secolo.¹⁶

Un'uguale considerazione può farsi per l'*eta*, descritta nei suoi tre tratti e rigorosamente epigrafica.¹⁷

Diverso è il caso del *sigma*: fra le tre versioni la descrizione più evidente appare essere quella di Agatone, che paragona la lettera all'arco scitico. Questo era infatti un arco a doppia curvatura;¹⁸ e che si trattasse di una forma come quella appena indicata risulta evidente anche da un passo di Licofrone.¹⁹

La descrizione di Teodette, in stretta dipendenza da quella di Eudipide, paragona invece il sigma a un βόστρυχος ovvero un ricciolo, che in Euripide è ὦς εἰλιγμένος in Teodette ἐλιπῶ.²⁰ Se proviamo a disegnare un ricciolo avvolto, si noterà come il sigma a cui i nostri due autori fanno riferimento non sia affatto quello lunato,²¹ ma quello regolarmente tracciato in quattro tratti e con nodi di collegamento fra l'uno e l'altro. Sigma di questo genere appaiono nei papiri del quarto secolo e forme non dissimili si possono vedere nei documenti epigrafici del periodo che intercorre proprio fra gli anni di Euripide e quelli di Teodette.²² Il fatto che si tratti di un siffatto sembra essere confermato proprio dalla parallela descrizione di Agatone che, come abbiamo già visto, paragona il tracciato del sigma alla forma dell'arco scitico.²³

¹⁶ Cfr. Seider 1990 185 e Crisci 1996, tavv. I-II-III.

¹⁷ Già da tempo si è notato il fatto che Euripide utilizza la grafia ionica per scrivere il nome di Teseo già alcuni anni prima della sua adozione ufficiale in Atene del 403–402 a. C.: Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 102 e n. 2.

¹⁸ Cfr. Daremberg and Saglio 1877, I 389.

¹⁹ Lycophron, *Alexandra* 917–918: [...] ῥαβῶ χειρας ὥπλισε Σκύθη / δρᾶκοντ' ("... armò le mani del ricurvo serpente degli Sciti..."). Cfr. anche gli *scholia ad loc.* 910: [...] δρᾶκοντι οὖν τῷ τόξῳ [...] (δρᾶκοντι δὲ) ἥ διὰ τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν βελῶν θανατηφόρων ὄντων. Vd. tav. 1.

²⁰ Cfr. Chantraine 1968 187, βόστρυχος è connesso con la stessa radice di βότρυς e sembra indicare una pluralità di riccioli, non il singolo come si sarebbe tentati di fare. L'aggiunta della voce del verbo ἐλίσσω (per cui si veda Chantraine 1968 339, ἐλίσ) sembra per altro versante confermare questa possibilità. Non si vede infatti come possa riferirsi l'aggettivazione di "avvolto" a un sigma a mezza luna.

²¹ Come sembra a Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 102 e n. 4, e, prima di lei, anche al Meineke 1867 206. Vd. tav. 2.

²² Per i papiri si veda Crisci 1996, tavv. I–II; per una prima occorrenza del sigma lunato si veda Crisci 1996, tav. III, al quale in nessun modo si può paragonare l'immagine del ricciolo avvolto. Per un esempio di iscrizione del sec. IV a. C. di veda Seider 1990 185, iscrizione di Samo del 346–345.

²³ Gli esempi, come si vede nella nota precedente, possono essere più d'uno, ma mi sembra che il tracciato più simile all'idea del "ricciolo avvolto" si possa trarre dal notissimo papiro di Derveni. All'immagine dell'arco scitico di Agatone si

Quanto all' *epsilon*, Euripide lo descrive in quattro tratti: uno verticale e tre paralleli a questo uniti perpendicolarmente. Al contrario Teodette, che in questo caso pedissequamente imita Agatone, utilizza la somiglianza della lettera con il tridente. Un utile ausilio a sciogliere l'immagine espressa da questo verso ci giunge dai reperti monetali con raffigurazioni di tridente.²⁴ Sono numerosissime le monete che possiedono tale raffigurazione su una delle facce. Nella quasi totalità dei casi il tridente è raffigurato con base retta e non curva. Se appoggiato su un fianco (πλάγιος), esso restituisce una perfetta raffigurazione dell'epsilon epigrafico.

Quanto all' *hypsilon*, tutti e tre i poeti si limitano a descriverne i tratti e la loro posizione: Euripide, senza far uso di alcuna immagine figurata, parla di due linee che concorrono su stessa base, Agatone di due regoli uniti a un terzo e Teodette di due bastoni che convergono a una medesima base.

Per l'ultimo *sigma* poi, tutti e tre i poeti rimandano alla descrizione già fatta nei versi precedenti.

Il tracciato di queste lettere, se escludiamo che si trattasse di un testo lapideo, conferma dunque la resistenza delle forme epigrafiche almeno fino all'epoca di Teodette. Di questo periodo sono i famosissimi papiri di Timoteo (PBerol. 9875), dell'imprecazione di Artemisia (PVindob. G1) e di Derveni (PDerveni), al quale più degli altri credo si possa accostare la descrizione del nome di Teseo come è composta da Teodette.

II. Alcune note sulla produzione drammatica di Teodette

Nella citazione dei versi del fr. 6 Snell Ateneo, o la sua fonte, omette di riferire il titolo della tragedia di Teodette da cui furono estratti.

Delle tragedie di Teodette possediamo circa venti frammenti. Fra questi, per ironia della sorte, i testi più brevi risalgono a tragedie delle quali conosciamo il titolo, mentre i più diffusi, estratti per la maggior parte dall' *Anthologium* di Stobeo,²⁵ non possiedono alcuna determinazione sicura che li faccia risalire a una o a un'altra delle opere drammatiche del Nostro. Otto i titoli noti: *Aiace* (fr. 1 Snell =

potrebbe invece con verosimiglianza associare anche il tracciato del sigma nel papiro di Timoteo.

²⁴ Cfr. Anson 1967 summary and plates, tavv. XXII-XXIII.

²⁵ Cfr. Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 25.

Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 1399b28),²⁶ *Alcmeone* (fr. 1b Snell = Porph. in Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10.3.19 e fr. 2 Snell = Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 1397b3),²⁷ *Elena* (fr. 3 Snell = Aristot. *Polit.* 1.6 1255a37),²⁸ *Linceo* (fr. 3a Snell = Arist. *Poet.* 18 1455b29e11, 1452a27),²⁹ *Edipo* (fr. 4 Snell = Athen. 10 451F ex Hermippo),³⁰ *Oreste* (fr. 5 Snell = Arist. *Rhet.* 2.24 1401a35),³¹ *Tideo* (fr. 5a Snell = Arist. *Poet.* 16 1455a4),³² *Filottete* (fr. 5b Snell = I Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 7.8 supra ad 70 F 1b all. et II Anon. ad eundem l.).³³

A questi si aggiunge il *Mausolo*, tragedia di argomento storico che Teodette compose quando era ormai noto sia come retore che come poeta tragico.³⁴

La fama di Teodette poeta drammatico è, per altro verso, ampiamente confermata dalle numerose citazioni che si rintracciano in più opere aristoteliche, non ultima la *Poetica*, in cui si fa esplicito riferimento al *Tideo* e al *Linceo*.³⁵

E Teodette fu sicuramente compreso dallo Stagirita nel numero di quei poeti a lui contemporanei sui cui personaggi ben distingue che οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς (*Poetica* 1450b7-8). Indicando poi i temi delle tragedie dei poeti

²⁶ Del Grande 1934 193-194, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979b 71-72.

²⁷ Del Grande 1934 194-195, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979b 70-71.

²⁸ Del Grande 1934 196, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979b 75-76.

²⁹ Del Grande 1934 197-198, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979b 73-74.

³⁰ Del Grande 1934 195-196, Xanthakis Karamanos 1980 98.

³¹ Del Grande 1934 199-200, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979b 70-71.

³² Del Grande 1934 200.

³³ Del Grande 1934 196-197, Xanthakis-Karamanos 1979a 99-100.

³⁴ Nel 353-352 la regina Artemisia, moglie del defunto Mausolo, convocò ad Alicarnasso i migliori retori della Grecia perché pronunciassero l'elogio funebre del defunto sovrano in un agone (T 1, 5, 6 Snell). Teodette non ottenne la vittoria nell'agone retorico, ma conseguì un grande successo con la sua tragedia: T 6 Snell: [...] *exstat nunc quoque Theodecti tragoedia quae inscribitur Mausolus; in qua eum magis quam in prosa placuisse Hyginus* (fr. 12 Funaioli) *in exemplis refert*. La combinazione delle informazioni giunteci attraverso il lessico *Suda* (fr. 1 Snell) e le *Noctes Atticae* di Aulo Gellio (fr. 6 Snell [sulla fonte e la veridicità della affermazione di Aulo Gellio riguardo alla possibilità di leggere la tragedia ai suoi tempi cfr. Di Gregorio 1988 108 n. 72]), ci spinge a credere che Teodette rappresentò la tragedia ad Alicarnasso, anche se non all'interno dell'agone retorico (in cui vinse Teopompo). Snell suggerisce invece che la tragedia possa essere stata rappresentata ad Atene e che non abbia alcun rapporto con le 'laudes Mausoli dicundae': Snell 1971, apparato critico a 228.

³⁵ Sulla influenza che il complesso della produzione drammatica del IV sec. esercitò su Aristotele cfr. Webster 1954, e spec. 309, dove si legge: "Classical tragedy is seen in the light of modern practice and for this reason A. leaves out much that we think most valuable". Cfr. anche Webster 1956 65.

attivi al suo tempo ([οί] νῦν), Aristotele fornisce un breve elenco dei miti coi quali con più frequenza questi costruivano le loro tragedie.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλιστα τραγωδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον περὶ Ἄλκμεωνα καὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι. (*Poetica* 1453a18–24)³⁶

Questi dunque alcuni fra i titoli delle tragedie correnti ai suoi tempi:

Alcmeone

Edipo

Oreste

Meleagro

Tieste

Telefo

tre dei quali ricorrono fra quelli di Teodette:

Alcmeone

Edipo

Oreste

E. Matelli³⁷ sospetta che qui Aristotele potrebbe aver tenuto in considerazione la produzione drammatica del Faselite, pur senza fare esplicito riferimento al suo nome. Se così fosse, si potrebbero suggerire due titoli per altrettanti frammenti di Teodette.

Il fr. 9 Snell sembra il caso più evidente.

ἀλλ' ὦ τάλαν Θυέστα, καρτέρει δάκνων
ὀργῆς χαλινόν· παρακελεύομαι δέ σοι
τεθηγμένῳ νῦν· ἀλλ' ὁ μυρῖος χρόνος
τὰ πάντ' ἄμαυροῖ χυπὸ χεῖρα λαμβάνει.³⁸

Se nel passo della *Poetica* Aristotele pensava anche alle tragedie composte da Teodette, il frammento potrebbe effettivamente appartenere a un *Tieste*.³⁹

³⁶ “Infatti i poeti dapprima prendevano i racconti dove capitava, ma ora le più belle tragedie che si compongono si riferiscono a poche famiglie, come quelle di Alcmeone, Edipo, Oreste, Meleagro, Tieste, Telefo, e di quanti altri si trovano a patire o commettere fatti terribili.” Trad. di Gallavotti 1974.

³⁷ Cfr. Matelli in questo volume.

³⁸ “Ma, o sventurato Tieste, resisti, mordendo il freno dell’ira. Io parlo a te ora colpito; ma il tempo infinito tutto oscura e prende sotto la sua mano”, da Del Grande 1934 201.

³⁹ Così cautamente suggeriva anche Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 136 e n. 2, ove cita Ravenna 1903 e Diehl *RE*, che ugualmente supposero che il frammento risalisse al *Tieste*. Cosa per lo meno plausibile per il fatto che nei versi in questione un

Più complessa la situazione per il fr. 6 Snell. In questo caso infatti l'idea più diffusa è che il fr. risalga a un *Teseo* teodetteo,⁴⁰ dal momento che il fr. descrive il nome dell'eroe e che uno dei suoi due modelli fu evidentemente il *Teseo* di Euripide. Abbiamo già mostrato come però il fr. di Teodette evidenzi una rete di dipendenze molto evidenti anche con il fr. analogo estratto dal *Telefo* di Agatone. Ateneo, per giunta, cita i due passi senza soluzione di continuità, connettendoli con la semplice congiunzione καί, e omette il titolo della tragedia teodettea.

Aristotele, nel passo citato, fra i soggetti più usati dai tragici suoi contemporanei inserisce proprio *Telefo*, e, se mi è lecito esprimere un'ipotesi, non è improbabile che Teodette abbia composto un *Telefo* sul modello di Agatone, allo stesso modo in cui avrebbe potuto comporre un *Teseo* sul modello euripideo.⁴¹

III. Conclusioni

I pochi versi del fr. 6 Snell ci sembra offrano qualche stimolo per valutare sotto nuova luce giudizi già da tempo diffusi attorno alla produzione drammatica del sec. IV a. C. e, in particolare, di Teodette.

Si pensi alla "questione dei modelli": la deriva della grandissima parte del materiale drammatico contemporaneo a Euripide non consente di considerare appieno l'influenza che altri poeti esercitarono sulla tragedia del IV secolo. Dal canto suo anche la *Poetica* di Aristotele, più che indicare nomi, fa piuttosto riferimento a una temperie culturale in senso lato. In questo senso l'influenza di Agatone, sia pure nel breve esempio del fr. 6, ci appare significativa.

Ancora, balza all'occhio la rapida evoluzione che nel quarto secolo interessa la letteratura e la cultura nel suo complesso. Il fr. 6 consente una breve riconsiderazione del problema, sia che venga inteso come frutto di un "periodo di transizione" fra la grande letteratura del V secolo e la poesia ellenistica, sia che, in miglior modo, come effetto di una "innovazione" rispetto alle modalità di composizione poetica precedenti e "preludio" di successive, in stretta

interlocutore si rivolge direttamente al "personaggio" Tieste. Cfr. anche Welcker 1841 1078.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Welcker 1841 1079, e, recentemente, Monda 2000 42, e anche la nostra n. 3.

⁴¹ Più cautamente a Xanthakis-Karamanos 1980 100–102, lascia aperta la questione dell'assegnazione.

dipendenza dai nuovi modi di trasmissione della letteratura (il libro) e dalle metodologie di insegnamento in voga nelle scuole di retorica (la mnemotecnica).

Aristofane, che ai primi segnali di questo cambiamento assisteva sul finire della propria vita, potè dire di Euripide che componeva le sue tragedie con del *χυλὸν* [...] *στωμυλμάτων ἀπὸ βιβλίων ἀπηθῶν*.⁴²

E dei poeti a lui successivi faceva dire:

HP. οὐκ οὖν ἔτερος ἔστι ἔνταῦθα μειρακύλλια

τραγωδίας ποιοῦντα πλεῖν ἢ μυρία,

Εὐριπίδου πλεῖν ἢ σταδίῳ λαλίστερα;

ΔΙ. ἐπιφυλλίδες ταῦτ' ἔστι καὶ στωμύλματα,

χελιδόνων μουσεῖα, λωβηταὶ τέχνης,

ἃ φροῦδα θάπτον, ἣν μόνον χορὸν λάβη,

ἅπαξ προσουρήσαντα τῇ τραγωδίᾳ.

γόνιμον δὲ ποιητὴν ἂν οὐχ εὖροις ἔτι

ζητῶν ἄν, ὅστις ῥῆμα γενναῖον λάκοι..⁴³

Il quasi totale naufragio della letteratura drammatica del IV secolo a. C. ci impedisce di valutare la prassi compositiva dei poeti che in questo periodo operarono sulla scena. Tuttavia, quanto più si farà chiaro il quadro dell'interazione fra fenomeni culturali, educativi e tecnici, tanto più evidente risulterà l'importanza del "secolo di transizione", il IV, che diede vita alla grandezza di quel crocevia filosofico, scientifico e critico letterario rappresentato da Aristotele e dai suoi scolari.

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⁴² Aristoph. *Ran.* 943, "succo di chiacchiere spremuto dai libri".

⁴³ Ar. *Ran.* 89-97.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

DER EURIPIDEISCHE *PHILOKTET* UND DIE RHETORIK DES 4. JAHRHUNDERTS

CARL WERNER MÜLLER

I

In seinem Vergleich der drei Philoktettragödien des Aischylos, Euripides und Sophokles rühmt Dion von Prusa die besonderen rhetorischen Qualitäten des euripideischen Dramas.¹ Schon in seiner 18. Abhandlung, die dem Nutzen der Lektüre der klassischen Autoren für den Redner gewidmet war, hatte Dion den Literaturkanon mit den Vertretern des Dramas, mit Menander und Euripides, begonnen. Zwar hieß es entschuldigend, mit dieser Präferenz solle der Rang der Alten Komödie und der beiden älteren Tragiker nicht in Zweifel gezogen werden, aber was Euripides betrifft, so ist Dion der Meinung, dieser sei “für einen im normalen gesellschaftlichen Leben stehenden Menschen sehr nützlich, ferner fähig, Charaktere und Schicksale zur vollen Wirksamkeit zu bringen, und er mischt unter seine Verse Lebensregeln (γνώμαι), die in allen Situationen hilfreich sind, weil er sich in der Philosophie auskennt” (Dion 18.7). “Philosophie” meint hier in einem allgemeineren Sinne das Wissen, wie es in der Welt zugeht. Die Beschreibung der rhetorischen Qualitäten des euripideischen *Philoktet* in der 52. Rede geht über diese allgemeinen Angaben, die den Realitäts- und Lebensbezug der Tragödien des Dichters betreffen, hinaus. Zwar wird auch hier die Wirklichkeitsnähe der euripideischen Kunst betont, aber zugleich ihre rhetorische *Form* herausgestellt, die dem Leser großen Nutzen gewähre (Dion 52.11). Dann heißt es speziell auf den *Philoktet* bezogen: Durch die Einführung einer Gesandtschaft aus Troja “gestaltet Euripides das Drama abwechslungsreicher und findet Redemöglichkeiten, durch die er sich als versiert und unvergleichlich geschickt im dialektischen Argumentieren erweist.” “Bei den Reden (zeigt er)

¹ Dion 52,11. 13f. Vgl. die kommentierte Ausgabe der 52. Rede in Müller 2000 274ff.

eine unwiderstehliche und bewundernswerte Wirkung.”² Der Dramatiker versteht es demnach, Situationen auf der Bühne herbeizuführen, in denen die redenden Personen erfolgreich gegensätzliche Standpunkte vertreten. Ein Musterbeispiel dafür ist im *Philoktet* das Rededuell zwischen Odysseus und einer Gesandtschaft aus Troja.

Die thematische Nähe des *Philoktet* zur Rhetorik ist im Dramenstoff angelegt.³ Philoktet, von einer Schlange gebissen, als er dem Heer der Trojafahrer auf einer kleinen Insel der Nordägäis den Altar der Chryse zeigte, den nur er kannte und wo die Griechen opfern mußten, wenn sie Troja erobern wollten, war gleich zu Beginn des Feldzugs auf den Rat des Odysseus an der Küste des benachbarten Lemnos ausgesetzt worden, weil die Gefährten den Gestank der Wunde und die Schmerzensschreie des Kranken nicht mehr ertragen zu können glaubten. Doch nach über neunjähriger vergeblicher Belagerung der Stadt des Priamos erfuhren die Griechen von einem Orakel, daß ihr Sieg an die Präsenz des Bogens und der Person des Philoktet vor Troja gebunden sei. Im Unterschied zum homerischen und nachhomerischen Epos, in dem die Rückholung des Kranken unproblematisch verlaufen zu sein scheint,⁴ bringt die attische Tragödie seit Aischylos einen Philoktet auf die Bühne, der den Verrat der Freunde von einst nicht vergessen hat und eine Teilnahme am Kampf verweigert. Seitdem steht neben der Überlistung des Helden seine Überredung im Mittelpunkt der Handlung. Bei Aischylos gelingt es Odysseus, den die Griechen nach Lemnos geschickt haben, Philoktet nach langem Widerstand am Ende doch davon zu überzeugen, daß es auch in seinem eigenen Interesse sei, mit nach Troja zu kommen, wo er von seiner Wunde geheilt und ihm die Ehre des Troja-Eroberers zuteil werde.⁵ Im euripideischen *Philoktet* erfährt das Überredungsthema eine Ausweitung und wird zu einem durchgehenden Leitmotiv des Dramas in situativ wechselnder Beleuchtung. Im Vorfeld der Dramenhandlung ist es zunächst Odysseus, der überredet werden muß, Philoktet von Lemnos zurückzuholen. Seine anfängliche Weigerung begründet er mit dem Haß des Ausgesetzten, den er unmöglich zum Mitkommen überreden und der ihn sofort

² Dion 52,13–14 ποιικιλώτερον τὸ δρᾶμα κατασκευάζων καὶ ἀνευρίσκων λόγων ἀφορμὰς, καθ’ ὅς εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιχειρῶν εὐπορώτατος καὶ παρ’ ὄντινοῦν ἱκανώτατος φαίνεται ὁ ἀμήχανον δὲ καὶ θαυμαστὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις δύναμιν [sc. ἐπιδείκνυται].

³ Vgl. zum Folgenden Müller 1997 11 ff., 70 ff., 133 f.; 2000 25 ff.

⁴ Müller 1997 11 ff., 70–71.

⁵ Müller 2000 42, 61 ff. Zur Überredungsthematik im *Philoktet* des Sophokles vgl. Müller 1997 219 ff., 253 ff.

mit seinem immertreffenden Bogen töten werde, weil Philoktet nicht vergessen habe, daß er—Odysseus—seinerzeit die Griechen veranlaßt hatte, ihn auf Lemnos auszusetzen.⁶ Die Umstimmung erfolgt durch göttliche Intervention: Athene erscheint Odysseus im Traum und verspricht, ihn an Aussehen und Stimme zu verwandeln, so daß Philoktet ihn nicht erkenne.⁷ Trotzdem legt Philoktet bei ihrer ersten Begegnung seinen Bogen auf ihn an, sobald er hört, daß der Fremde einer aus dem griechischen Heer vor Troja ist. In einer Rede, die geschickt Lüge und Wahrheit mischt, gelingt es dem verwandelten Odysseus, seinen Kopf aus der Schlinge zu ziehen, indem er sich als ein Opfer des (wirklichen) Odysseus ausgibt und Philoktet um Hilfe gegen den gemeinsamen Feind bittet. So gewinnt er gleich bei der ersten Begegnung die Gastfreundschaft des Kranken, der seit fast zehn Jahren einsam in seiner Höhle haust.⁸ Die rhetorische Glanzleistung des Dramas aber vollbringt der euripideische Odysseus im dritten Epeisodion.⁹ Es ist der Höhepunkt seiner Überredungskunst und die Szene, auf die Dion 52,14 Bezug nimmt. Bei Euripides schicken nämlich nicht nur die Griechen eine Gesandtschaft nach Lemnos, um Philoktet zur Rückkehr zu bewegen, den Trojanern ist durch dasselbe Orakel zugesagt, daß sie der Eroberung ihrer Stadt entgehen, wenn sie sich der Hilfe Philoktets und seines Bogens versichern. Also kommen gleichzeitig mit Odysseus auch Boten aus Troja, die Philoktet durch Goldgeschenke und die Zusage, ihn zum König zu machen, auf ihre Seite ziehen wollen. Und Philoktet ist nicht abgeneigt, dieses überwältigende Angebot anzunehmen. An diesem Punkt greift Odysseus ein. In dem rhetorischen Agon mit den Trojanern demonstriert er die unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten der *πειθώ*. Adressat des Rededuells ist Philoktet, den jeder der beiden Parteien für sich gewinnen will. Der schließliche Sieg des Odysseus (für Philoktet ist er immer noch der angebliche Flüchtling vor der Rache des Odysseus) verdankt sich der Pervertierung menschlicher Rede durch eine Rhetorik, die ihren argumentativen Erfolg nur für möglich hält, wenn Realität und Moral auf den Kopf gestellt werden. Der Anwalt einer aufgeklärten Religiosität, der sich erfolgreich bemüht, die Konventionen der Orakelpraxis als Priesterbetrug zu entlarven, erweist sich als Betrüger; denn das solchermaßen diskreditierte Ora-

⁶ Eur. *Phil.* P 6 Müller (Dion 59,3).

⁷ Ebenda.

⁸ Eur. *Phil.* P 10 Müller (Dion 59,5–11). Vgl. Müller 1997 55 ff.

⁹ Eur. *Phil.* F 13–15 Müller (796. 795. 794 Kannicht [N.²]). Vgl. Müller 1997 117 ff.

kel ist Anlaß und Grundlage seines Auftrags, Philoktet ins Lager der Griechen zurückzubringen.¹⁰ Doch die Gegenseite steht ihm nicht nach: Die "Frommen" aus Troja berufen sich bei ihrem Bestechungsversuch auf die Habgier der Götter und empfehlen Philoktet zynisch solche ὁμοίωσις θεῶ als Vorbild. Der persuasive Erfolg des Odysseus am Ende des dritten Epeisodions ist freilich ein Pyrrhussieg und die Ursache für sein rhetorisches Scheitern im fünften und letzten Akt des Dramas. In der Troerszene hatte Odysseus Philoktet überzeugt, daß Orakelsprüche nur geschickte Priesterreden sind mit dem aufgesetzten Anschein von Glaubwürdigkeit.¹¹ Nach der Abreise der trojanischen Gesandten und dem Bogendiebstahl durch Odysseus und Diomedes aber soll Philoktet dem Dieb, dem nunmehr zu seiner wahren Identität zurückverwandelten Odysseus, vertrauen und dem Lügner glauben, daß das Orakel in Wirklichkeit doch den Willen der Götter verkündet habe und auch die Zusage seiner Heilung mehr sei als eine neue Täuschung. Das kann nicht gelingen, und so bleibt Odysseus am Ende nur das ihm eigentlich fremde Mittel des Zwangs. "Da er durch den Besitz des Bogens vor ihm sicher war, konnte er Philoktet zwingen, ihm auf sein Schiff zu folgen."¹² Die Tragik des Odysseus, wenn man es so nennen darf, besteht darin, daß der Meister der Überredung, erfolgreich ist, solange er lügt, und versagt, wenn er die Wahrheit auf seiner Seite hat.

II

Der kaiserzeitliche Autor aus der zweiten Hälfte des 1. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. steht mit seiner Tragikerinterpretation in einer langen literaturwissenschaftlichen Tradition. Schon Aristoteles hatte in der *Poetik* gegenüber dem Politischen (πολιτικῶς λέγειν) als einem Merkmal der "Alten" das Rhetorische (ῥητορικῶς λέγειν) als die Eigenart der zeitgenössischen Tragödie bestimmt (*Poet.* 6 1450b7–8). Euripides gehört hier chronologisch zweifellos zu den ἀρχαῖοι, aber als das maßgebliche Vorbild der nachklassischen Tragödie des 4. Jahrhunderts wird man das Urteil über deren Eigenart im Ansatz auch bereits auf ihn ausdehnen dürfen, zumal das Euripides-Bild im Dichteragon der *Frösche* des Aristophanes bereits in diese Richtung weist.¹³

¹⁰ Eur. *Phil.* P 6 Müller (Dion 59,2–4).

¹¹ Vgl. Eur. *Phil.* F 14 Müller (795 Kannicht [N.²])

¹² Eur. *Phil.* T 27 Müller (*POxy* 2435 fr. 17,265 f.).

¹³ Vgl. Müller 2000 274 f.

Aristoteles zitiert die *Philoktet*-dramen aller drei großen Tragiker des 5. Jahrhunderts.¹⁴ Wenn sich auch keines dieser Zitate in seiner *Rhetorik* findet, so gibt es doch zwei Bezugnahmen auf den *Philoktet* des Euripides, von denen die eine der antiken Tradition des rhetorischen Unterrichts im Peripatos entstammt, die andere aber, im 22. Kapitel der *Poetik*, das Verhältnis von Alltagssprache und Kunstsprache betrifft, eine Thematik, die allgemein die Kunst der Rede und damit auch den Gegenstandsbereich der Rhetorik berührt. Aristoteles vergleicht einen Vers aus dem euripideischen *Philoktet* mit der nur geringfügig variierenden Vorlage im *Philoktet* des Aischylos:¹⁵ „Wie zum Beispiel Aischylos denselben jambischen Trimeter gedichtet hat wie Euripides, dieser aber nur ein einziges Wort austauschte, und zwar anstelle des üblicherweise gebrauchten ein erlesenes. Dieses wirkt poetisch, das andere gewöhnlich. Aischylos nämlich dichtete in seinem *Philoktet*: „ein Krebsgeschwür, das meines Fußes Fleisch frißt,“ Euripides aber hat „frißt“ (ἔσθιει) durch „sich ein Mal bereitet“ (θoinᾶται) ersetzt.“ θoinᾶται gilt für Aristoteles als γλῶττα, weil es nicht zum Wortschatz der attischen Prosa gehört und Aischylos, Sophokles und die Komödie das Wort meiden. Außerdem hat es im Vers des Euripides metaphorische Bedeutung. Aristoteles nennt dessen Wortwahl καλόν („gelungen“, „eindrucksvoll“, „poetisch“), die des Aischylos εὐτελής („gewöhnlich“, „trivial“). Bemerkenswert an diesem Gegensatz ist, daß der ältere Dichter der poetischen Inspiration das einfache Wort wählt, der Dichter der rationalen Präzision aber das poetischere. Im übrigen zeigt der Vergleich, wie exakt die aristotelische Kenntnis des Textes der beiden Tragiker ist.

Das zweite Zitat aus dem *Philoktet* des Euripides im Zusammenhang mit Aristoteles ist die Parodie eines Euripides-Verses als Pointe einer Anekdote, in welcher der Peripatos gegenüber der Schule des Isokrates die Technê des Redens auch für sich beansprucht und ihre Aufnahme in sein Lehrprogramm ankündigt: „Zu schweigen schändlich wär's, Isokrates aber reden zu lassen“ (αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, ἴσοκράτην δ' ἔαν λέγειν). Der Originalvers stammt aus dem dritten Epeisodion, das, wie oben gezeigt, mit der Auseinandersetzung

¹⁴ *Poet.* 22 1458b19–24 (Aischylos Fr. 253 Radt; Euripides Fr. 10 Müller = 792 Kannicht [N.²]); *Eth. Nic.* 6.9 1142a1–8 (Eur. Fr. 2/3 Müller = 787/788 Kannicht [N.²]); *Eth. Nic.* 7.3 1146a18–21; 7.10 1151b17–21 (Sophokles).

¹⁵ Arist. *Poet.* 22 1458b19–24 (Aischylos Fr. 253 Radt; Euripides Fr. 10 Müller = 792 Kannicht [N.²]). Der Vers aus dem *Philoktet* des Aischylos lautet: φαγέδαιναν ἥ μιν σάρκα θοινᾶται ποδός, der des euripideischen *Philoktet*: φαγέδαιναν ἥ μιν σάρκα θοινᾶται ποδός.

zwischen Odysseus und einer Gesandtschaft aus Troja, in der jede der beiden Seiten versuchte, Philoktet für sich zu gewinnen (Dion 52.93–95), den rhetorischen Höhepunkt des euripideischen Dramas bildete. Der Vers markiert den Augenblick, da Odysseus in den Dialog zwischen Philoktet und den Trojanern, die gerade dabei sind, den Besitzer des Heraklesbogens erfolgreich zum Mitkommen zu bewegen, eingreift:¹⁶ “Doch um des Wohls des ganzen Heers der Griechen willen / zu schweigen schändlich wär’s, das Wort zu überlassen aber den Barbaren” (ὑπὲρ γε μέντοι παντὸς Ἑλλήνων στρατοῦ / αἰσχροὺν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρους δ’ ἔαν λέγειν). Es muß einer der bekannteren Verse des Dramas gewesen zu sein,¹⁷ jedenfalls wird er am häufigsten zitiert, freilich nicht in der Originalfassung, sondern in der boshaften, gegen Isokrates gerichteten Parodie, die Aristoteles zugeschrieben wird. Die besondere Malice bestand darin, daß die Vertauschung der beiden Akkusative eine Gleichsetzung von “Isokrates” und “Barbaren” insinuierte, und das bei einem Mann, der als der bedeutendste griechische Redelehrer seiner Zeit gelten konnte, sein Bildungsprogramm als φιλοσοφία verstand¹⁸ und das Kriterium des alten Gegensatzes von Hellenen und Barbaren im unterschiedlichen Besitz der Bildung sah (Isok. 4.50). Ob die Parodie des Euripidesverses wirklich von Aristoteles stammte oder ihm erst in der Schultradition des Peripatos zugeschrieben wurde, muß dahingestellt bleiben. (Alle Testimonien gehen auf eine gemeinsame Quelle zurück.) Sicher aber ist, daß sie ein Dokument der Rivalität des Peripatos und der Schule des Isokrates ist. Das schließt nicht aus, daß es sich um einen ingeniösen Einfall erst der Aristotelesbiographie handelt, der Eingang in die Wissenschaftsgeschichte der antiken Rhetorik gefunden hat. Die Übertragung auf die Konkurrenz zwischen der neugegründeten Schule des Aristoteles zur Akademie unter Xenokrates (Diog. Laert. 5.2–3) ist sekundär und entbehrt der originären Pointe. λέγειν in der Euripidesparodie ist nicht zu trennen vom vorgängigen rhetorischen Erfolg der Trojaner im Philoktetedrama, der erst durch die noch größere Überredungskunst des Odysseus zunichte wird. Der umgedichtete Vers des Odysseus ist bei Philodem (*Rhet.* 35.21–36.5), Cicero (*De or.* 3.141; *Tusc.* 1.7), Quintilian (*Inst.* 3.1.14) und in den Hermogenesscholien (IV 297 f. Walz) mit dem Entschluß des Aristoteles verknüpft, das Feld des Rhetorikunterrichts nicht Isokrates allein zu überlassen. λέγειν gewinnt

¹⁶ Eur. *Phil.* F 13 Müller (796 Kannicht [N.²]). Vgl. Müller 1997 118 f.

¹⁷ Vgl. Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.1.14: *noto quidem illo ... versu ex Philocteta.*

¹⁸ Wersdörfer 1940.

somit die prägnante Bedeutung im Sinne von "reden lehren". Eingebunden ist diese Mitteilung in die Überlieferung, daß Aristoteles im täglichen Lehrplan des Peripatos der Rhetorik die Zeit des späten Nachmittags für ein erweitertes Publikum einräumte, während der Vormittag dem philosophischen Unterricht vorbehalten blieb. Der Hermogenesscholiast verknüpft dies mit der Unterscheidung von λόγοι ἀκροαματικοί und λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί (298.5–8 Walz).¹⁹ Die Gemeinsamkeit der literarischen Quelle beweist eine Übereinstimmung im Detail bei Quintilian und dem Scholiasten zu Hermogenes: Aristoteles habe den Vers (aus dem euripideischen *Philoktet*) ständig im Munde geführt (*frequenter usus*, συνεχῶς ἐπεβόα). Der Autor der Vorlage muß dem Euripideszitat die Funktion eines stets präsenten Mottos des aristotelischen Rhetorikunterrichts zugewiesen haben. Ein bemerkenswerter Unterschied besteht zwischen den griechischen und den lateinischen Testimonien. Während die griechischen nur die Parodie des Euripidesverses zitieren, weil sie bei ihren Lesern die Kenntnis des Originals oder einer ausführlicheren Fassung der Aristotelesanekdote voraussetzen dürfen, paraphrasiert Cicero auch den Originalvers und teilt den (freilich irrtümlichen) Namen des Sprechers mit (Philoktet statt Odysseus), um seinem römischen Publikum zum Verständnis der Pointe eine Vorstellung von den Änderungen der Parodie gegenüber dem Original zu vermitteln. Quintilian, dessen Leser wiederum Cicero kennen, kann sich damit begnügen, dessen Fehler zu korrigieren und "Philoktet" als Dramentitel zu erklären. Beide dürften eine ausführlichere griechische Quelle benutzen, soweit sie nicht aus eigener, bei Cicero nicht ganz fehlerfreier, Erinnerung an Euripides zitieren.²⁰

III

Eines der längeren erhaltenen Zitate aus dem *Philoktet* des Euripides²¹ findet sich in der *Rhetorik* des Anaximenes von Lampsakos (18.15 1433b10–16). Es handelt sich um ein frühes Beispiel der

¹⁹ Vgl. zu diesem in der Aristotelesforschung vieldiskutierten Gegensatzpaar Wieland 1958 323 ff.; Gaiser 1972 866; Flashar 1983 180 f.—Cicero (*De or.* 3.141) gibt diesem Gegensatz eine metaphorische Bedeutung, indem er mit ihm zwei Seiten des literarischen Werks bei Aristoteles bezeichnet sein läßt. Der Zeugniswert der Cicerostelle ist im übrigen ambivalent.

²⁰ Vgl. Müller 1997 258.

²¹ Fr. 16 Müller; 797 Kannicht [N.2].

Verwendung des euripideischen Dramas im Rahmen des Rhetorikunterrichts. Zum Verhältnis der beiden *Rhetoriken* des Aristoteles und des Anaximenes, dessen Werk innerhalb des Corpus Aristotelicum überliefert ist, sei nur soviel gesagt, daß Anaximenes ein Zeitgenosse des Aristoteles war, daß aber die *Rhetorik an Alexander* ungeachtet gewisser Übereinstimmungen unabhängig von der aristotelischen *Rhetorik* geschrieben ist.²²

An der vorliegenden Stelle handelt es sich um die empfohlene Reaktion auf ein zuvor vom Gegner angewandtes rhetorisches Mittel, der anderen Seite den Wind aus den Segeln zu nehmen, indem er den gegen ihn erwarteten Angriff vorweggenommen und im voraus zu entkräften versucht hatte. Der Terminus für die Verfahrensweise des Gegners ist προκατάληψις.²³ Im Schlußakt des euripideischen *Philoktet* hatte sich ihrer der rückverwandelte Odysseus vor dem lemnischen Chor, der gleichsam als Schiedsinstanz fungierte, gegenüber Philoktet bedient, indem er sein an Philoktet begangenes Unrecht, vor allem den Diebstahl des Bogens, freimütig zugegeben hatte. Philoktet akzeptiert den von Odysseus beabsichtigten moralischen Befreiungsschlag nicht und reagiert mit einer Technik, die man als ἀντιπροκατάληψις bezeichnen könnte.²⁴ Was Anaximenes zu ihrer Beschreibung sagt, entspricht *mutatis mutandis* dem, was Philoktet zu Beginn seiner Rede auf die Selbstbeschuldigungen des Odysseus antwortet.²⁵

Ich will mir das Reden nicht abnehmen lassen, auch wenn er meinen Worten dadurch bereits ihre Wirkung genommen zu haben scheint, / daß er von sich aus sein Unrecht zugegeben hat. / Doch du wirst staunen, wenn du von mir hörst, was ich erlebt, / der aber wird selbst durch seine Reden schon offenlegen, was er für einer ist.²⁶

Dazu sagt Anaximenes:

²² Vgl. Fuhrmann 1960 11 ff.; Kennedy 1963 114 ff.; Barwick 1966 212 ff.; 1967, 47 ff.—Dort ist auch die ältere Literatur verzeichnet.

²³ Vgl. Volkmann 1885 139, 279 und Lausberg 1960 855.

²⁴ Das Substantiv ist nicht belegt, vgl. aber 1433b1 ἀντιπροκαταληπτέον ἐστίν. Zur Szene des Dramas vgl. Müller 2000 207 ff., 425 ff.

²⁵ Als Beispiel aus den Rednern führt Spengel 1850 180 f. Demosthenes 18.10 f. an.

²⁶ Der überlieferte Text ist erheblich verderbt, die Emendation strittig. Zur vorliegenden Fassung vgl. Müller 2000 208, 428 ff. In V. 2 weist Kannicht (*TrGF* 5.2 [2004] 841) ἀποφθὰς als überlieferte *varia lectio* nach. Sollte es auch der authentische Text sein (statt ὑποστάς), wäre die Bedeutung: "Zuvorkommend (im Eigenständnis), Unrecht getan zu haben."

Wenn wir aber an zweiter Stelle reden und die Gegenpartei schon vorher aufgegriffen hat, was wir sagen wollen, muß man gegenhalten gegen diesen Vorgriff und ihn auf folgende Weise unwirksam machen: "Dieser hat nicht nur vor euch [den Richtern] viele Verfälschungen der Wahrheit gegen mich vorgebracht, sondern wohlwissend, daß ich ihn widerlegen werde, hat er meine Rede vorab aufgegriffen und in Mißkredit gebracht, damit ihr nicht in gleicher Weise meiner Rede euere Aufmerksamkeit schenkt oder ich sie erst gar nicht vor euch vortrage, weil sie zuvor von diesem heruntergemacht worden ist. Ich bin aber der Meinung, daß ihr meine Argumente von mir erfahren müßt und nicht von diesem, auch wenn er das, was ich sage, vorher mit seiner Rede heruntergemacht hat ...;²⁷ denn dieser sagt nichts Richtiges." Auch Euripides im *Philoktet* verwendet diese Form in kunstgerechter Weise folgendermaßen (es folgt das Zitat).²⁸

Was sich aus Dion und den Zeugnissen peripatetischer Provenienz erschließen läßt, erfährt bei Anaximenes seine Bestätigung: In der Behandlung einer schwierigen und nicht alltäglichen Prozeß-Situation belegt er die exemplarische Präsenz des euripideischen *Philoktet* in der rhetorischen Literatur des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.

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²⁷ Der Text ist an dieser Stelle korrupt (vgl. Fuhrmann 2000 ad locum, 48).

²⁸ Anax. *Rh. Al.* 19.15 1433b11–15 κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν Φιλοκτῆτι τεχνικῶς τοῦτω τῷ εἶδει διὰ τοῦδε κτλ.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

THEOPHRASTUS AND CALLISTHENES

STEPHEN A. WHITE

Theophrastus and Callisthenes were colleagues and friends. Both belonged to Aristotle's inner circle: one was his closest associate and successor, the other his nephew and a prominent historian. When and where they met is fairly clear: probably in the mid-340s during Aristotle's time at Assos and Mytilene. Cicero calls them *sodales* (*Tusc.* 3.21)—presumably for ἑταῖροι—and his report fits our other evidence well. They were probably very close in age, about a dozen years younger than Aristotle,¹ and they shared many intellectual interests.² Callisthenes, whose hometown of Olynthus was razed by Philip in 348, was “reared” by his uncle (Plut. *Alex.* 55.8), whom he surely accompanied to the Troad that year and again to Mieza a few years later, when Aristotle was summoned to tutor Alexander.³ By 334, when he joined Alexander as an authorized historian and publicist of his campaign against the Persian empire, he had known Theophrastus for over a decade. They never met again. Seven years later, probably in the spring of 327, Callisthenes was brutally executed high in the Afghan mountains on dubious allegations of instigating a plot to assassinate Alexander.⁴

¹ Aristotle's contrast of the two (Theophrastus “needs a bridle, the other a spur”: Diog. Laert. 5.39 = Callisth. T 4 *FGrH* 124 = FHS&G 1.37–38), though possibly apocryphal (likewise Plato on Aristotle and Xenocrates in Diog. Laert. 4.6, and Isocrates on Ephorus and Theopompus in Cic. *Att.* 6.1.12), implies that they were roughly the same age, each born c. 370.

² Callisthenes' major works, all three on fourth-century history, included detailed discussions of scientific topics: explanations for the Nile floods (fr. 12 *FGrH*), earthquakes (frs. 19–20), and meteorological phenomena (frs. 20–21, cf. 12), as well as points in astronomy (fr. 11, cf. T 3), geology (fr. 54), geography (frs. 6–7), zoology (fr. 41), and botany (fr. 42, cf. T 35). His reports often reflect material in Aristotle and Theophrastus; see Spoerri 1994 189–214.

³ On Plutarch's vague ἐτεθράπτο, see Spoerri 1994 185. Callisthenes was roughly 15 years older than Alexander and may also have tutored him; see Callisth. T 9–11 *FGrH*, Plut. *Alex.* 7–8 and Düring 1957 284–299.

⁴ Accounts of his death differ even in the earliest sources; see Arr. *Anab.* 4.14, Plut. *Alex.* 55.9. His complicity in the conspiracy, reportedly denied even by Alexander in

What reunites these two in my title and on this occasion is a lost work by Theophrastus in which he paid respect to his friend and colleague. Its full title, as recorded in the catalogue of his works (Diog. Laert. 5.44 = 1.123 FHS&G), was *Callisthenes, or On Mourning* (Περὶ πένθους). About its form and content we have very little information. Cicero cites it twice, once by title (*Tusc.* 3.21 = 505 FHS&G, *Tusc.* 5.25 = 493 FHS&G), and it is mentioned again over two centuries later in a short essay “On Fate” ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Mantissa* 25 = 504 FHS&G).⁵ These four meager shards are the only sure testimony we have to the work, though it almost certainly lurks behind other material as well. Scholars abhor a vacuum, and many have ventured to fill this one. Historians in particular have speculated that the *Callisthenes* was a major source for later criticism of Alexander.⁶ But the theme of this volume invites a different question, not about the influence of this work on later works (many lost or fragmentary in turn) but about its inspirations. Considered from the perspective of “influences on Peripatetic rhetoric,” the *Callisthenes* illustrates Aristotelian theory responding to popular belief, literary tradition, and the seismic impact of Alexander. Moreover, it was also an instance of actual rhetorical practice by a leading Peripatetic. Its title and occasion imply that it served in the first instance as a eulogy, and other evidence suggests that this in turn provided a springboard for philosophical reflection. Shifting his focus from commemoration and consolation to moral instruction, I suggest, Theophrastus produced a disquisition on the virtues exemplified by his colleague and friend.

1. *Philosophical Eulogies*

The influence of the *Callisthenes* has been felt mainly in two areas: criticism of Alexander and discussions of fortune or luck.⁷ A third area is at least equally likely: the reputation of Callisthenes himself. His execution was widely deplored. Curtius, writing some four cen-

a letter of disputed authenticity (Plut. *Alex.* 55.5–6, cf. Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.1), is widely dismissed; see Hamilton 1969 153–157, Bosworth 1995 90–100, Badian 2000 70–72.

⁵ On the question of authorship, see Sharples 1980; cf. Fortenbaugh 1984 230–231.

⁶ Stroux 1933 has been especially influential; but see Badian 1958 154–157, Menschling 1963 279–282, and Fortenbaugh 1984 102–103.

⁷ Fortenbaugh 1984 102.

turies after the fact, is most emphatic: “no one’s execution incited greater resentment of Alexander among the Greeks” (*Hist.* 8.8.22). Valerius Maximus (9.3 ext. 1) and Seneca (*NQ* 6.23) pronounce very similar sentiments, and Cicero, in a courtroom speech, names Callisthenes alongside Plato and Demetrius of Phalerum as famous victims of tyranny (*Rab. Post.* 23). This Roman rhetorical tradition was probably influenced by Stoic criticism of Alexander.⁸ We therefore cannot be sure that its verdict goes back to Theophrastus. Yet any account he gave of his friend’s character and fate was very likely the first and probably also the most influential. Moreover, this particular execution earned Alexander grave reproach largely because the victim was widely respected and admired, not least for his courageous and principled opposition to the growing despotism and orientalism of Alexander’s conduct after the death of Darius. Witness Curtius’ stirring obituary in full:

Callisthenes quoque tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam aulae et assentantium accommodatus ingenio. Itaque nullius caedes maiorem apud Graecos Alexandro excitavit invidiam, quod praeditum optimis moribus artibusque, a quo revocatus ad vitam erat cum interfecto Clito mori perseveraret, non tantum occiderit sed etiam torserit, indicta quidem causa. [*Hist.* 8.8.22 = T 17 *FGrH* 124]

Callisthenes was also tortured and died, innocent of the plot against the king’s life but in no way suited to a court and the temperament of courtiers. Thus, no one’s execution incited greater resentment of Alexander among the Greeks, because this man, who was endowed with the best character and intelligence, who had revived him when he had resolved to die after Cleitus was killed, Alexander not only executed but even tortured, all without a trial.

Others, including the Alexander historians, echo this praise, and the rare dissent is readily explained.⁹ Even Arrian, whose close ties

⁸ See Stroux 1933, Fears 1974. The Epicurean Philodemus shows similar respect for Callisthenes in naming him alongside Palamedes and Socrates as virtuous victims of injustice (*De morte* 33.7–34.9, cf. 35.19–34).

⁹ See esp. Plut. *Alex.* 53.1–2, Justin 15.3.3–10; cf. Philod. *De morte* 33.7–34.9, Sen. *Suas.* 1.5 (citing Cestius), Plut. *Adul.* 65c–d, Tatian *Ad Graec.* 2.1, Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 7.2, Them. *Or.* 7 94a and 10 129d–130a, and Pliny *NH* 36.36 reports a memorial statue, probably commissioned soon after his death (cf. Tatian, *Ad Graec.* 33.1); see Spoerri 1994 216–220. The exception is Timaeus, who said Callisthenes deserved to die for exalting Alexander in his own history (fr. 155 *FGrH* 566 = Polyb. 12.12b; patently the source of Philod. *De adul.* [*PHerc.* 1675 col. 5.25–36] = Callisth. T 21); but Timaeus was a notoriously harsh critic (called Epitimaïos or “censorious”), as Polybius cites this claim to illustrate (cf. 12.23), and his objection here appeals to

to Hadrian obliged him to criticize Callisthenes for being tactless and foolish in his “free speech” (*Anab.* 4.10.1, 4.12.6–7), emphasizes his integrity in opposing, eloquently, solitarily, and successfully, Alexander’s plan to adopt the notorious Persian ceremony of “obedience” (προσκύνησις) and to demand it also from Greeks and even Macedonians (*Anab.* 4.10–12).¹⁰ This story of Callisthenes thwarting Alexander, whether true or not, is most unlikely to come from the partisan accounts later composed by the king’s own companions and apologists.¹¹ In the first place, they had little reason to publicize an aborted policy that clearly grated on the vast majority of Greeks and Macedonians alike, both among Alexander’s immediate entourage and throughout the Hellenic world for which they later wrote. In the second place, even those who did acknowledge the policy and its failure (as at least Chares did: fr. 14 *FGrH* 125) had good reason not to portray so favorably someone summarily executed by Alexander—and deservedly so, according to Ptolemy and Aristobulus (and probably Chares: fr. 15, cf. frs. 13–14), who pronounced Callisthenes guilty of instigating the plot to assassinate Alexander (*Anab.* 4.14.1). It is therefore hard to resist the suspicion that the initial impetus for depicting Callisthenes as a champion of traditional piety and civic freedom—*vindex publicae libertatis* in Curtius (8.5.20)—came from Theophrastus in a eulogy of his friend.¹²

the very values of liberty and moderation that Callisthenes died for upholding; see Walbank 1967 353–355 and 1972 48–55, Bosworth 1988a 286–287, Gigon 1958 191.

¹⁰ Cf. Curtius 8.5.5–6.1, Plut. *Alex.* 54.3–6, Justin 12.7.1–3; see Bosworth 1988b 113–123, 1995 68–90, 1996 108–114.

¹¹ See Brunt 1976 532–544, who ascribes the bulk of *Anab.* 4.7–14 to a “vulgate” tradition deriving only in part from Clitarchus. Some of this material certainly goes back to Chares (frs. 14–15 *FGrH* 125), but probably nothing favorable to Callisthenes (cf. fr. 13); cf. Bosworth 1988b 113–114, esp. n. 88.

¹² Where Theophrastus got his information (or misinformation), like most else involving Alexander, is a mystery. But two plausible sources warrant mention. According to Hermippus, who was familiar with events involving the Lyceum (see frs. 28–38, 71, 74–75 *FGrH* 1026), an assistant of Callisthenes named Strobilos (his ἀναγνώστης, perhaps a slave) told Aristotle about related events, including another speech in Bactria (Plut. *Alex.* 53.3–54.1 = fr. 57 Wehrli = fr. 73 *FGrH* 1026); cf. Bollansée 1999 517–519. A compatriot of Callisthenes named Ephippus recorded lurid accounts of Alexander’s court, including a diagnosis of Alexander as “melancholic” (fr. 5 *FGrH* 126 = Ath. 12 538a), hence a possible link to Callisthenes’ fate; but both the title of his work (*On the Tomb—or Death—of Alexander and Hephaestion*) and extant testimony focus exclusively on the final weeks of his reign, which entails a date very likely after the *Callisthenes* (cf. n. 14 below); see Pearson 1960 61–68.

When Theophrastus wrote his *Callisthenes* is uncertain. Bill Fortenbaugh, comparing Plato's composition of the *Phaedo* a dozen or more years after Socrates died, cautiously allows a similar gap here.¹³ Still, the likeliest occasion is within a year of Callisthenes' death.¹⁴ The peculiar double title is suggestive. Eponymous works were often posthumous and honorific, whether straightforward encomia like Isocrates' *Evagoras* (d. 374) and Xenophon's *Agésilas* (d. 361), or memorial dialogues like Aristotle's *Gryllus* (d. 362) and *Eudemus* (d. 353).¹⁵ An intriguing parallel is Callisthenes' own *Hermias*, no doubt composed soon after Aristotle's father-in-law was treacherously arrested and executed by the Persians in 341. An excerpt preserved in Didymus' commentary on Demosthenes recounts the circumstances of Hermias' death and highlights his fine character and integrity, illustrated in a final message back to his friends "that he had done nothing unworthy of philosophy" (*In Dem.* 5.64–6.18 = Callisth. fr. 2, cf. 6.50–62 = fr. 3).¹⁶

Perhaps the closest extant parallel is Plato's *Theaetetus*, which is similarly dedicated to the memory of a longtime friend and colleague of the author. After a prologue eulogizes his valiant death in combat (142a–c), the dialogue presents a conversation from his youth, which first amplifies the praise (143e–145c), then explores the nature of knowledge in implicit tribute to a pioneering mathematician. The dialogue also acquired a subtitle, *On Knowledge* (Diog. Laert. 3.58, from Thrasyllus), though we do not know when. The *Phaedo* is cited by its subtitle, *On Soul*, already in Plato's (possibly apocryphal) *Epistle* 13 (363a) and Callimachus (*Epigr.* 23 Pf.). Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Gryllus* also bore subtitles (*On Soul* and *On Rhetoric*, respectively) indi-

¹³ Fortenbaugh 1984 103; on the timing of the *Phaedo*'s composition, see White 2000.

¹⁴ His remote death, which precluded normal funeral rites, might have increased the need felt for a formal eulogy; the death of Hermias in Persepolis provoked both an ode by his son-in-law Aristotle (fr. 842 *PMG* = fr. 675 *Rose*) and a formal eulogy by Callisthenes (frs. 2–3 *FGH*). But Hermias was Philip's ally, and Callisthenes Alexander's enemy. Might a public eulogy risk offending Alexander, even without the explicit criticism reported by Cic. *Tusc.* 3.21? There were mitigating factors in 327: the safety of distance, doubts about Alexander's continuing success and return, prevailing sentiment in Athens and much of Greece, and the author's lack of prominence or Macedonian ties (unlike Aristotle; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 55.7); even the subtitle "on mourning" could help divert offense.

¹⁵ Eponymous titles, of course, are not always posthumous or encomiastic; cf. Isoc. *Nicocles* and Pl. *Ion*. On the *Eudemus* (for Eudemus of Cyprus), see Spoerri 1966.

¹⁶ Fr. 2, unless from a preface to a dialogue, suggests the form was a declamation or essay.

cating the broader topics each addressed at length.¹⁷ It may then be that the *Callisthenes*, which also had a subtitle, was a dialogue too. Yet subtitles were by no means restricted to dialogues: witness speeches like Demosthenes' *For Ctesiphon*, *On the Crown*, and Theophrastus' own essay or open letter *To Cassander*, *On Kingship* (cf. Arist. frs. 646–648 Rose).

The subtitle Περί πένθους makes it very likely that Theophrastus wrote shortly after Callisthenes died, since πένθος refers specifically to mourning: the reactions of the bereaved, both their feelings of grief and the behavior expressing it, whether physical or verbal. The subtitle also specifies a distinctive focus; and as Badian emphasizes, it rules out polemic against Alexander, at least as a central theme, though not as a topic addressed in passing.¹⁸ The most celebrated ancient work with this title was by the academic Crantor, a younger contemporary of Theophrastus who outlived him scarcely fifteen years. Here too we know the occasion. His work *On Mourning* was addressed to one Hippocles, whom it (ostensibly) sought to console for the untimely death of his children ([Plut.] *Cons. Ap.* 104c). I mention this parallel for two reasons. One is to emphasize the perspective implied by its title: a work “on mourning” is implicitly addressed to the bereaved, hence survivors who care—or should care—about the deceased, and it implicitly promises to discuss how they should respond to their loss. In short, how should they “mourn” and why? Second, Crantor’s approach to this question was distinctly moralizing, both invoking traditional lore about the rewards of death and an afterlife for the pious and virtuous (frs. 5–6 Mette) and introducing reflections on fortune and character (frs. 4, 6–7). In adopting this approach, his aim was evidently to foster fortitude—among the bereaved, in the first instance, but presumably among a wider readership as well—by showing how the virtuous face adversity. The underlying message, it appears, was that the best way for the living to honor the dead is in the conduct of their own lives.

¹⁷ There is no attested parallel for the subtitle *On Mourning*; the *Menexenus* is labelled *epitaphios* (Diog. Laert. 3.60), the *Theages* is *On philosophy* (3.59).

¹⁸ Badian 1958 154–155. His duly guarded synopsis—“a disquisition on a philosophical theme dedicated to the memory of a great man”—is unassailable; cf. Gigon 1958 188–191: Plut. *Alex.* 53.1 “ist stark enkomiaistisch; so etwa mag Theophrast von Kallisthenes gesprochen haben.”

2. *The Callisthenes*

It is tempting to suppose that Theophrastus addressed the same general issues in similar terms, and that Crantor imitated him so well that he effaced his model. But I propose to consider the *Callisthenes* from the opposite side, not its influence but its inspirations. A useful place to begin is with a passing remark in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In a summary discussion of pleasure (in connection with forensic oratory), he observes that "in acts of mourning and lament [ἐν πένθει καὶ θρήνοις] some pleasure supervenes; for there is pain at someone's absence but pleasure in remembering and in a way seeing him and what he used to do and the sort of person he was" (1.11 1370b25–28).¹⁹ Lovers do the same, he notes in the preceding lines (b19–25). His focus on conduct (ἅ ἔπραττον) and character (οἷος ἦν) pinpoints the rationale and goal of eulogy: a speech to evoke and enhance positive memories. But it also reflects more general encomiastic principles of recounting and recording a person's admirable deeds and character. Thus, when Aristotle lists different kinds of honors (μέγῃ τιμῇς) in his discussion of deliberative oratory, "memorials in verse and prose" (μνημαὶ ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων) join both temporary privileges like front-row seats and public meals, and enduring monuments like gravestones and sculpture (1.5 1361a34–37). Prose memorials may be expository, narrative, or dramatic: eulogies, biographies, or dialogues. Dialogue and narrative lend themselves more readily to the vivid visualization of Aristotle's "seeing in a way"; but eulogies can be more directly instructive.

How well do the meager remains of the *Callisthenes* suit Aristotle's encomiastic principles? Only three explicit references to the work survive. The earliest and most informative comes from Cicero in *Tusculans* 3, which presents an extended defense of the Stoic thesis that the wise never feel any emotional pain or distress (*aegritudo* for λύπη). Early in the book, Cicero considers two specific forms of distress, envy and pity.

Cadit igitur in eundem et misereri et invidere. Nam qui dolet rebus alicuius adversis, idem alicuius etiam secundis dolet, ut Theophrastus interitum deplorans Callisthenis sodalis sui, rebus Alexandri prosperis

¹⁹ The collocation of πένθει καὶ θρήνοις is suggestive, since verse θρήνοι emphasized general reflections over personal feelings; cf. Harvey 1955 168–172: "their content is entirely gnomic and consolatory ... no wild tearing of the hair or floodgates of emotion; the mood is one of resignation and philosophic admonition."

angitur, itaque dicit Callisthenem incidisse in hominem summa potentia summaque fortuna, sed ignarum quem ad modum rebus secundis uti conveniret. Atqui, quem ad modum misericordia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus adversis, sic invidentia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus secundis. In quem igitur cadit misereri, in eundem etiam invidere; non cadit autem invidere in sapientem; ergo ne misereri quidem. [*Tusc.* 3.21 = 505 FHS&G]

Hence, pity and envy occur in the same person. For anyone who feels hurt at someone's misfortunes also feels hurt at someone's good fortune, just as Theophrastus, while deploring the death of his friend Callisthenes, is vexed at Alexander's success: thus, he says that Callisthenes encountered a man at the summit of power and success but ignorant of the proper way to handle good fortune. Yet in the same way as pity is distress at another's misfortunes, so envy is distress at another's good fortune. Hence, if pity occurs in a person, envy also occurs in him; but envy does not occur in a wise man; therefore, neither does pity occur in him.

The context is crucial. Cicero makes three claims about Theophrastus, one of which is patently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt that Theophrastus "deplored" the death of his friend, or that he held Alexander largely responsible (as the statement following *itaque* implies). He may even have elaborated this criticism of Alexander. But as Fortenbaugh observes, the intervening claim, that he envied or resented Alexander's success, is plainly an inference drawn to suit the thesis at hand.²⁰ For the Stoics, as Cicero explains, pity and envy are necessarily linked, since both derive from the same excessive concern for external goods and matters of fortune, whether bad or good (*adversis* or *secundis*). For Aristotelians, however, the two emotions are only loosely related. Both are reactions to how other people fare. But Aristotle restricts pity (ἔλεος) to undeserved ill, and hence bad luck or misfortune (*Rhet.* 2.8 1385b13–15), just as he restricts the "contrary" feeling of indignation (νέμεσις) to undeserved success or good luck (2.9 1386b8–15). Envy (φθονός), by contrast, is distress at others doing well without regard for their merit or desert (2.9 1386b16–20). Aristotle thus argues that pity and indignation occur in the same people, namely, those who are "decent" (χρηστός, b29) and "fair" (ἐπιεικής, b32), since both reflect a concern for justice, whereas envy and "malice" (ἐπιχαιρεκακία), as their "contraries", reflect contrary kinds of character (2.9 1386b25–87a5). In short, the same people are susceptible to pity and indignation, or malice

²⁰ Fortenbaugh 1984 235.

and envy, but not pity and envy. It is therefore at least misleading, and probably false, for Cicero (or his Stoic source) to allege that Theophrastus was “envious” of Alexander’s success.²¹

Cicero also implies that Theophrastus held Alexander responsible for his friend’s death. This verdict has three important implications. First, it minimizes any fault in Callisthenes. His own character and conduct certainly played some role in his demise. Aristotle himself is said to have worried about his nephew’s sharp tongue (Diog. Laert. 5.5, quoting *Il.* 18.95; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 54.1–2), and several anecdotes amply confirm his worry. But the decisive factor, according to Theophrastus in Cicero’s report, was his “encountering” (*incidisse*) someone who had immense power over the lives of everyone around him, but insufficient understanding of how to exercise that power (*ignarum* etc.).²² Second, if Callisthenes bears little blame for his fate, then his death was essentially undeserved, as it must be to warrant pity. Cicero is therefore on the mark in taking Theophrastus’ reaction of “deploring” as an example of pity. Finally, this account of Callisthenes’ fate exemplifies Aristotle’s analysis of “luck” or fortune (τύχη): not the intervention of a capricious deity or impersonal force, but simply an “incidental” encounter resulting from the intersection or collision of his own intentional actions with other forces beyond his control.²³ Cicero’s first report thus reveals why Theophrastus decried his colleague’s death, and why he considered it undeserved and a case of bad luck.

Cicero refers to the *Callisthenes* again in Book 5 of the *Tusculans*, where he addresses the same theme from a broader perspective. The thesis of Book 5 is that virtue alone is fully sufficient for *eudaimonia*, and Cicero contends that most philosophers agree, regardless of school, many on principle and most others in practice. But he singles out Theophrastus for criticism as a rare dissenting voice. Despite first pronouncing him “the most polished and learned of all philosophers” (*elegantissimus omnium philosophorum et eruditissimus*), Cicero reports that he was criticized for denying the sufficiency of virtue in two different works.

²¹ The equivocation is evident in Cicero’s use of *angitur* instead of *invidet*.

²² So Gigon 1958 189, paraphrasing Cicero: “das unschuldige Opfer eines Mannes ... der mit dem grossen ihm zugefallenen äusseren Gütern nicht recht umzugehen verstand.” Cf. Regenbogen 1940 1484.

²³ See *Phys.* 2.5; Cicero’s *incidisse* may reflect an original συμπεσεῖν or συμβεβηκέναι. Cf. Fortenbaugh 1984 232–233 for a contrast between Alexander’s hot temper and Callisthenes’ “sluggish nature” (νοθοῦ τὴν φύσιν, D.L. 5.39).

Vexatur autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit *De vita beata*, in quo multa disputat quam ob rem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur beatus esse non possit. ... [25] Vexatur idem Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum, quod in *Callisthene* suo laudarit illam sententiam: "Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia." Negant ab ullo philosopho quicquam dictum esse languidius. Recte id quidem, sed nihil intellego dici potuisse constantius. [*Tusc.* 5.24–25 = 493 FHS&G]

But he is assailed by all first for his book *On Eudaimonia*, in which he argues at length that someone who is tortured and tormented cannot be happy. ... The same Theophrastus is assailed in the books and lectures of all philosophers because in his *Callisthenes* he praised that well known verse: "Life is ruled by luck, not wisdom." They say no philosopher has said anything more feeble. That is correct, of course, but I know nothing more consistent could have been said.

Cicero makes two distinct claims here, one about what Theophrastus said in his work, and another about the criticism it provoked. But first, as he promptly admits, what Theophrastus said, even if feeble, was entirely "consistent" (cf. *constanter* in 5.24): if bodily and external goods are required for *eudaimonia*, as Cicero proceeds to explain, then luck (*fortuna*) can overwhelm intelligence (*consilium*), since luck is "mistress" (*domina*) of bodily and external affairs. Cicero and others echo this criticism elsewhere, and the explanation is always the same. After all, Theophrastus is consistent not only in both works here named but also with Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. More to the point, all that Theophrastus here concedes is that misfortune can ruin *eudaimonia*, not that it can undermine virtue. He made essentially the same concession in a sentence quoted in the *Consolation to Apollonius* (104c–d = 488 FHS&G), which could well come from the *Callisthenes*: "luck is inscrutable [ἄσχοπος] and formidable at undoing prior efforts and overturning supposed prosperity [εὐημερίαν] since it follows no regular schedule [καὶ οὐκ ὀνόματι τακτόν]." ²⁴ Luck, then, affects only the external factors in *eudaimonia*—what is here called "prosperity"—not the virtues of character and mind on which it rests. Applied to Callisthenes, this again implies respect for his character and conduct as well as an admission that he

²⁴ Cf. 487 FHS&G, Arist. *Phys.* 2.5 197a8–12 and Fortenbaugh 1984 213–214. In his *Ethics* (probably an "esoteric" treatise), Theophrastus "examined the question" (διαπορήσας) whether luck can also affect character, and he recited an anecdote about Pericles succumbing to superstition when afflicted by the plague (463 FHS&G = Plut. *Per.* 38.1–2). But the claim in 488 FHS&G, which is preserved in a *Consolatio* and among excerpts from Crantor's *On Mourning*, is more likely to come from the *Callisthenes*; cf. Kassel 1958 35, citing Rohde 1900 300.

came to a “bad” end; and it counts his end as “bad” only because his life was suddenly cut short, not because he was corrupted or did anything dishonorable or wrong. This also fits well with Cicero’s claim in Book 3 that Theophrastus “deplored” his friend’s death, where the context requires that “deplored” count as a case of pity. Whatever Theophrastus may have felt about his friend, both reports imply that his work presented the death of Callisthenes as undeserved.

The only other explicit reference to the *Callisthenes* occurs at the end of a short essay “On fate,” the last in a loosely related collection appended to Alexander’s *De anima* and now called the *Mantissa*. After sketching his own account of fate as “nothing other than each individual’s own nature [τὴν οἰκείαν ... φύσιν ἐκάστου]” (185.11), Alexander cites two uses of the term “fate” in Aristotle (from *Mete.* 1.14 and *Phys.* 5.6) to corroborate his account (186.13–28), then cites Theophrastus and an unidentified Polyzelus.

φανερῶτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσιν ταῦτόν ὃν τὸ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει, καὶ Πολύζηλος δὲ ἐν τῷ οὕτως ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περί εἰμαρμένης συγγράμματι. [*Mantissa* 25, 186.28–31 = 504 FHS&G]

Theophrastus also shows very clearly in the *Callisthenes* that what is fated is the same as what is natural, and so does Polyzelos in the work entitled *On Fate*.

This bald report, though not very informative, is probably reliable. The scholarship in the essay is generally sound. Discussions of untimely death had long prompted talk about “fate” (cf. *Phd.* 115a). And a very similar view is ascribed to Theophrastus in the doxographic tradition, where the “nature” in question is specified as an individual’s, in line with the view advanced here (Stob. 1.6.17c = 503 FHS&G): Theophrastus “is brought in a way to the view that each individual’s nature is fated” (φέρεται δὲ πως εἰς τὸ εἰμαρμένην εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν).²⁵ The cautious phrasing of φέρεται πως implies inference and paraphrase, and Fortenbaugh, in a careful analysis of the two passages, concludes that Theophrastus “höchstwahrscheinlich” included “individual nature” among the factors governing conduct and “in diesem Zusammenhang das Wort εἰμαρμένην auf eine eindrucksvolle Weise gebraucht hat.”²⁶ What Theophrastus had in mind is less clear. The *Mantissa* essay equates “individual nature” with tem-

²⁵ Syntax (an articular infinitive with feminine subject) favors taking εἰμαρμένην (in predicate position and lacking an article) as the participle “fated” rather than the substantive “fate.” Diels assigned this excerpt to Aëtius (1.29.4), but it may come rather from Arius Didymus; see Runia 1996 376.

²⁶ Fortenbaugh 1984 231, cf. 1979.

perament, and in the analysis that precedes the citations of Aristotle and Theophrastus, it sketches four examples: temerity, intemperance, perseverance, and greed (185.21–33; cf. Alex. *De fato* 6). The essay also argues that such traits, since they shape our behavior, can have dramatic impact on “both people’s lives and their downfalls [καὶ οἱ βίοι καὶ αἱ τῶν βίων καταστροφαί]” (185.14–26; cf. *De fato* 170.9–21)—and such “downfalls” are just “fate” in the traditional sense of fatality.

We cannot be sure that Theophrastus advanced a similar account; and even if he did, we can only speculate about how he might have applied it to the case of Callisthenes—or Alexander—if he did. On the other hand, this or a similar account would harmonize well with the Aristotelian analysis of “luck” as an “incidental cause”: as the intersection of one person’s deliberate action with other actions, events, or circumstances outside his immediate control (cf. συμπίπτουσιν in 186.1 and *incidisse* in *Tusc.* 3.21). Moreover, as the essay *On the Life and Poetry of Homer* puts it, Theophrastus recognized—along with Homer, Plato, and Aristotle—that we have only partial control over the outcome even of our deliberate actions: “not everything occurs by fate; ... the necessitated is linked to the voluntary, whenever someone does what he wants but encounters [ἐμπέσῃ] something he does not want” (2.120 = 502 FHS&G). Such situations, of course, still leave plenty of room for praise or blame, depending on how people handle or face their fate. Callisthenes, in particular, spoke out decisively and eloquently when confronted with conduct he found morally repugnant. Neither what occasioned his response nor the terrible penalty it incurred lay within his control. The response itself, however, was both deliberate and principled, and even if tactless or imprudent as some accounts charge, plainly honorable and courageous. In all the many reports of his gruesome end, in fact, he fully adheres to the standard he had himself set for Aristotle’s father-in-law: he “did nothing unworthy of philosophy” (*Hermias* fr. 2).

3. *Integrity* in extremis

Thus far, all of the direct evidence for the *Callisthenes* is compatible with a eulogy, though we have no indication of how any of this material figured in the work as a whole—in a dedicatory prelude, as a central theme, or only in passing. But even this very limited conclusion invites two broader questions. First, what place does *eudaimonia*

have in a eulogy? Second, how is it related to the ostensible topic of mourning?

The first question has an obvious and tempting answer. Aristotle distinguishes three general categories of praise: *enkomia* for specific deeds and achievements; *epainoi* for virtues, talents, and other general traits; and best of all, *makarismos* or *eudaimonismos* for a union of character, talent, achievement, and overall well-being.²⁷ Only the third kind asserts that the *laudandus* has attained—and maintained—*eudaimonia*. Theophrastus could thus extol Callisthenes for his deeds and for his talents, integrity, and intelligence, yet deplore his lack, or more likely, his loss of *eudaimonia* occasioned by his untimely—and undeserved—demise.

But this raises another question: Whose *eudaimonia* was at issue? If Callisthenes', then were listeners and readers expected to admire the man and his deeds but mourn his premature death? Or perhaps a discussion of mourning was likelier to focus on the lives of the bereaved, his friends and relatives? Theophrastus could then have argued that Callisthenes died *eudaimon*, at least to console those who mourned his loss. But that would be to minimize the impact of misfortune on their lives, which is precisely what Cicero criticizes Theophrastus for emphasizing (*Tusc.* 5.24–25). Most likely, then, it was the *eudaimonia* of Callisthenes that was in question. However, if luck was to have a decisive influence on his life, as Cicero in *Tusc.* 5.25 implies it did, he had to meet any other conditions necessary for *eudaimonia*; hence, he must have both possessed and exercised the requisite virtues. In that case, his life must have been *eudaimon* until he died—or at least until his situation with Alexander became untenable. His loss of *eudaimonia* would then have come very late in life, and lasted very briefly.

This sharpens my second question: What has any of this to do with mourning? The subtitle adopts the perspective of the bereaved, which suggests some consideration of how they should respond. In general terms, the answer to that question is clear: they should honor the deceased. But how to do so—what honors to offer and how—is far from clear. Which among those listed by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 1.5, for example, should be emphasized? Moreover, to focus on honoring Callisthenes would limit the work to topical interest. After all, eulogy typically has loftier ambitions; admiration endures only if the dead exemplify perennial virtues. Its primary aim is not to console, which

²⁷ *Eth. Nic.* 1.12, *Eth. Eud.* 2.1 1219b8–16, *Rhet.* 1.9 1367b28–36.

serves only the bereaved and only their immediate needs, but to articulate a more general picture of the kinds of control we have over our lives, and not only the limits of our control but also its basis and potential. Precisely this question is the focus of a passage from Theophrastus paraphrased by Vitruvius, and although he cites no title, it harmonizes very well with the rest of our evidence for the *Callisthenes*.

Namque ea vera praesidia sunt vitae quibus neque fortunae tempestas iniqua neque publicarum rerum mutatio neque belli vastatio potest nocere. Non minus eam sententiam augendo Theophrastus hortando doctos potius esse quam pecuniae confidentes ita ponit:²⁸ doctum ex omnibus solum neque in alienis locis peregrinum neque amissis familiaribus et necessariis inopem amicorum sed in omni civitate esse civem difficilesque fortunae sine timore posse despicere casus; at qui non doctrinarum sed felicitatis praesidiis putaret se esse vallatum, labidis itineribus vadentem non stabili sed infirma conflictari vita. [*De arch.* 6 praef. 2 = 491 FHS&G]

For life's true safeguards are those that neither the unfair storms of fortune nor change in government, nor the devastation of war can harm. Amplifying this view no less [sc. than Aristippus in the preceding lines], and exhorting us to be learned rather than trusting in wealth, Theophrastus puts it thus: only a learned man is neither an alien in a foreign land nor destitute of companions when away from family and friends, but rather a citizen in every country and able to scorn without fear the difficult occurrences of fortune. But if anyone believes himself to be fortified by the safeguards not of learning but of prosperity, he rushes along slippery paths buffeted in a life not secure but unstable.

This contrast between fortune and intelligence would be at home in many contexts, and the passage could obviously come from any number of other works: *On Eudaimonia*, *On Prosperity*, or *On a King's Education*, to name only the most obvious candidates among the numerous titles ascribed to Theophrastus. Yet both the central antithesis and the specific vicissitudes cited to highlight it fit Callisthenes remarkably well. The "storms of fortune" had certainly treated him more "unfairly" than most. The destruction of Olynthus by Philip in 348 deprived him of his homeland and probably most or all of his immediate family early in his life (cf. n. 3 above). His travels with Aristotle in the following years exposed him repeatedly to "change in govern-

²⁸ The syntax is awkward and the text may be corrupt; emending at least one of the two gerunds to present participles (*augendo* to *agens* and perhaps also *hortando* to *hortans*) would improve things considerably, and I translate accordingly. I thank Jen Ebbeler for help on this point.

ment." Then, on Alexander's campaigns, he witnessed "war's devastation" continually for seven extremely hazardous years. Yet even in these "foreign lands," ever more remote from "family and friends" in Greece, he was never an "alien" or "destitute of companions." On the contrary, according to Plutarch, his "orderly, dignified, and self-sufficient" bearing appealed to the older men in Alexander's inner circle (Plut. *Alex.* 53.1, cf. 52.3–4, 54.3, Arr. *Anab.* 4.12.1); both his character and his learning also won over many of the young Macedonian elite who served as Alexander's bodyguards (Arr. *Anab.* 4.10.3–4, 4.13.1–2, cf. 4.14.2, Plut. *Alex.* 53.1); and as his fatal protest against "obseisance" demonstrates, he both maintained and championed a "citizen's" autonomy to the bitter end. His very independence, in fact, led to his downfall, when some of the bodyguards who most admired him were caught plotting to assassinate Alexander. Yet throughout, as Theophrastus here claims, this "learned" man—historian, naturalist, teacher, and intellectual—faced fortune "fearlessly," not without suffering, of course, but "scorning" any price he might pay for upholding values and principles he cherished more than life itself.

This veritable eulogy of an intellectual's life clearly fits Callisthenes well. Whether it did in fact appear in the work that Theophrastus dedicated to his memory we are unlikely ever to know, unless relevant parts of the work are someday recovered. Even if it was modeled on him, it could still be a reminiscence from another, later work by Theophrastus. But two other details provide further links specifically to the *Callisthenes*.²⁹ One is the negative side of the central antithesis: opposite the learned man, secure in his convictions, stands one who trusts in prosperity. The same contrast, we may recall, is at the heart of Cicero's passing reference in *Tusc.* 3.21. Indeed, just as the positive model here fits Callisthenes, so the negative model fits Alexander in turn: someone "at the summit of power and success [*fortuna*]" but ignorant of how he should handle good fortune [*rebus secundis*]," in Cicero's paraphrase of Theophrastus' description of him, and trusting in his "prosperity" (*felicitas*), in Vitruvius' paraphrase, while "rushing along slippery paths."

A second link suggests that these parallels are not simply variations on a standard topos. In Cicero's only other explicit reference to the *Callisthenes*, he reproaches Theophrastus for approving a verse

²⁹ A third possible link is at least suggestive: Vitruvius, in describing Theophrastus as "amplifying" his thesis and "exhorting" readers, ascribes to the work a distinctly rhetorical orientation, which is better suited to the protreptic aims of a eulogy than a treatise.

which he renders into Latin as “Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia” (*Tusc.* 5.25). The charge suits Cicero’s contention there that Theophrastus conceded too much influence over our lives to fortune, and specifically that he denied that virtue or virtuous activity is sufficient for *eudaimonia*. That general criticism is on the mark, as I observed above, but superb advocate that he was, Cicero stretches his evidence, ever so slightly, but decisively. For in translating the crucial verse, he correctly captures the iambic meter but exaggerates the sense tendentiously. The Greek original of the verse was widely cited, and it comes from a play by Chaeremon, an early fourth-century tragedian quoted by Theophrastus twice elsewhere.³⁰

τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ’ οὐκ εὐβουλία. [Stob. 1.6.7 = fr. 2 *TrGF* 71]

The affairs of mortals are luck, not good planning.

Cicero’s translation runs awry at two points, each natural and trivial on its own but jointly significant. In supplying a verb, he adds a reference to control (*regit*) absent from the original; and in changing “good planning” to “wisdom,” he bends the verse to suit his Stoicizing argument, which equates wisdom with virtue. The result is a sharper antithesis, but one that distorts Chaeremon’s point. The original contrast of luck and planning centers on external outcomes (taking *πράγματα* in an Aristotelian sense), much as in Robert Burns’ proverbial lines on “the best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men.” Human endeavors depend on luck in many ways, most strikingly in how they turn out, but not in every way. Cicero’s version shifts the focus to an ethical plane and advances the despairing thesis that wisdom is useless. The difference is stylistically subtle but philosophically substantial. Aristotelians like Theophrastus accept the truism behind Chaeremon’s antithesis, that planning can never ensure success; but they reject the implication of Cicero’s stronger version, that wisdom and virtue are therefore worthless. On the contrary, the passage in Vitruvius shows Theophrastus exhorting us to cultivate learning and intelligence precisely on the ground that they alone enable us to face anything life may bring with fortitude and integrity.³¹

³⁰ *HP* 5.9.4 cites fr. 39 (not attested elsewhere) on the date-palm, and *Eroticus* 559 FHS&G transfers fr. 16 on wine to *eros* (cf. *Prob.* 3.16). Chaeremon is also singled out by Aristotle for his graphic style (*Rhet.* 3.12 1413b11–14) and metrical innovation (*Poet.* 1 1447b20–23, 24 1460a1–2); see Collard 1970 24–25.

³¹ The idea is vividly expressed by Aristotle in *Eth. Nic.* 1.10: even in extreme adversity, “nobility shines forth when someone bears many great misfortunes with

Chaeremon's verse is widely cited in other sources, and a brief survey of its afterlife lends some modest support to my account of its significance for Theophrastus and Callisthenes. Although the original context of the verse is lost, the play in which it appeared apparently centered on an ominous parallel to Alexander and Callisthenes: Achilles slaying Thersites for impugning his respect for an Amazon queen.³² Cicero claims that Theophrastus "praised" (*laudavit*) the verse. If that is true (which is far from certain), it implies that he not only quoted or paraphrased the verse but also endorsed its thesis, though in what context or for what purpose we do not know. The sentiment was clearly popular, and Chaeremon's formulation is echoed repeatedly. It provides the keynote for a polemical essay "on luck" ascribed to Plutarch (*Fort.* 97c), and it survives still in Alci-phron (*Epist.* 3.8.3) and Libanius (*Or.* 25.11). Three allusions from the mid-4th century predate the death of Callisthenes by two decades or so. Aristophanes' son Nicostratus borrows the first hemistich for a toast to "good luck" in his comic *Pandrosus* (fr. 18 KA), presumably a burlesque of Attic myth, and clearly in a parodic context. The Athenian in Plato's *Laws* (written c. 350) paraphrases the verse in summarizing popular distrust of planning and foresight (4 709b). And Demosthenes, in his second *Olynthiac* (delivered late in 349) urges the Assembly to action by arguing that Philip may be lucky, but Athens is far more so, and "luck has great weight, rather it is everything in all human affairs" (*Or.* 2.22).³³

The most intriguing echo is a direct quotation, a decade or so after Callisthenes' death, in Menander's *Aspis*, itself a play about drastic reversals of fortune. There is no need to recount the tangled plot here. Suffice it to recall the central ploy. A wily slave forestalls his master's greedy brother by pretending the master is dying of sorrow. The slave emerges from their house wailing and spouting sententious lines from tragedy (cf. *Asp.* 324): first the famous opening verse of Euripides' *Sthenobolia* (fr. 661) in *Asp.* 407 (cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 1217),

equanimity, not due to insensitivity but because of his integrity and great heartedness" (1100b30–33). A reminiscence of his nephew and father-in-law is not at all implausible.

³² As Callisthenes reproached Alexander for promoting foreign customs—including perhaps his recent marriage to the Bactrian princess Rhoxane? For Chaeremon's play, cited in Stobaeus as *Achilles Thersiktonos* (fr. 2) but as *Thersites* in the *Suda* (fr. 3), see Collard 1970 26.

³³ The line also appears in a letter to Alexander in a Hellenistic version of the Alexander romance (*Alex. Epist.* 13.6 Merkelbach = *PSI* 1285 2.16)—a work later ascribed to none other than Callisthenes.

then Chaeremon's verse in 411 (cf. Men. *Monost.* 725), followed in rapid succession by a notorious pair of verses from Aeschylus' *Niobe* (fr. 154a15–16 Radt) in 412–413 (cf. Plat. *Rep.* 380a), three verses from Carcinus (fr. 5a) in 416–418, the incipit of Euripides' *Orestes* in 424–425, two more verses from Chaeremon (fr. 42) in 426–427, and finally another from the *Orestes* (232) in 432. The result is a virtuoso display of *paratragodia* composed by a celebrated student of Theophrastus, only a decade or so after he had cited Chaeremon's verse in response to a genuine personal tragedy. The larger joke in Menander is that the tragic verses are ironically apt as well as absurd. Presiding over the play as a tutelary deity is none other than Lady Luck, Tyche herself, who announces in a delayed prologue that she is "in control of everything" (147–148). And indeed, the plot does turn on some implausibly fortuitous events. Yet ingenuity remains the driving force of the play: only the "good planning" (εὐβουλία in 411 = fr. 2) of the slave delays events long enough to avert a miserable outcome. The play thus illustrates the interplay of "luck" and clever planning—and especially decisions governed by intelligence and integrity—which is at the center of what remains of the *Callisthenes*. In neither case is luck or Fortune portrayed as random chance or accident but rather as the convergence of multiple lines of voluntary human action, each largely independent but essentially deliberate. Chaeremon's verse, as even the poet probably recognized, is simply a pointed expression of standard tragic sentiment: a poignant denial of human control in the face of imminent danger, misfortune, or loss (cf. Chaeremon fr. 19, preceding 503 FHS&G). The denial is exaggerated, according to Theophrastus, but recognition of the underlying truth can be both reassuring and inspiring for those left in the lurch.

The evidence for Theophrastus' *Callisthenes* is scanty and elusive, but suggestive when seen in context. It is also consistent. Two points of Aristotelian doctrine emerge. One comes from the theory of causation, which analyzes luck as "incidental" events in human affairs, or the intersection of deliberate action and external factors. The other is the fundamental ethical thesis that virtue and intelligence are essential for a genuinely good life but not always enough—necessary but not sufficient for *eudaimonia*, which major disruptions can impede, prevent, or overthrow. In Callisthenes' case, the disruption came from Alexander, whose extraordinary success and passionate temperament strained many traditional Hellenic customs and norms to the breaking point, and often beyond. These two theoretical points, I suggest, buttressed a third, which is what makes this an apt topic

for the present volume. Doctrine also served rhetorical purposes, no doubt in homage to a friend and colleague, whom Theophrastus could scarcely not have presented in this context as an exemplar of moral and intellectual virtues. That is not to say that the *Callisthenes* was a partisan panegyric, any more than it was a diatribe against Alexander or Macedonian rule. Rather, I suggest, it presented a philosophically grounded model of rectitude, learning, and integrity—a model dedicated, as the title implies, to an essentially good man, gentleman, scholar, and friend of Theophrastus.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TOPICS OF VITUPERATION: SOME COMMONPLACES OF 4TH-CENTURY ORATORY

THOMAS M. CONLEY

I decided to talk about this subject because I got tired of hearing that no one has paid attention to it, not in antiquity and not in modern times. This is patently false, of course. It may be true that there exists no treatise comparable to Menander Rhetor's *On Epideictic*, but Aristotle is quite clear about the topical resources to be employed in *psogos*—the contraries of goods and virtues that *epideixis* praises (*Rhetoric* 1.9 1366a36–b22, 1368a36–37); and Anaximenes devotes part of a chapter to the subject (*Rh. Al.* 35 1441b15–29). Neither, however, offers a very detailed or informative account of actual oratorical performance, as we shall see. In modern times, Süß¹ provides a list of *topoi* of blame or censure in his study on rhetorical *êthos*; Vögelin's inaugural dissertation² covers Lysias and cross-references Lysianic material with other orators' speeches; and Severin Koster's *Die Invektive in der griechischen und römischen Literatur*³ offers a brief survey of the ancient Greek tradition of insult and abuse. Hermann Wankel shows that charges of political corruption (vote stealing, bribery, and the rest) are so ubiquitous as to qualify as commonplaces, with the consequence that scholars should be very careful about taking such charges seriously.⁴ But no one, to my knowledge, has stepped back, as it were, and taken a broad look at the pattern of abuse in Greek oratory or thought very deeply about what a study of topics of vituperation can teach us about rhetoric in general.⁵ I don't claim here to be able to do much to set things straight, but I think I can sketch out some directions in which rethinking the matter might proceed.

¹ Süß 1910 247–256.

² Voegelin 1943.

³ Koster 1980 41–96.

⁴ Cf. Wankel 1982.

⁵ I make no exception of Phillip Harding's study of "Comedy and Rhetoric" 1994.

What I am calling “vituperation” embraces a number of Greek terms, not just *psogos*, but *loidoria*, *katêgoria*, and *kakologia*, among others. “Vituperation” is generally aimed at two classes of individuals, “lowlifes” and “hot shots”. “Lowlifes”, *ponêroi*, are people who can be charged with embarrassing lineages (mother a whore, father a Scythian), low-class occupations (sausage-seller, cobbler), ugliness, uselessness to the City, and lack of refinement. “Hot shots”, *hybristeis*, are responsible for violent and cruel actions, sexual perversion, drunkenness and gluttony, being supercilious, impiety, taking bribes, anti-democratic sympathies, and, in general, shamelessness.⁶ This, of course, is only a sample. As you can see, too, the two classes are not mutually exclusive: an opponent may be accused of being a lowlife who acts like a hotshot, as severe an indictment as there is. There is, besides, another, more specific class that can be included in both of these general ones: *sykophantes*, usually “vexatious litigator”, but the word covers a range of disreputable qualities.⁷

One thing these lists make clear is that simply listing the contraries of virtues Aristotle counts as deserving of praise in *Rhetoric* 1.9—even if we add to those certain qualities he says are typical of wrongdoers in 1.12, the brief discussion of *hybris* in 2.2 (1378b22 ff., 1379b7 ff.), and of shame and shamelessness in 2.6 (e.g. 1383b17 ff.)—fails to capture the richness of the Greek traditions of insult and abuse. If we were to add Aristophanes to the mix—or even various exchanges in some of the tragedies—we might get closer. I won’t include Aristophanes—though surely his is the first name that comes to mind in connection with vituperation—except in passing, however, and I won’t depend upon Aristotle as my guide. I want rather to look briefly at a very limited sample from what remains of fourth-century oratory.

We should probably be clear also about the occasional difficulties that arise in trying to locate commonplaces among the items we have listed. That is, it is obviously not the case that every time we see an assertion that one’s opponent is guilty of bribe-taking we are seeing an appeal to a commonplace. Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Aeschines all accuse Demosthenes of taking bribes, so there are good reasons

⁶ The best general survey of Athenian values is still Dover’s *Greek Popular Morality* 1974.

⁷ The etymology of the word is itself vexatious. See the interesting—and informative—exchange between Robin Osborne and David Harvey 1990. More recently, there is a penetrating examination of the question by Lene Rubenstein 2000 198–212. [Cf. M. Christ 1998. DCM].

to believe that they are stating what their audiences would accept as a simple matter of fact. Likewise, Lysias' Euphiletos (in Or. 1, *On the Killing of Eratosthenes*) is not appealing to a commonplace when he accuses Eratosthenes of committing adultery, but rather making a specific charge in his defense. So we have to be careful not to assume that any time someone accuses someone else of being a bastard or of being guilty of *hybris*, we are seeing a commonplace being deployed. There are similar problems with charges of "sykophancy". Are the accusations made at Antiphon 5.80, Andocides 1.99–101, Lysias 6.31 (*Against Andocides*, probably not by Lysias, in fact) and 7.20–21 matters of actual fact, or just commonplaces?

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that many of the grounds for vituperation tend to cluster together, which may be an indication that what we are seeing is topical invention, not simply allegations of fact. True, Dinarchus 1, *Against Demosthenes*, harps pretty much on a single theme, Demosthenes' alleged political corruption—taking bribes in particular. But in Dinarchus 3, *Against Philocles*, for instance, we see charges made of a wider array of faults: *ponêria* (although not the "lowlife" variety), shamelessness, greed, theft, and damage to the city.⁸ Lysias 3, *Against Simon*, lists, in addition to *hybris*, drunken and violent actions, and *ponêria*; and Demosthenes 54, *Against Conon*, argues that Conon should be convicted because he is guilty of drunken and violent acts, sexual perversion, and committing acts of *hybris*. In Demosthenes 45, *Against Stephanos*, especially at §§ 71–82, we hear Apollodoros expressing his revulsion at Phormio's brutal and violent actions, sexual debauchery, shamelessness, and barbarian birth. Demosthenes and Aeschines accuse one another of being thieves, deformed, aliens, and violent. After a while, the clusters seem to form with almost predictable regularity, an indication that we are not seeing mere name-calling (of which there is plenty, to be sure, as at Aeschines 2.40, where Demosthenes is called

⁸ The general tone of this speech is captured in this passage from § 18: τὸν δὲ μιὰρὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ προδότην, ὃν οὐχ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ζητήσασα ἀποπέφαγκε χρήματ' ἔχειν καθ' ὑμῶν, ὃς οὐσίαν ἔχων πολλὴν καὶ παίδων ἀρρένων οὐκ ὄντων αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δεόμενος ὢν ἂν ἄνθρωπος μέτριος δεηθεῖν, οὐκ ἀπέσχετο χρημάτων διδομένων κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο τὴν ἔμφυτον πονηρίαν... ("[so will you acquit] this abominable (μιὰρὸν) man and traitor, reported not by a single accuser but by the entire council of the Areopagus after a thorough investigation of taking bribes against your interest; who, though he has plenty for himself and no sons and lacks nothing else a normal person could need, did not turn down the bribes offered him against his homeland or suppress his natural depravity (ἔμφυτον πονηρίαν)...?").

κέρκωψ, παιπάλημα, and παλίμβολος), but conventional constructs.⁹ How persuasive Athenian audiences found these constructs is not entirely clear. Demosthenes charges Androtion with having engaged in prostitution (22.21 f.), of inheriting *atimia* from his father, a fugitive debtor (34 ff.), of committing acts of *hybris* and brutality (52, 58, 68), and with shamelessness (75) and impiety (78); but Androtion was evidently acquitted.¹⁰

What is more, the vituperation passages in the speeches we have are often framed by (sometimes long) reminders of and appeals to traditional Attic values, to the virtuous forbearers, to the makers of law, especially Solon himself (e.g., Dinarchus 3.21 f.; Aeschines 1.6–36 and 3.168–170; Demosthenes 19.256–259, 22.25–32, 24.34–38, 59.74–77). These appeals are obviously intended to provide such a contrast with the opponent being abused as to mark him (or her, in the case of Neaira) as an intolerable deviant. Not every speech we have relies on vituperation for making its case. But those that do may explain why we see in speeches in response the apparent boasting of community service rendered; for a record of sustaining *leitourgiai* would be an indication of non-deviant status.¹¹ It would clearly not do for someone whose mother was called Empousa (as Aeschines' was) simply to stand up and say, "No she wasn't!"

In many speeches, charges of *kakourgia* or *ponêria* seem to boil down to classic instances of what came to be known in rhetorical handbooks as *paradiastolê*, "rhetorical redefinition", whereby one and the same quality or action can be subject to opposite interpretations.¹² Hence, one man's *andreia* is another man's *tolma*; one man's *mellêsis* another's *deilia*. The "facts", as it were, do not speak for themselves. Aeschines accuses Timarchus of being a sykophant (1.1) and of being guilty of *hybris* (§§ 62, 108, 116, 188). He has a history, moreover, of "prostitution" (§§ 40, 154, and *passim*), a point important for Aeschines' main argument. Somewhat more gratuitously, Aeschines

⁹ The meanings of these words are not clear, but I suspect there are obscene connotations. At one level, they are all ways of accusing Demosthenes of sophistic duplicity. But Hesychius tells us that one meaning of κέρκωψ is ἀνδρείων αἰδοῖον ("prick"); but we also know that the *Cercopes* of mythology were tricksters and liars, so the word may have both connotations here. παιπάλημα has connotations of masturbation (thus, "wanker") and παλίμβολος ("often sold") of one who has hired out various body parts. It also has connotations of deceit. Maxwell-Stuart 1975 7–12 interprets these words a bit differently.

¹⁰ See Harding 1976.

¹¹ See Johnstone 1999 93–108.

¹² Kowalski 1928 remains quite useful.

makes similar charges against Demosthenes (2.23, 88, etc. *On the Embassy*, and 3.162 *Against Ctesiphon*). Now we all know that erotic relationships between older men and younger men were common and accepted. There is no reason to doubt that both Timarchus and Demosthenes had such relations when they were young. True, effeminacy was looked down upon, as numerous passages in Aristophanes make abundantly clear. But when you come down to it, both noble lovers (to borrow the terminology of Plato's *Phaedrus*) and base lovers committed the same sexual acts with one another, and it was normal to, say, exchange gifts. "Love"? or "Prostitution"?¹³ In the same way, rhetorical ineptitude could be seen as, on the one hand, a sign of lack of refinement (*apeirokolia*) or, on the other, of honesty and forthrightness; and by the same token skill in speaking could be seen as a sign of good breeding or as grounds for vilification.

Stepping back a little further from our texts, it appears that, with their enumerations of vices and praise of the past, these speeches are implicated in a bit of genre-bending. Demosthenes and Aeschines don't seem concerned to stick to the issues Aristotle authorizes forensic or deliberative rhetoric to deal with, for instance, but (sometimes gleefully) work in *topoi* usually associated with epideictic rhetoric. It seems quite normal, in fact, to do this. Aristotle understood this, I think, but is rather constrained by the classification he sets up in *Rhetoric* 1.3; and Aristotle tends to stand by his classifications.

But we can draw a couple of lessons from this apparent "genre-bending". The first is that the very common assumptions about the integrity of rhetorical genres must be discarded—and not only in the context of fourth-century Attic oratory. The second draws on the pervasive infiltration of "epideictic" *topoi* of praise and blame into forensic oratory and suggests that such infiltration is not only permissible, but essential. In fact, it calls into question not only Aristotle's classification of genres but the hierarchy of genres he holds to, in which symbouleutic oratory is the most "noble", with forensic and epideictic falling far behind—or below. Cicero was probably not the first to see the flaw in such a hierarchy, but he is the first I know of to explain why it is epideictic rhetoric that is the most "noble" and prior to the others. How, he asks himself in his *Partitiones oratoriae* (§§ 70 ff.), can we determine what is just or good (that toward which the issue of expediency is directed) without having first a sense of what is "good" (so praiseworthy) and "bad"

¹³ On this side of Athenian social thinking, see, e.g., Cohen 1991 175–202.

(blameworthy)? That is, it is a mistake to imagine that legal cases or policy debates are “value-free”, in the sense that proper conclusions can be arrived at by a sort of logical calculus alone (whence also the genius of Cicero’s definition of “*argumentum*” at §5: *probabile inventum ad faciendum fidem*, instead of Aristotle’s συλλογισμός τις [1355a8]).

We have to be careful at this point not to conclude that rhetoric in general or epideictic rhetoric in particular is simply emotional appeal. To be sure, epideictic seeks to make audiences feel good about something—to admire it—and the instances of vituperation we have seen are nothing if not emotional. But vituperation is not just an expression of, say, Aeschines’ feelings toward Demosthenes. He wants his audience to feel that way, too; and he cannot cast his abuse in terms other than communal values, values he knows he can assume his audience to share and which he may try to reinforce—not to create—by bringing up the glories of the Athenian past, which is perhaps the most pervasive commonplace of all in fourth-century Attic oratory. But I submit that the way he does that is not so much to try to bring the audience over to his side as to establish that he is on *their* side, whereas Demosthenes is not.

So the vituperation we find in the speeches is not necessarily a reflection of the speakers’ true feelings, but probably more just “part of the game” (of politics); and we are not seeing in vituperation an attempt to arouse the audience’s emotions, but something like what we see in, e.g., the sharp exchanges that come up in British parliamentary debate (something we very seldom see in the United States Congress), a *performance* of communal values.¹⁴

Looking at the topics of vituperation from this perspective, we can see some larger implications for many of the prevailing views of how rhetoric works and what it is for. The most common rhetorical scenario I know of envisions a speaker standing up before a largely inert group of people and trying to influence them—the well-known “bullet theory” of persuasion, which has orators conveying or transferring their feelings and/or beliefs to passive audiences. This view posits a distinctly adversarial or confrontational relationship between speaker and audience that requires the speaker to overcome the defenses of the audience and get them over to the speaker’s side. But in fact even this unilateral and asymmetric model can work only when there is a considerable amount of prior “complicity” on

¹⁴ On “performative” aspects of Athenian trials, see Hall 1995.

the part of the audience, what Kenneth Burke pointed to years ago as “identification”.¹⁵ This “identification” operates at various levels simultaneously—at the level of a shared sense of cultural and social identity, at the level of agreement about the reasons for and ends of a particular rhetorical situation, and at the consequent level of the conventional norms of behavior in play at that moment. We are not always “jurors”, but we can be when we want or need to be.

Taking a broad view of topics of vituperation, then, we see that what appears at first glance to be the most adversarial and emotional sort of rhetoric turns out to be something quite different, something just as involved in the assertion of communal values as its contrary, epideictic; and something that cannot exist without its contrary, the rhetoric of praise. Both are, at base, endorsements of popular morality, although vituperation, like satire, is an implicit and indirect way of doing that.

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¹⁵ See Burke’s *A Rhetoric of Motives* 1969, especially 19f. and 55–65.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE EMOTION IN ARISTOTLE *RHETORIC* 2.7: GRATITUDE, NOT KINDNESS¹

DAVID KONSTAN

In chapters two to eleven of the second book of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle analyzes a series of emotions or *pathê* that the orator must know how to arouse and assuage. In chapter two, he treats anger (*orgê*), in chapter three what we may call “calming down” (*praiusis* is the term Aristotle coins for this condition) or perhaps “self-satisfaction”,² in four love and hate, in five fear, in six shame, in eight pity, in nine indignation (*νέμεσᾶν*), in ten envy, and in eleven the emulous impulse he calls *zêlos*. The reader will have noticed that I skipped chapter seven (1385a16–1385b11), although it too treats *apathos*. The object of the present paper is to determine just what emotion is under discussion in this chapter.

To go by the translations and commentaries on this section, the answer would seem to be entirely clear, for they are unanimous on this score—or rather, have been until the recent edition by Christof Rapp,³ which appeared just after I had given the talk on which this paper is based. The present contribution may be regarded as an expansion and independent confirmation of Rapp’s thesis, which must take pride of place as the first detailed published defense of the view put forward below.⁴

Here, for example, is the first sentence of chapter seven in Roberts’ translation, published in the Bollingen series edited by Jonathan Barnes:⁵ “To take Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind.”

¹ I wish to thank David Mirhady for his valuable comments on this paper, which saved me from at least one serious error; I am also grateful to the participants in the colloquium honoring, and not least the honorand himself, for lively discussion and suggestions.

² Konstan 2003.

³ Rapp 2002 *ad loc.*

⁴ Rapp notes that Striker 1996 301n. 15 had already adumbrated this position; I regret to say that I had not noticed Striker’s comment.

⁵ Barnes 1984 2207.

And the chapter concludes in Roberts' version: "So much for kindness and unkindness." The subject of the chapter, then, is precisely kindness. Or again, consider George Kennedy's translation of the opening and closing sentences:⁶ "To whom people show kindness and for what reasons and in what state of mind will be clear [to us] after having defined *charis*;" and, "This finishes the discussion of being kindly and being unkindly." Kennedy's head note to the chapter reads: "*Charis* has a number of meanings in Greek—'kindliness,' 'benevolence,' 'good will,' 'a favor,' 'gratitude,' 'grace' ... Aristotle's definition in section 2 makes it clear that he is speaking about an altruistic feeling of kindness or benevolence that at a particular time gratuitously moves a person to do something for another." It could not be clearer. Or take Cope's commentary:⁷ "χάρις, the πάθος, or instinctive emotion, of which this chapter treats, represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested to another, or to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to return favours received." In what amounts to a translation of the opening sentence (88), Cope writes: "the object of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions (on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have defined benevolence." To be absolutely unambiguous, Cope adds that "'gratitude' and 'ingratitude' are not distinctly noticed in the chapter."

Permit me to belabor the point a little longer. The great Spanish linguist Antonio Tovar⁸ renders the opening phrase: "A quiénes se hace favor y sobre cuáles cosas, o en qué disposición, resultará claro una vez que hayamos definido el favor." The Penguin edition⁹ begins: "To what people men show favour," etc. The Budé version¹⁰ runs: "A l'égard de quelles personnes, en quelles occasions et dans quelles habitus l'on est obligé, c'est ce que sera évident quand nous aurons défini cette passion." Franz Sieveke¹¹ offers: "Wem gegenüber man Freundlichkeit (Wohllollen, Gunst) erweist und wofür bzw. in welcher Disposition, das wird klar, wenn der Begriff 'Freundlichkeit' definiert ist." So too the Loeb version¹² has "benevolence"; the Span-

⁶ Kennedy 1991 149, 151.

⁷ Cope 1877 87.

⁸ Tovar 1953 115.

⁹ Lawson-Tancred 1991 111.

¹⁰ DuFour 1960 80.

¹¹ Sieveke 1980 [3rd. ed. 1989] 108.

¹² Freese 1926 221.

ish translation by Bernabé¹³ offers “Con quiénes tenemos generosidad...,” and the still more recent one by Ramírez Trejo¹⁴ gives “Y a quienes hacer un favor...” And so on.

Nor is this interpretation of the subject of chapter seven of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* a novelty. While I have not yet examined every translation ever produced (the number is very large, and many are difficult to obtain), it is clear that the modern consensus began at least as early as the Renaissance.¹⁵ For example, Ermolao Barbaro, in his translation published in Basel in 1545, has (387): “quibus hominibus, et quibus in rebus gratia fieri videatur, et quo pacto affecti sint qui gratiam faciunt, ex definitione eius rei aperte constabit. Gratia est res, qua is qui facit et collocat gratiam, dicitur obsequi precibus, indigentiae alicuius, non reddendae vicissitudinis causa, aut gratiae referendae, sed gratuito.” The commentary, which was provided by Daniel Barbaro, worries at the fact that in defining gratia or *charis*, Aristotle includes the *definiendum* in the definition (426); but he rescues Aristotle from this elementary logical error by noting that “*aliud enim significat Gratia quae definitur, aliud Gratia quae in definitione ponitur. nam prior absolute beneficium non significat, ut posterior, sed beneficium quod gratia illius fit, in quem confertur. reliqua sunt facilia.*” Clearly this distinction is contrived, though Barbaro was right to identify a problem here.

So too Theodore Goulston, in his edition and translation of 1619 (p. 110), which was frequently reprinted (see Erickson’s catalogue), provides the chapter title “*De gratia seu Gratificandi affectu,*” and renders the first sentence:

Quibus autem Gratiam praebeant homines, et in Quibus rebus, et Quomodo ipsi se habentes, cum definiverimus gratiam, perspicuum fuerit: Sit igitur Gratia, per quam is, qui rem possidet, dicitur gratiam exhibere ei, qui indiget; non pro ulla re accepta, neque ut quicquam omnino referatur ipsi qui exhibet, se ut illi soli, cui exhibetur, contingat bonum.

¹³ Bernabé 1998 166.

¹⁴ Ramírez Trejo 2002 90.

¹⁵ What survives of the 7th-century Byzantine commentary by Stephanus of Alexandria (Rabe 1896) does not treat this section of the *Rhetoric*, nor do two fragmentary commentaries or paraphrases, also edited by Rabe. The anonymous Byzantine commentary, or rather scholia, to the *Rhetoric* begin with the definition of *kharis* (108.9 Rabe), thus skipping the crucial introductory sentence in Aristotle; for the rest, the comments deal exclusively with *kharis* rather than *kharin ekhein*.

The chapter concludes (p. 111): “*Ac de conferenda quidem Gratia, et non conferenda dictum est.*” The sense of the phrases “*gratiam praebere*” and “*gratiam conferre*” is evident from “*gratificor*” in the chapter rubric.

Such, then, is the consensus. It is, however, wrong. The emotion discussed in chapter seven of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is not kindness, kindness, benevolence, “favor,” “obligance,” “Freundlichkeit,” “Wohll wollen,” “beneficium,” “se obsequia”,¹⁶ or anything of the kind. Kindness is not an emotion for Aristotle, and it should be expunged from all lists of the Aristotelian *pathê* without further ado, to be replaced throughout by gratitude, the emotion that Aristotle in fact examines in this chapter. Or at least such is the argument I am about to defend.

There is no other way to proceed than by a close scrutiny of Aristotle’s text. It begins as follows:

τίσιν δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, ὁρισμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται.

Those toward whom people have *kharis* and in what circumstances [or for what things] and how they themselves are disposed, will be clear when we have defined *kharis*.

What does “having *kharis*”—*kharin ekhein*—mean? It means to feel gratitude, and only that (in Aristotle, e.g. *Rhetoric* 1374a23).¹⁷ It never means to show favor toward someone, be kindly, do a service, or anything of the sort. Never: not anywhere else in Greek literature, and not here. The way to say “do a favor” in Greek is *kharin pherein*, *tithesthai*, etc., or with the verb *kharizesthai*. By way of illustration, here is Plutarch’s account of Cato’s response to Lucius Caesar’s offer to intercede in his behalf with Julius Caesar (*Cato Minor* 66.2):

If I wished to be saved by the benefaction [*kharis*] of Caesar, I should approach him myself. But I do not wish to owe gratitude [*kharin ekhein*] to a tyrant for something in which he violates the law, and he violates the law by saving me as my master, though it is not right for him to have despotic power

ἐμοὶ γὰρ ... εἰ σῶζεσθαι χάριτι Καίσαρος ἐβουλόμην, αὐτῷ βαδιστέον ἦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον μόνον. οὐ βούλομαι δὲ τῷ τυράννῳ χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ὃν παρανομεῖ· παρανομεῖ δὲ σφύζων ὥς κύριος, ὃν αὐτῷ δεσπόζειν οὐδὲν προσῆκεν.

In the first use, *χάρις* means “saved by Caesar’s grace,” in the second, it means “gratitude.”

¹⁶ In the Portuguese version of Fonseca 2000 49, 53.

¹⁷ It is otiose to cite examples, but simply for the record, cf. Herodas, *Mimiambi* 5.81: καὶ ἔχε τὴν χάριν ταύτην, which plainly means, “Be thankful to her”; also Plutarch, *De audiendis* 42C6.

Aristotle next offers a definition of the term *kharis*, on the basis of which, as he says, the significance of *kharin ekhein* will become manifest:

ἔστω δὴ χάρις, κατ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῷ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἄλλ' ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ.

Here, I expect, is the chief source of the misunderstanding of this chapter. It is true that, in several other chapters on emotions, Aristotle uses the formula ἔστω δὴ to introduce the definition of the *pathos* under consideration, for example in the case of anger (1378a31), love (*philein*, 1380b35), fear (1382a21), shame (1383b13), pity (1385b13), varying it in the final three cases of indignation, envy, and emulousness with the expressions *ei gar esti* (1387a8–9, 1388a30) for the first and last and *eiper estin* (1387b22) for *phthonos*. In chapter seven, however, Aristotle offers a definition not of the emotion itself, that is, gratitude, which is signified in Greek by the compound expression χάριν ἔχειν, but of the constituent term χάρις. It is not difficult to see why, if we translate correctly. Roberts offers the following, which is fairly representative of the general run of translations: “Kindness—under the influence of which a man is said to be kind—may be defined as helpfulness toward someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped.” The redundant and awkward formulation, “Kindness—under the influence of which a man is said to be kind,” is rather a lame attempt to escape the definitional problem signaled by Daniel Barbaro in his commentary of 1545.

Now my version:

Let “a benefaction,” then, in respect to which the one who has it [i.e., receives the benefaction] is said to feel gratitude, be a service to one who needs it, not in return for something, nor so that something should accrue to the one who does the service, but rather that it should accrue to the other.

As I understand it, Aristotle is here offering a punning explanation of how the phrase χάριν ἔχειν came to mean “feel gratitude”: one receives or has a favor (χάρις) from another, and in turn is said to feel or have gratitude (again, χάρις). Barbaro was right that the two uses of χάρις here are different; he failed, however, to recognize the force of the expression χάριν ἔχειν.¹⁸

¹⁸ For the use of κατὰ to explain the connection between χάρις and the phrase *kharin ekhein*, cf. *Categories* 1a12–15: παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς

The next few phrases expand on the conditions in which a favor is likely to inspire gratitude:

μεγάλη δὲ ἂν ᾗ σφόδρα δεόμενος, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα.

(The χάρις) is great if it is for someone in serious need, or in need of great or difficult things, or at a time that is such [i.e., urgent], or if he [who provides the service does so] alone or first or chiefly.

What is “great” here presumably refers to the service performed. Aristotle next specifies the nature of needs:

δείσεις δὲ εἰσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ἔρως, καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσιν καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος.

Needs are desires, and of these above all those that are accompanied by pain if it [i.e., the thing desired] is not realized. Cravings are desires of this sort, for example erotic passion, and those desires connected with bad states of the body and with danger: for in fact those who are in danger and in pain do crave [release].

Why does Aristotle concentrate here on need? According to the definition of a *pathos* that Aristotle offers in the *Rhetoric* (2.1, 1378a20–23), pain and pleasure are necessary components of an emotion. The pain entailed in the emotion of gratitude consists in an awareness of one’s own relative weakness or dependency in regard to one’s benefactor. Certainly, the pain associated with need has no relevance to feelings experienced by the benefactor.

Aristotle continues:

διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, καὶ μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεισεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς. ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω (text according to Kassel 1976).

Thus, people who stand by those in poverty or exile, even if they do a small service, yet because of the magnitude of the need and the urgency of the occasion, are pleasing [κεχαρισμένοι], like the man who gave the

καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Although Aristotle here defines paronymy in respect to changes in the termination of a word, the idea is easily transferred to a variation in expression. I am grateful to Rob Bolton for bringing this passage to my attention. Compare also the expression *aitian ekhein* in the sense of “be accused,” as opposed to *aitian epipherein*, etc., “impute a fault” (LSJ s.v. *aitia*; my thanks to Eckard Schütrumpf for this observation). Donald Russell suggests to me that *kath’ hên* here may specify the sense of χάρις according to which one who “has” it is grateful, that is, a disinterested service as opposed other senses of χάρις such as “grace” or “charm.”

mat in the Lyceum [the reference is unknown]. It is most necessary, then, to receive the service [ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν] in regard to these things, and if to not these, then to equal or greater things.

There are two points that invite elucidation. The first is the meaning of *κεχαρισμένοι*. Roberts, for example, translates: “Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us,” etc., associating the perfect participle with middle verb *χαρίσασθαι*, which uniquely means “do a favor,” “please,” “oblige” (examples in Aristotle: *Eth. Nic.* 1133a3–5, 1164b31–32; *Politics* 1263b5–6: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἢ δίοισιν). This interpretation favors the idea that kindness is the subject of this passage. However, it is highly dubious. The perfect participle is connected rather with the passive voice of the verb, and invariably bears the sense “pleasing” (over 50 occurrences in this sense in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; for Aristotle, cf. *Parts of Animals* 645a4–10), which puts the focus on the recipient’s attitude. The second point concerns the meaning of the phrase ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν. Again, Roberts translates: “The helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need,” which, while it rather fudges the Greek, suggests that ἔχειν bears the sense of “do” or “provide” a service. This yields an odd construction, rather like taking *ekhein kharin* in the sense of “do a favor.” Hence, I have preferred to render it “receive a service,” although certainly *lambanein* or *apolambanein* would be the more natural verb (cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.2.5, 2.2.14). I suspect that Aristotle may again be playing with the idea that “receiving a benefaction” (*tên kharin ekhein*) gave rise to the expression “feel gratitude” (*kharin ekhein*), and is here simply substituting ὑπουργίαν for *kharin*.

To continue:

ὥστε ἐπεὶ φανερόν καὶ οἷς καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἢ ὄντας ἢ γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ λύπῃ καὶ δεήσει, τοὺς δὲ ὑπερηγετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρεΐᾳ τοιοῦτον τι ἢ ὑπερηγετοῦντας.

Thus, since it is clear to whom and for what things *kharis* occurs, and how they are disposed, it is obvious that *kharis* must be elicited on the basis of the following: by showing that the one party either is or has been in pain and need of this sort, and that the other party has rendered or is rendering such a service in such necessity.

It is clear that the first clause—καὶ οἷς καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι—answers to the one with which the chapter begins: τίσιν

δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες.¹⁹ On my reading, then, *χάρις* here must be understood as “gratitude,” a perfectly natural sense of the term, rather than a “kindness” or “service”, the sense it bears in the subsequent definition (Roberts translates “kindness is shown”; for the meaning “gratitude” in Aristotle, cf. e.g. *Politics* 1334b40–42: ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις). The balance of the sentence, moreover, surely favors gratitude. Aristotle is offering advice on how to produce *kharis* in an audience. In actual courtroom situations, litigants often emphasize the benefactions they have bestowed on their fellow citizens or the polis, in an effort to elicit the jurors’ gratitude and make it clear that they have employed their wealth properly and for the public weal.²⁰ Rarely would one try to induce in an audience a sudden impulse to bestow a favor (acquittal and the like do not count as a *hupourgia*). So too, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* advises that “people are grateful [*kharin d’ekhousi*] to those, thanks to whom or whose friends, they believe that they or those they care for have experienced or are experiencing or will experience some good beyond what is due [*para to prosêkon*]” (34.2–3), whereas affection is stimulated by receiving what is in accord with desert.

Returning to Aristotle:

φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀχαρίστους· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρετήσαν (τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτε εἰδότες εἴτε μὴ· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀντί τινος, ὥστε οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀν εἴη χάρις.

It is clear too on what basis it is possible to diminish the *kharis* and render people *akharistoi*. Either [argue] that the one party is rendering or rendered the service for their own sake (this was said not to be a *kharis*), or that the service happened by chance or they were constrained to do it, or that they paid back rather than gave, whether knowingly or not: for either way, it is ‘in return for something’, and so would not thus be a *kharis*.

The three uses of *kharis* here clearly signify a favor or benefaction, since (among other things) the stipulation that it must be altruistic refers back to Aristotle’s definition of the term. The point, then, is that showing that an act does not meet the conditions for being a

¹⁹ Compare *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a23–24, where Aristotle sets out three aspects relevant to the discussion of any emotion: *pōs diakeimenoi* [*ekhousin*], *tisîn* and *epi poiois*.

²⁰ Cf. Fisher 2003.

kharis in this sense renders people *akharistoi*. The question is what this latter term implies. Roberts translates: “We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make our opponents appear unkind,” taking *akharistoi* to mean refusal to perform a genuinely selfless act of kindness, and this is the standard interpretation. The difficulty is that *akharistos* does not mean “unkind.” Rather, it means either “miserable,” “unpleasant,” or else “ungrateful.” For the former, we may cite Euripides’ *Medea* (chorus) 659–660: “May he die *akharistos* who does not honor his *philoî*” (ἀχάριστος ὅλοιθ’ ὅτῳ πάρεστιν μὴ φίλους τιμᾶν); so too, in Isocrates, *To Demonicus* 31.7–8 the adverb means something like “ungraciously” (μηδὲ τὰς χάριτας ἀχαρίστως χαριζόμενος, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ πολλοί). In Euripides, *Ion* 879–880, however, it may well mean “ungrateful”: “I shall not point out the *akharistoi* betrayers of the bed” (οὐκ ἀποδείξω λέκτρων προδότας ἀχαρίστους; cf. *Hecuba* 137, 254).

When Herodotus (5.91.15) speaks of the *akharistos dêmos* (καὶ ἔπειτα ποιήσαντες ταῦτα δῆμῳ ἀχαρίστῳ), the term clearly carries the sense of ungrateful (cf. Ar., *Wasps* 451). Perhaps the most telling instances in regard to Aristotle’s usage, however, are to be found in the works of Xenophon, where forms of the adjective and adverb occur twenty-three times, almost always in the sense of “ungrateful” (e.g. *Hellenica* 5.2.37 καὶ οἱ τε ἄλλοι προθύμως τῷ Τελευτία ὑπηρετοῦν, καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀχάριστος ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς ὑπουργοῦσί τι). Indeed, Xenophon is kind enough to provide us with a definition of the term. At *Memorabilia* 2.2.1., Socrates says:—“Tell me, son, do you know that some people are said to be *akharistoi*?”—“Indeed I do,” said the boy.—“And have you learned what they do that people call them by this name?”—“I have: when those who are well off and are able to repay a kindness [*kharin apodounai*] do not repay it, this is what people call them.”—“Ought we, then, to list those who are *akharistoi* among unjust people?”—“I think we ought” (εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, οἷσθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλουμένους; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Καταμεμάθηκας οὖν τοὺς τί ποιοῦντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν; Ἐγὼ γ’, ἔφη: τοὺς γὰρ εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν δυνάμενοι χάριν ἀποδοῦναι μὴ ἀποδώσιν, ἀχαρίστου καλοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν δοκοῦσί σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκους καταλογίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀχαρίστους; Ἐμοιγε, ἔφη).²¹ Aristotle’s

²¹ For the noun ἀχαριστία and the verb ἀχαριστεῖν cf. 2.2.2–3; also 2.2.13–14, 2.6.19, 4.4.24; *Anabasis* 1.19.18.2, 7.6.24; *Cyropaedia* 1.2.7; *Agésilas* 11.3. For the sense “unpleasant,” see *Oeconomicus* 7.37, *Anabasis* 2.1.13, 2.3.18; for ἀχαριστεῖν in the sense, “not to indulge,” cf. Eryximachus in Plato, *Symposium* 186C τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν ὁ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν; *Republic* 411E2, where ἀχαριστία is paired

meaning, accordingly, is: “It is clear too on what basis it is possible to disparage the favor that has been rendered and make the recipients ungrateful [*akharistoi*].”

Aristotle continues:

καὶ περὶ ἀπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτόον· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ πότε ἢ ποῦ. σημεῖον δὲ εἰ ἐλάττων μὴ ὑπηρετήσαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταῦτά ἢ ἴσα ἢ μείζων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

One must also consider all the categories. For it is a *kharis* either because it is this particular thing or of such a quantity or sort, or at such a time or place. An indication of this is if they did not do a lesser service [when it was needed], and if they did the same things or equal or greater for one's enemies: for it is then obvious that what they did for us was not for our sake. Or if they knowingly did an unworthy service: for no one will confess to have needed what is unworthy.

There is no question but that *χάρις* here means a concrete favor or kindness rather than gratitude—though when Roberts translates, “as evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need,” etc., he is importing a reference to a disposition rather than an act, in accord with the supposition—erroneous, in my view—that *χάρις* in this passage denotes a *pathos*. Rather, Aristotle is showing how the description of a favor determines whether the response to it will be gratitude or not.

The chapter on *χάρις* concludes: “We have now finished discussing *to kharizesthai* and *akharistein*” (καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται 10–11). I have already cited Roberts' version of this sentence: “So much for kindness and unkindness.” Kennedy's²² is similar: “This finishes the discussion of being kindly and being unkindly.” For the first term, I prefer “doing favors” to “kindness” or “being kindly,” inasmuch as the latter terms once again introduce an unwarranted reference to a psychological state.²³ As for *akharistein*, the meaning must, I think, be “act ungratefully,” although it is just possible, I suppose, that it bears the sense of “begrudge” or “withhold,” as it does in Plato's *Symposium* 186C (cited above), where

with *arrythmia* and evidently means “gracelessness.” On *kharin apodounai* = “repay a favor,” cf. Isocrates 4.57; contrast *kharin prodounai* = “betray a kindness,” Euripides, *Heracleidae* 1036.

²² Kennedy 1991 151.

²³ Gohlke's 1959 “Über Dank und Undank is damit gehandelt” cannot be right in respect to *kharizesthai*; Gohlke's version presumably influences Sieveke 1989 109: “Das sei nun über die Erweisung von Dank und über das Undankbar-Sein gesagt.”

too it is contrasted with *kharizesthai*: τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἑκάστου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὃ ὄνομα τὸ ἱατρικόν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρόν τε καὶ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν; cf. LSJ s.v.). The Portuguese version of Fonseca²⁴ gets it right, in my view: “Relativamente ao fato de prestar favor e de não retribuí-lo, já tudo foi dito.”

Performing a kindness is not an emotion; neither is kindness, for that matter. If a favor were to be prompted by an emotion, the relevant *pathos* would be love or *philia*. The *pathê* in Aristotle are typically responses to the behavior of others, and more particularly to words or deeds that have consequences for the relative social standing or *doxa* of the parties involved. Gratitude is just such a state, since it depends on the need of the recipient in relation to the generosity of the benefactor. The awareness of one’s indebtedness to another triggers a painful sensation or *aisthêsis* that is an indispensable component of emotion, according to Aristotle. For the ancients, gratitude was a powerful and innate sentiment. Cicero says in regard to children, whom he takes to be a mirror of mankind: “What a memory they have for those who have deserved well of them, what a passion to pay back a favor!”²⁵

Since gratitude is elicited by a service, it is no wonder that Aristotle’s discussion of it focuses largely on what a service or χάρις consists in. He is at pains as well to bring out the connection in Greek between the term for a favor and the expression meaning “be grateful,” that is, *kharin ekhein*. To do a favor (*kharizesthai*) puts the recipient in one’s debt. So too, the English word “oblige” means both to indulge and to put someone under obligation; in return for a service, we say “much obliged” (cf. Portuguese “obrigado” = “thank you”). This accounts for why Aristotle summarizes the content of his chapter on gratitude by referring both to the act of generosity (*kharizesthai*) and the response of gratitude, or rather, in light of his concluding remarks on how to belittle favors, ingratitude.

Here I rest my case. If it is convincing, then we must revise the list of basic emotions that Aristotle treats in the *Rhetoric*, expelling benevolence or kindness, which never did sound much like an emotion (how is it different from *eunoia* or good will?) and inserting gratitude in its place—an emotion that has otherwise been conspicuously lacking in a treatise devoted to rhetoric.²⁶

²⁴ Fonseca 2000 53.

²⁵ Cic. *Fin.* 5.22.61 *quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas*; cf. Barton 2001 11.

²⁶ This paper is the basis of the chapter on gratitude in Konstan 2006.

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